Military Cyber Research Articles

Navigating uncharted waters: Legal challenges and the future of unmanned underwater vehicles in maritime military cyber operations

The evolving landscape of maritime security is increasingly shaped by the integration of cyber technologies into naval operations, posing complex legal challenges under international maritime law. This paper examines the 2016 Bowditch incident, in which a U.S. Navy Unmanned Underwater Vehicle was detained by the Chinese navy, as a case study for comprehending the legal implications of maritime military cyber operations. The research delves into the ambiguous legal standing of unmanned underwater vehicles and their activities, particularly within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Through a detailed analysis of the incident, this study identifies significant gaps in existing legal frameworks and advocates for the urgent need to augment international law to adequately address the emergence of cyber technologies in maritime military operations. The findings underscore the crucial role of international consensus in defining the legal status of unmanned maritime systems and the norms governing maritime military cyber operations, essential for upholding global maritime security and stability.

Arranging the Defence of the Cyber Environment as a Part of Military Affairs: Tactical, Operational and Strategic approach in retrospect of The Russian - Ukrainian War 2022

The artificial cyber environment has reached national security interest and emerged as the fourth domain of battle in the military concept of all-domain operations in most Western armed forces and coalitions in the past 30 years. Currently, militaries are struggling to keep up with cybercriminals and advanced persistent actors while trying to gain an advantage of their data and digital infrastructure. The paper focuses on military affairs' ways and means to address the need for cyber warriors operating in friendly, neutral, and hostile cyber environments integrated under Multi-Domain Operations. The paper uses design research methodology to create and test a model for cyber defence capabilities generation and utilisation. The theoretical reference to military affairs is based on Beer's Viable System Model and previous studies of military organisations' evolution as capability generators. The military and societal cyber environment evolution model is based on industrial revolutions and current tendencies. These approaches define a hypothetical model for two main functions of military affairs (force generation and utilisation) concerning cyber defence capabilities. The fast evolution of cyber threats sets unique requirements for cyber force utilisation and generation structures. This difference has culminated in a recent war between Russia and Ukraine, and data from that conflict is used to test the hypothetical model. The rapid evolution of the cyber environment and its weaponisation establish different requirements for military cyber capabilities compared to any other operational dimension or capability (space, air, land, or maritime). The difference is evident in sourcing resources, generating capabilities, and using them in Multi-Domain Operations. The paper provides a tested model for generating cyber defence capabilities at a strategic level and an operation model for cyber defence at a tactical and operational level. The designed model extends the technically oriented cybersecurity thinking with operational and strategic levels. Furthermore, the model introduces the value stream behind the cyber capability acquisition and supports strategic designers in national and military analysis.

Portuguese Military Cyber Human Resources Management

The Portuguese public sector institutions, including the Armed Forces, are facing increasing cost reductions due to budget cuts resulting from economic crises and the pandemic scenario. Although Lean thinking aims to reduce waste and improve customer satisfaction through continuous improvement, its implementation often faces challenges. The Portuguese Air Force was a pioneer in applying Lean methodology, achieving positive results in crucial areas, and extending this methodology to other Armed Forces institutions could contribute to better use of national resources. This paper explores the implementation of Lean philosophy in the Portuguese Armed Forces, specifically in the recruitment, integration, and retention of talent in Cyber Security. Centralizing and simplifying processes and resources, as well as resolving challenges inherent to the area, maybe the right approach to respond to the implications on National Security and Defense, providing necessary resources for the capture, training, and maintenance of essential Cyber teams and processes. The mentality based on work processes needs to change to speed up the use of resources and the behaviour of executing elements.

From code to command: Unveiling India’s cyberpower strategy

As cyberspace gets advanced, its significance has increased making it a key element of national power. In response to heightened cyber threats and vulnerabilities, states may seek to achieve their national objectives through digital means. As a result, strategic policies, dedicated organizations, collaborative cyber efforts, and similar initiatives seamlessly integrate into the state system. With this perspective in mind, this article explores both internal and external cyber threats, and the measures to mitigate them in India. The article will delve into three major themes- India’s domestic cybersecurity concerns, external digital threats, and its participations in global cyber affairs. As the article intends to focus chiefly on India’s digital strategic interests, it concentrates on the military cyber activities, cyber doctrines, command structure, and related areas. While the article also briefly discusses on India’s domestic efforts to combat cybercrime, it additionally examines India’s intentions to expand its role in global cyber affairs/politics.

Human-Centered AI in Military Cyber Operations

Military Cyber Operations are an integral part of modern warfare and national security strategies as they crossed the science fiction realm, represent a real operational battlefield, and developed into an option in military toolboxes. Seeing ongoing technological advancements that allow the creation and use of complex mechanisms and technologies, the increasing digitalization of critical infrastructure, the growing abundance of data collected, generated, and exchanged between multiple parties, and the rise of stakeholders engaging in building and/or executing military Cyber Operations together with the increased number of such operations being conducted all over the globe reflects important lessons that need to be learned: the core element of such operations are humans: they build, acquire, execute, and assess them while also being impacted entities by them, e.g., through (psychological or physical) injury or death, or damage or destructions of human infrastructure. Moreover, the key process governing all the life cycle phases of military Cyber Operations is human decision-making or humanly assisted/augmented decision-making relying on advanced intelligent methods built with AI. Nevertheless, building and conducting military Cyber Operations should be done in a legal, responsible, and effective way implying a deep understanding of the context and adversary, proper target and cyber weapon selection, development, and use, and a clear overview of potential effects produced. These represent important aspects that should be properly defined and tackled in this domain. Hence, this research aims to introduce the Human-Centred AI concept and approach in the military cyber domain to illustrate ways to prioritize human involvement and interaction, human understanding, effective decision-making, and ethical considerations when building and conducting military Cyber Operations. To this end, an extensive literature review is conducted in the military, cyber, and AI domains together with instantiation on military Cyber Operations.

Towards Trustworthy AI-based Military Cyber Operations

Within the dynamic realm of contemporary warfare, Artificial Intelligence (AI) emerges as a transformative force that reshapes the ways and means used to strategize, execute, and assess military operations. In this journey, the use of AI spans functions and capabilities like intelligence analysis, target engagement decision-making support, weapon autonomy, and effects analytics. Concurrently, AI enhances, e.g., the effectiveness of military plans and capabilities having the potential to reducing risks to civilians, civilian objects, and military personnel. In this rapidly evolving arena, military Cyber Operations gained unprecedented prominence due to their intrinsic digital and cross-domain nature, speed, and became a clear option to achieving military goals, and a mature set of alternatives to conventional ones. Nonetheless, they need continuous assessment, deal with different uncertainty types produced by characteristics like anonymity and can imply psychological impact. Hence, such military operations demand meticulous planning, sophisticated execution, and a deep understanding of technical, military-legal, ethical, and strategic implications and consequences. This represents a direct call for building solutions that align the potential of AI with the responsible and safe conduct of military operations in the military cyber domain: building trustworthy AI-based military Cyber Operations. While incipient efforts to tackle important dimensions of such an approach exist in this domain, a direct and unified approach that unifies them as a commitment and artefact lacks. To tackle this knowledge gap, this research aims to build a bridge between the above-mentioned dimensions by proposing a working definition and framework for building trustworthy AI-based military Cyber Operations using the Design Science Research methodology.

Cyber Operations in Peace and War: A Framework for Persistent Engagement

During 1990s, the concept of information warfare (IW) and information operations (including cyber operations, psychological operations, and electronic warfare) could be conducted with varying intensity across all stages of peace and conflict. At that time, many of the concepts related to cyber operations were still hypothetical. Subsequently, conflicts and competition between states have demonstrated the capabilities and limitations of cyber operations. Research emerging in 2022 by multiple authors demonstrate the limitations and usage of offensive cyber operations and maintaining a sustainable military cyber capability, as well as proposing alternative models for conflict in cyberspace. Alongside this, there has been increased attention on the impact of ICTs on international security and the responsible behaviour of nation-states in cyberspace. There is still ambiguity and different perspectives on the application of international law in cyberspace. This uncertainty disrupts the original models of IW and warfare, which assumed clear distinctions amongst the conflict stages. Both the discourse of ICTs in international security and recent conflict necessitate a reconsideration of the decades-old view of IW in times of peace, war and the grey zone in between. This paper proposes a framework for the roles of cyber operations across the stages of conflict based on contemporary perspectives on the utility of cyber operations as well as practical examples. In rethinking the IW model, a multidisciplinary view is required, considering the technical, legal, social and international security perspectives.

The Role of Civilian Cybersecurity Companies in Military Cyber Operations

Abstract The Russia-Ukraine war has clearly shown that critical infrastructures are prime targets for cyber operations in addition to the physical domain. In practice, in many cases, these critical infrastructures are protected by civilian cybersecurity companies in the context of a managed security service, so their defense operations must necessarily be coordinated with military defense activities. This includes among others the sharing of information classified under different classification systems (national, EU, NATO) between different actors in national cyber defense, the inclusion of appropriate civilian experts in the armed forces, and the usage of cutting-edge cybersecurity technologies (e.g. AI-enabled solutions) that are first introduced for civilian use, with military organizations only having access to them later or possibly not encountering them at all due to procurement difficulties. The main goal of this paper is to introduce the existing opportunities and obstacles to civilians’ involvement in military cyber operations in the areas of legislation, technology, and human resources from the European perspective. Moreover, the paper deals with the actual questions of cybersecurity intelligence sharing between civilian and military entities and the European Union’s actions in order to improve the overall cybersecurity posture of the region.

Regression Analysis of The National Cyber Security Index In The Southeast Asia Region

In the current era of the Industrial Revolution 4.0, information and communication technology is rapidly developing in all sectors. In the matrix of non-military defense implementation, technology is one of the dimensions that influence the achievement of a country's general defense policy. Technological development does not always have a positive impact. Cyber threats and attacks are an example of the negative impact in technological development. In the "Cyber Defense Guidelines," national cyber security is defined as all efforts to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and all its supporting facilities at the national level, which are cross-sectoral in nature. According to data from the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI) survey agency, a country's National Cyber Security Index (Y) is measured based on 12 indicators, including: cyber security policy development (X1), cyber threat analysis and information (X2), education and professional development (X3), contribution to global cyber security (X4), protection of digital services (X5), protection of essential services (X6), e-identification and trust services (X7), protection of personal data (X8), cyber incident response (X9), cyber crisis management (X10), fight against cybercrime (X11), and military cyber operations (X12). In this study, a regression analysis will be conducted on the 12 indicators of the National Cyber Security Index against the Total Assessment of the National Cyber Security Index (Y) in Southeast Asia, so that the type of equation in the regression analysis can be identified.

The challenges of military adaptation to the cyber domain: a case study of the Netherlands

ABSTRACT Whilst NATO speaks increasingly publicly about the military use of cyber operations, adaptation to the cyber domain has reportedly been challenging for most militaries. Little research has sought to understand the nature of these challenges. This study seeks to address this gap through a case study of the Netherlands. By utilizing a range of primary and secondary sources, this article reveals that the Dutch Defense Cyber Command has faced significant constraints in its adaptation to the cyber domain, primarily due to issues related to organizational structure, operational mandate, and the availability of skills and resources. A cyber command that lacks regular opportunities for day-to-day operations and where personnel may not have continuous learning opportunities to acquire and refine their skills will encounter difficulties in recruiting, training, and retaining a proficient workforce. These findings highlight the tendency of observers to mistakenly equate the mere establishment of a cyber command with the existence of a robust military cyber capability – namely, the ability to effectively carry out and sustain a range of cyber operations for tactical or strategic purposes.

White Hat, Black Hat, Slouch Hat: Could Australia’s Military Cyber Capability be Deployed Under Commonwealth Call-Out Powers?

In April 2016, then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull confirmed the existence of Australia’s offensive cyber capability. Said to constitute both a coordinating Information Warfare Division inside the Australian Army as well as dedicated cyberoffensive capability inside the Australian Signals Directorate, the unveiling of this capability was a watershed in Australian defence policy. Yet whilst the literature has briefly examined whether Australia’s cyberoffensive capability is congruous with international law, no such analysis under Australia’s domestic laws has been undertaken. This paper seeks to partially address this gap in the research by focusing on whether the Australian Defence Force could legally launch cyberattacks against domestic targets under Commonwealth call-out powers.

Dictatorial Psychopathological Commination in Server-Side Public Mental & Psychological Menace

Background: Communist formation introduced Marxist’s non-falsifiable anthropocentric theory for ideology and discourse. The form of communication sustaining torture has been noticed in the Chinese indoctrination both in education and mass communication. The research adopted scientific methods in observation to the Marxist structuralism with psychoanalysis of dominance in power-incentivized structuralism. Aim: With the global authoritarian drawbacks and emergence of dictatorship in the structural realist powers, the psychopathology of modern & contemporary cyber-based informatics penetrations with nuclear threat semantics is impacting global mental & psychological health, and especially for the LGBTQIA+ individuals. The research aims to mitigate the harms that transgress the Geneva Conventions and against the spirit of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Methods: The research adopted a media analysis approach to the sexological elements in anthropological and sociological developments. It focuses on the derivatives of Oedipus Complex with relation to death wish that impact the LGBTQIA+ suicidal ideations in the structured cybercrimes, with a Gestalt psychoanalysis in informatics. The research conceived a somatic method in media psychology counteracting the media-based extension of gender & sexuality castes. Results: The Bell curve of memory were retrieved on the fundamental hypothesis of LGBTQIA+ stigmatization with new combinations in power structure, cosmological, and anthropological consciousness re-combinations. The multilateral dictatorial semantic spread in the cyber-information domains through the monopolization of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was conceptualized as a structural source of dictatorial psychopathology epidemiology with artificial intelligence (AI). Military cyber psychological warfare spillover in the civil economy is recognized to be the source of global mental & psychological disparities, possibly the contributing factor for LGBTQIA+ suicidal ideation, and derogation of human security

Using Military Cyber Operations as a Deterrent

The Deterrence theory was formed after the World War II to describe the tensions between nuclear-armed states. Because of its origins, deterrence is mainly researched from the point of view of powerful states. However, deterrence nowadays is essential for any state to include in their strategies. The ever-increasing dependence on technology forces states to protect their sovereignty in cyberspace as well as in other domains. Cyber operations should be considered not just as a means to protect the cyber domain, but as means of deterrence. Cross domain deterrence (CDD) is a theory that includes all the warfighting domains in creating deterrence, including cyberspace. Despite these new perspectives, the use of military cyber operations as a deterrent has been studied mainly in terms of offensive strategies. Incorporating all types of military cyber operations into deterrence strategies is understudied. This study focuses on the possibilities of a small state to use cyber operations to create deterrence. The research question is: “How can a small state use cyber operations as a deterrent?” According to the Finnish understanding, cyber operations can be divided into three types: offensive, defensive and supportive operations. Using Finland as a case study, this paper argues that using military cyber operations is noteworthy for any state dependent on cyberspace, not only for military purposes, but for building CDD. The CDD theory and characteristics of cyber operations are studied in order to form better understanding of the topic and provide ideas for academic discussion. The research methods are content and SWOT analysis. The key observation presented is that each type of cyber operation has a role in forming CDD. For a small state, it´s profitable to use every type of cyber operations and thus expand the tool box for deterrence.

КІБЕРБЕЗПЕКА ЯК НАПРЯМОК ЗАХИСТУ ІНФОРМАЦІЙНОКОМУНІКАЦІЙНОГО СЕКТОРУ В СУЧАСНИХ УМОВАХ

Ensuring the protection of the information and communication sector is an important component in the country's economic growth and further progress. The issue of cyber security of the information and communication sector stands out as an important direction both at the international and at the state level. In times of war, cyber threats can have serious consequences, including financial losses, reputational damage, legal liabilities, and risks to both national security and individual sectors. It is analyzed the progress of Ukraine in cyber security based on such indicators as general security indicators, basic cyber security indicators, incident and crisis management indicators in the article. According to the Global ICT Regulatory Outlook, Ukraine ranks low in the regulation of the studied area – 78th out of 96 countries. However, Ukraine has made significant progress in cyber security, as highlighted by the Global Cyber Security Index. According to most of the general indicators, full implementation is highlighted, among the basic indicators there is a need to increase the protection of digital services, according to the indicators of incident and crisis management, military cyber operations and cyber crisis management are the least developed. Cyber threats can result in significant consequences during times of war, including financial loss, reputational damage, legal liabilities, and risks to national security. At the beginning of the war, more than 120 powerful cyber attacks on the resources of state authorities and military administration of Ukraine, as well as IT systems of critical infrastructure facilities, communication operators and mass media. Despite the positive developments, the country still faces challenges, especially in the area of protection of digital services, for which there is no competent supervisory authority. The need for cyber security in the information and communication sector and measures that can be taken to increase cyber resilience are highlighted, especially in the area of protection of digital services. Parties should cooperate with the government to improve cyber resilience. Cooperation may include sharing threat information, best practices, and resources, and coordinating incident response and recovery efforts. The issue of cyber defense of the economy in the conditions of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is gaining special relevance and is allocated to a separate direction of state policy.

The Determinants of Military Cyber Units

The Determinants of Military Cyber Units

An Outlook of Digital Twins in Offensive Military Cyber Operations

The outlook of military cyber operations is changing due to the prospects of data generation and accessibility, continuous technological advancements and their (public) availability, technological and human (inter)connections increase, plus the dynamism, needs, diverse nature, perspectives, and skills of experts involved in their planning, execution, and assessment phases respecting (inter)national aims, demands, and trends. Such operations are daily conducted and recently empowered by AI to reach or protect their targets and deal with the unintended effects produced through their engagement on them and/or collateral entities. However, these operations are governed and surrounded by different uncertainty levels e.g., intended effects prediction, consideration of effective alternatives, and understanding new dimensions of possible (strategic) future(s). Hence, the legality and ethicality of such operations should be assured; particularly, in Offensive Military Cyber Operations (OMCO), the agents involved in their design/deployment should consider, develop, and propose proper (intelligent) measures/methods. Such mechanisms can be built embedding intelligent techniques based on hardware, software, and communication data plus expert-knowledge through novel systems like digital twins. While digital twins find themselves in their infancy in military, cyber, and AI academic research and discourses, they started to show their modelling and simulation potential and effective real-time decision support in different industry applications. Nevertheless, this research aims to (i) understand what digital twins mean in OMCO context while embedding explainable AI and responsible AI perspectives, and (ii) capture challenges and benefits of their development. Accordingly, a multidisciplinary stance is considered through extensive review in the domains involved packaged in a design framework meant to assist the agents involved in their development and deployment.

An Outlook of Digital Twins in Offensive Military Cyber Operations

The outlook of military cyber operations is changing due to the prospects of data generation and accessibility, continuous technological advancements and their (public) availability, technological and human (inter)connections increase, plus the dynamism, needs, diverse nature, perspectives, and skills of experts involved in their planning, execution, and assessment phases respecting (inter)national aims, demands, and trends. Such operations are daily conducted and recently empowered by AI to reach or protect their targets and deal with the unintended effects produced through their engagement on them and/or collateral entities. However, these operations are governed and surrounded by different uncertainty levels e.g., intended effects prediction, consideration of effective alternatives, and understanding new dimensions of possible (strategic) future(s). Hence, the legality and ethicality of such operations should be assured; particularly, in Offensive Military Cyber Operations (OMCO), the agents involved in their design/deployment should consider, develop, and propose proper (intelligent) measures/methods. Such mechanisms can be built embedding intelligent techniques based on hardware, software, and communication data plus expert-knowledge through novel systems like digital twins. While digital twins find themselves in their infancy in military, cyber, and AI academic research and discourses, they started to show their modelling and simulation potential and effective real-time decision support in different industry applications. Nevertheless, this research aims to (i) understand what digital twins mean in OMCO context while embedding explainable AI and responsible AI perspectives, and (ii) capture challenges and benefits of their development. Accordingly, a multidisciplinary stance is considered through extensive review in the domains involved packaged in a design framework meant to assist the agents involved in their development and deployment.

Cybersecurity Policy-Related Developments in Latin America

Latin American countries begin to develop their national-level cyber policy including their cybersecurity strategy. The paper aims to provide a comparative analysis of the strategy development processes in six Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The methodology is based on a mixed approach. For the quantitative analysis, the National Cyber Security Index and UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal were used, while for the qualitative analysis a document analysis was carried out on the national strategies. Analysing national data based on the NCSI, Chile stands out overall, however, the country is still in the initial phase in terms of digital and essential service protection, personal data protection and cyber crisis management. Brazil’s position is interesting, standing at 3rd place overall, being the most targeted country by cyberattacks in the region. Brazil stands out in terms of cyber threat analysis and military cyber operations. Based on the document analysis, Chile and Argentina have a more holistic cybersecurity strategy, including factors such as cybersecurity education, cybercrime detection, regulatory framework, and the aim to cooperate with international and industrial partners.

Organizing cyber capability across military and intelligence entities: collaboration, separation, or centralization

This paper explores how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities and provides recommendations for policy and research development in the field. Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identifies three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. Despite their divergence in organizing cyber capabilities, the three countries converge on the assumption that both responding to cyber conflict short of war and developing military cyber power are dependent on the skills, information, and infrastructure of intelligence services. This calls for cooperation and coordination across military and intelligence entities. However, it remains unclear whether decision makers have systematically assessed the implications of the organizational structure for the ways in which the two dimensions relate to and shape one another at strategic, tactical, and operational levels. The paper concludes that there is a need for increased political attention and a deliberate approach to how the organizational model allows for the operational cyber capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which political implications at both national and international levels.

Technical Analysis on the Cyber Organizational Criminology of Dictatorial Military Conducts -- Experience from Human Trafficking and Coercions by Military Cyber Aggressions

The reformulated paper after the proceeding of the NCWMC 2022 recovers some previous manuscripts intercepted by the PLA of PRC for covert military operations with intrusions in global investment and financial systems. The crimes are analytically conducted through cloud servers and I/O for intelligence gathering. The information contained in the manuscripts with THEIR informatics not only could have led to further economic-financial surrogation of the PLA in American economy with investments, but also threats American national security through ontological calculation frameworks with artificial intelligence and further calculative power assertions - apart from the threats of outer space peace and security. It can be the reason behind the black hole and white hole observational results with the signal-satelliteinformation approach to general relativity manuscripts. A preliminary conception for defense strategy is proposed with previous insights and post facto security breaches to USA Space Command directly and national security conductively.