Reviewed by: Warfare and Logistics along the US–Canadian Border during the War of 1812 by Christopher Dishman Don Hickey (bio) Keywords War of 1812, Canada, Maritime history Warfare and Logistics along the US–Canadian Border during the War of 1812. By Christopher Dishman. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2021. Pp. 352. Cloth, $39.95.) It is well-known that armies travel on their stomachs, but that doesn't mean that nations going to war are always prepared to adequately support their troops in the field. When the theaters of operation are numerous and remote, the problem of supply is magnified. In the War of 1812, there were arguably as many as ten theaters: Four in the Canadian–American borderlands (Lake Erie–Detroit River, Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence River, and the Richelieu River–Lake Champlain corridor); three on the Atlantic seaboard (Maine, the Chesapeake Bay, and the Georgia coast); another on the Gulf Coast (that included Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans); the St. Louis theater in the West; and, finally, the high seas. Although the British had to send men and materiel across the Atlantic, they had deep pockets and plenty of wartime experience and thus had a well-developed and well-financed system of supply. Even so, they had trouble supporting operations in the West, especially at Detroit and New Orleans. For the United States, the distances were more manageable, but without an established system of supply and the money to support it, their challenges were no less daunting. As a result, despite the successes of the British early in the war and of the Americans later on, the outcome on the battlefield was inconclusive. In his new book, Christopher Dishman, an independent scholar who cut his teeth on the Battle of Monterrey in the Mexican War, examines the war along the Canadian–American border. Not unreasonably, Dishman treats the four theaters as an integrated whole. Although the title, preface, and dust jacket promise that this work will take a deep dive into the logistics of the war, he offers little more on that important and underserved subject than one finds in any study of the battles and campaigns. There is some material on logistics in the opening chapter, but that is far from complete and serves as little more than a teaser for what should have followed. This work is instead a conventional narrative. Dishman is a newcomer to the field of 1812 studies, and he brings to the project a fresh set of eyes. This is often a plus because the author is unencumbered by the traditional narrative. For 1812 studies, Alan Taylor's The [End Page 627] Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (New York, 2010) is a good example of the freshness that a newcomer can bring to the table. The great strength of Dishman's work is that he offers readers a tight and coherent treatment of Canadian–American theaters in this conflict, and it was here, after all, that the war was going to be won or lost. Although the United States went to war to force the British to give up certain maritime practices—restricting and looting American trade under the authority of the Orders-in-Council and impressing American seamen from American merchant vessels—the only way the new nation could put any pressure on Britain to change these policies was by targeting Canada. In theory, this meant seizing Canada and holding it for ransom on the maritime issues, although in practice what the fate of Canada would have been had the United States actually conquered it is unknown. In any case, the young republic failed to take Canada, and in truth conquering it was probably beyond its means. If so, then this war was unwinnable and probably never should have been undertaken. Better, perhaps, to simply endure the insults and injuries until the end of the war in Europe eliminated them. The principal weakness of Dishman's work is that he is treading a well-worn path, and while he does a good job of drawing together material from a wide variety of sources, there isn't much here that most students of...