Metaphysics Of Objects Research Articles

Mental Causes

The question I shall consider is whether there are any mental causes, that is, whether there is anything which is both a state of mind and a cause of other mental or physical happenings. The obvious common-sense answer to this question is Yes. In ordinary discourse (that is, outside philosophy and psychology) we constantly refer to human actions and experiences in what appears to be causal language; we seem to be saying that some states of mind are causes of other states of mind, and of some bodily activities. Sometimes we do this by using the word ‘cause’ itself— ‘His driving into the ditch was caused by his seeing a child run into the road’, ‘The cause of his silence was his wish to protect his friend’. More often we use expressions which in physical contexts are admittedly causal— ‘A glimpse of the look on her face made him hesitate’, ‘Ambition was the driving force of his career’. Most philosophers have taken for granted the genuineness of these causal attributions. But recently it has been frequently denied that any state of mind can be properly described as the cause either of other states of mind or of physical occurrences, at any rate if by a state of mind one means a state of consciousness. Some philosophers who deny this are materialists, advocates of the Unity of Science. They believe that everything that happens in the universe can be causally accounted for by reference to a single set of fundamental laws, the laws of physics, and since a state of consciousness is not, as such, a physical state of any kind, it cannot have a place in the causal explanation of any event, and must be an epiphenomenon. Others are believers in an indeterminist interpretation of human freedom, and hold that o t introduce the category of cause and effect into the explanation of human actions is to deny that there is any genuine free will. I shall not be concerned with either of these general metaphysical objections, neither of which convinces me; but I shall consider some more specific objections to the admission of particular sorts of mental causes.

In Defense of Étienne Gilson: Concerning a Recent Book about Thomistic Metaphysics

REVIEW ARTICLE IN DEFENSE OF ETIENNE GILSON: CONCERNING A RECENT BOOK ABOUT THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS 1 H THE attempt to proceed 'existentially' in the Gilsonian sense, is based upon a doctrinaire transformation of metaphysics into theology, a transformation which is applied by assuming knowledge concerning God in order to present the dubious interpretations of the quinquae viae as discoveries of His existence." Such is the conclusion of a contemporary critic of Gilson's concept of St. Thomas' philosophy.2 What is this "Gilsonian concept" so far as metaphysics and God are concerned? It is, according to this critic, the notion that Godipsum esse-is" the true object of metaphysics." 3 Does Gilson hold this? Yes, if "object" be taken in the sense of end, definitely not if taken in the sense of subject. For Gilson expressly acknowledges "the distinction between natural theology, in which God is considered as cause of the subject of metaphysics (viz., being), and revealed theology (viz., Scripture), in which God Himself is the 1 Thomas C. O'Brien, 0. P., Ph. D., Metaphysics and the Existence of God: A Reflexion on the Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics , Washington 17, D. C., The Thomist Press, 2nd printing, 1960. This book has been reviewed briefly by Fr. Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., in The New Scholasticism, Vol. XXXVI, no. 2, April, 1962, pp. 2.50-253. More about this review later. (Also see note 2, below.) 2 Fr. O'Brien, op. cit., p. 262. In this paper I am primarily concerned with Section II of this book, entitled " The Question of God's Existence Among Contemporary Thomists," and, within this Section, I deal only with what I take to be the crux of the criticism that the author levels against the position of Etienne Gilson (and other Thomistic " existentialists ") as to the fundamental nature of the relationship between metaphysics and the existence of God. Fr. Owens' review has been objected to by Fr. William A. Wallace, 0. P. (The New Scholasticism, Vol. XXXVI, no. 4, Oct., 1962, pp. 529-531) as "misrepresenting Fr. O'Brien's teaching," and as "obscuring the basic issue at stake in the controversy," viz., the so-called Gilsonian School's misinterpretation of St. Thomas. Fr. Wallace's allegations are substantially the same as those of Fr. O'Brien. It is the object of this paper to assess their validity objectively. 3 Op. cit., p. 94. 378 874 JAMES F. ANDERSON very subject of that science." 4 And Gilson here cites St. Thomas' Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate (V, 4), where this wellknown distinction is made by the Angelic Doctor himself. True, Gilson does speak 5 of the "inner reordering of metaphysics by the final causality of its ultimate object" so that it becomes necessarily and by full right scientia divina. But he nowhere says that God becomes the very subject of metaphysics or of philosophical theology. It is perfectly true, as Fr. O'Brien remarks,6 that since God is attained as principle of the subject of metaphysics, viz., being-incommon , metaphysical knowledge concerning Him is formally and exclusively knowledge about Him as this principle. On this point, repeatedly stressed by the author, there should be no disagreement among Thomists. Indeed I know of no Thomist who does not subscribe to this doctrine. Nor do I see how one could call himself a " Thomist " without doing so. (It is true that Gilson, and likeminded Thomists, do not stress the point because of their interest in the "inner reordering " of the whole of first philosophy to the knowledge of God-the emphasis is expressly upon final causality). While Gilson maintains this teaching, he nevertheless forcefully underscores the simple Thomistic point that God could not be the primary principle of being-in-common were He not Being itself. Of course this is not only Gilson's point, it is St. Thomas'. The Angelic Doctor says, for example: "that which is said by essence is the cause of all things that are said by participation. . . . But God is a being-by-essence because He is Being itself (ipsum esse). Every other being, however, is a being-by-participation.... Therefore God is the cause...

Plato's Atlantis Myth: "Timaeus" or "Critias"?

IN recent attempts to date the Timaeus, comparatively little attention has been paid to its companion piece, the Critias.l The usual procedure is to study the Timaeus intensively, and to look at the Critias in passing, either to verify certain conclusions formed concerning the Timaeus, or to point to it as the unexpected vehicle of an even more surprising political novella, the Atlantis myth. This perfunctory treatment of the Critias, which will be found to prevail in practically all general works on Plato, is connected with the assumption, tacit and therefore, I believe, unchallenged, that the Critias was written after the completion of the Timaeus. And indeed, it is a most natural assumption. In the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus we have a trilogy which apparently was planned in the order in which we print the dialogues today; just so the Timaeus, Critias, and a supposedly planned Hermocrates must have formed another trilogy. The guess appears to become a virtual certainty when we look at the introductory section of the Critias which clearly alludes to the Timaeus as the dialogue which preceded it. And yet, once we look a little more carefully at that introductory section, we find a detail that will disturb us. Timaeus ends his speech (106a) which, he says, dealt with the god who has long existed, i.e., the cosmos, the universe, the object of natural science and metaphysics. Now Critias takes over; and the first thing he says is that it is more difficult to talk about men than about gods, and that therefore he must ask his audience for more tolerance and forbearance than had been required in the case of Timaeus. Here is the gist of his words: It is easier to talk about the gods than about men. We are satisfied with an approximate portrayal of the earth and mountains and rivers and woods and the whole ouranos and the things which are and circulate around it. But if someone tries to portray our own bodies, then we sharply criticize omissions and mistakes in the picture (107a 7-d 5). The obvious implication of this passage is that human bodies, and men in general, have not been described in the Timaeus. But equally obviously, that just is not so; as much as a third of the Timaeus as we

Abstraction and the Distinction of the Sciences

ION AND THE DISTINCTION OF THE SCIENCES !\.RECENT author 1 has treated of abstraction in regard to its objective basis and to the division of the speculative sciences. He notes that moderate realism requires an objective basis for the abstractive process of the intellect, and asserts that this basis can be found in the real composition of distinct principles which are combined in sensory things. There will be as many orders of abstraction as there are of real composition in these things. Three orders of composition can be found in sensory things, namely, the composition of substance with accidents, the composition of substantial form with primary matter, and the composition of essence with existence. In each of these three orders there is an act or formal principle combined with a potential subject, although both subject and form are diverse in the distinct cases, not similar. It is asserted that in regard to each of these three orders the intellect is able to grasp an act or formal principle apart from this or that potency. Thus there are three ascending orders of abstraction from sensory matter, each of which has a basis in objective reality, and according to which there is an increasingly deeper penetration of sensory being by the inquiring mind. It is suggested that the usual ordering of physical and mathematical abstraction is defective and should be the reverse. The real composition of substance with accident is the basis newly proposed for the abstraction which should be regarded as of the first degree. This composition is the more superficial, and yet it is the basis for the abstraction by which we attain the object of mathematical science. The real compo1 F. S. Connolly, "Science vs. Philosophy," The Modem Schoolman, XXIX (1952), 197-209; " Abstraction and Moderate Realism," The New Scholaaticism, XXVII, No. I, (1958), 72-90. 48 44 WILLIAM H. KANE sition of the substantial form with primary matter is the basis proposed for the second degree of abstraction, by which we attain the object of the philosophy of nature. This science is not very extensive, because there is only a small number of natural species to be· known philosophically. Modern natural science is distinct from the philosophy of nature, because it is merely empirical and schematic knowledge, and is not science in the Aristotelian sense of the term. The real composition of essence with existence is the basis proposed for a third degree of abstraction, by which we attain the object of metaphysics. Finally, the author inquires why St. Thomas was unable to correlate the three degrees of abstraction and the three kinds of speculative science with the distinct orders of real composition in sensory things, a correlation which seems to be demanded by moderate realism. To the present writer it seems that St. Thomas has clearly answered all of these and many other pertinent questions in his explanation of the fifth and sixth questions of the work On the Trinity by Boethius.2 But because this doctrine which St. Thomas explains and defends is not well known or well understood , we shall try to interpret it and apply it to the problems raised above. In doing so we shall depart somewhat from the order of the articles in the commentary by St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor first proves that there are three and only three kinds or genera of speculative science, and then he proceeds to defend; characterize and compare the knowledge attained in each. For the present purpose we shall consider first what it is to abstract, and why we abstract. Then we shall try to see what is required for the validity of abstract knowledge, and finally what it is that distinguishes the different sciences. ABSTRACTION To abstract, says St. Thomas,8 is to consider separately things which are not really separated but are conjoined in reality. We abstract because we are not able to know things perfectly in • In Boet. de Trin. (ed. Paul Wyser. 0. P.; Fribourg, 1948). 3 Ibid., q. 5, a. S; II Physic., lect. S. ABSTRACTION AND THE DISTINCTION OF THE SCIENCES 45 their wealth of detail and intelligibility in a single act of knowing . What we cannot do in...

Illicit Naturalizing of Religion

1. The discussion starts with four propositions: (1) that we are bound to think about religion; (2) that the usual result of thinking about religion is to naturalize it; (3) that religion resists being naturalized; (4) that we cannot let religion go. 2. Starting from the fundamental experience of religion, viz, worship, it is discovered that worship (1) secures freedom, by breaking through the determinisms of habit, mood, and thought; (2) promotes the meeting of minds in such a way as to make differences of view fruitful instead of merely combative. 3. Although worship promotes useful ends in human social life, it must not be made a mere means to a utilitarian end. It demands a metaphysical object of worship. To leave religion with merely psychological attitudes or social task is illicitly to naturalize it. The object of worship must be worthy of worship; it must be God. 4. The existence of evil is the chief obstacle to objective worship. The refusal to be content to let evil remain an unexplained fact in...