Military Competence Research Articles

Strikt functioneel: over de militaire ervaring met het organiseren van de terugtocht

The military is generally considered to act as a professional when it comes to retreating forces from military battleground or international conflict areas. At the same time recent national experiences with the withdrawal of national troops from international peacekeeping operations are filled with disappointments and crises. In this article the authors question the idea that these disappointments and crises are simply due to problems of reduced military competence or military morale. They argue that the military is still the alleged expert who knows how to perform military retreats and other military actions. At the same time they show that network-like decision-making structures that are inherent to the deployment of troops in international peacekeeping missions, have become a major obstacle for the military to act in its own right. The lessons that government can learn from the military experience are firstly, that decisions for national public cutbacks should be accompanied by a more in-depth (re)consideration of public (key) tasks than up to now was considered appropriate, and secondly, that more trust should be shown in the skills, knowledge and motivation of professionals to delineate and constrain the boundaries of their own fields of expertise.

Successful Mediocrity: The Career of Polyperchon

Successful Mediocrity:The Career of Polyperchon Elizabeth D. Carney Justin (13.1.12–13) famously admired the qualities of Alexander’s generals, observing “For never before that time did Macedonia, or indeed any other nation, produce so rich a crop of brilliant men, men who had been picked out with such care, first by Philip and then by Alexander, that they seemed chosen less as comrades in arms than as successors to the throne” (Yardley 1994, 123–24). Like Alexander, many of the officers who marched east with him demonstrated mental toughness, political ruthlessness, and military competence. Polyperchon, son of Simmias, proved a partial exception. Though Polyperchon also acted with ruthless violence on occasion, compared to many of the other Successors, he demonstrated modest (or worse) command skills. Perhaps more striking, at moments of military and political crisis, he appeared to second guess himself or perhaps suffer a failure of nerve; neither reaction was a common or forgivable failing, on the face of it, in the Macedonian elite. Waldemar Heckel memorably judged him “a jackal among lions” (1992, 188). Other scholars have described Polyperchon in similarly slighting terms.1 Yet first Alexander—the very man Justin claims chose his leaders with such care—and later Antipater—known for his judiciousness—chose this mediocrity for critical posts. Even late in Polyperchon’s career, despite his previous failures, both Antigonus and Cassander tried to employ him. At two points in his life, Polyperchon seemed poised for greatness, yet [End Page 1] greatness never arrived; indeed, on the second occasion, Polyperchon conspicuously and consciously avoided it. Nonetheless, he survived long after many of his more competent contemporaries had perished on the battlefield or from treachery. Whatever the exact date of his death (see below), Polyperchon died old, still conniving and contriving against his remaining rivals. This article attempts to understand why a man with such limitations not only survived but sometimes prospered. While it assesses his generalship, it focuses on Polyperchon’s political role in the era of the Successors and what his career tells us about the political dynamic of the period and of dealings within the ruling Macedonian elite. In recent years, only Heckel2 has examined Polyperchon’s career in a general way, though several scholars3 have attempted to untangle assorted problems that relate to specific events in his long life. Because Polyperchon, son of Simmias, is anything but the best known of the Successors, I will begin with an overview of his lengthy career and its three major phases. PHASE 1 He was roughly contemporary in age with Philip II (who was born in 382).4 Polyperchon came from Tymphaea (Diod. 17.57.2), a region long considered part of Epirus but incorporated into Macedonia early in the reign of Philip II, only after Polyperchon had reached adulthood.5 [End Page 2] The four sons of Andromenes (one of whom was named Simmias) were likely related to Polyperchon; possibly he was their maternal uncle.6 These brothers, because of their close relationship to Philotas, came under suspicion after the elimination of Parmenio and Philotas in 330, but were acquitted, perhaps because of their prominence (Heckel 1992, 178). Polyperchon and the four brothers may have belonged to the former princely family of Tymphaea;7 while there can be no certainty, several factors suggest this.8 Polyperchon commanded the Tymphaean taxis and three of the four brothers commanded taxeis at one time or another. If a recent restoration is correct, the Delphians honored Polyperchon with a proxeny decree, probably shortly before his departure for the Asian campaign.9 Polyperchon’s close relationship with the royal house of Molossia (see below) seems suggestive too, as does his decision, when attempting to establish Heracles (Alexander’s son by Barsine) on the Macedonian throne, to launch his invasion through Tymphaea, hoping [End Page 3] to get back his lands (Diod. 20.28.1–3); possibly this was the second time (see below) he led an invading force into Macedonia through his home region.10 Throughout his career Polyperchon’s identity apparently remained anchored in his Tymphaean homeland and he continued to manipulate philia networks he had likely inherited. As we have noted, he...

Lietuvos vyriausiasis tribunolas XX amžiuje

The article describes the history of practice and organization of the High Tribunal, the highest judiciary unit, called according to the tradition of Middle Ages grand principality of Lithuania. It was found in December, 1918 and functioned under this name till the Soviet occupation. In the beginning, the organization and functioning of the Tribunal was arranged under the so-called Temporary Act of Judiciary Practice and Organization of 1918, which later on was substituted by the new Judiciary Act of 1933. The latter act divided the history of the institution mentioned above into two periods. The former act described the High Tribunal as an appeal instance for the cases tried in the courts of the middle unit (district courts). The later appendices of this act also delegated the limited cassation towards some cases tried by general competence courts and military courts. However, since a great amount of cases did not reach the Tribunal, the possibilities of law interpretation function were not fully benefited. According to the second Judiciary Act, the High Tribunal was released from theappeal function, which was referred to the newly established judiciary unit, therefore, the High Tribunal turned into the court of appeal for the cases tried by the general competence courts, military competence courts and the courts of Klaipeda region. There were developed and regulated the possibilities of law interpretation and application equalization as well as setting the distribution of cases and some functions of administrative court. It remained the trial of cases brought against the President of the Republic and the members of government for high treason and malfeasance as the first instance. The article describes the structure, practice organization and statistical data on practice load analyzing the complaints against the decisions of the lower courts as well as the practice on law interpretation of the Tribunal, which was regarded as one of the most important functions of the Tribunal.

Case Report: Military Subcultural Competency

The military is comprised of numerous subcultures. These subcultures can dramatically impact perceptions of illness and care. Although efforts are currently underway to improve the military cultural competence of all health care providers, efforts to improve the subcultural competence of military providers require attention. Military providers, although part of the military culture, may not appreciate their patients' military subculture or be aware of the impact their own subculture plays on the encounter. To illustrate potential difficulties, a case is described where limited military subcultural competence disrupted care. As the military medical corps continues to integrate across service lines, this case underscores the importance of training military physicians to assess the influence of a service member's specific military subculture.

Military Identity as Predictor of Perceived Military Competence and Skills

Recent radical changes in the application of military power and service patterns have triggered demands for a change in military identity. This article aimed to examine the ability of military identity to predict perceived military performance and attitudes beyond the contributions of personality traits and Hardiness in Norwegian military academy cadets ( N = 117). Military skills, general military competence, and organizational commitment were measured by self-report. Military Identity, in particular operational identity, was found to predict both perceived military competence and skills. Furthermore, Individualism negatively predicted organizational commitment. As the first investigation of the unique influence of Military Identity on perceived skills and competence in the Norwegian armed forces, this study identifies operational identity as an important predictor of military performance. Implications for training as well as leadership development programs are discussed.

Organisation du pouvoir en Serbie médiévale

The organization of power in medieval SerbiaThe Serbian Mediaeval State was a monarchy where the ruler exercised supreme powers with legislative, military, diplomatic and judicial competences. The kings also claimed property right over the whole territory of the State (dominium eminens). However, diverse types of institutional representation completed the governmental structure. State Councils exercised a great influence. They were representative body comprising the most powerful lords, secular and ecclesiastical. The sources also mention the existence of various court dignitaries and local civil servants. The most important court dignitaries comprised the kaznac (tax collector) and the tepcija (land official). In the administrative reform of 1340, under King Dusan, new titles and offices were introduced, mostly as a result of the Byzantine influence. These new titles included the logothet (chancellor), the protovestijar (chamberlain), the great celnik (comes palatinus), and the dvorodržica (marshal of the court), while on the local level, a new office of kefalija (capitaneus) was created. Representative assemblies (sabori) comprised the most powerful lords of the kingdom. They met on thirtyseven occasions between the end of the twelfth century and the middle of the fifteenth century. A few Serbian and Byzantine narrative sources point also to the existence of a Privy Council that regrouped the highest nobility of the kingdom.

The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations

In June of 2010 the publication of an article entitled, Runaway in Rolling Stone magazine captivated the nation and ended the career of the commanding general in Afghanistan. The incident captured the national and international media for almost a week. For an intense period between 48 and 72 hours, when General Stanley McChrystal's job hung in the balance, a focused national security dialogue occurred on the topic of whether or not he should retain his post. General McChrystal and his staff were not criticized for their lack of military competence, for their dissent over policy, or for failure to implement strategy. Their professionalism--especially those professional competencies related to understanding the roles and responsibilities of military leaders vis-a-vis the civilian leadership in the context of democratic civil-military relations--was found wanting. Among other lessons, this case illustrates the deficiencies of the Professional Military Education (PME) system, which gives short shrift to the promulgation of civil-military relations norms in its leader development curricula. Currently, the US Army is midway through its Profession of Arms Campaign during which it is refreshing and renewing its understanding of the Army as a profession. (1) Among the areas being assessed is civil-military relations--especially the Army's interaction with and support of the Nation and its elected and appointed officials. (2) The case of General McChrystal's relief is detailed here for review so its elements can be mined and analyzed, thereby strengthening the civil-military norms at issue in the case. The incident provides an opportunity to examine the national dialogue of June 2010 as a window into the state of national consensus on principles of strategy and civil-military relations norms. Recommendations are offered in an attempt to emphasize the development of the political skills required to navigate the nexus of political-military collaboration and media engagement at the strategic level. PME curricula with sufficient emphasis on civil-military norms will yield commanders better prepared to lead, staffs more capable of supporting them, and enhanced trust between the and military spheres that is essential for strategic success. The case presents a unique opportunity for all actors involved in the national security process: senior military officers, the civilian national security team, members of Congress, the media, scholars, and the public at-large to weigh in on matters of civil-military relations and strategy. Its study will help to hone the strategic competencies of the national security community, particularly the importance of a solid grounding in the fundamentals of the American system, the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military actors within it, and the norms of civil-military relations in a democracy. The Case Unfolds On Monday, 21 June 2010, an eight page article was released to reporters ahead of its planned publication date of 25 June. (3) Runaway General, the work of Rolling Stone reporter Michael Hastings, was intended to profile the Afghan war's commanding general and the progress made on the execution of the war's strategy. Instead, a firestorm erupted around the disparaging remarks reported in the article that General Stanley McChrystal, and especially his staff, made related to senior administration officials, including President Barack Obama. Hastings was embedded with Team America, the moniker that General McChrystal's staff had assigned to itself. (4) What was originally intended to be a brief visit with the staff was extended by a number of days when volcanic ash stalled air travel in Europe. In the meantime, McChrystal and his staff let down their guard with the embedded journalist still in their midst and spoke candidly about the civilian leadership. Hastings' reporting laid bare Team America's irreverent attitudes and detailed the mocks and insults hurled at members of the administration's national security team. …

The Decay of Communism: Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel in the Soviet Union, 1937‐1991

AbstractThe aim of this article is to explore the dynamics of spent nuclear fuel management in the Soviet Union, from the origins of nuclear engineering in the 1930s to the collapse of the country in 1991. Spent nuclear fuel is analyzed in relation to other components of what is referred to as the “nuclear fuel system,” such as nuclear weapons production, breeder reactor development, uranium enrichment, and the operation of nuclear power plants. The article shows that spent fuel management in the Soviet Union centered on military applications from the 1940s up to the 1960s, after which enormous efforts were devoted to exploiting military competencies for civil purposes. A “tandem” system was partly realized in this context, in which spent fuel from VVER nuclear power plants, submarine reactors, and research installations was reprocessed and used for the production of RBMK (Chernobyl‐type) fuel. The plutonium gained did not find any use, however, due to failures in fast breeder developments. RBMK spent fuel was not reprocessed. The Soviets never officially discussed the option of direct disposal of RBMK fuel and strictly distinguished between “spent fuel” and “nuclear waste.” Facing stagnation in reprocessing and breeder technology, the development came to focus increasingly on expanding interim storage capacities. But far‐reaching R&D efforts in the field of nuclear waste management and storage methods meant that the Soviet Union, at the time of its collapse, had accumulated a considerable competence that might turn out to be of great value, should a direct disposal strategy be officially considered in the future.

Corruption European Style: The 1861 Frémont Scandal and Popular Fears in the Civil War North

Union General John C. Frémont excited considerable controversy during the Civil War, and not just due to his dubious military competence and early advocacy of emancipation. Many republican‐influenced citizens suspected Frémont of the corrupt misuse of power, and undermining the essential moral basis of the republic. While ultimately his ineffectual generalship might have reassured Northerners that “the Pathfinder” was hardly likely to succeed in his suspected schemes, it is striking that even during the war for national survival, citizens remained deeply concerned with the possible threat of power (particularly in the hands of corrupt, designing men) to liberty.

Livy: Hannibal's War. Books 21–30 by J. C. Yardley

BOOK REVIEWS/COMPTES RENDUS 193 that are "arguably uniquely Roman" Pagan concludes that "[literary and material remains] validate the decision to focus solely on Roman gardens, in Roman literature, as products of a Roman imagination" (3). This confident assertion is recast towards the end of the work in farmore hesitant terms: "it is possible that the Romans did have a particular way of thinking about gardens and it is closely tied to the literary expressions and the literary forms that they developed" (124). Such reticence suggests that Pagan is not completely convinced by her arguments, undermining awork that offers much worth reading. Brock University Katharine T. von Stackelberg Livy: Hannibal's War. Books 21-30. Translated by J. C. Yardley. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. xliii, 740. Yardley's Hannibaus War is a welcome addition toOxford World Classics and to the other books of Livy's From theFoundation of Rome already published in the same series (Luce 1998,Yardley 2000). PreviousEnglish translations ofLivy'sThird Decade include Canon W. M. Roberts (Everyman's Library 1912-31), B. O. Foster and Frank Gardner Moore (LoebClassical Library 1949), andAubrey de Selincourt(PenguinClassics 1965). All have merits, but Yardley's text is, in general, both more accurate and more readable, an unusually rare combination worthy of kudos. The volume follows the standard Oxford World's Classics format and includes an Introduction (ix-xxxiii), Select Bibliography (xxxvi-xxxviii), Chronology of Events (xxxix xliii),Maps (xliv-xlviii), ExplanatoryNotes (631-714), Glossary (715-726), and Index (727-740). In addition, there are two appendices. Appendix One lists instances where Yardley's translations differs from Dorey's andWalsh's Teubner edition. Appendix Two details the vexata quaestio ofHannibal's Alpine route. Written by Dexter Hoyos, the introduction offers basic information about Livy (life and work) and provides a historical background for the period covered by the translation, the Second Punic War. While very informative and clear, the introduction suffers from a persistent bias which views Livy as a talented writer but a second-rate historian and political thinker, who is "not very good at source analysis" (xxviii), lacks military competence (xxix), and is too "patriotic" (see, e.g., xxviii) to be entirely reliable. Overall, Livy is a distant second to Polybius, his Greek predecessor and a key source of Livy's Decade. This traditional view espoused by Hoyos seems not to take into account modern critical studies which have begun to challenge these notions and which, tellingly, are completely absent from the "Selected Bibliography." A case in point: Hoyos views Livy's portrayal of the Roman leaders of the period (e.g., Marcellus, Scipio) as straightforwardly positive (Cf. xxv: "Scipio Africanus is almost Livy's perfect hero"), and yet Livy's presentation seems to be more nuanced. Scipio's Alcibiades-like role mAUC 28 (Rodgers) and his many actions which anticipatethoseofRome's first century dynasts(Chaplin) casta darkcloudonLivy's Scipio and problematize his character more than Hoyos allows.1 The same is true forMarcellus. In the early phase of his career, Marcellus isRome's unfailing "sword." After the capture of Syracuse, however, he begins to show signs of moral failings and reckless temeritas that JB. Rodgers, "Great Expeditions: Livy on Thucydides," TAPA 116 (1986) 335-352; J. D. Chaplin, Livy's Exemplary History (Oxford 2000) 97, n. 56. 194 PHOENIX will eventuallyleadhim tohis death andwill bringtheentirestateto thebrink (Carawan, cf. also Jaeger on the spoils of Syracuse).2 A similar pro-Polybian bias and an excessive concern for source hunting can be detected in the otherwise extremely instructive and detailed notes. Livy's version is usually deemed inferior to that of the Greek historian and the result of Livy's misunderstanding and/or careless collation of sources rather than the consequence of a strategy of design (e.g., 30.34; Livy's narrative of the battle of Zama and his negative portrayal ofmercenary troops should possibly be read as reflecting Livy's own bias and concerns about contemporary Roman practice rather than as a sign of his sloppy reading of Polybius). In his "Note on the Text and Translation" (xxxiv) Yardley states that he has attempted "tomake English readable for the Latinless reader, while staying close enough...

Formal Mentoring in Military Academies

We examined the relationship between mentoring functions and protégé outcomes in formal mentoring relationships in military academies. A total of 424 (listed as 424 under Method) freshmen and 659 senior cadets from six different military academies participated in the survey. Results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses suggest that career mentoring was positively related to mentor satisfaction and participants' provision of career mentoring to their protégés. Surprisingly, career mentoring was negatively related to freshmen's commitment to a military career. We found that psychosocial mentoring was positively related to mentor satisfaction and participants' commitment to a military career, leadership competency, and provision of psychosocial mentoring to their protégés. Furthermore, psychological mentoring was negatively related to stress. We discuss these findings and their implications for mentoring research and practices in the military.

Conclusion

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Chapter Two: National Ambitions and Performance

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Glossary

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Chapter Three: Domestic Determinants of National Profiles: Constraints or Enablers?

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Chapter One: EU Crisis Management: Ambitions and Achievements

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Notes

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Introduction

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

A Comparison of Experiences of Training Emergency Care in Military Exercises and Competences among Conscript Nurses with Different Levels of Education

The military emergency care education of nurses is primarily concerned with the treatment of soldiers with combat-related injuries. Even though great progress has been made in military medicine, there is still the pedagogical question of what emergency care education for military nurses should contain and how it should be taught. The aim of this study was to describe and compare experiences of training emergency care in military exercises among conscript nurses with different levels of education. A descriptive study was performed to describe and compare experiences of training emergency care in military exercises among conscript nurses with different levels of education in nursing. There were statistical differences between nurses with general nursing education and nurses with a general nursing education and supplementary education. A reasonable implication of the differences is that the curriculum must be designed differently depending on the educational background of the students. Hence, there is an interaction between background characteristics, e.g., the level of previous education and differences pertaining to clinical experience of the participants, and the impact of the exercise itself.

An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973

In the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt shocked the world with its atrocious performance in battle, only to stun the world again with its remarkable military turnaround in the October 1973 war. Existing studies, which emphasize culture, social structure, and regime type, have a difficult time explaining why this single autocratic state, in such a short period of time, exhibited such extremes in its military competence. None can explain both why Egypt performed so poorly in 1967 and improved so significantly in 1973. Other explanations such as military strategy and learning explain the puzzle in part, but they alone cannot account for the outcome. This article presents a theory that accounts for the divergence in effectiveness, focusing on underlying differences in the fabric of the autocratic regime. It argues that changes in the balance of civil-military power in the state—born from more fundamental differences in domestic politics in the autocracy—shaped three areas of military activity critical to military effectiveness: strategic assessment, command, and control, and leadership. In developing this argument, the article both contributes to growing scholarship on the sources of states' military effectiveness and explains why Egypt's performance varied so significantly in these historically consequential wars.