Metaphysical Indeterminacy Research Articles

Structural Indeterminacy

The threat of ontological deflationism (the view that disagreement about what there is can be non‐substantive) is averted by appealing to realism about fundamental structure—or so tells us Ted Sider. In this paper, the notion of structural indeterminacy is introduced as a particular case of metaphysical indeterminacy; then it is argued that structural indeterminacy is not only compatible with a metaphysics of fundamental structure, but it can even safeguard it from a crucial objection; finally, it is shown that, if there are instances of structural indeterminacy, a hitherto unacknowledged variety of ontological deflationism will arise. Unless structure is shown to be determinate, ontological deflationism remains a live option. Furthermore, I will consider whether structural indeterminacy could be challenged by adopting a naturalistic epistemology of structure; the question is answered in the negative on the basis of a formal result concerning theory choice. Finally, I submit a new way of articulating the epistemology of structure, which hinges on the very possibility of structural indeterminacy.

INDETERMINATEZZA METAFISICA E MECCANICA QUANTISTICA

The paper argues that quantum mechanics provide examples of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy that cannot be accounted for in purely modal terms. The best account of quantum indeterminacy has it that quantum systems have determinable properties without thereby having a unique determinate of that determinable.

Modelling deep indeterminacy

This paper constructs a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can accommodate a kind of ‘deep’ worldly indeterminacy that arguably arises in quantum mechanics via the Kochen–Specker theorem, and that is incompatible with prominent theories of metaphysical indeterminacy such as that in Barnes and Williams (Oxf Stud Metaphys 6:103–148, 2011). We construct a variant of Barnes and Williams’s theory that avoids this problem. Our version builds on situation semantics and uses incomplete, local situations rather than possible worlds to build a model. We evaluate the resulting theory and contrast it with similar alternatives, concluding that our model successfully captures deep indeterminacy.

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy

On a wide variety of presently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of ‘value definiteness’, according to which the properties (‘observables’) of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether two recent approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy—a metaphysical supervaluationist account, on the one hand, and a determinable-based account, on the other—can provide an intelligible basis for quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI), understood as involving quantum value indefiniteness. After identifying three sources of such QMI, we show that previous arguments (Darby in Australas J Philos 88:227–245, 2010; Skow in Philos Q 60:851–858, 2010) according to which supervaluationism cannot accommodate QMI are unsuccessful; we then provide more comprehensive arguments for this conclusion, which moreover establish that the problems for supervaluationism extend far beyond the orthodox interpretation. We go on to argue that a determinable-based approach can accommodate the full range of sources of QMI.

Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects

Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes–Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes–Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliver genuinely vague objects, it in fact provides grounds for rejecting them.

Emerging (In)Determinacy

In recent years, a number of authors have defended the coherence and philosophical utility of the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy. Concurrently, the idea that reality can be stratified into more or less fundamental ‘levels’ has gained significant traction in the literature. Here, I examine the relationship between these two notions. Specifically, I consider the question of what metaphysical (in)determinacy at one level of reality tells us about the possibility of metaphysical (in)determinacy at other more or less fundamental levels. Towards this end, I propose a novel conception of the way in which fundamental states of affairs determine derivative states of affairs in the presence of indeterminacy and construct a corresponding formal model of multilevel systems that demonstrates the compatibility of determinacy at the fundamental level with indeterminacy at higher levels (and vice versa), thereby rebutting Barnes’ (2014) suggestion that indeterminacy at any level of reality implies indeterminacy at the fundamental level.

Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and worldly incompleteness

An influential theory has it that metaphysical indeterminacy occurs just when reality can be made completely precise in multiple ways. That characterization is formulated by employing the modal apparatus of ersatz possible worlds. As quantum physics taught us, reality cannot be made completely precise. I meet the challenge by providing an alternative theory which preserves the use of ersatz worlds but rejects the precisificational view of metaphysical indeterminacy. The upshot of the proposed theory is that it is metaphysically indeterminate whether p just in case it is neither true nor false that p, and no terms in ‘p’ are semantically defective. In other words, metaphysical indeterminacy arises when the world cannot be adequately described by a complete set of sentences defined in a semantically nondefective language. Moreover, the present theory provides a reductive analysis of metaphysical indeterminacy, unlike its influential predecessor. Finally, I argue that any adequate logic of a language with an indeterminate subject matter is neither compositional nor bivalent.

Against Quantum Indeterminacy

A growing literature is premised on the claim that quantum mechanics provides evidence for metaphysical indeterminacy. But does it? None of the currently fashionable realist interpretations involve fundamental indeterminacy and the ‘standard interpretation’, to the extent that it can be made out, doesn’t require indeterminacy either.

Metaphysical Indeterminacy, Properties, and Quantum Theory

It has frequently been suggested that quantum mechanics may provide a genuine case of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy. However, discussions of quantum theory in the vagueness literature are often cur- sory and, as I shall argue, have in some respects been mis- guided. Hitherto much of the debate over ontic vagueness and quantum theory has centered on the indeterminate construal of ontic vagueness, and whether the quantum phenomenon of entanglement produces particles whose identity is indeterminate. I argue that this way of framing the debate is mistaken. A more thorough ex- amination of quantum theory and the phenomenon of entanglement reveals that quantum mechanics is best in- terpreted as supporting what I call the property construal of ontic vagueness, where vague properties are understood in terms of determinable properties without the corresponding determinates.

A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy

ABSTRACT Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) have typically taken this to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate (precise) states of affairs obtain. On my alternative account, MI involves its being determinate (or just plain true) that an indeterminate (imprecise) state of affairs obtains. I more specifically suggest that MI involves an object's (i) having a determinable property, but (ii) not having any unique determinate of that determinable. I motivate the needed extension of the traditional understanding of determinables, then argue that a determinable-based account of MI accommodates, in illuminating fashion, both ‘glutty’ and ‘gappy’ cases of MI, while satisfactorily treating concerns about MI stemming from Evans’ argument and the problem of the many.

Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy

The topic of this paper is whether there is metaphysical vagueness. It is shown that it is important to distinguish between the general phenomenon of indeterminacy and the more narrow phenomenon of vagueness (the phenomenon that paradigmatically rears its head in sorites reasoning). Relatedly, it is important to distinguish between metaphysical indeterminacy and metaphysical vagueness. One can wish to allow metaphysical indeterminacy but rule out metaphysical vagueness. As is discussed in the paper, central argument against metaphysical vagueness, like those of Gareth Evans and Mark Sainsbury, would if successful rule out metaphysical indeterminacy. One way to argue specifically against the possibility of metaphysical vagueness might be thought to be to argue for a specific theory of the nature of vagueness according to which vagueness is a semantic phenomenon. But it is shown that there are complications also pertaining to arguments with that structure. Toward the end of the paper, I discuss Trenton Merricks’ well-known argument against a semantic view on vagueness and for a metaphysical view.

Open future and modal anti-realism

Open future is incompatible with realism about possible worlds. Since realistically conceived (concrete or abstract) possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a world is actual now, the future is fully settled now, which rules out openness. The kind of metaphysical indeterminacy required for open future is incompatible with the kind of maximality which is built into the concept of possible worlds. The paper discusses various modal realist responses and argues that they provide ersatz openness only, or they lead to incoherence, or they render the resulting theory inadequate as a theory of modality. The paper also considers various accounts of the open future, including rejection of bivalence, supervaluationism, and the ‘thin red line’ view (TRL), and claims that a version of (TRL) can avoid the incompatibility problem, but only at the cost of deflating the notion of openness.

Ross Revisited in advance

Drawing upon Saul Kripke’s discussion of rules, James F. Ross deduces the immateriality of thinking from the metaphysical determinacy of thinking and the metaphysical indeterminacy of any physical process. It has been objected that Ross does not establish the metaphysical indeterminacy of what function a physical process realizes, that Ross does not show the incoherence of a highly deflationary view of our talk about thinking, and that Ross opens up an unbridgeable gulf between sui generis thinking and behavior. Edward Feser has recently defended Ross’s argument from these objections. The present paper explains why Ross’s argument remains vulnerable to all three objections.

Metaphysically indeterminate existence

Sider (Four-dimensionalism 2001; Philos Stud 114:135–146, 2003; Nous 43:557–567, 2009) has developed an influential argument against indeterminacy in existence. In what follows, I argue that the defender of metaphysical forms of indeterminate existence has a unique way of responding to Sider’s argument. The response I’ll offer is interesting not only for its applicability to Sider’s argument, but also for its broader implications; responding to Sider helps to show both how we should think about precisification in the context of metaphysical indeterminacy and how we should understand commitment to metaphysically indeterminate existence. And if I’m right that metaphysical indeterminacy can allow for indeterminate existence in a way that semantic indeterminacy can’t, indeterminate existence might actually give us a reason to accept metaphysical indeterminacy (rather than a reason to reject it, as is commonly assumed).

The Split World of Gerard Manley Hopkins: An Essay in Semiotic Phenomenology (review)

Dennis Sobolev, The Split World of Gerard Manley Hopkins: An Essay in Semiotic Phenomenology (Catholic Univ. of America Press, 2011). 368 pp. $69.95. Dennis Sobolev's new book is the most ambitious scholarly work on the poet to appear in several years. While his publisher's triumphalist claims (For the first time in almost half a century, the worm of Hopkins is examined as an indivisible whole) cannot be allowed, The Split World of Gerard Manley Hopkins nevertheless represents a major undertaking deserves serious analysis. The split of the title reflects what Sobolev identifies as the central tension in all of writings: on the one hand a commitment to the perceived truths of the material world, on the other hand an equally strong commitment to a religiously defined supernatural world whose truths often conflicted with the sometimes-harsh realities forced on him by what he would have called nature. That tension Sobolev summarizes in this key passage: Hopkins's poems combine the most orthodox doxological statements with apparent heterodoxy, rationalism with mysticism, complex religious philosophy with metaphysical indeterminacy, divine immanence with 'the disappearance of God,' the self-projection of meditation with the self-effacement of contemplation, the Scotist univocity of being with the Thomistic analogous structure of the universe, moments of symbolic revelation with the chains of allegorical disruption, ecstatic declarations of faith with bouts of loneliness inner emptiness, the excesses of happiness with those of despair (p. 8). An exegesis of these polarities provides Sobolev with his agenda. The starting point for Sobolev's analysis is the principle of counterpoint, first identified in music then adapted by the poet to his theory practice of sprung rhythm. Hopkins' world evidences these complementary opposites at every turn. A material object--for example, a candle, a plough, a windhover--can represent both itself Christ, both the world of nature the supernatural world, Sobolev goes to great lengths, in a series of carefully constructed readings, to tease out these polarities show their relevance both to the poetry to the prose. Hopkins emerges as a writer who both celebrates suffers. Readers should reject (so goes the argument) all oversimplifications, from on the one hand the temptation to see Hopkins as devout Roman Catholic priest uttering orthodox, even simplistic pieties, to on the other hand the equally misleading temptation to view him as a modern paradigm of existentialist despair. Such a series of theses engenders the temptation to push the both/ and a little too hard, occasionally Sobolev succumbs: the reader knows that if Hopkins is said to be X, the argument that Hopkins is equally not-X or also-Y is sure to follow. Nor is Sobolev the first to point out polarities in Hopkins. But by large the book reflects the poetry: Hopkins is often a poet of irreconcilable opposites, his language does show both ecstasy despair. Furthermore Sobolev's determination to live with, even celebrate, the tensions rather than to look for easy answers earns him credit with discerning readers. Steering a middle admittedly syncretic course, however difficult it can prove to be, has the advantage of providing a direct avenue to the heart of Hopkins' poetry, as seen in the way Sobolev illuminates the myriad ways in which a poetic language devoted to celebration is nevertheless marked by a deep intense sorrow. For this reader the best part of the book lies in its oft-times penetrating readings of individual topics or poems. The analysis of Hopkins' concept of inscape, for example (pp. …

Arguments Against Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness

In this article, I survey some of the major arguments against metaphysical indeterminacy and vagueness and outline potential responses.

DEEP METAPHYSICAL INDETERMINACY

A recent theory of metaphysical indeterminacy says that metaphysical indeterminacy is multiple actuality: there is metaphysical indeterminacy when there are many ‘complete precisifications of reality’. But it is possible for there to be metaphysical indeterminacy even when it is impossible to precisify reality completely. The orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics illustrates this possibility. So this theory of metaphysical indeterminacy is not adequate.

Quantum Mechanics and Metaphysical Indeterminacy

There has been recent interest in formulating theories of non-representational indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relevance of quantum mechanics to this project. Quantum-mechanical examples of vague objects have been offered by various authors, displaying indeterminate identity, in the face of the famous Evans argument that such an idea is incoherent. It has also been suggested that the quantum-mechanical treatment of state-dependent properties exhibits metaphysical indeterminacy. In both cases it is important to consider the details of the metaphysical account and the way in which the quantum phenomenon is captured within it. Indeed if we adopt a familiar way of thinking about indeterminacy and apply it in a natural way to quantum mechanics, we run into illuminating difficulties and see that the case is far less straightforward than might be hoped.

Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy

AbstractMight it be that world itself, independently of what we know about it or how we represent it, is metaphysically indeterminate? This article tackles in turn a series of questions: In what sorts of cases might we posit metaphysical indeterminacy? What is it for a given case of indefiniteness to be ‘metaphysical’? How does the phenomenon relate to ‘ontic vagueness’, the existence of ‘vague objects’, ‘de reindeterminacy’ and the like? How might the logic work? Are there reasons for postulating this distinctive sort of indefiniteness? Conversely, are there reasons for denying that there is indefiniteness of this sort?

The Coming Universal Wish Not to Live in Hardy's "Modern" Novels

C OLERIDGE, in an essay on the inherent disappointments of human consciousness, describes a state of intolerable betweenness as the ineluctable condition of human activity. I would rather not have been, he confesses, . . let that which is to come so soon, come now-for what is all the intermediate space, but sense of utter worthlessness? 1 Convinced of Nature's inability to provide the secure grounds of his identity and thus resolve his indeterminacy, Coleridge contemplates in the Dejection Ode the withdrawal of man into the recesses of his psyche where the passion and life denied him by outward things can hopefully be found. The human psyche, unfortunately, owing to its radical fragmentation, also fails to disclose the basis of individual identity. Seeking finality in this matter, man discovers it only in death, and the duration of mortal life consequently becomes a ceaseless petition of conscious creation for immediate release from its situation. What began as a recognition of metaphysical indeterminacy eventually breeds catatonia: death-in-life serves as the only consistent mode of being in the world. Thomas Hardy came to recognize this catatonic state not only as the prevailing mood of man but also as the undercurrent of his aesthetic position; and the significance of this insight goes far to explain both the thematic and artistic development of the later and modern novels, especially The Return of the Native,