Middle East Peacemaking Research Articles

The Johnson Administration and Arab-Israeli Peacemaking after June 1967

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States took a relatively passive approach to Middle East peacemaking. The passivity shown by the administration of President Lyndon Johnson stemmed primarily from its belief that the Arab states had failed to make reasonable proposals for an agreement and from the White House's awareness that pressuring Israel would likely have significant domestic political consequences. Thus, even though it felt the need to press Israel to withdraw to prewar boundaries as part of a settlement, the administration made little effort to achieve an agreement on that basis.

The USA and the EU as a third party in Middle East peacemaking: an asymmetric division of labour

This article aims to analyse the role played by the USA and the European Union (EU) in Middle East peacemaking. It argues that there exists a de facto division of labour between two actors. While the USA has played a primary role and acted as the principal mediator in successive mediation efforts and dominated political and diplomatic dimension of the peace process; the EU was relegated to a secondary and supplementary role and has mainly focused on economic and financial dimension of the peace process and the creation of the structural conditions for sustainable peace which aimed to complement peacemaking efforts at the diplomatic level.

Plus ça change…? Israel, the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean

The patterns characterizing relations between Israel and the European Union comprise, firstly, repeatedly tense political ties that contrast with constantly deepening economic relations. Secondly the practice of bilateral relations markedly differs from their rhetoric. Thirdly, disagreements usually revolve around Middle East peacemaking. Finally, unlike the EU, Israel prefers disconnecting bilateral ties from regional politics. These patterns explain Israel's position and strategy toward the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and permit an assessment of the relevance of the latter for EU–Israeli relations. The conclusion is that the UfM is unlikely to alter the basic patterns of bilateral ties.

The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (review)

Reviewed by: The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace Robert O. Freedman The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, by Aaron David Miller. New York: Bantam, 2008. 398 pp. $26.00. For those of us teaching courses on U.S. policy in the Middle East, and on the Arab-Israeli conflict, The Much Too Promised Land by Aaron Miller is a very welcome addition to the literature. Miller, who served in a number of U.S. Government positions dealing with the Middle East, including as deputy to U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, presents an "insider's view" of what works—and what doesn't—in U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Spicing up his narrative, Miller frequently cites the rather earthy language used by both U.S. officials and foreign leaders, as they discuss Middle Eastern personalities, such as the comments of the late King Hussein of Jordan who characterized Yasser Arafat in the following way: "That little shit. He hasn't a clue what he is doing" (p. 55). Similarly, Miller's portrayal of the eating habits of Israeli negotiators is absolutely hilarious (p. 50). Miller gives the reader a real feel for how Middle Eastern diplomacy actually works, including how divisions among U.S. policy-makers hampers U.S. policy in the region. [End Page 173] The book is divided into three sections. The first is an introduction to the dynamics of Middle East peacemaking and the challenges which even a superpower like the United States faces in trying to enforce its will. This section also includes an entire chapter devoted to the impact of U.S. domestic politics and the strengths and weaknesses of the so-called "Israel Lobby." The second part of the book presents case studies of successful U.S. policymakers: Henry Kissinger in negotiating the Sinai I (1974) and Sinai II (1975) agreements between Israel and Egypt, and the Golan Heights Agreement (1974) between Israel and Syria; Jimmy Carter, who worked out a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt (1979); and James Baker, who successfully convened the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 after the First Gulf War. The final section of the book deals with U.S. President Bill Clinton, who failed in his efforts to achieve peace between Israel and both Syria and the Palestinians, and President George W. Bush who, according to Miller, did not try very hard to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. In the first section of the book, Miller presents a number of lessons for U.S. policy-makers as they deal with the nations of the Middle East. Perhaps the most pithy are as follows: In negotiations, to be effective, you need to believe that things can change but have extraordinary patience if they don't. (p. 26) You need to be tough but empathetic, firm but practical. And above all, you need to be ready to endure the endless maneuvering and machinations of Arabs and Israelis for whom the conflict has sadly become a way of life. (pp. 26–27) Smaller nations will do just about anything to survive, and are not inclined to listen or even trust advice offered by a distant power whose political and physical survival is not at stake. The ghosts of the past, made real by history's fears and traumas, speak louder than the untested promise of a brighter future offered up by American diplomats. (p. 37) Americans who recognize the galactic gap between a secure and confident America and the insecure world of Israelis and Arabs fare best of all. (p. 41) This conviction (of Yitzhak Rabin), that however well intentioned, the Americans were naive and didn't understand the Arabs, was shared by almost every Israeli with whom we worked. (p. 42) In his chapter on the Israel Lobby, Miller shows how a combination of common values and common enemies has forged a close U.S.-Israeli alliance. He also cites the influence of pro-Israeli Jews in the Democratic Party, and pro-Israeli Evangelical Christians in the Republican Party to show the broad bipartisan support for Israel in the U.S...

Remembering the Palestinian Nakba: Commemoration, Oral History and Narratives of Memory

This year Palestinians commemorate the 60thanniversary of the Nakba – the most traumatic catastrophe that ever befell them. The rupture of 1948 and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Nakba are central to both the Palestinian society of today and Palestinian social history and collective identity. This article explores ways of remembering and commemorating the Nakba. It deals with the issue within the context of Palestinian oral history, ‘social history from below’, narratives of memory and the formation of collective identity. With the history, rights and needs of the Palestinian refugees being excluded from recent Middle East peacemaking efforts and with the failure of both the Israeli state and the international community to acknowledge the Nakba, ‘1948’ as an ‘ethnic cleansing’ continues to underpin the Palestine-Israel conflict. This article argues that to write more truthfully about the Nakba is not just to practice a professional historiography; it is also a moral imperative of acknowledgement and redemption. The struggles of the refugees to publicise the truth about the Nakba is a vital way of protecting the refugees’ rights and keeping the hope for peace with justice alive.

Middle East Peacemaking and the Limits of American Power

Middle East Peacemaking and the Limits of American Power

Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, vol. 3: The United Nations, the Great Powers and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948–1954 (London: Frank Cass, 1997). Pp. 416. $55.00 cloth, $25.00 paper. - Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, vol. 4: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956 (London: Frank Cass, 1997). Pp. 435.

Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, vol. 3: The United Nations, the Great Powers and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948–1954 (London: Frank Cass, 1997). Pp. 416. 25.00 paper. - Neil Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, vol. 4: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956 (London: Frank Cass, 1997). Pp. 435. - Volume 31 Issue 1

Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East Peace-Making

Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East Peace-Making

Futile Diplomacy. The United Nations, the Great Powers and the Middle East Peacemaking, 1948–1954. (Vol.3); Futile Diplomacy. Operation Alpha and the Failure of the Anglo‐American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab‐Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956.(Vol. 4); Neil Caplan

Futile Diplomacy. The United Nations, the Great Powers and the Middle East Peacemaking, 1948–1954. (Vol.3); Futile Diplomacy. Operation Alpha and the Failure of the Anglo‐American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab‐Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956.(Vol. 4); Neil Caplan

Futile Diplomacy, Vol. 3: The United Nations, the Great Powers, and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948-1954

Futile Diplomacy, Vol. 3: The United Nations, the Great Powers, and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948-1954

Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (review)

118 SHOFAR Summer 1996 Vol. 14, No.4 pre-election polls all contribute to our understanding of how the medium can, indeed, become part of the message, and how the act of communication can become almost as significant as what is being communicated. No study of Israeli elections would be complete without some discussion of electoral reform, and this volume ends with two very good chapters on the subject. Tamar Hermann discusses "The Campaign for Political Reform," and shows how political reform became a subject on the political agenda and how supporters kept it visible and in the public eye. A final essay by Gideon Doron and Barry Kay discusses on a more theoretical level the types of reform that have been considered in the past, and what their results might have been. like other books of this type, the styles of writing and analysis vary as one works from chapter to chapter through the text, with some chapters being more theoretical, some more empirical, and many written in different styles. However, this being said, all of the contributions are very good about keeping the focus on the 1992 election and what made it special. Could the book be improved? It would have been nice to have a concluding chapter that tied together the various themes introduced in the fourteen chapters, and it would have been nice to have a cumulative bibliography, or "for further reading" section at the end of the book. Overall, however, this is a very readable book representing the efforts of a number of the very best scholars in the field today, and students of Israeli politics will want to own a copy of this book for the comparison it provides with this year's election. Gregory S. Mahler Department of Political Science University of Mississippi Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, byWilliam B. Quandt. Washington: The Brookings Institution and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 612 pp. $38.95 (c); $15.95 (P). One is tempted to say that William Quandt's Peace Process, thorough and exhaustive that it may be, has been eclipsed by events, specifically the mutual recognition and subsequent routinization of negotiations between Israel and the Palestine liberation Organization. But that is not the case at all. The radical change in the peace process that occurred after the election Book Reviews 119 victory ofYitzhak Rabin's Labor Party in 1992 decisively ended the 25-year period that began with the Six-Day War and included seemingly endless indirect negotiations between Arabs and Israelis and the notable triumph of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. In a sense Quandt had the good fortune to time the end of his research to coincide with the end of a clearly identifiable period. The peace process that Quandt details for us was one in which the United States, and specifically its presidents, played a critical role, often taking the lead in producing new ideas and proposals. It is a measure of the magnitude of the shift that occurred after 1992 that Israel and the PlO negotiated without U.S. involvement. But for the previous quarter century American presidents clearly took the initiative, as Quandt so ably demonstrates . Perhaps because of the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel, or perhaps because of the obligations incumbent on a superpower that takes its role seriously, or perhaps because its own interests were at stake, the United States undertook responsibilities for Middle East peacemaking that no other nation could or would. Hence it is reasonable to chronicle these vitally important events from the American perspective. Nevertheless we do miss the perspectives of the Israelis and the various Arab actors. In any event, even after the 1993 Israeli-PlO Declaration of Principles, it is important to have an authoritative record of what went before, at least as seen from Washington. It has been well understood for years that each U.S. president from Nixon onward tried to produce some kind of innovative contribution to the peace process, usually during his first year in office. This is the time when presidents are best able to accomplish something, whether domestically or internationally. By the second year there...

Israeli Politics and Middle East Peacemaking

Israel, Henry Kissinger once remarked, has no foreign policy, only domestic politics. Although this remark involves an obvious oversimplification, it does raise an interesting question about the relationship between the two in Israel. While domestic politics influence foreign policy in all countries, the impact of the first on the second is particularly profound in Israel, where the questions of national identity involved in foreign policy weigh more heavily on the public mind than they generally do elsewhere. The relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy is not a one-way street. Just as internal politics influence foreign policy decisions, developments in the external sphere feed into the domestic political scene in a never-ending process. The purpose of this article is to examine the interplay between domestic politics and Middle East peacemaking since the June 1992 elections brought Labor back to power after fifteen years of Likud dominance. The main focus is the eventful period from the signing of the Israel-PLO accord on 13 September 1993 to the signing of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty on 26 October 1994.

Israeli Politics and Middle East Peacemaking

Israeli Politics and Middle East Peacemaking

Failed Attempts: The Lausanne Conference, 1949: A Case Study in Middle East Peacemaking. . Neil Caplan.

Failed Attempts: The Lausanne Conference, 1949: A Case Study in Middle East Peacemaking. . Neil Caplan.

The geopolitics of Arab‐Israeli diplomacy in the 1990s: Security, territory and peace

Abstract Both the United States and Israel will have to approach the question of Middle East peacemaking and regional stability in the years ahead in the context of reduced American military capabilities. The inevitable impact of a declining U.S. presence overseas is to make regional stability far more dependent on the quality of regional military balances. This article assesses Israeli security requirements and negotiating positions in light of this changing strategic environment. Due to a number of Arab‐Israeli force asymmetries, the Israeli need for secure borders will be much more difficult to accomplish in negotiations on the West Bank and Golan Heights than it was for the Sinai. What becomes central in diplomacy is flexibility and the ability of both Israel and the United States to adjust their policies in accordance with the realities they face in the region.

A Tale of Two Cities: The Rhodes and Lausanne Conferences, 1949

The opening of the Madrid peace conference at the end of October 1991 has been accompanied by a number of attempts to look into historical precedents to search out lessons for successful mediation and conflict resolution in the future.2 Recently, in addition to Madrid, the words and have become more recognizable in political discussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While not yet as familiar as Camp David, each of these cities has come to denote not just a venue for past negotiations, but also, loosely: (a) a procedural approach to peace talks; (b) a particular agenda; and (c) an outcome that became a reference point-positive or negative-to each of the attending parties. This article offers a summary of the talks at Rhodes and Lausanne based on recently released archival materials [see Note on Sources]. It also attempts to illustrate some of the patterns that emerge with regard to such international attempts at Middle East peacemaking: the coaxing of parties to the table; the careful maneuvering by the principal parties; the strategies used by the mediators in pursuit of consensus; and the recurring cycle of stalemates leading to a resort to outside-mainly U.S.-pressure.