Japan's Military Research Articles

Chapter Five: Japan's External Military Commitments

Is Japan on a path towards assuming a greater military role internationally, or has the recent military normalisation ground to a halt since the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi? In this book, Christopher W. Hughes assesses developments in defence expenditure, civil–military relations, domestic and international military–industrial complexes, Japan's procurement of regional and global power-projection capabilities, the expansion of US–Japan cooperation, and attitudes towards nuclear weapons, constitutional revision and the use of military force. In all of these areas, dynamic and long-term changes outweigh Japan's short-term political logjam over security policy. Hughes argues that many post-war constraints on Japan's military role are still eroding, and that Tokyo is moving towards a more assertive military role and strengthened US–Japan cooperation. Japan's remilitarisation will boost its international security role and the dominance of the US–Japan alliance in regional and global security affairs, but will need to be carefully managed if it is not to become a source of destabilising tensions.

Chapter Two: Japan's Military Doctrine, Expenditure and Power Projection

Is Japan on a path towards assuming a greater military role internationally, or has the recent military normalisation ground to a halt since the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi? In this book, Christopher W. Hughes assesses developments in defence expenditure, civil–military relations, domestic and international military–industrial complexes, Japan's procurement of regional and global power-projection capabilities, the expansion of US–Japan cooperation, and attitudes towards nuclear weapons, constitutional revision and the use of military force. In all of these areas, dynamic and long-term changes outweigh Japan's short-term political logjam over security policy. Hughes argues that many post-war constraints on Japan's military role are still eroding, and that Tokyo is moving towards a more assertive military role and strengthened US–Japan cooperation. Japan's remilitarisation will boost its international security role and the dominance of the US–Japan alliance in regional and global security affairs, but will need to be carefully managed if it is not to become a source of destabilising tensions.

Shielding the ‘Hot Gates’: Submarine Warfare and Japanese Naval Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond (1976–2006)

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security.

Normalizing Japan: politics, identity, and the evolution of security practice

Normalizing Japan seeks to answer the question of what future direction Japan's military policies are likely to take, by considering how policy has evolved since World War II, and what factors shaped this evolution. It argues that Japanese policy has not changed as much in recent years as many believe, and that future change also will be highly constrained by Japan's long-standing security identity, the central principle guiding Japanese policy over the past half-century. Oros' analysis is based on detailed exploration of three cases of policy evolution - restrictions on arms exports, the military use of outer space, and cooperation with the United States on missile defense - which shed light on other cases of policy change, such as Japan's deployment of its military to Iraq and elsewhere and its recent creation of a Ministry of Defense. More broadly, the book refines how ideational factors interact with domestic politics and international changes to create policy change.

Securing Japan: Tokyo's grand strategy and the future of East Asia

For the past sixty years, the U.S. government has assumed that Japan's security policies would reinforce American interests in Asia. The political and military profile of Asia is changing rapidly, however. Korea's nuclear program, China's rise, and the relative decline of U.S. power have commanded strategic review in Tokyo just as these matters have in Washington. What is the next step for Japan's security policy? Will confluence with U.S. interests-and the alliance-survive intact? Will the policy be transformed? Or will Japan become more autonomous? Richard J. Samuels demonstrates that over the last decade, a revisionist group of Japanese policymakers has consolidated power. The Koizumi government of the early 2000s took bold steps to position Japan's military to play a global security role. It left its successor, the Abe government, to further define and legitimate Japan's new grand strategy, a project well under way-and vigorously contested both at home and in the region. Securing Japan begins by tracing the history of Japan's grand strategy-from the Meiji rulers, who recognized the intimate connection between economic success and military advance, to the Konoye consensus that led to Japan's defeat in World War II and the postwar compact with the United States. Samuels shows how the ideological connections across these wars and agreements help explain today's debate. He then explores Japan's recent strategic choices, arguing that Japan will ultimately strike a balance between national strength and national autonomy, a position that will allow it to exist securely without being either too dependent on the United States or too vulnerable to threats from China. Samuels's insights into Japanese history, society, and politics have been honed over a distinguished career and enriched by interviews with policymakers and original archival research. Securing Japan is a definitive assessment of Japanese security policy and its implications for the future of East Asia.

The Tokugawa Bureaucracy and Urban Crises: A Revival of the Humanist Traditions of China and Japan in Ogyu Sorai's Political Writings

AbstractOgyu Sorai (1666–1728) is a Japanese Confucian scholar who formulated his political philosophy, honoring the benevolent Way of the ancient Chinese Sages. It was his firm conviction that the task of government is to bring peace to the people. This humanistic concern was indeed central to classical Confucianism before the rise of a bureaucratic empire like the Qin (221–206 bce). How then is it possible to account for this lofty idealization of early Chinese Confucianism and its relevance to Tokugawa Japan (1600–1868)? This paper explores how Sorai's pursuit of Chinese antiquity was pitted against Tokvgawa bureaucratic control in the Edo metropolis and how he celebrated the centrality of great human beings to the promotion of popular welfare. In this view, the institution of soceity rests ultimately on political personalities who govern the land virtuously, and not on enforcement of order by punishments. It is worth noting, however, that Sorai did not articulate this humanist position merely as a Sinologist. In his mind, the Confucian values of humane rulership and interpersonal and social ethics were conflated with the samurai ideals prior to the establishment of the centralized Tokugawa power structure. He was well acquainted with the mental prowess of Japan's military lords and with their commitment to the primacy of human potentialities in both the military and civil arts. Theoretically, the ideal drawn from the way of antiquity is decentralized rule, as samurai rulers were originally lords of their fiefs. The construction of a human order in autonomous regions is what Sorai considered to be essential to realizing a society where the people can enjoy peace and tranquility.

From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who Was Responsible?

ASIANPERSPECTIVE, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007, pp. 193-208. Document FROM MARCO POLO BRIDGE TO PEARL HARBOR: WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?* YomiuriShimbun WarResponsibilityReexamination Committee© The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006 Summary Why did Japan's military and government leaders trigger the Manchurian Incident and then launch the Sino-Japanese War? Why did the nation opt to go to war with the United States and continue to fight recklessly? Wasn't it possible to end the war before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? To find answers to these questions, we, the War Responsibili­ ty Reexamination Committee, an ad hoc in-house panel of the Yomiuri Shimbun, delved thoroughly into, combed through and examined historical developments during the period from the early 1930s to 1945. The Yomiuri Shimbun presented its readers with its findings of a yearlong "War Responsibility" series end­ ing on August 15, 2006, the 61st anniversary of the end of World War II. We comprehensively touch on Japan's mistakes commit­ ted at various key points from the Manchurian Incident to the Soviet Union's entry into a war with Japan and named those who should chiefly be held responsible for each event. We elaborate upon the accountability of those who were so deeply responsible * Excerpt from the book From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who Was Responsible?, this summary appears with permission and is copyright of The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006. For details on the book, visit The Daily Yomiuri Online at www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/info/book/. 194 Yomiuri Shimbun War ResponsibilityReexamination Committee and we summarize a host of historical lessons from which we should leave for the future generations to learn. The Yomiuri Shimbun decided to define the wars in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean as the "Showa War." This series of wars has been called the Great East War or the Second World War, the Pacific War, the 15-Year War, the Asia Pacific War or the Second World War. Each of these titles has some justifica­ tion, but they are not necessarily appropriate when considering factors such as the sense of resistance against certain ideologies, the period of the wars and the areas where fighting took place. Sino-Japanese War The starting point of the Showa War was the Manchurian Incident that took place in September 1931. It escalated to the Sino-Japanese War and finally led to the Pacific War. Manchuria is now known as Northeast China, where Japan gained an opportunity to establish a stronghold following its vic­ tory in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. As a result of that war, Japan acquired the Russian leasehold on Kwantung (Guandong) in the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula and the Russian rights to the South Manchurian Railway Company that ran between Changchun and Port Arthur (Lushun). To protect these new interests, Japan dispatched troops to southern Manchuria. From the very beginning of the troop deployment, the Imperial Japanese Army cherished an ambition—to control the whole of Manchuria. The Manchurian Incident took place as members of the Kwantung Army, a unit of the Imperial Japanese Army, blew up a section of the South Manchurian Railway in Liutiaohu (Lake Liutiao), outside Mukden (presently Shenyang). Taking control of Mukden in a single day, the army began advancing into Jilin Province beyond its original garrison area. The main instigators of the incident were Kanji Ishihara and Seishiro Itagaki, staff officers of the Army. At the core of Ishihara's militarist thinking was the pursuit of the "Final World War Theory" to determine the Number One country of the world in a war between Japan and the United States, which he considered to be the greatest nations of the Eastern and Western civilizations, respectively. From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor 195 He said," The nation could be in a state of war for even 20 years or 30 years if we have footholds all over China and fully use them." Shigeru Honjo, commander of the Kwantung Army, initial­ ly opposed sending troops to Jilin. But he eventually yielded to Itagaki's persistence and decided to give the go-ahead to the deployment. Senjuro Hayashi, Commander of the Korea Army, the Japanese forces in Korea...

Japan, 1936–1945: Fascism or Communism?

August 2006 marked the sixtieth anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II. It is usually said that Japan was dominated by ruling fascist capitalists and landowners who wanted war in order to secure access to colonial resources and markets. The actions of the Allies after the war, mostly led by the United States, stemmed from this belief, including such policies as taking land from the former owners and distributing it among farmers, and dismantling the zaibatsu cartels by taking the shares from the largescale capitalists and selling them. Recent research on the Japanese wartime economy, however, has cast doubt on this view. For the capitalists and landowners, peace and markets were far more profitable than war and colonial dominance. Japanese capitalists reaped great profits before the war, not from Japan's colonies, but from trade with the United States and Asia, especially with America- and British-owned companies that operated in and around Shanghai, and European colonies such as Singapore and Malaya. Japan's military incursions into povertystricken northeast China yielded little of value to Japanese capitalists. On the contrary, they had the adverse effects of restricting trade with the United States and the United Kingdom (and their colonies), and arousing anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Similarly, cheap grain imported from Japan's colonies did nothing to increase the profits of the large Japanese landowners, whose main source of profits came from exporting silk products to the United States. The military and the government bureaucrats regulated and controlled Japan's economy after the military took over the government in 1936. The policies they adopted are fascinating. First of all, workers' fights were substantially strengthened, with companies prohibited from firing or reducing the wages of their employees. At the same time, the profits and rights of the capitalists and landowners were greatly reduced. Dividend payments to the shareholders were restricted to an extremely low level, and companies were forced to name their presidents not from among the shareholders or the founding families, but from among the workers. Rent paid by tenant farmers and rental-property residents was set by fixed contracts, which could not be unilaterally broken by the landowners.

Whither Japan's Military Potential? The Nixon Administration's Stance on Japanese Defense Power

[W]e have an ambivalent view of Japan. On the one hand, it is regarded as a friendly and allied power in Asia that is not utilizing its resources to “do more” for our common security interests. On the other hand, there are residual fears that Japan may, in “doing more,” adopt courses of military preparedness and diplomatic action that are inimical to our interests.1

Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What It Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy

This article seeks to make sense of the policy debate on constitutional revision underway in Japan, to consider what international and domestic factors are driving the debate forward, to assess the range of proposals currently on the table, and to gauge the likelihood of actual constitutional change. Additionally, it considers how various forms of constitutional revision, if actually implemented, might affect Japan's military doctrines and capabilities; the extent of its alliance cooperation with the United States; its devotion of military capabilities to un operations; and the repercussions for Japan's regional relations in East Asia.

The Regional Command of the Commons: Japan's Military Power

Abstract Japan is traditionally viewed as a weak military power. When considered in light of Barry Posen's Command of the Commons model, Japan can be seen as a major power and of particular significance to East Asia. Japan has a “regional” command of the commons. In other words, Japan is predominant in the air, sea and space in East Asia and can use those areas at will against opponents. Japan's command of the commons rests on the power of its navy, which is one of the world's most modern and powerful, and its air force, which is competitive. From a regional perspective there is no competitor aside from the United States, which is an ally. Much of Japan's military power rests on the American alliance which provides technology and complimentary forces. This paper's contention has important policy implications. If Japan is powerful, then the United States should work to more closely integrate its military operations with those of Japan in order to leverage Japanese strength. Chinese reaction to date has not...

Softly, softly to Iraq: Removing the inverted commas from Japan's security contributions

This article considers the Japanese Government's decision to send self-defence force personnel to Iraq 'for humanitarian assistance' as a basis for examining the tensions between expectations and aspirations of Japan's security identity. The deployment presents us with an opportunity to examine prevailing assumptions about international security and what it means for Japan's international 'contributions'. The article seeks to explore the theoretical constructs and practical constraints which foster the tension between those who expect Japan's military capability to be equal to its economic status (that is, a 'normal power') and those who champion Japan's 'comprehensive security' position as a long-standing alternative security interpretation. The article acknowledges that while the deployment may well represent the very limits of constitutional interpretations of the famous Article 9 (or peace clause), it also presents an option which ought to withstand ongoing international and domestic pressures to revise the 1947 Constitution.

The Sinking of the Ehime Maru: The Interaction of Culture, Security Interests and Domestic Politics in an Alliance Crisis

The loss of life that resulted from the sinking of the fisheries training vessel Ehime Maru by the nuclear submarine USS Greeneville off Hawaii in February 2001 exemplifies the risks to United States–Japan alliance relations posed by US global military deployments. Following a pattern of incidents involving the US military in Japan itself, the collision violated Japanese expectations of benevolence from its stronger partner and put considerable pressure on the government to seek public apology and reassurance. This article examines the interplay of culture, national security interests and domestic politics in framing both perceptions and diplomacy during the crisis. While differences at both the cultural and security levels complicated diplomacy, asymmetry in the respective domestic political stakes, combined with overriding and largely congruent security interests, helped the United States to provide Japan with the requisite reassurance. After a decade of alliance drift, both Japan and the United States were determined to forestall defection by their alliance partner.

Introduction

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Japan's shifting security trajectory and policy system

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Japan's post-war security trajectory and policy system

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Japan's national security policy and capabilities

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Japan, regional cooperation, multilateral security and the ‘war on terror’

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Conclusion

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally

Forging a strengthened US–Japan alliance

Is Japan re-emerging as a ‘normal’, or even a great, military power in regional and global security affairs? This Adelphi Paper assesses the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy over the last decade, and the impact of a changing Japanese military posture on the stability of East Asia. The paper examines Japan's evolving security debate, set against the background of a shifting international environment and domestic policymaking system; the status of Japan's national military capabilities and constitutional prohibitions; post-Cold War developments in the US-Japan alliance; and Japan's role in multilateral regional security dialogue, UN PKO, and US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’. It concludes that Japan is undoubtedly moving along the trajectory of becoming a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated post-9/11. Japan is unlikely, though, to channel its military power through greatly different frameworks than at present. Japan will opt for the enhanced, and probably inextricable, integration of its military capabilities into the US-Japan alliance, rather than pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism. Japan's strengthened role as the defensive shield for the offensive sword of US power projection will only serve to bolster US military hegemony in East Asia and globally