Metaphysical Theory Research Articles

An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds

This paper defends an ontology of weak entity realism for homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theories of natural kinds, adapted from Bird’s (Synthese 195(4):1397–1426, 2018) taxonomy of such theories. Weak entity realism about HPC kinds accepts the existence of natural kinds. Weak entity realism denies two theses: that (1) HPC kinds have mind-independent essences, and that (2) HPC kinds reduce to entities, such as complex universals, posited only by metaphysical theories. Strong entity realism accepts (1) and (2), whereas moderate entity realism accepts only (1). Given its commitment to (2), strong entity realism is more theoretically complex than weak entity realism, with little explanatory payoff. Given their commitment to (1), moderate and strong entity realisms cannot explain how the identity conditions of HPC kinds are to be straightforwardly knowable. I argue that weak entity realism avoids such epistemic difficulties. I further rebut two plausible criticisms of weak entity realism, namely that weak entity realism cannot account for quantification over kinds, and that weak entity realism cannot provide identity conditions for HPC kinds which are both scientifically useful and objective. Given the theoretical costs of strong and moderate entity realism, and weak entity realism’s adequate response to its most plausible challenges, weak entity realism about HPCs is to be preferred, especially for biological and chemical kinds.

Metafísica da informação em um quadro referencial tridimensional

O objetivo deste estudo é expandir um dos assuntos que desenvolvi em minha pesquisa doutoral e apontar desenvolvimentos que ampliem o valor filosófico do tópico. A tarefa consiste em pavimentar o terreno para a construção de uma teoria metafísica tridimensional, centrada no conceito de informação. A primeira dimensão desta teoria é uma epistemologia informacional baseada nos levels of abstraction de Floridi. A segunda dimensão (semântico-pragmática) é baseada na filosofia da linguagem de Brandom e a terceira dimensão é baseada na ontologia de processo de Seibt. O resultado é um quadro referencial teórico metafísico versátil e dinâmico, que procura manter a eficiência do modelo metafísico clássico de propriedade-ente-substância, dotado de um núcleo metafísico da ontologia de processo. A tarefa de exposição desta teoria Floridi-Brandom-Seibt se divide em quatro etapas. Na primeira, darei uma definição geral de informação. Na segunda, definirei informação pragmática a partir do arcabouço conceitual elaborado por Robert Brandom. Estas duas etapas resultam de uma pesquisa parcialmente elaborada em minha tese. As duas etapas seguintes são um conjunto de reflexões que, até o momento, considero relevantes e profícuas possibilidades de desenvolvimento. A terceira etapa da exposição segue Luciano Floridi e propõe o deslocamento do conceito de informação como um produto de ações, desenvolvido na etapa anterior, para o papel de categoria central que constituirá a composição e compreensão do próprio mundo povoado por ações, entidades, eventos e processos. A quarta e última etapa desta reflexão procura vislumbrar o deus ex maquina da visão informacional de Floridi, revelando uma ontologia de processos como substrato último, de onde deve emergir o conceito de informação como tentativa de discretizar o continuum dos processos que perfaz a realidade.

Constitutionalizing nature’s law: dignity and the regulation of biotechnology in Switzerland

Abstract The Swiss Constitution was amended by referendum in 1992 to include two unique provisions: Article 119, which imposes strict limits on genetic and reproductive technologies in humans in order to protect ‘human dignity’, and Article 120, which commits the Swiss federal government to limiting genetic technologies in non-human species on the basis of the ‘dignity of the creature’. This article analyzes the role of ‘dignity’ as a limit on biotechnologies in the Swiss constitutional order. It concludes that the understanding of dignity the constitution embraces codifies a contestable metaphysical theory of value at the constitutional level. Specifically, the Swiss constitutional concept of dignity embraces the normative theory that the natural order is a source of moral value. Because this theory speaks directly to contested questions of the good life, Switzerland’s adoption of it as a constitutional principle is analogous to the adoption of a religious theory in a constitution. The concept of dignity as understood in the Swiss constitutional order is contrary to the commitment to epistemic humility characteristic of liberal constitutions.

Prinsip Hidup Kawruh Begja dalam Perspektif Anton Bakker

<p><em>This article outline aims to understand the principle of life in this kind of Javanese society based on Anton Bakker’s metaphysical theory. Describes the position of the Javanese as being there among other creators in a structure of reality. Javanese people in this context are assumed to have metaphysics, namely placing themselves as subjects as well as objects of metaphysics, and occupying a position as a being for themselves as well as being for others. The principle of kawruh thus is more dominant showing mental aspects in the form of the soul but, it is emphasized again that the soul and the body remain a unity of reality inseparable with their respective roles. The Javanese do not merely look at reality through their own perspective, but also look at the physical reality of the world outside themselves, then see the range of connectedness between themselves and the reality outside themselves.</em><em></em></p>

Comments on Nietzsche’s Constructivism by Justin Remhof

Justin Remhof defends a constructivist interpretation of Nietzsche’s view regarding the metaphysics of material objects. First, I describe an attractive feature of Remhof’s interpretation. Since Nietzsche seems to be a constructivist about whatever sort of value he accepts, a constructivist account of objects would fit into a nicely unified overall metaphysical theory. Second, I explore various options for developing the constructivist view of objects. Depending on how Nietzsche understood concepts, and whose concepts he saw as giving rise to objects, he could’ve had a variety of different constructivist accounts.

Super-Humeanism and physics: A merry relationship?

Humeanism started life as a metaphysical program that could turn out to be false if our best physical theories were to postulate ontological features at odds with Humean ones. However, even if this has arguably already happened, Humeanism is still considered one of the strongest and most appealing metaphysical theories for describing the physical world. What is even more surprising is that a radical Humean thesis—Super-Humeanism—which posits an extremely parsimonious ontology including nothing more than propertyless matter points and their distance relations, is said by its proponents to follow from an attentive reading of our best physical theories. Given its close relationship with physics, Super-Humeans argue that their doctrine (i) conforms to Scientific Realism, (ii) offers the ontology that best explains physics’ empirical evidence, and (iii) is a naturalistic theory. This paper investigates the strategies that Super-Humeans have adopted to defend these three claims and, more generally, its alleged closeness to physics. I will show that, contrary to what advocates of Super-Humeanism claim, some of its commitments have inevitably created a gap between itself and physics that is difficult to overcome. While it is laudable that Super-Humeans have adopted various strategies to close this gap, no strategy has yet fully succeeded.

Epistemology in African Thought: Theory and Language

This work presents epistemology in African thought system as it is informed by theory and language. Numerous problems faced in Africa on how we know what we know and the power of sustaining knowledge becomes clearer as we define knowledge in the question of ontology and metaphysics. The African nations have been termed as not been able to produce written historical documents until recent times. This thought seems to downgrade African theory of knowledge even with it deep seated languages of meaning. To foster an understanding of African theory of knowledge, we employ African epistemology in theory and in language which informed ontology and metaphysics. This work utilizes primary and secondary sources while deploying any useful materials and journals articles on African theory of knowledge, language, ontology and metaphysics. This study linked up the African theory of knowledge with historical search that connect African thought system as we found that African epistemology lies in and beneath the statuesque of African though system. We conclude that in the context of Africa epistemology in theory and language, each culture have a philosophical position that are articulated by its gifted individuals in any given society. Keywords: Epistemology, Theory, Knowledge, Language, Africa, Ontology, Metaphysics DOI: 10.7176/JLLL/69-04 Publication date: June 30th 2020

Abduction as a Method of Inductive Metaphysics

Abstract Like scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of creative abduction (sec. 1–2). Two rationality conditions are proposed that distinguish scientific from speculative abductions: achievement of unification and independent testability (sec. 3). Particularly important in science is common cause abduction (sec. 4). The justification of metaphysical realism is structurally similar to scientific abductions: external objects are justified as common causes of perceptual experiences (sec. 6). While the reliability of common cause abduction is entailed by a principle of (Markov) causality (sec. 5), the latter principle has an abductive justification based on statistical phenomena (sec. 7).

Against Metaphysical Structuralism

Abstract Inductive Metaphysics (IM) combines an anti-aprioristic emphasis on an empirical and scientific basis for metaphysics with an insistence on a specifically philosophical abductive theory-building. Since the latter specifically philosophical work is not empirical itself, it may in a liberal sense be called apriori. This paper highlights this apriori dimension within IM by a case study on Structuralism, the view that fundamental reality consists of a network of relations (and properties), which a number of philosophers consider to be suggested by modern physics. Focussing on Dasgupta’s algebraic Generalism, the author argues that Structuralism suffers from a severe entailment problem, because the relations-spanning apparatus must stand for metaphysically fundamental forms. Schaffer’s contention that there are no entailment problems is rejected. Advocates of IM are well advised to take seriously their own insistence on metaphysical abduction and not to one-sidedly emphasise the empirical input: the elaboration of exact metaphysical theories and the apriori evaluation of their inherent tenability is a constituent of IM no less important than the consideration of scientific input. More traditional ways of metaphysical reasoning inevitably survive as an essential dimension within IM.

The important of Ontology to Public Administration

Metaphysics, as we understand, is a philosophical enterprise that deals with the nature of the ultimate reality. However, this is a sweeping conception; we can say metaphysics, is concerned with the nature of reality as well as problems of existence which is more appropriately considered under ontological discussions. Thus, there have been questions on whether ontology has vital importance in human practical dealings. This paper aims to show the importance of ontology in administration. The work analysis some existing philosophers' postulation on the importance of ontology in public administration. This work agrees with most philosophers on the ontological abstract theories that have some bearing on the ethical and practical issues. It defends this position by analysing unique cases of humane administration; that metaphysical thesis, theories, and conceptions are equally important in resolving real-life cases. The research is carried out with the philosophical method of textual analysis.

Can We Know Substances? Suárez on a Sceptical Puzzle

AbstractIt has often been said that the knowability of substances became a problem in the early modern period, when anti‐Aristotelians doubted that we could know anything more than the sensory qualities that are present to us. This article argues that the late scholastic Aristotelian Francisco Suárez was already aware of this sceptical problem. On his view, substances are really (and not just modally) distinct from the perceivable qualities, and therefore cannot be known through sense perception. The article first examines the metaphysical theory that motivated him to defend this thesis. It then looks at the epistemological consequences he drew from it. Though he rejected direct knowledge of substances, he nevertheless conceded that knowledge can be obtained through a “discursive process”. The article explores this process, spelling out all the cognitive steps it involves. In particular, it analyses Suárez's explanation of how we produce special cognitive devices (the “intelligible species”) that enable us to represent substances. Finally, it assesses Suárez's solution to the knowability problem by comparing it to Locke's solution. It argues that metaphysical rationalism led him to posit substances: we need to accept them as active causes and bearers of qualities, although we have no direct access to them.

The Multi-location Trilemma

The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location—in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for (1) the location of immanent universals, (2) the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, (3) the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it (4) makes extended simples impossible.

The painful implications of four-dimensionalism

Summary This paper introduces two conceptions of persons and their pain(s). The “Naive Cartesian View” holds that persons are atomic, synchronically and diachronically unified entities that directly exemplify pain. While the “Four-dimensionalist View” holds that persons are non-atomic entities, whose pains are directly exemplified by their person-stages and only derivatively exemplified by the person. Two forms of “Four-dimensionalist View” are developed: “Cartesian Four-Dimensionalism”, and “Stage Four-Dimensionalism”. Against “Cartesian Four-Dimensionalism”, I argue that it (i) requires us to deny the moral permissibility of voluntarily chosen pains (ii) to believe that there more harms in the world than we thought, and (iii) it raises difficulties for our understanding of redemptive and pedagogical pains. Against “Stage Four-Dimensionalism”, I argue that it denies commonsense truths about punishment, compensation, and temporal neutrality, and well-being. The “Naive Cartesian View” avoids these difficulties, so we have reason to prefer it, and a metaphysical theory consistent with it.

Metaphysics to the rescue?: Four-dimensionalism and the twinning argument against conceptionism.

The view that human beings begin to exist at fertilization (namely conceptionism) faces a serious challenge from the twinning argument, that identical twins coming from the same zygote must be numerically distinct from the zygote and so did not exist at fertilization. Recently, some philosophers have claimed that the twinning argument rests on a particular metaphysical theory of persistence, namely endurantism, on which a human being, for example, is wholly present at every moment of her existence. And we can easily refute the argument, they claim, by employing perdurantism or exdurantism, according to which a human being is a temporally extended entity with temporal parts or a momentarily existing stage who has other momentarily existing stages as counterparts. I argue that such claims are mistaken. The twinning argument does not rest on endurantism and can be formulated in terms of perdurantism to provide a good reason for perdurantists to reject conceptionism. And exdurantism does not have any advantage in defending conceptionism either, for it already concedes more than what the twinning argument aims to show.

Essence and Explanation

In Necessary Beings, Bob Hale addresses two questions: What is the source of necessity? What is the source of our knowledge of it? He offers novel responses to them in terms of the metaphysical notion of nature or, more familiarly, essence. In this paper, I address Hale’s response to the first question. My assessment is negative. I argue that his essentialist explanation of the source of necessity suffers from three significant shortcomings. First, Hale’s leading example of an essentialist explanation merely asserts that the nature of an entity explains some necessity, but leaves unexplained how it does so. Second, his essentialist explanation of particular necessities introduces new necessities that remain unexplained. Third, Hale’s version of essentialism presupposes a controversial metaphysical theory of properties, for which he offers no defense.

The growth of knowledge through the resource-based view

Purpose The resource-based view (RBV) has not previously been conceptualized as a theoretical framework encompassing metaphysical and empirical perspectives. The purpose of this paper is to logically analyze the evolutionary process of the RBV, triggered by “rigidity.” It attempts to clarify the significance and limitations of the RBV. Design/methodology/approach Based on Popper’s methodological model of the growth of knowledge, the study analyzed and evaluated the evolution of the RBV. Findings The RBV has evolved in three phases. The sub-problems have changed through empirical testing on the basis of one metaphysical problem and one metaphysical theory. Thus, the evolution may indicate progress within one framework. However, during phase 3, the ambiguity of concept may inhibit the growth of knowledge. For further progress, it is necessary to overcome the vulnerability of the RBV’s metaphysical statements. Research limitations/implications This paper shows the possibility of the growth of knowledge within the RBV framework and for a new framework to emerge due to its limitations. It should contribute both theoretically and practically to the field of strategic management. Originality/value Popper’s model was used to examine a previously neglected topic, namely, the growth of knowledge in the evolution of the RBV. Moreover, considering “rigidity” as corresponding to a process of error elimination is a novel approach, clearly revealing the dynamism of the RBV’s evolution.

On What (In General) Grounds What

A generic grounding claim is a grounding claim that isn’t about any particular entity or fact. For example, consider the claim: an act is right in virtue of maximizing happiness. One natural idea is that generic grounding claims state mere regularities of ground. So if an act is right in virtue of maximizing happiness, then every possible right act is right in virtue of maximizing happiness. The generic claim generalizes over particular grounding relations. In this essay, I argue that this simple story is wrong. Generic grounding claims are not merely quantificational; rather, they express real definitions, where real definitions are (in part) claims about essence. My view has two major upshots: (i) it makes better sense of debates where generic grounding claims are at issue (like debates about moral laws); (ii) it clarifies the distinction between reductive and non-reductive metaphysical theories.

Reality, fundamentality, grounding (and cognate notions)

The notion of grounding is one of the central notions in the debates concerning ontological dependence in contemporary metaphysics and metametaphysics. In this paper we have carried out a comparative analysis of grounding, supervenience, reality, fundamentality, and cognate notions, and we have demonstrated what their role should be in the context of neo-Aristotelian hierarchical ontologies and the project of metaphysical foundationalism. We have also sketched out some basic outlines of what Kit Fine calls ?the pure logic of ground? by establishing certain formal desiderata which grounding ought to meet in order to successfully carry out its specific ontologico- explanatory role. It is finally shown that grounding suffers from similar problems and shortcomings as supervenience, and that a satisfactory solution of those problems cannot be found by looking to metaphysical primitivism according to which grounding is a sui generis, primitive and unanalysable notion which is nonetheless essential for metaphysics. Even though grounding might turn out to be an ?essentially contested concept?, in the end we suggest how the aforementioned problems might be met by means of holistic considerations of grounding within the broader context of the entire (meta)metaphysical theory.

Predication, Intentionality and Relative Essentialism

Relative essentialism is the novel metaphysical theory that there can be multiple objects occupying the same space at the same time each with its own de re modal truths. Relative essentialism is motivated by Davidson’s semantics and his denial that nature itself is divided into a privileged domain of objects. Relative essentialism was first presented by Samuel C. Wheeler. I argue that Wheeler’s approach to the Davidsonian program needs to be elaborated in terms of various types of preconceptual intentional relations. This elaboration is already largely implicit in Davidson’s own later work and in Wheeler’s relaunching of Davidsonian metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that relative essentialism is ultimately founded not on predication narrowly construed but on intentionality broadly construed. Following Wheeler’s suggestion, comparisons are made between relative essentialism and work within the phenomenological tradition.

Socio-Philosophical Aspects of the Neuro-Digital Noosphere Formation and Development

At present there is more than half of the world population who is currently using the Internet, due to which it seems relevant to develop not only technical, but also humanitarian and metaphysical views and theories that can serve the basis for the analysis of this phenomenon. The aim of these areas of studies should be rethinking of the role and place of man in the structure of modern society, as well as the role and place of the society in human life. The methodology for these processes comprehension lies in the plane of ontology, social philosophy and anthropology, based on the integration of the latter with cybernetics and mathematics, synergetics and mathematical modeling. Systemic and historical methods are inevitably capable of synthesizing the results of such a methodological approach, leading to the appearance of neologisms, the explication of new notions that most adequately reflect the essence of modern processes. The article illustrates a number of phenomena that should be studied with the aim of forming a person not as an object, but as a subject of global digital communication.