Reading in the huge literature addressed to the issues surrounding intentional contexts it is easy to lose sight of what is at stake in the controversy. In what follows I attempt to isolate some of these stakes and provide an account of propositional attitudes which, if I am right, salvages them from intensionality. I do not attempt a general treatment of intentional contexts although there are obvious connections between what I say about the propositional attitudes and other apparent instances of intensionality. The theory I propose owes much to Wittgenstein (of the Tractatus) and Russell, though more by way of inspiration than developed idea. Kaplan's influence may also be detected here and there, although I reject many of the notions which seem to play a central role in his work on propositional attitudes. The main line I adopt is a defense of that which I take to be crucial to extensionalism. So I begin by arguing for its centrality and its plausibility. I next turn to the development of my proposal, sketching it against the background of ideas of Russell and Wittgenstein. Finally, I try to show how my proposal both keeps the propositional attitudes extensional and explains their apparent intensionality. In doing this I also show how we may, adopting my account, preserve some of our intuitions about some of the attitudes-particularly belief. In much of what follows I take a frankly metaphysical stance. While some have attempted metaphysical neutrality on these issues, this seems not merely hopeless but unnecessary. These are, after all, at their deepest level metaphysical problems. So I will start by showing how that is.