Michael Oakeshott Research Articles

Michael Oakeshott and the Postulates of Individuality

Michael Oakeshott provides the best articulation of the widespread view that the moral foundations of the modern state limit it to the defense and maintenance of a system of formal rules governing individuals and non-state enterprises. While this understanding of the proper relation between individual and state has been challenged by liberals of a more Rawlsian persuasion, these criticisms have persuaded few to change their minds, as they rest upon assumptions that are plainly incompatible with the view under consideration. I argue that, rightly understood, central and attractive features of Oakeshott’s own conception of understanding, philosophy, individuality, and education lead to significantly different conclusions than those embraced by Oakeshott himself. The “morality of individuality” upon which Oakeshott rests his strict restrictions on the use of state power requires that we be open to the use of that power to guarantee that all receive the education postulated by individuality.

Human Rights Indicators and the Sovereignty of Technique

Indicators are increasingly used in international human rights monitoring, and time, expertise and resources are being devoted in ever-growing quantities to the production of more apparently powerful and sophisticated ways to objectively measure human rights performance. However, there is a certain level of resistance and scepticism to the statistical measurement of human rights on the part of many practitioners and advocates, who argue that it is reductionist and disruptive to their work. This article uses the writing of Michael Oakeshott as a lens through which to examine the shift towards indicators and argues that it is a project that is strongly characterized by rationalism: a desire for certainty, uniformity and clarity that neglects the experiential, tacit, and conversational. This not only provides a method for analysing the dangers present in the phenomenon but also explains why the reliance on indicators and other measurement methods seems destined to grow despite the reservations held by practitioners and scholars alike.

Intimations of Oakeshott: A critical reading of his ‘Notebooks, 1922–86’

The nature and worth of Michael Oakeshott’s contribution as a political thinker have long been the subject of deep disagreement within the community of Anglophone political theory. This is partly the product of a partial familiarity with Oakeshott’s corpus. During his lifetime, his body of published work had a rather slender appearance, comprising two major monographs, separated by some forty years, and two rather more accessible collections of essays on politics and history. Following his death in 1990, however, a much larger body of writings has become available. In particular, with the publication of his Notebooks, we are afforded the chance to form a nuanced and informed understanding of how the thinking in his texts interconnected, and to appreciate the range of intellectual influences and political preoccupations that characterised his work.

Michael Oakeshott and Hayden White on the practical and the historical past

Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between the practical and the historical past has been the focus of much discussion in contemporary theory of history. This is primarily due to Hayden White’s appeal to Oakeshott’s distinction in several recent works. However, the philosophical underpinnings of Oakeshott’s distinction are seldom discussed. This essay provides a philosophical elaboration and critique of both Oakeshott’s distinction and White’s use of it. Oakeshott’s distinction is expounded as an integral part of his idealist philosophy. My contention is that in order to properly understand the distinction, we must first understand Oakeshott’s theories about different modes of understanding to which different kinds of past belong. Besides comparing White and Oakeshott, this essay will also develop a critique of the distinction between history and practice. The main claim of the essay is that there are important internal connections between history and practice that Oakeshott’s distinction neglects. In conclusion, I argue that the ethical and existential dimension of history can only be appreciated by dissolving Oakeshott’s absolute distinction between the practical and the historical past.

Michael Oakeshott’s Cold War Liberalism. Edited by Terry Nardin. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. 197p. $90.00 cloth.

Michael Oakeshott’s Cold War Liberalism. Edited by Terry Nardin. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. 197p. $90.00 cloth.

Conceptions of Reinhart Koselleck's Theory of Historical Time in the Thinking of Michael Oakeshott

SUMMARYIn recent years students of politics have begun to recognise Reinhart Koselleck's practice of Begriffsgeschichte, the study of conceptual history, as a useful approach for investigating key concepts in political ideologies and the history of ideas. But his theory of historical time—the temporal dimension to his semantic project and his broader theorising of the historical discipline—is often overlooked and underused as a heuristic device. By placing the thinking of Michael Oakeshott alongside Koselleck's theory of historical time, this article brings his thinking on temporality to the forefront, fashioning a conversation between the two thinkers about the place for history and the formal criteria necessary for ordering the past properly. In doing so, it juxtaposes Koselleck's reflections on historicity and his theory of historical time with Oakeshott's philosophical enquiry on the historical mode of understanding. It identifies important convergences and divergences between the two thinkers' theories, focusing in particular on questions regarding the potential for representing the past as multilayered and plural historical times. The article then suggests that their respective thoughts on the theory of history are in part a reaction to the modern politicisation of historical time and comprise a shared critique of radical political change.

Namier, Zionism and the Palestine question: a case study of objectivity, truth and balance in the writing of history

Lewis Namier was one of the best known and most respected historians of the first half of the twentieth century and beyond, noted for his stubborn pursuit of objectivity, truth and historical balance. This article offers a survey of Namier’s attitude to Zionism and the Palestine Question, and considers the extent to which he and a number of his friends and admirers were able to maintain such objectivity, truth and historical balance in the face of the threat posed to them and to others by the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe in the inter war years and the resulting holocaust. The answer, not surprisingly, is: not very far. Though a number of philosophers of history might well argue that, in this particular case at least, questions of objectivity, truth and balance were not relevant, as the case Namier makes for Jewish emigration to Palestine was essentially practical (as defined by Michael Oakeshott in his Experience and Its Modes, 1933 and On History, 1983) and not historical (again as defined by Oakeshott in the same books).

On Michael Oakeshott: Scepticism and rationalism in politics

Although he is often included in the Pantheon of Conservative thinkers, Oakeshott has much to teach the modern left, says Andrew Gamble. He examines Oakeshott's politics of scepticism, whereby sustainable and well-adapted state institutions arise from experimentation and contingency rather than any grand political project.

Michael Oakeshott and the conversation of modern political thought

Michael Oakeshott and the conversation of modern political thought

O conceito epistemológico de passado para professores de história

O texto apresenta parte dos resultados da investigação de doutorado intitulado “A Significância do Passado para Professores de História”.Os sujeitos são dezessete professores de História de dez colégios de Ensino Médio na cidade de Curitiba-PR, atuantes no quadro próprio do Magistério. O objetivo foi identificar como os professores entendem o conceito epistemológico de passado. Apresenta e categoriza as respostas dos professores sobre as ideias de passado em seis grupos: passado estático, passado para criar empatia, passado como memória, passado para memorização, passado exemplar e passado para orientação.O suporte teórico de análise e investigação desenvolvido por Michael Oakeshott (2003) e David Lowenthal (1989, 1998) que fundamentam as análises sobre o conceito de passado. JörnRüsen (2001, 2007a, 2007b) é o autor responsável pelo referencial teórico sobre a Educação Histórica e consciência histórica. Jacques Le Goff (1992) auxiliou a construção da categoria relacionada à memória e a memorização, Peter Lee (2003) e Maria Auxiliadora Schmidt (2010) auxiliaram na elaboração da categoria de empatia com o passado. A categorização apresenta resultados que podem contribuir para a discussão sobre como o professor de História compreende a epistemologia da sua ciência de referência.

Michael Oakeshott and the conversation of modern political thought

Michael Oakeshott and the conversation of modern political thought

Rationalism and the Rule of Law: Michael Oakeshott and the American Constitutional Order

AbstractMany commentators have mentioned the fact that Michael Oakeshott describes the American founding as a “Rationalist” project. But there has been little careful investigation into the actual character of his criticisms. This essay first considers the critique on its own terms before turning to an examination of the alternative that Oakeshott recommends, which is designated “the rule of law.” Several observations emerge from this analysis. First, Oakeshott’s concept of Rationalism still has purchase in the present day. Second, it can be applied to contemporary American law and politics as a way of illuminating certain widespread political tendencies. And finally, it is possible both to appropriate his critique and simultaneously to moderate it such that it proves beneficial for thinking about our current political situation in the United States.

Abating contingency

This article investigates the liberal political implications of Michael Oakeshott’s political theory of civility and civil association by focusing on his judicious attempts to abate contingency. It argues that Oakeshott’s political theory can be best understood as ‘political pluralism’, aimed at the maximalist accommodation of abundant and fluctuating human pluralities, individual and associational. By reinterpreting Oakeshott as a defender of civil society, composed of numerous purposive associations, against state-imposed monism, it argues that in Oakeshott’s theory civil association is devised to protect associational freedom, thereby keeping civil society as free as possible. It then discusses the distinctiveness of Oakeshott’s characteristically ‘liberal’ political theory by critically engaging it with two dominant strands of liberalism, namely, liberal pluralism and political liberalism.

Michael Oakeshott’s Skepticism

In the debate about Michael Oakeshott’s philosophy there is very little agreement on the theoretical and historical meaning of his skepticism. Starting from the assumption that skepticism is not a fixed theory but a tradition of ideas, this article draws on both published texts and archival materials to contend that Oakeshott developed his thought by confronting himself with, and even merging, different strands of skepticism: the ancient, the modern, as represented by Hobbes and Montaigne, and the idealist, as conceived by F. H. Bradley. The article firstly shows Oakeshott’s awareness of ancient skepticism, even though its impact on his thought is contested and controversial. With regard to modern skepticism, it looks at how Oakeshott defines Hobbes’s skepticism in his “Introduction to Leviathan.” It also examines the relevance of Montaigne to Oakeshott’s image of conversation, his idea of human agency and conception of politics. Finally, the article illustrates the influence of Bradley’s skepticism on Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy and reveals the consistency between Oakeshott’s skepticism and idealism. What emerges is a complex picture, in which Oakeshott’s skepticism is a constellation of elements taken from a variety of sources.

Defence, Civil Honour, and Artificial Will

Three influential interpreters – Michael Oakeshott, Leo Strauss, and Carl Schmitt – note that Hobbes’s sovereign is tasked with containing the natural wills of subjects for the sake of civil peace. Yet Hobbes’s sovereign also has a mandate to govern or use his subjects for collective defence, and each suggest that the political-psychological means to ensure submission preclude and prevent the contribution of subjects towards collective ends, which would render Hobbes’s commonwealth near indefensible. This paper will argue instead that Hobbes does envision a way his sovereign could harness potentia publica: the sovereign must also instil an artificial will through civil honour, an artificial will that is necessary for the defence of the commonwealth.

Leisure and Play: The Way of A Hopeful Life

Leisure and play are the cause and nature of Christian hope. Both address the world’s woundedness, needs, and desires by creating time and space for dignity, freedom, and stillness. This is my argument, and I will look at Josef Pieper’s Leisure, The Basis of Culture to show how leisure is a stillness in which human beings realize their importance within the harmony of the cosmos and the divine. Leisure allows humans to be receptive to the grace of God, and it gives them hope for what the fulfillment of God’s kingdom looks like. I will also look at the political philosopher, Michael Oakeshott, who wrote the essay “Work and Play.” From here, I will show how play coupled with leisure gives human beings hope because there are some activities done for their own sake because they are good in themselves. Human beings in their wounds, needs, and desires think that work, utility, and possession are what will fill their lacks. In reality, according to Oakeshott, a life solely dominated by work, utility, and possession ends up exacerbating these lacks because no fulfillment ever comes–the lack and desires only deepen and expand. It is like a man paying off his debt with more debt: the obligation to keep working to pay what you owe only expands and enslaves you to work more. Thus, leisure and play are the cause for Christian hope because they are done for their own sake. They heal wounds and fulfill human being’s deepest desires for dignity, love, and meaning.

Michael Oakeshott’s political philosophy of civil association and constructivism in International Relations

This article shows the relevance of Oakeshott’s political philosophy for the contemporary constructivist debate in International Relations. First, the article argues that Oakeshott’s perspective stresses that political institutions are based on norms and relationships which result from human understanding. Second, it elaborates on Nicholas Rengger’s recent work and reveals that Oakeshott’s On Human Conduct presents considerations pertaining to international politics that are consistent with his broader political philosophy. These observations concern the nature of war, the historical role of colonialism and the evolution of international society. Third, this article discusses Terry Nardin’s notion of ‘practical association’ and Christian Reus-Smit’s criticism of it. It contends that international civil association is a relationship between states based on understood and socially constructed moral values and practices. Finally, the article claims that customary international law declares and reflects these values and practices. As such, it reveals that Oakeshott’s notion of authority and his theory of civil association illuminate the possibility of an international legal order without a legislative office. This is of particular relevance also because of the Hobbesian influence on Oakeshott. Overall, this article illustrates how Michael Oakeshott’s theory of civil association sheds light on the nature of international society and law.

Oakeshott on Practice, Normative Thought and Political Philosophy

This paper examines Michael Oakeshott's ideas on the relation between political philosophy and normative thought. To this end, some of the most controversial concepts of his thought are considered in the context of the philosophical debates that developed after the success of analytic philosophy and, in particular, of Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic. First, the paper argues that, in contrast to analytic and ordinary language thinkers, Oakeshott defends the legitimacy and the rationality of normative thinking. To this end, the importance of the Oakeshottian concepts of tradition and moral practice is stressed, and the controversial notion of ‘pursuit of intimations’ is considered. Through a discussion of Oakeshott's unpublished notes, the relevance of Aristotle for the development of his thought is also highlighted. Second, the paper contends that Oakeshott sees political philosophy as a critical activity aiming at universal concepts. At the same time, the paper stresses the Oakeshottian distinction between political philosophy and normative thought. With this discussion as a background, the paper finally discusses some of the controversies provoked by Oakeshott's position.

Michael Oakeshott ve Radikal Demokrasi

Michael Oakeshott, one of the most influential theoreticians of the twentieth century, has been brought to the forefront surprisingly by a strand in democratic theory that advocates the radicalization of democracy. What is interesting is that Chantal Mouffe, the leading theoretician of the project of radical democracy argues that Oakeshott, who is known as one of the symbolic names of the conservative thought, could make an important contribution to their project. In doing that Mouffe is aware of the incongruence between their approaches but nevertheless she insists that Oakeshott’s conceptual and theoretical framework can be incorporated into radical democracy. As this article shows, the most important parallelism between the two approaches is their concern with individual and his/her life choices and with the danger and/or impossibility of politics of uniformity as well as their focus on the general rules that are supposed to regulate the intersection between the public and private. But they seriously diverge in their approach to the processes through which these rules emerge, in short, to the concept of politics: while Oakeshott has a consensus-oriented conception of politics which has no particular reference to the conflicts, antagonisms, unequal power relations or hegemony Mouffe’s conceptualization of politics is built completely on these phenomena. This in turn leads us to argue that these two approaches are indeed too different to be brought together or that the effort to bridge them is far from being persuading, since this pair seems artificial.

A History of Experiences and Thinking Men. The History of Political Thought according to Michael Oakeshott

Michael Oakeshott conceives the history of European political thought as a structuring of ideas and arguments of the practical experience aimed to understanding political expressions in vogue in the culture of a people. It is not a continuous and cumulative history of abstract and disembodied ideas, as it is wrongly conceived, but of some men who thought politics in a certain way on the basis of the language and of the set of actions, moral beliefs and contingencies of the people which they belong to. The article highlights the comparison between Oakeshott, Quentin Skinner and Gianfranco Miglio on the search for the most appropriate method to be applied in the study of the history of political thought.