Military Jargon Research Articles

Sketch-Thru-Plan

Speaking military jargon, users can create labels and draw symbols to position objects on digitized maps.

“Now there is a real effort to make sure people are adhering to orders they are supposed to be adhering to.”

It is widely regarded that war journalism is centred on the dichotomy good/evil, with “good” being (almost always) on the author’s side, who promotes a type of discourse that readers should adhere to. In this paper, we put forward an examination of events in various conflict areas (Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Senegal, and Dagestan) in order to identify and analyse linguistic strategies employed by journalists in order to construct attitudes. We refer to such strategies as: stance-taking patterns, source identification, use of military jargon, and inculcation of a politically-correct way of thinking. In order to carry out this analysis, we selected ten articles from representative American daily newspapers reporting on conflictive events. The data were gathered starting from the idea of simultaneity of opinions and of events. This feature allows our analysis to focus on recurrent patterns in the articles.

Military Jargon in the Slovenian Translation of Hostile Waters

The article examines Slovenian translations of military jargon in the non-fiction novel Hostile Waters. In the introductory part, jargon is presented as a linguistic category as well as its main features in the novel. Next, select examples from the original text are compared to their Slovenian equivalents. The focus is on collocations and lexically dense nominal phrases. The comparison finds that most translation shifts in the target text occur because of incorrect interpretation of technical jargon expressions in the original. As a result, the target text reader perceives certain situations differently than the source text reader.

Cheering American Casualties? Avatar and the Global War on Terror

This essay explains the surprising ways in which Avatar (the top-grossing film of all time in the U.S. and worldwide) shows the pervasive influence of the so-called Global War on Terror; rearranges prevailing American assumptions about good guys and bad guys; positions an American military-industrial complex as the film’s source of malefactors; uses post-9/11 visual rhetoric to indicate that the film’s American military personnel are themselves effectively terrorists; and prompts audience members to cheer when American military personnel are killed in the film (a remarkable feat for a major American film released and re-released while real U.S. military personnel were dying in real wars). Although Avatar features private military contractors rather than active-duty U.S. military personnel, the film’s use of military jargon, rank structure, uniforms, and materiel encourages audiences to disregard the distinction, as do frequent references to protagonist Jake Sully as a U.S. Marine when in fact he is a paraplegic former Marine. This essay also analyzes important shots in Avatar to explain their powerful post-9/11 visual rhetoric; explains how such images relate directly to famous images from the real 9/11 terrorist attacks; and thus situates Avatar within a larger field of action films that employ post-9/11 visual rhetoric.

Surveillance in Suburbia

Value By Cheryl Pagurek Patrick Mikhail Gallery Ottawa, Canada January 6-February 8, 2010 High Value Targets, a multimedia exhibition by Canadian artist Cheryl Pagurek, employed a diptych format to present contemporary military surveillance and war imagery from the Middle East juxtaposed with domestic scenes of a lush urban backyard to convey a disquieting sense of unease and underlying tension in the family life of middle-class North America. Pagurek's exhibition raised questions about personal and public security and vulnerability. As she noted in her artist's statement, work opens up a space to contemplate the myriad ways in which we, as individuals, might feel under siege in today's world. The artist's understated disclosure about the source of the military content (1) consisting of video footage and stills from the war in Iraq dating predominantly from 2007 and 2008 (2)--allows it to be read as a symbol of threat and surveillance of our time rather than a specific reference. The soundtrack of Pagurek's dual-channel video, Growing Pains (2009), combined everyday domestic sounds with the aggressive noise of armed conflict, and provided an intentionally disturbing-ambience in which to view her series of five large digital prints, High Value Targets (2009). (3) Pagurek's sinister title High Value Targets was derived from U.S. military combat terminology refering to attack objectives. Each of the photographs' subtitles--They have wounded, Clear to engage, Good Missile, We've got a runner, and Follow my lead--is an example, of military jargon or command taken from her video and reflect the type of armed activity seen in one half of the print and by inference the potential for this activity in the seemingly tranquil urban environment depicted in the adjacent half. For example, Value Target 4: Good Missile, a vertical diptych, presents a verdant suburban Garden of Eden seen from above, abutting a grainy green aerial night-vision image of pale buildings surrounded by palm trees and a smoky green tail from a missile that has just, hit its target. Both parts of the diptych arc overlaid with viewfinder lines that center on the garden and conjure a sense of danger while also raising the spectre of civilian space as the objective of military assault. Value Target 2: We've got a runner, a horizontal dual-image print whose title refers to chasing an escaping person, contrasts a close-up photograph of tender green and red shoots pushing through the soil amid a tangle of last year's dead foliage with a military observation image. The garden--also a scene of surveillance--is superimposed with a circular viewfinder and is seen beside a grainy brown night-time aerial surveillance image matted in vivid green, depicting a barely discernable, ghostly-white human figure running just beyond the crosshairs. Pagurek's work conjures the possibility that our safe and protected neighborhoods might also become a place of surveillance and danger; it also allows us to dimly grasp the living conditions of civilians who experience war from the air. Pagurek's major work, the Growing Pains video, introduces the artist's other roles as parent and gardener. …

Vulgo apud nos (Aug. quaest. hept. 7, 56)

From an Augustinian text (quaest. hept. 7, 56) we can know how misleading can be the denomination “indirect Christianism”. Explaining the biblical idiomatism occurrere with dative, only Augustine records, as alternative to standard word occīdere, the verb alleuare, peculiar to military jargon, and compendiare with dative: that is explained as idiomatic vulgarism, which Augustine points out in his expression uulgo apud nos.

Not “War,” Not “Victory” Not Even “Deterrence”

It is no secret that most commentators on the recent events in Gaza are former and current senior military officials and journalists, who, in fact, are serving as unofficial spokespersons for Israel’s defense establishment. When they report on what is happening, or provide forecasts of what they believe will occur, they are still influenced by the accepted military thinking and resort to the use of accepted military jargon. They all regularly employ familiar terms such as “war,” “victory” and “deterrence.” However, in the case of the ongoing clash between the IDF, Hamas and other Palestinian organizations in Gaza and the West Bank, traditional military thinking and the use of these terms is inappropriate.

Cold War, Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico, 1955–1975

Marcos Cueto is a medical historian who describes the details of malaria eradication efforts in Mexico in the context of the Cold War era authoritarianism. His approach works overall, but occasionally he overreaches. Mr. Cueto asserts that the politics of the time allowed the medical community to be similarly authoritarian in forcing malaria eradication to be the accepted strategy. He states that the political climate relied on fear-based tactics of spreading anxiety about the communist threat and that similar strategies were used to gain public support for the malaria eradication effort, incorporating military jargon such as “enemy” mosquitoes and “campaigns” against disease into the public health lexicon. These campaigns included a propaganda arm in which pop stars became champions for the cause, to make the public sympathetic to their efforts. At one point, the author likens the strategy of screening persons for asymptomatic malaria parasitemia to the 1950s McCarthy-style witch hunts for hidden communists—stretching the analogy beyond tolerable limits. A recurring theme in the book is Mr. Cueto’s skepticism of new technologies, especially those introduced by other (non-Mexican) national or international organizations.He disparages the adoption of chloroquine, DDT, and smear microscopy as “magic bullet” strategies, claiming they distracted from rather than enhanced control efforts. He suggests that current efforts, which tout the use of long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets and artemisinin-based combination therapy, are similarly flawed. He never really articulates proven alternatives to the adoption of new technologies, but he vaguely suggests relying on community-based broad public health programs at the grassroots level. I found the tone of the book a bit cynical and fatalistic. I got the impression that Mr. Cueto believes that all individuals and organizations attempting malaria eradication were doing so not for its own sake but rather as a front for other agendas such as centralizing national power in Mexico, furthering the international interests of capitalist countries, or personal glory. The author uses the fact that the eradication effort failed to support his contention that it was probably a bad idea in the first place. Fast forward to today when there is a renewed interest in malaria control efforts. Witness the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; the President’s Malaria Initiative; and pop stars such as Bono championing the cause, including the possibility of eradication. Sounds familiar. In light of the current progress of malaria control efforts in Mexico, where most states are now malaria free and the total number of cases has been steadily decreasing, Mexico is well on its way to achieving those original eradication goals. Thus, whether you agree with the author’s politics or not, if you are considering getting into the business of malaria eradication, you could benefit by reviewing this very detailed historical account of a malaria eradication effort that was unsuccessful.

Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low Intensity Conflict?The Israeli Case

The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward intrastate conflicts—known in military jargon as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)—pose a challenge to the nature of the interaction between the political and the military echelons in general and in Israel—where such a conflict has been a protracted reality since 2000—in particular. While, in these instances, political supremacy is maintained on institutional and formal levels, on the substantial level, which requires reliance on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political position is weakened and substantive civilian control is wanting. I characterize the interactions between the political and the military echelons in Israel during the last half-decade as a "discourse space" imbued with military content and characterized by a blurred political directive. The concept of "epistemic authority" is borrowed from the field of social psychology. Showing how Israel's military echelon has become an "epistemic authority" with regard to the confrontation with the Palestinians, in the eyes of both the general public and the political echelon in Israel, is elucidated through both the nature of the political-military interaction during this period and the weakness of civilian control of the military. The operations launched by the Israeli military, according to its own interpretation of the politicians' intentions and following its newly developed knowledge, helped shape the conflict environment and were perceived by politicians and by most of the Israeli public as justified. The military's hegemonic role in the conflict, in its turn, resulted from the inherent weakness of political control of the military and, at the same time, was a fresh indication of it. The weakness of civilian control of the military in this period suggests that political thinking in Israel is inadequate and attests to the threat to both the supremacy of its civilian sphere and the delimitation of the military's influence over its politics.

Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low Intensity Conflict \-\- The Israeli Case

The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward intrastate conflicts—known in military jargon as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)—pose a challenge to the nature of the interaction between the political and the military echelons in general and in Israel—where such a conflict has been a protracted reality since 2000—in particular. While, in these instances, political supremacy is maintained on institutional and formal levels, on the substantial level, which requires reliance on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political position is weakened and substantive civilian control is wanting. I characterize the interactions between the political and the military echelons in Israel during the last half-decade as a "discourse space" imbued with military content and characterized by a blurred political directive. The concept of "epistemic authority" is borrowed from the field of social psychology. Showing how Israel's military echelon has become an "epistemic authority" with regard to the confrontation with the Palestinians, in the eyes of both the general public and the political echelon in Israel, is elucidated through both the nature of the political-military interaction during this period and the weakness of civilian control of the military. The operations launched by the Israeli military, according to its own interpretation of the politicians' intentions and following its newly developed knowledge, helped shape the conflict environment and were perceived by politicians and by most of the Israeli public as justified. The military's hegemonic role in the conflict, in its turn, resulted from the inherent weakness of political control of the military and, at the same time, was a fresh indication of it. The weakness of civilian control of the military in this period suggests that political thinking in Israel is inadequate and attests to the threat to both the supremacy of its civilian sphere and the delimitation of the military's influence over its politics.

Covering the Iraqi Insurgency

Journalists covering war and fractured peace in Iraq have had to grope for facts in a fog of broken telephone networks, tribal politics, military jargon, and a seething rumour mill. The result has not been a cool, definitive analysis of conflict (that will be a job for historians in future), but a very current, patchy composite of fighting, peacemaking, small victories, and large policy reversals as well as blood, sweat, tears, and tragedy. This war has arguably been covered more completely, by more journalists, than any in modern history.Over time, our reporting has yielded a big picture, like slow reveal of a photographic print in a bath of developer. But as details merged into a whole, a crucial blank spot appeared. There was, and is, very little information about what's become known as the insurgency. The ruthlessness of both its leaders and its fighters have made close contact too dangerous for everyone-obviously American military and Iraqi security forces, but also western and Arab reporters. Ultimately, it is this blank spot-the failure to see how strong insurgency would become, or to come to grips with its makeup-that most seriously threatens America's victory in Iraq, and Iraq's own long-term stability.Rereading my field notes, which date back to before war, I am reminded how slowly we all woke up to potential danger of sustained armed resistance. Consider this upbeat entry written in Baghdad not six months after fall of city. The first frenzy of looting (one of freedom's untidy features, according to US Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld) had abated, and deadly bombings had not yet begun in earnest.9 September 2003: American authorities and those Iraqi civil servants who have trickled back to work are reopening schools and hospitals. We don't report often that they have done a good job-but in this case they have. By dint of massive currency imports, they've even set up regular paydays.In Baghdad, Amarah and Kut grieving and complaining voices are still loudest: people who have lost family members, jobs and their place in a stable world; those who are afraid thieves will attack their homes and those who are simply outraged by American soldiers patrolling their country.But there's a descant to this chorus too, and it is just as important.It comes from people who are delighted with their new regular, and relatively generous, wages. The Coalition Provisional Authority (the American administration in Iraq led by Paul Bremer) is giving a regular salary to every government employee-and there are hundreds of thousands of them, many of them women.Female civil servants, nurses, and teachers have seen their pay (and buying power-in spite of inflation) rocket up. In some cases, they have had a hundred-fold increase, from three to three hundred dollars a month. In addition, markets are full of goods that have been unattainable for years because of sanctions.You should see head-high piles of satellite dishes stacked on sidewalk all along main shopping street in Mansour... Satellite TV-the link with world-was forbidden for so long. Now, it's first thing families want to buy.Then there are electrical appliances, medicine, and cosmetics too. People, especially women, are giddy with choice and opportunity.This is buying patience for American occupation. These people have no desire to see Islamists or former Sadaamites-all basically totalitarians-get control.I think peace is far from won, of course, but war on many fronts is over.Bustling markets, satellite TV, and optimistic women seduced me, that September day, into believing country might be settling down to rebuild its future. But in background, Iraq's violent history was resurfacing. A mere month later I covered one of very first riots in area that is now notorious as the Sunni triangle. …

Medical Aspects of Harsh Environments

The Office of the Surgeon General of the United States Army has created a remarkable 2-volume set that comprehensively covers the essentials of medical care in extreme environments. Produced by the Borden Institute, the Army's medical publishing division, Medical Aspects of Harsh Environments, Vols 1–2, features contributions from noted authorities, clear photographs and figures, and a thorough list of references at the end of each chapter. Both volumes have been skillfully edited by US Army physicians Dave Ed Lounsbury and Ronald F. Bellamy, and detailed scientific information is presented in a highly readable format. Although the volumes are part of the Textbooks of Military Medicine series, they would make a welcome addition to any medical library. Volume 1 is divided into two sections: Hot Environments and Cold Environments. Hot Environments includes chapters on the physiology of exercise in hot climates, the pathophysiology of heatstroke, and the prevention of heat illness. The chapter on clinical diagnosis, management, and surveillance of exertional heat illness is particularly informative and includes an excellent review of the controversies related to the treatment of heatstroke. Cold Environments includes chapters on physiological responses to cold stress and hypothermia, prevention of cold injuries, cold water immersion, and the treatment of accidental hypothermia. Readers with an interest in research will appreciate the discussions of hypothermia studies from the military literature, many of which are not mentioned in other texts. Volume 2 begins with a section on mountain medicine, including acute mountain sickness and high-altitude cerebral edema, high-altitude pulmonary edema, and human adaptation to altitude. The chapter on high-altitude pulmonary edema is particularly well written, although the effects of beta-agonists such as salmeterol are not mentioned. The authors, however, cannot be faulted for this omission because major studies of beta-agonists and high-altitude pulmonary edema were almost certainly published after the chapter had already gone to press. This volume also reviews topics that are not typically found in most texts of emergency or wilderness medicine. For example, in addition to chapters on diving medicine, the reader will find chapters on shipboard medicine, motion sickness, acceleration effects on fighter pilots, biological and chemical warfare, medical support of special forces, and military spaceflight. A unique feature of the text is the integration of cases from prior military engagements, including those dating to ancient times. The historical perspective provided for mountain medicine, hypothermia related to shipwrecks, freezing cold injury, and other topics makes for fascinating reading and in no way detracts from the scientific merits of the work. On the contrary, these historical cases are used as effective teaching tools and add interest to the material presented. The work is timely, given recent military and political events. At the time of this writing, US and other forces have been deployed to Iraq and continue to be present in Afghanistan. Both of these countries are known for harsh environments with temperature extremes, and Afghanistan has difficult, mountainous terrain. With patient populations in such diverse climates and conditions, these volumes should be a valuable resource for military medical personnel. This work will also appeal to an audience much broader than the military medical community, and the reader will not find an excess of military jargon. Although some sections may be extraneous, civilian medical personnel who care for patients in extreme conditions will find these volumes to be of great clinical value. Furthermore, the merits of this work are not confined to clinical utility. Anyone with an interest in the physiological effects of extreme environments and patient care in the outdoors could enjoy and learn from this text. In summary, this is an outstanding work that contributes greatly to the medical literature. The foreword, written by the Surgeon General of the Army, James B. Peake, promises a third volume with a focus on prevention and further historical perspective. One wonders whether experiences from recent military action in the Middle East will provide additional insight for this coming volume—an insight that could contribute to the further advancement of patient care in harsh environments.

The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-1947 (review)

Volume 9, No.1 Fall1990 101 become a network of single-purpose and multi-purpose "authorities" to do the business of the Jewish people as a whole in such a way that threatened neither the political sovereignty of the State of Israel nor the local loyalties of diaspora Jewish citizens of other states, but that is a story for the next volume . In the contemporary world, new diasporas are sprouting as a result of the recent revolutions in transportation and communication. The Jewish people is playing a pioneering role in the generation of appropriate forms of state-diaspora relations. Not the least of that role is in the development of institutional frameworks for such relations, of which JAFI is the prime example . We owe Dr. Stock a debt of gratitude for having so well advanced the exploration of this phenomenon. Daniel 1. Elazar Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and Bar-Ilan University The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-1947, by David A. Charters, foreword by General Sir Nigel Bagnall. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 287 pp. $45.00. This book dates back to the era of "counter-insurgency studies," that is, the 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, it originated in the first military history seminar offered at the University of New Brunswick in 1970-71 and was originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation in the War Studies Department , King's College, London, in 1980. It takes as its major theme Clausewitz 's famous dictum that "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesmen and commanders have to make is to establish ... the kind ofwar on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." With this focus, the author tries to discover how well the British army adapted to the new challenges of what he calls the "Palestine campaign," specifically the period between May 1945 and the British government's decision to withdraw from Palestine in September 1947. If campaign it was, and at its highpoint the British army, including the militarized Palestine Police and "imperial forces" such as the Transjordian Frontier Force, deployed over 100,000 men, not including naval elements blockading the coast, it was a campaign the British lost. In his conclusion, the author quotes Maurice Tugwell, a "Palestine Veteran" and later a historian , that "the Jews had the highest quality of terrorists the British army faced in the post-war period" (p. 176). If one removes the objectionable term 102 SHOFAR "terrorist" and includes these operations under the Israeli heading as the opening stages of the War of Liberation in which all the three resistance groups involved, the Haganah, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Lochmei Heruth Israel, participated as fighters, it becomes the first victorious operation conducted by the Israel Defence Forces, as they came to be known after May 1948. Still, this study is only marginally concerned with the insurgent groups, and among them more with the smaller, if more deadly, Irgun and the Lochmei Heruth Israel. Above all it focuses on actions taken and lessons learned on the British side, especially those that had applicability to later counter-insurgency operations in Malaya, Kenya, Aden, and the many other places from which the British retreated in the decades following World War II. Specifically the volume sets out to address two issues. The first is whether, and to what degree, the British army adapted to the problems created by the Jewish insurgency, and the second issue is how much the military operations contributed, in conjunction with the other security forces and governmental policies, including propaganda and intelligence activities, to the eventual outcome of this conflict. The questions and issues are discussed in six chapters. The first looks at the nature of insurgency, low-intensity conflict in the current military jargon, and its military and political implications. In the second chapter the political setting of the campaign is discussed, touching briefly on the place of Palestine in British Middle East policy, the history of the conflict between Jewish and Arab aspirations, and the desire of the British government to maintain a base...

Modern Idiom in an Ancient Context

Since the Second World War we have been subjected to a flood of memoirs and counter-memoirs by generals, admirals, air marshals, and politicians. One of the direct results of this is that our vocabulary has been increased—if not enriched—by a military jargon. Most of the latter's terms have in fact very specialized meanings, and if they are used out of their proper context they can present a highly coloured view of a rather simple situation. Can these terms be applied with validity to historical situations of antiquity ? At first sight there is an attraction in theirvery modernity, for they seem to give a freshness of approach; but Professor Salmon's use of them in his recent article, ‘The Strategy of the Second Punic War’, has made the dangers of their use manifestly clear. By his use of these anachronisms—for that is surely what they are—Professor Salmon has given nothing new in the way of interpretation, but merely provided confirmation of Oman's dictum ‘Historians may have the most divergent views according to their predispositions’, and has exaggerated the capabilities of both sides beyond belief.