Military Commissions Research Articles

Совместное заседание АО «РТИ» и секции № 9 МРГ по вопросам разработки и производства ЭКБ при коллегии ВПК РФ

Совместное заседание АО «РТИ» и секции № 9 МРГ по вопросам разработки и производства ЭКБ при коллегии ВПК РФ

Xin Jinping Starts His Second Term with Prospect of Ruling for Life

Xi Jinping started his second term as general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and chairman of the Central Military Commission at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. No heir apparent was installed at the congress, leading to greater speculation that Xi may continue to serve his third term after 2022. In February 2018, the CPC proposed to remove a constitutional clause limiting presidential service to just two terms in office.

Оценка военных потерь: поиски истины, невежество или предвзятость?

Хотя Великая Отечественная война закончилась более 70 лет назад, проблема оценки военных и гражданских потерь советского населения горячо обсуждается сегодня как в научных, так и в общественно-политических кругах. Отчасти это связано с привлечением новых архивных материалов и информации, сохранившейся в семьях людей, пострадавших в годы войны. Но, с другой стороны, использование средств массовой информации, особенно Интернета, открывает возможность для людей недостаточно компетентных, но приверженных определенной точке зрения, широко распространять свои взгляды. Так, историк И. Ивлев утверждает, что для оценки численности населения в 1941 г. не нужно использовать переписи населения, сведения о рождаемости и смертности, поскольку он нашел в архиве Госплана абсолютно достоверную «истинную» оценку. В статье показывается ошибочность подхода Ивлева и других авторов, преувеличивающих, как правило, размеры демографических потерь.
 Что касается собственно военных потерь, число погибших не может быть сильно увеличено, поскольку ограничено численностью призывного контингента на неоккупированных территориях, а также соотношением в боевых потерях убитых, раненых и уцелевших (погибшие в бою составляют, как правило, 20-25% вступивших в сражение). С другой стороны, увеличение авторами числа погибших в немецком плену, представляется верным. Военная комиссия Кривошеева занизила численность умерших в плену в два или более раза. Эту и ряд других проблем еще предстоит решить историкам Второй мировой войны.

Brief of Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Dalmazzi et al. v. United States

This amicus brief in support of neither party explains why the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review cases from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). Though called a court by statute, the CAAF is located for constitutional purposes within the Executive Branch and does not exercise the judicial Power of the United States or of any sovereign. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison makes it clear that the Supreme Court cannot exercise appellate Jurisdiction under Article III directly from an officer of the Executive Branch. There is no basis in law or logic to distinguish between a single officer (James Madison in Marbury) and a body composed of multiple officers (the CAAF), even if the latter is designated a court by statute. Accordingly, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over cases directly from the CAAF violates Article III. The brief canvasses a number of precedents in this area arising from cases involving military commissions, the Court of Federal Claims, petitions for writs of habeas corpus, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and administrative agencies.

The Decaux Principles on the Administration of Justice by Military Tribunals and the Guantanamo Bay Trials

This chapter takes a close look at the practice of the U.S. military commissions criminal trials. It is co authored with Dr. Mitch Robinson, a defense international law specialist in the ongoing 9/11 trial taking place at Guantanamo Bau, Cuba, and it is largely based on a field research conducted in 2016. The first part of the chapter situates these military commissions within the general U.S. justice system and describes how U.S. federal judicial branch actively re-appropriated to itself a central role in reviewing issues related to the commissions' function. The second part of the chapter takes a close look from within the ongoing proceedings, and more specifically the 9/11 trial. Through the description of the legal framework and actual practice of military commission proceedings, it is empirically shown how 'The most important trial since Nuremberg' continues to be mishandled.

АНАЛИЗ ИЗМЕНЕНИЙ КОМПОНЕНТОВ СИСТЕМЫ ПЕРЕКИСНОГО ОКИСЛЕНИЯ ЛИПИДОВ И АНТИОКСИДАНТНОЙ ЗАЩИТЫ У ВОЕННОСЛУЖАЩИХ

The article presents the analysis of inspection results of the military personnel who passed a medical examination at the initial military registration, with the call to military service and recognized as health fit for military service. The aim of the research was to study the dynamics of changes in the components of lipid peroxidation and antioxidant defense system of the soldiers during the primary adaptation to military service. Materials and methods: 34 young men (recruits), called up for military service, and 18 military personnel who have served 6 months. As material for biochemical research we used blood plasma and hemolysate. Modern spectrophotometric, fluorometric and statistical methods have been used. Results. In recruits, we noted increased activity of lipids oxidation, low level of blood antioxidant activity and reduced glutathione. In 6 months of the military service we found decreased contents of TBA-active products and improving of the overall antioxidant activity of the blood. Conclusions. Analysis of the data shows significant changes in the indices of lipid peroxidation and antioxidant defense system. The ratio of the activity of oxidation and antioxidant components not only reflects, but also largely determines the rate of metabolism and adaptive capabilities of the organism. The study found that young people, who were recognized as fit for military service due to health criteria for military medical commissions by military commissioners and were called up for military service, have low adaptive capacity and reach the stage of “satisfactory adaptation” only after 6 months of service.

The Military Commissions Act, Coerced Confessions, and the Role of the Courts

The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) challenges a core principle of American justice: that courts should not admit evidence yielded by coerced interrogation. In deciding cases under the MCA, courts need not abandon this principle. In many cases, courts will be able to vindicate concerns under the Due Process Clause, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause by invoking the MCA's requirement that admissible evidence be reliable. In other cases, courts will have to assert their supervisory power to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings. Finally, courts can rely on a pragmatic conception of the extraterritorial application of fundamental rights that extends from The Insular Cases to Justice Harlan's concurrence in Reid v. Covert and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.

Reflection on the governance of clinical stem cell research and applications in China.

Reflection on the governance of clinical stem cell research and applications in China.

China’s Military Reform: The Strategic Support Force, Non-Traditional Warfare, and the Impact on Cross-Strait Security

In late 2015, the Chinese leadership announced sweeping reforms designed to bring the military into the modern era, signaling a departure from a traditional over-dependence on ground forces and incorporating extensive structural reorganization to create a more balanced joint command system. The reform aims to create a system suited to the modern conditions of informatization, with direct leadership from the Central Military Commission, and is bolstered by the Chinese military’s advancement in progressive information technology, space technology, and cyber security. With the creation of a new Strategic Support Force (SSF), China has clearly demarcated the operational command of traditional and non-traditional warfare within the military system, representing a strategic and tactical step forward that gives greater scope to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to dominate in non-traditional military theaters. While the military reform has the potential to affect military strategy around Asia and further afield, the extent of China’s deep and far-reaching military reform, with a view to consolidating military capabilities under a joint command and giving full rein to non-traditional warfare under conditions of informatization, represents a particularly significant factor in the stability of cross-strait relations and security. This study will outline the creation of the SSF under the new reform, and discuss the development of China’s strategy and tactics for non-traditional warfare under conditions of informatization. The implications of the military reform will then be put into the cross-strait context, in order to draw conclusions concerning the potential impact on cross-strait security.

Nineteenth-Century American Literature and the Long Civil WarBelligerent Muse: Five Northern Writers and How They Shaped Our Understanding of the Civil WarDefining Duty in the Civil War: Personal Choice, Popular Culture, and the Union Home FrontCivil War Nurse Narratives, 1863–1870

Nineteenth-Century American Literature and the Long Civil WarBelligerent Muse: Five Northern Writers and How They Shaped Our Understanding of the Civil WarDefining Duty in the Civil War: Personal Choice, Popular Culture, and the Union Home FrontCivil War Nurse Narratives, 1863–1870

The 9/11 Terror Cases: Constitutional Challenges in the War against Al Qaeda

In retrospect, it now seems obvious that the zealous counterterrorism policies pursued by the U.S. government in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks would provoke years of litigation—and, in some cases, sustained pushback from the federal courts. But as Allan A. Ryan explains in this usefully concise and succinct volume, that endgame was hardly obvious at the beginning, as government lawyers pushed the envelope not only on substantive authorities ranging from military detention and interrogation to surveillance and immigration roundups but more fundamentally on the role of the courts as well, arguing for an almost nonexistent judicial role in supervising counterterrorism policy. Ryan’s volume recounts the story behind, and rulings in, four major U.S. Supreme Court rulings militating rather sharply in the other direction, including a pair of 2004 decisions involving the government’s power to detain (and the courts’ power to review the detention of) enemy combatants; a 2006 ruling striking down the first iteration of the Guantánamo military commissions; and a landmark 2008 precedent rejecting efforts by Congress to prevent the courts from hearing habeas petitions from noncitizens held without trial at Guantánamo. Ryan’s book offers not just a fantastic and accessible exegesis of these complex rulings but a narrative of the stories behind these cases that illuminate their personal, political, and constitutional stakes.

China’s Institutional Changes in the Foreign and Security Policy Realm Under Xi Jinping: Power Concentration vs. Fragmentation Without Institutionalization

This article focuses on the institutional changes that have occurred in the foreign and security policy realm since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012. The establishment of a National Security Commission (NSC) in November 2013, the power centralization in the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the reorganization of the CCP leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as the major branches of the PLA, the reorganization in March 2013 of the various civilian maritime security agencies and the establishment in December 2013 of a Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Small Group (LSG) are the most striking organizational reforms introduced by Xi. But other institutional changes have taken place as Xi’s inclination to rely on a larger number of actors and in particular to give his closer political allies a bigger role also in foreign and security policy. These changes have obviously helped concentrate more power in the hands of Xi Jinping and, to some extent, better coordinate domestic and external security objectives and on the whole have well served China’s foreign and security policy’s assertiveness and initiatives. However, these changes have only partly reduced the power fragmentation that has developed extensively under Hu Jintao, and they have not contributed to institutionalizing decision-making processes at the top of the CCP and the state apparatuses. On the contrary, it appears that through these changes Xi has not only created new bureaucratic overlaps and tensions but also, in relying more on his own advisers, fed frustrations and competitions among agencies and officials, in other words, new forms of power fragmentation.

A Study of Career Networks and the Geographical Characteristics of CCP's Top Political and Military Positions

AbstractThis research study attempts to map out the career network of selected members from the Politburo and Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by adopting social network analysis techniques, calculating various network indices, and quantifying the value and importance of each position. The purpose of this research is to uncover the crucial positions leading to the CCP's political and military power center, as well as to how these positions interrelate. The results show the following. First, in the Jiang Zemin era (Jiang's era), Politburo members were mainly promoted from the central party committee or Central Government. Secondly, in the Hu Jintao era (Hu's era), key members from administrative regions started to step into the power center. Third, in the era of Xi Jinping (Xi's era), most Politburo members were promoted directly from administrative regions, especially from the coastal areas, such as Shanghai and Guangdong province. The research also indicates that being a military commander for Military Regions appears to provide experience necessary for promotion, whilst being an officer at the central military departments, such as a (Deputy) Chief General of Staff or Commander of Armed Services, is considered a major stepping stone. Although the succession trend defined by the innovative analysis of this research might not match the fixed model used by the CCP for its succession plan, under the circumstances of probable further institutionalization of the CCP, a quantified analysis of network position could be considered a more promising method of prediction.

Military Commissions and the War on Terror: A Separation of Powers Tug-of-War

Much of the literature on the war on terror overstates the power of the presidency and overlooks the respective roles of Congress, the courts, and the bureaucracy. The creation and development of military commissions in the war on terror demonstrates that our system of separation of powers and checks and balances has in fact worked in complex and surprising ways to constrain the presidency during wartime, with consequences both positive and negative. In this article, two insights loom largest. First, internal executive branch divisions often interact with the separation of powers in ways that limit presidential dominance. Second, national security policy is now a heavily legalized area, with important consequences for the separation of powers.

A Labyrinth of Appointments Clause Issues in the Military Appellate Courts: Unpacking United States v. Ortiz and United States v. Dalmazzi

United States v. Ortiz and United States v. Dalmazzi present two important constitutional Appointments Clause issues that may come before the Supreme Court in the next term. The first issue is whether military officers serving as judges on the United States Court of Military Commission Review (USCMCR) are “principal” officers under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. If yes, the second issue is whether such officers’ principal status prohibits them from simultaneously serving as judges on the various armed services courts of appeals, including for the Air Force, Navy, and others. More broadly—and relevant beyond the military appellate court system—these questions implicate the as-yet-unanswered question of whether the Appointments Clause principal-inferior status of government officers who serve in multiple positions should be evaluated “holistically” across their offices, or instead independently for each office they hold. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) recently decided United States v. Ortiz on non-constitutional grounds, and the Supreme Court has asked for briefing on the constitutional issues in United States v. Dalmazzi. The issues in these cases are critical for two reasons. One reason is that the current military appellate court system sometimes utilizes the same officer-judges serving on multiple courts at the same time. A second reason is that a Supreme Court determination that military appellate judges serving on the USCMCR are principal officers may also constitutionally preclude military officers from serving on that court. To explore whether USCMCR judges are constitutionally prohibited from simultaneously serving on an armed service court of appeal, this paper provides a brief summary of the relevant facts and background law surrounding United States v. Ortiz in Part I and presents the parties’ constitutional arguments in Part II. In Part III, the paper evaluates Ortiz’ statutory argument that Colonel Mitchell’s presidential appointment to the USCMCR pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 950f(b)(3) makes him ineligible to serve on the AFCCA. In Part IV, this paper then evaluates the constitutional arguments in concluding that simultaneous service on the USCMCR and armed service courts of appeal does not violate the Appointments Clause. This is because USCMCR judges are not principal officers and, even if they were, no other officer on an armed service court of appeal supervises or directs them. More broadly, in section IV.B.2, this paper suggests that courts should review the principal-officer status of officers serving in multiple positions “holistically”: If, in any one position, an officer is “supervised and directed” by another officer, that officer should be considered an inferior officer for purposes of all positions the officer holds.

Gitmo at Home, Gitmo at Play

This photo essay is excerpted from Gitmo at Home, Gitmo at Play, an investigation of daily life for both prisoners and guards at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where nobody has chosen to live, and where photographs of faces are forbidden by military regulation. Since the first “War on Terror” prisons opened on January 11, 2002, 780 men have been held at “Gitmo,” the vast majority without charge or trial of any kind. As of autumn 2016, most have been cleared and released: 61 men remain held, including 33 cleared for transfer, 10 convicted in military commissions, and 28 designated as “forever prisoners,” destined to remain held indefinitely. Gitmo at Home, Gitmo at Play is one chapter in a larger body of work investigating the peculiarly American normalization of offshore extrajudicial detention.

BALANCING SECURITY AND LIBERTY

AbstractThis paper examines the legitimacy of the US government’s argument that it must “balance liberty and security” with regard to its policy of trying enemy belligerents in military commissions rather than federal courts. I distinguish between three senses of “balance,” and argue that the policy is ambiguous between the second (internal) and third (emergency external) senses of balance. Neither line of reasoning justifies the policy, however. On the second sense, it is unjustified because it constitutes an arbitrary limitation of the rights of some for the sake of the security of others. It thus violates the government’s duty to decide questions of policy in accordance with accepted legal procedures. Alternately, if the policy is intended to be an exercise of emergency powers, then it violates what I call the government’s juridical duty to serve as a guardian of justice. I offer an alternative justification for emergency measures, one that is based on the model of self-defense. I conclude that although the exercise of military commissions in times of emergency can be justified, the current exercise is illegitimate.

Микроэлектронные минифабрики в российском ОПК – путь к импортонезависимости в сфере ЭКБ расширенное заседание секции № 4 МРГ по ЭКБ при коллегии ВПК РФ

Микроэлектронные минифабрики в российском ОПК – путь к импортонезависимости в сфере ЭКБ расширенное заседание секции № 4 МРГ по ЭКБ при коллегии ВПК РФ

Organizational and economic activity of the Kuban military and industrial committee of 1915-1917

Organizational and economic activity of the Kuban military and industrial committee of 1915-1917

The reorganisation of the french military commission in russia: in anticipation of change (1916–1917)

This article considers the evolution of the French Military Commission in Russia during the First World War. Initially consisting of peacetime structures (the office of the military attaché and his aide), in 1916 the French Military Commission became a strongly centralised and multipurpose military mission whose structure was later borrowed by other Allied nations. The authors use the term ‘mission’ extensively in the article: its meaning depends on the specific task or duty assigned to a person or group of people and on the extent to which the group was institutionalised. As a result, the term may be understood in two different ways mission as an organisation abroad, including personnel or mission as a business trip, a temporary assignment given to an envoy. In this paper, the term ‘mission’ is applied to all the forms of the French Military Commission in Russia, whose personnel considerably increased during the war as it shifted into a centralised multifunctional military mission. The need to establish effective interaction among the members of the Entente and the growing number of issues the French military attaché in Russia had to deal with conditioned the transformation of French military representation. The project was initiated by Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre. Joffre based his decisions on the reports of Major Langlois, who visited Russia eight times between February 1915 and February 1917. Joffre managed to turn the small and rather ineffective mission, distrusted by Russian generals, into a centralised military mission. General Maurice Janin was appointed head of the new commission, and it was under his leadership that it became the centre of coordination for French military activities in Russia.