Military Disaster Research Articles

The Soft Power Currencies of US Navy Hospital Ship Missions

The Tsunami in South-East Asia in 2004 prompted the largest military disaster response in history. Encouraged by the success, increasing attention has been paid to the various humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities conducted by US armed forces. Since 2006, the US Navy deploys one of its two large hospital ships in annual missions to either Central and South America or the Asia-Pacific region to provide people in need with free care. These missions offer many opportunities to increase the soft power capital of the United States by forging ties with host nation governments and improving the image of the United States within the local population. However, this article argues that we need more research on the impact of humanitarian assistance to justify a continuation in a fiscally constrained environment.

Evaluation of POCT technique application in medical treatment of military operations and disasters

Point of care testing（POCT）is undergoing tremendous change in recent years driven by biotechnology and laboratory medicine.Attributed to its high performance, rapidity, convenience and instantaneity, POCT has been widely used in more and more fields.In this article, the categories, principles and applications of POCT in current military operations, disasters and emergency responses are elaborated.Furthermore, the future development trends of military and emergency responses POCT are discussed.（Chin J Lab Med,2012,35:1057-1061） Key words: Point-of-care systems; Military medicine; Fiest aid; Evaluation studies

Bren Guns for China: The Origin and Impact of Sino-Canadian Relations, 1941–9

Prior to the Second World War official Sino-Canadian relations were virtually non-existent. Global military events of the early 1940s brought an abrupt change to this situation. In response to early Axis victories, Canada began to provide military support to China as a means of strengthening cohesion within the burgeoning anti-Axis alliance. It was in support of this policy that the Canadian government expanded its diplomatic relations with China. At a time of great crisis this Canadian effort served as a geostrategic manoeuvre of benefit to larger powers. It was begun largely as a result of US pressure emanating from inside the White House with the most dangerous manifestation being the reinforcement of Hong Kong. Although the global impact of this move was significant in late 1941, most notably in the Soviet Union, the resulting military disaster involved heavy loss of life. Despite defeat at Hong Kong, Canada continued to assist China with military aid. Once the United States was involved fully in the war, however, the long-term impact of Sino-Canadian association was of much less consequence than it was during the fall and winter of 1941–2.

Beth Quitslund, The Reformation in Rhyme: Sternhold, Hopkins and the English Metrical Psalter, 1547–1603The Reformation in Rhyme: Sternhold, Hopkins and the English Metrical Psalter, 1547–1603. Beth Quitslund. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. Pp. x+322.

<i>Beth Quitslund</i>, The Reformation in Rhyme: Sternhold, Hopkins and the English Metrical Psalter, 1547–1603<i>The Reformation in Rhyme: Sternhold, Hopkins and the English Metrical Psalter, 1547–1603</i>. Beth Quitslund. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. Pp. x+322.

Convoy Movement: Consideration of Turning Geometrics for Selected Vehicle Shapes

This research is aimed at facilitating the understanding of the restrictions of convoy movement with object shapes as they might apply to ground vehicles maneuvering in a theater-of-operations. Such a theater would include civilian or military disaster evacuation/relief and military security or logistics operations. The goal of the overarching study was first to identify routes for maximal throughput rate that will facilitate the maneuver of a convoy unit omnidirectionally (radially) to different localities at different elapsed times. The focus of this study was to characterize several models for physical boundary conditions. Having done so, they would be used to evaluate the passability of convoy vehicles through streets in an urban environment under different conditions of road geometry, especially at an intersection. Special cases are also evaluated to study the capability of the general models. Models for radius and length of curvature are also developed for different traffic geometrics such as intersections, curvature, and a circular island in an intersection. In all modeling approaches, detailed descriptions of the derivations are illustrated with numerical examples and figures. These road geometrics will help estimate the reduction of traffic speed for deployment of ground vehicles.

Visual Culture, Spectatorship and Humanitarian Disaster

This article examines the dialogic encounter between the spectator and the spectacle in the context of war crimes and humanitarian disasters (in this context, the Sri Lankan civil war) in Vanni Eli, a short film by a Sri Lankan Tamizh diasporic filmmaker Tamiliam Subhas. The narrative introduces us not only to the military disaster that is war but also to the humanitarian disasters effected through war. The article studies the role of the spectator who ‘witnesses’ the torture, and thus complicates the ethics of both the act of torture and the viewing of it. By looking closely at the ingenious ways of narrating torture the article argues that the creative representation of war and disaster implicates within its discourse not merely the participants and the victims of the war alone but also the ‘peripheral’ subjects like the mice (the film’s lead ‘actors’), and by extension, the spectators participating in the discursive construction of the victimized. Despite the symbolic disembodiment and effacement of the tortured, their suffering is recognized as a humanitarian disaster with the shared grammar of suffering common to all.1

Minority rights in post-war Iraq: An impending catastrophe?

Many commentators see Iraq as divided between Sunni, Shia and Kurds – and perhaps a few Turkmen. Nothing could be further from the truth. Iraq also has significant populations of Baha'is, Christians, Faili Kurds, Mandaeans, Palestinians, Shabak and Yezidis. Some of Iraq's minority groups have been present in the region for more than two millennia. But they now face the threat of eradication in or expulsion from their ancient homeland. Since 2006, the situation has deteriorated. To make matters worse, the international law of minority and group rights has largely developed in the context of the recent history of Europe, and, perhaps, has little to contribute to the situation in Iraq. This article asks what role, if any, can international law, notably the law of human rights, minority rights and group rights, play in resolving or mitigating conflict. This is especially the case when the underlying rationale of this law is so problematic. The structure of this article is as follows. I start with an overview of the various minority groups in Iraq. There is a common theme – things have got a lot worse since 2003. Next, I explore Iraq's statehood, that it is a recent construct, a product of British imperial ambition and cynicism. In fact, Mesopotamia, the territory of contemporary Iraq, was a Persian territory for many centuries until its conquest by militant Islam, its glorious role in the Golden Age of Islam (contemporaneous with Western Europe's dark ages) and incorporation into the Ottoman Empire. Third, I reflect on Britain's disastrous adventures in the region. Mesopotamia was the scene of Britain's greatest military disaster; but Britain has been responsible for the unceasing violence and persecution which characterizes modern Iraq. Fourth, I turn to a marvellous dream, a document of extraordinary cogency and unreality: Iraq's 1932 Declaration, on admission to the League of Nations. This document is a tragic mirage: an Iraq of respect for and enjoyment of its cosmopolitan diversity. It is significant that the only two occasions on which such a vision achieved a purchase in Mesopotamia were the short periods of Kemalist and communist rule. For Britain and the United States such a trajectory was utterly impermissible. Fifth, I turn to the fact that Iraq was one of the first members of the United Nations, and ratified all the relevant human rights instruments dealing with minority rights. Iraq was until the 1990s an assiduous participant in the UN human rights mechanisms, submitting periodical reports to the treaty bodies and submitting itself to interrogation in Geneva, followed by concluding observations and recommendations. This continued despite the eight years' war with Iran, the disastrous invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the long years of sanctions, blockade and continuous aerial attack, reminiscent of Britain's reliance on the Royal Air Force (RAF) during and after the Mandate. Finally, there is Iraq's 2005 Constitution, a joke version of the 1932 Declaration. At the same time, since 1999 Iraq has not engaged with the UN human rights mechanisms. My conclusion is not sanguine.

Military Nurses: Caring often Invisible and Unheralded

Every year nurses are honored nationally during one week in May, around Florence Nightingale’s birthday, May 12. Memorial Day in May is also a day in which Americans honor and remembers military members who have served or perished in service to our country. The military and nursing are inextricably connected. Let us also remember military nurses when we honor others who served in military war zones, humanitarian missions, and natural disasters.

Considérations concernant la fin du pouvoir des Petchénègues du Bas-Danube

Considerations on the end of the Pechenegs’ power at the Lower Danube. This study addresses the political and military context of the last great invasions of the North-Danube Pechenegs in the Byzantium Empire, from 1091 and 1122-1123 and their political and military consequences. Basic information was provided by a series of Byzantine chronicles such as those of Ioannes (John) Skylitzes, Ioannes (John) Zonaras, Ioannes (John) Kynnamos, Anna Comnena, Niketas Choniates and others, or Heimskringla of the Icelandic chronicler Snorri Sturluson. The Pechengs of Turanian race entered the Lower Danube in the 10th century, laid the bases of a large “steppe empire” – Patzinakia – bounded by the lower course of the Danube and Volga. Their invasions in Byzantium, started in the third decade of the 11th century, led to some gaps of the Byzantine rule on Thema Paristrion or Paradounavon, in 1046/ 1047-1053, 1059, 1072-1091. Defeated by a categorical manner by the Emperor Alexios I Comnenos, allied with the Cumans, at Lebunion, on April 29, 1091, the Pechenegs gave them the main place of military factor in the Lower Danube. Three decades later, with their military potential restored they take their last great invasion in the Byzantine Empire, advancing to Thracia (fall 1122). In the spring of 1123 they take are, however, crouched by the Byzantine forces commanded by Emperor Ioannes (John) II Comnenos, close to Berroe. The suffered military disaster caused the permanent end of their power at the Lower Danube.

Identification of post traumatic stress disorder and risk factors in military first responders 6 months after Wen Chuan earthquake in China

BackgroundMilitary personnel commonly serve as first responders to natural disasters. Our aim is to identify Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and determine risk in military responders to the Wen Chuan earthquake. MethodsAnalyses were carried out on 1056 of the 1125 soldiers enrolled. In addition to social demographic characteristics, the Davidson Trauma Scale (DTS) and an Earthquake exposure screening scale were administered. ResultsPTSD prevalence was 6.53% (69 cases). Logistic regression indicated that intensity of traumatic exposure (odds ratio 6.46, 95% CI 4.47–9.32, p<0.001), not having received psychological counseling (odds ratio 3.28, 95% CI 1.31–8.20, p<0.02) and regular drinking (odds ratio 2.42, 95% CI 1.04–5.62, p<0.05) were significant predictors of PTSD. Being a single-child, not being raised by both parents and regular smoking also independently predicted PTSD if intensity of earthquake traumatic exposure was not included in the model. LimitationsThe self-rated DTS was used to classify PTSD in this study and psychiatric co-morbidity outside of PTSD was not assessed in this sample. ConclusionPTSD is a concern for Military disaster responders; to identify those with high risk of developing PTSD would be important and beneficial.

Warlord: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874-1945 (review)

Reviewed by: Warlord: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874-1945 Raymond Callahan and David French Warlord: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874-1945. By Carlo D'Este. New York: Harper Collins, 2008. ISBN 978-0-06-057573-1. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Sources and selected bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 845. $39.95. When an author tackles the subject of Winston Churchill, one of the twentieth century's most closely examined figures, it becomes important to establish at the outset (at least for the serious historians among its readers) in what way the work differentiates itself from the ever-swelling number of books on the subject already crowding library shelves. Carlo D'Este, the talented author of several highly regarded studies of World War II campaigns as well as of biographies of Eisenhower and Patton, clearly understands this and, in an introductory "Note to Readers," tells them that he will focus on "Winston Churchill's military life." But Churchill's military career was quite brief – four years as a regular army cavalry subaltern (who spent as little time on regimental duties as he could) and, sixteen years later, five months in the trenches as a reserve lieutenant colonel commanding an infantry battalion. This might be material for an article but will not support a seven-hundred-page book. What D'Este in fact describes is Churchill's career during two world wars. But in those wars, Churchill's role was not "military." In 1914-15 he was a minister responsible for the Royal Navy and, as a member of what passed for a war cabinet under Asquith, for the formulation of Britain's war policy. In 1940-45, of course, he played a central role in the shaping of Britain's war policy as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. In both wars he was a civilian political leader responsible to Parliament, not a military leader, however often he appeared in uniform and however much he probed into tactical and logistical detail. (The tired trope "warlord," first used about Churchill three decades ago by Ronald Lewin, really needs to be retired.) To understand Churchill's career, it is necessary to grasp both the political world in which it was embedded and the social [End Page 621] structure from which those politics sprung – to grasp, in fact, the sweep of British history in Churchill's time. The politics of war in 1914-15, for instance, was strongly influenced by the atmosphere of the three crisis years in British political life preceding August 1914, something D'Este misses. It is clear that his research has led him deep into archives, but as his bibliography attests, not into the broader context of the war. A.J.P. Taylor's classic English History 1914-1945, to give but one striking example, is missing (as are many other significant titles). D'Este seems to have realized that the "military Churchill" was not a sturdy enough peg on which to hang his book and at times appears to be writing a full-scale biography, while at others he seems embarked on a history of the Anglo-American dimension of Churchill's Grand Alliance. But the original conceptual flaw continues to bedevil his efforts. He gets from 1922 to 1939 in one swift bound – omitting the politics of the Twenties and Thirties, which were the reason Churchill languished in the Wilderness in the 1930s. More importantly this treatment ignores as well the strategic legacy bequeathed to Churchill in May 1940 by the interwar years – the chain of dubious assumptions and bad decisions that were the precursor to military disaster in the Far East as well as the arguments and decisions (some of the early ones his own) that shaped the armed forces with which Churchill had to work in 1940-45. And when he does tackle Churchill as national war leader, he stays within the parameters established by Churchill's own very artful memoirs – which means that Britain's war in Asia, the war that mortally wounded the British Empire east of Suez, is almost completely neglected. Yet surely Churchill's role in a crucial episode in Britain's war-induced imperial decline deserves thorough...

Anatomy of a Military Disaster: The Fall of "Fortress Singapore" 1942

Anatomy of a Military Disaster:The Fall of "Fortress Singapore" 1942 Thomas S. Wilkins (bio) Singapore Diary: The Hidden Journal Of Captain R. M. Horner. Edited by Sally Moore McQuaid. Brimscombe, Port Stroud, U.K.: Spellmount, 2006. ISBN 1-86227-339-1. Illustrations. £20. Singapore Burning: Heroism and Surrender in World War II. By Colin Smith. London: Penguin Viking, 2005. ISBN 978-0-1410-1036-6. Maps. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 628. £25.00. The Battle for Singapore: the True Story of the Greatest Catastrophe of World War II. By Peter Thompson. London: Portrait, 2005. ISBN 978-0-7499-5099-6. Maps. Illustrations. Pp. 470. £9.99 (pb). Britain's Greatest Defeat: Singapore, 1942. By Alan Warren. New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006. ISBN 1-852-8532-8X. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 370. £16.99 (pb) The "Worst Disaster" Contrary to popular perception, the Pacific War (1941-45) actually opened with Japanese air operations against Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore. Ninety-five minutes before Japanese warplanes appeared over Pearl Harbor on 7 December [End Page 221] 1941, Britain had already been attacked in the Far East. Two days later the warships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, pride of the Royal Navy, had been sunk. In the land campaign that followed on the Malayan peninsula the Japanese inflicted such a reverse upon British imperial forces that their former prestige and self confidence never truly recovered. Thus, the psychological shock felt by the British after the fall of Singapore in 1942 paralleled that experienced by their American allies after their crushing defeats at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. Every conceivable reason has been advanced to explain the cause of the disaster. There is neither the space nor the necessity here to enumerate the full litany of factors that contributed to the Singapore debacle. It was, at the time, both the sheer unexpectedness and the magnitude of the defeat that stunned the British. The Japanese strike south (Nanshin) caught the complacent colonial overlords of Asia desperately unprepared. Many in the upper echelons misperceived Singapore island as an 'impregnable fortress' bristling with defenses. The Imperial Chiefs of Staff (COS), in a wildly optimistic assessment, expected this 'fortress' to withstand a siege of six months before expecting naval 'relief '. Moreover, weaned on a diet of Rudyard Kipling's 'white man's burden,' the British grievously underestimated their oriental foe, scorning Japan's martial prowess on the basis of ill-founded racist stereotypes. Some 80-120,000 troops surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February 1942 after the final battle for Singapore island.1 Not since Yorktown in 1781 had such a humiliation been experienced by British arms. Coming at a time of an almost unbroken series of setbacks in the war effort it caused morale in the home islands to plummet. The Beginning of the End of the British Empire? A story during the battle for Singapore – perhaps apocryphal – tells of a British officer questioning a young Singaporean passerby as to the source of a great explosion in the distance. The Singaporean, knowing this blast to be the demolition of the vaunted Royal Navy base at Sembawang, replied laconically: 'That was the end of the British Empire'.2 The passerby was Lee Kuan Yew, future Prime Minister of an independent Singapore, and his comment reflects the moment Britain's status and credibility as ruler of much of Asia was exploded. It 'shattered mental images held for a century or more', according to Karl Hack and Kevin Blackburn.3 Henceforth, Richard Mead declares, the British 'would never be held in the same [End Page 222] respect again. If any event can be said to be the beginning of the end of the British Empire, it was this.'4 The significance of the event cannot therefore be overstated and its place in British military historiography almost rivals that of Pearl Harbor to the Americans. Thus, we find the all too familiar controversies surrounding the campaign, both historical and contemporary. For example, in place of painful self-reflection and objective assessment we contend with the profusion of various myths and acrimonious disputes, coupled with an ever shifting 'blame game' (which now continues on internet...

Of Note: Intelligent Reform?

Of Note:Intelligent Reform? Emma Ashburn In the run-up to 9/11, the U.S. government spent millions of dollars to reproduce information that agencies already had but refused to share with others. These efforts included building antennae aimed to intercept phone calls of suspected terrorists and setting up a satellite phone booth in Kandahar for eavesdropping on suspected terrorists.1 After 9/11, Congress created the office of the Director of National Intelligence to integrate intelligence collecting and analysis work, yet critics argue that nothing short of a change as drastic as the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act can reform such structural deficiencies. The lack of a unifying authority in the intelligence community was mirrored in U.S. combat operations before the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. several military disasters in the early 1980s prompted the passage of the act in 1986. These blunders resulted from the military's inability to coordinate planning, and included the botched 1980 rescue mission of U.S. hostages in Iran, the 1982 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, and the clumsy intervention in Grenada in 1983. Before 1986, the leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps were charged with forming and implementing an integrated defense policy, but were not forced to plan with other agencies, only to coordinate their plans.2 The Goldwater-Nichols Act, named for Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, created the Unified Command plan, which required different commands to command "jointly" together in the field. The four services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—must assign personnel to the joint combatant commander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has budgetary authority and speaks with the authority of the President in important matters. In addition, as a prerequisite for promotion, officers must serve tours in different commands, both regional and functional.3 Much like the pre-reform defense structure, the pre-9/11 intelligence community was set up to satisfy post-World War II and Cold War demands. Each intelligence agency had a specific function, with the expectation that the agency would produce narrowly focused, thorough research.4 The community's current configuration resembles that of the disjointed military framework before the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was at its highest levels a committee that could act only with the consensus of all of its members. [End Page 139] Inter-departmental rivalries and security fears lead to each agency acting in near-isolation. Serious reform is still needed to prevent additional terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, intelligence reform has proven to be more difficult to complete than military reform. One problem is that U.S. intelligence agencies are spread between pure intelligence functions and defense-related functions. In 2004, Robert Gates, now the head of the Department of Defense (DOD), wrote in a New York Times editorial that "more than 80% of foreign intelligence dollars are spent by agencies under the control of the Secretary of Defense," and went on to explain that since these agencies perform other functions in addition to intelligence, Defense officials would never agree to relinquish control to an intelligence "czar" in the white house.5 Observers have noted continued struggles over jurisdiction between the CIA and DOD. The Defense Department has continued to develop multi-million dollar information-gathering units as well as enter into the territory previously held by the CIA in terms of collecting "human intelligence," or intelligence collecting through interpersonal contact as opposed to through wiretapping or other data mining.6 Also in November 2005, the Pentagon issued a directive in which it asserted control over the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which are all part of DOD. Then Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte received criticism for not resisting the DOD assertion of authority.7 The problem of isolated intelligence gatherers has persisted even since the time of the Cold War. The writers of a 1969 CIA report lamented the fact that "US intelligence activities are to be conducted as a coordinated rather than an integrated effort."8 Different agencies and departments still require more drastic overhaul in order to solve the problems of not...

Operation Aftershock: The U.S. Military Disaster Response to the Yogyakarta Earthquake May through June 2006

The U.S. military has recently been involved in many humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions around the world. This newfound role is in response to the U.S. government's desire to use "medical diplomacy" rather than "military might" to shape its relationship with foreign governments. With each of these humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions, the U.S. military has learned how to more rapidly insert desperately needed services and skill sets into disaster-struck communities, how to arrange for in-country services (translation services, transportation, etc.) that cannot be readily brought in, and how to work closely with foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations to determine their needs and expectations without the U.S. military appearing as if it were trying to establish a permanent presence.

The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression

This paper analyses Manchuria's economic history between 1929 and 1936, as part of a larger project on the Great Depression's impact on China. Based on a new series for Manchurian GDP, 1924–1937, the paper advances four key arguments. First, early in the Depression, Manchuria's use of silver currency partially protected its economy from the global downturn, while creating serious problems for importers and Japanese-owned enterprises, resulting in a small net decline in GDP. Second, as elsewhere, the Depression's impact was deepest where cyclical effects were accompanied by structural change – here, the decline in the soybean trade. Third, output levels, especially in agriculture, declined most steeply in response to climatic and military disasters rather than economic shocks. Fourth, as in Japan, policies that were Keynesian in effect led to rapid growth of the modern sector, especially construction, and to the recovery of many sectors of Manchuria's economy from 1934–1935.

Cochrane on Communism: the influence of ideology on the search for evidence

asked why, despite their enormous potential, randomized trials were much less widely used that they should be. At the time that he was writing, their geographical distribution was very uneven. He wrote ‘If some such index as the number of RCTs per 1,000 doctors per year for all the countries of the world were worked out, and a map of the world shaded according to the level of the index, one would see the UK in black, and scattered black patches in Scandinavia, the USA, and a few other countries. The rest would be nearly white. It appears in general that it is Catholicism, Communism, and underdevelopment that appear to be against RCTs. In underdeveloped countries this can be understood but what have Catholicism and Communism against RCTs? ’ In this article, I will focus on Soviet communism. Cochrane had a strong commitment to social justice, commenting that ‘The difference in the medical care of the rich and the poor was sufficient to touch the hardest-hearted student in the 1930s.’ He memorably went on a demonstration in favour of the creation of a National Health Service holding a placard stating that ‘All effective treatment must be free’ but, as he recalled, ‘the only person who noticed it damned me for having Trotskyite tendencies’. His political views were shaped by his experiences in the 1930s. Between 1931 and 1934, he had been in Berlin and Vienna, where he observed the rise of Nazism. In 1936, he enlisted with the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. However, there he saw another aspect of authoritarianism in the atrocities committed by the communists against followers of other parties on the Republican side, as well as the incompetence of some of the Soviet commanders whose actions led to military disasters. 2 Len Crome, the senior medical officer in the Brigade, reported, in relation to the communists, that ‘Archie is hostile’ (J Tudor Hart, personal communication). Thus, it is clear that Cochrane was certainly no nao ¨ve observer of communism.

Between a River and a Mountain: The AFL-CIO and the Vietnam War by Edmund F. Wehrle

190 Michigan Historical Review unions offered security above all else. As the progressive arm of the Democrats from World War II through the late 1960s, the labor movement, centered especially in theMidwest and led by unions such as the United Auto Workers, continued its educational mission yet did so inways thatmoved farther away from Gompers's voluntarism. Sinyai's analysis of the changing meaning of civic education in the American labor movement rests primarily on the views of union leaders. Although references are made in places to the political behavior of specific unions, Sinyai's arguments would have benefited from greater attention to developments at the local union level. How did local unions' "schools of democracy" reflect the views of union leaders? How did the rank and file's political behaviors impact union leaders' views? Still, Sinyai's book offers an important perspective on the vital contributions of labor unions to American political culture. Wilson J.Warren, Department of History Western Michigan University Edmund F. Wehrle. Between a River and aMountain: TheAFL-CIO and the Vietnam War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005. Pp. 320. Bibliography. Drawing. Index. Notes. Photographs. Paper, $25.95. In Between a River and aMountain, Edmund F. Wehrle demonstrates that the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and later the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were deeply and integrally involved in the Vietnam War. The relationship between the American labor federations and Vietnam began shortly after the Second World War. The AFL saw its postwar mission in the world as advancing free trade unionism. Ideally, independent unions were advocates for worker and human rights. They were also proponents of full-employment pohcies and vigorously anticommunist. In other words, the AFL and later the AFL-CIO sought to recreate themselves around the world. Initially, the AFL's foreign-pohcy endeavors languished. But in the late 1940s, the United States government offered a helping hand. In a Faustian bargain that Wehrle states significantly weakened the AFL CIO in the long term, the federation took the money. In return, by the late 1950s the AFL-CIO had become an international force supporting anticommunist labor movements around the world and in particular in Vietnam. The AFL-CIO did not create the Vietnamese labor movement. Book Reviews 191 Its roots were in the 1920s when Vietnamese workers sought to fight oppression in the factories and colonialism at the same time. In the 1940s two Vietnamese union leaders?Tran Quoc Buu and Gilbert Jouan? forged the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVTC, later renamed the CVT). The CVTC and the CVT had a difficult relationship with the South Vietnamese government. Like the AFL and the AFL-CIO, the Vietnamese federation struggled to remain an independent "third force." Eventually its alliances with both the South Vietnamese dictators and the Americans compromised its position. Stuck between those forces, the CVT became "pinched between a river and amountain" (p. 4), and the Vietnamese labor movement ultimately failed to forestall the political, economic, and military disasters that subsequendy occurred in South Vietnam. Losing the war inVietnam also contributed to the downfall of the AFL-CIO, as George Meany's unmovable stance on the war shattered the United States labor movement. Between a River and aMountain is easily one of the best books that I have read in a long time. Wehrle's narrative is engaging and hvely, and his story is compelling. One would hope that more historians would follow the path that he has blazed and investigate the relationships between the United States labor movement and the world. Andrew E. Kersten University ofWisconsin-Green Bay David K. Wiggins, ed. Out of the Shadows: A Biographical History of African American Athletes. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2006. Pp. 500. Bibhographical essay. Index. Notes. Photographs. Cloth, $34.95. Out of the Shadows: A Biographical History of African American Athletes offers a welcome addition to the field of sports history. Respected historian David K. Wiggins has collected nineteen biographical essays that investigate how sports and sports figures have reflected racial struggles inAmerican society throughout the twentieth century. Among the well-crafted essays from awide array of sports scholars, readers will find familiar names, such...

'The Klopper Affair': Anglo-South African Relations and the Surrender of the Tobruk Garrison

The loss of the Tobruk garrison in June 1942 proved to be one of the worst military disasters suffered by the British Empire during the Second World War. Following the surrender of Singapore earlier that same year it represented something of a nadir in public confidence about how the war was being conducted. At the same time it also threatened the relationship between Britain and one of its Dominion wartime partners, the Union of South Africa. The considerable military force based at Tobruk had been commanded by a young and relatively inexperienced South African general and included an entire South African division. The decision to surrender these forces—over 30,000 men—after a siege lasting less than 48 hours led to allegations of cowardice and treachery. Winston Churchill meanwhile faced a parliamentary vote of confidence in his leadership. He ultimately had few problems restoring his position and proved adept at resisting calls for a public enquiry. With the subsequent victory at the final battle at E1 Alamein the affair quickly receded from the public attention. During the summer of 1942 the possibility had however existed of a serious and damaging rift developing within the Imperial alliance.

Cry Bloody Murder

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Tager, Decay. This version was based on his Russian original, published in 1933 and 1934. I have used the second revised version contained in Delo Beilisa: Tager, Tsarskaia Rossiia i Delo Beilisa. The Marxist orientation of Tager’s original version is somewhat muted in the shortened English version. 2. Tager, Decay, 48. 3. Ibid., 213. 4. Samuel, Blood Accusation, 166. 5. In Russian murder trials, the family had the right to legal representation on the prosecution team. 6. Samuel, Blood Accusation, 191. 7. Ibid., 216. 8. Ibid., 229. 9. Tager, Decay, 217. 10. Ibid., 218–19. The reference was to the Battle of the Tsushima Straits, which was a Russian military disaster suffered in the Russo‐Japanese War of 1904. 11. Samuel, Blood Accusation, 268. 12. Ibid., 225. 13. Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right‐Wing Politics in Imperial Russia, 55. 14. Ibid., 54. 15. See Langmuir, History, Religion and Antisemitism; idem, Toward a Definition of Antisemitism. 16. See the suggestively titled study of the Host desecration theme in Miri Rubin’s Gentile Tales. 17. Trachtenberg, The Devil and the Jews. See also Dundes, Blood Libel Legend. 18. Katsis, Krovavyi navet, 147. 19. Ibid., 227–29. 20. Ibid., 303. 21. Oboniatel’noe I osiazatel’noe otnoshenie evreev k krovi. 22. Mondry, “Is the End of Censorship in the Former Soviet Union a Good Thing?” 115. 23. 〈www.eastview.com/research‐collections〉. 24. See the still‐useful overview in Grimsted, Archives, 62–67. 25. Dela Beilisa Stenograficheskii otchet. 26. PadenieTsarskogo Rezhima. 27. Krasnyi arkhiv 44 (1931): 85–125; 54–55 (1932): 102–204. 28. Tager, Decay, 32–33, 93–94. 29. Samuel, Blood Accusation, 59. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJohn KlierJohn Klier is Corob Professor of Modern Jewish History in the Department of Hebrew & Jewish Studies, University College London. He is currently completing a book devoted to the anti‐Jewish pogroms in Russia of 1881–82.

A Proposed Model for Military Disaster Nursing

There is a dearth of literature examining models related to nursing disaster preparedness and response, particularly in military nursing. Several recent articles address lessons learned by nurses who worked through wars and disasters, and these experiences can be used as a basis for a proposed model of military disaster nursing. This article will (a) review the literature about disaster nursing, including general disaster responses by nurses, disaster responses in military nursing, and research about military nurses and disaster response, (b) describe the uniqueness of the military environment, and (c) propose a model for military disaster nursing that can be evaluated for future implementation. Research about individual nurse readiness for deployment during disasters is also incorporated into the proposed model. Future research is needed to test the model and examine its relevance to military, as well as civilian, nursing for future disasters.