Metaphysical Foundations Of Logic Research Articles

Filosofia e psicoterapia no projeto da análise existencial de Viktor Frankl: a compreensão da pessoa espiritual a partir da transcendência

Esta tese, de caráter epistemológico, tem como objetivo demonstrar como a relação entre filosofia e psicoterapia contribui com o empreendimento da Análise Existencial frankliana, permitindo vislumbrar uma concepção de ser humano desde uma dimensão existencial. A relação com a filosofia se deu principalmente a partir das obras de Martin Heidegger, em especial Os fundamentos metafísicos da lógica (1928) e Seminários de Zollikon (1987). No tocante à bibliografia de Frankl, destaca-se Logoterapia e Análise Existencial (1967). Esta pesquisa teórico-bibliográfica está dividida em três momentos. No primeiro, buscou-se tematizar a relação entre filosofia e psicoterapia, a fim de compreender a Análise Existencial. O segundo capítulo, partindo de uma crítica à epistemologia psiquiátrica moderna, buscou perscrutar a antropologia filosófica proposta por Frankl com vistas ao itinerário de reabilitação da dimensão espiritual. Por fim, buscou-se explicitar o fenômeno da transcendência como constituição essencial do ser humano.

Thinking Transcendence: Heidegger’s Ontological Concept of Freedom

According to Hans Ruin, there are two ways to approach the examination of freedom in Heidegger’s writings: One can use the notion of freedom as a heuristic concept to interpret the entirety of Heidegger’s work as a philosophy of freedom, which was famously done by Günter Figal, or one can reconstruct Heidegger’s actual use of the notion of freedom. In my paper I’ll focus on the second approach and show that although “freedom” or, rather, “being-free” can already be found in Being and Time, his more elaborate concept of freedom as transcendence is developed in the years 1928-1930. These years are part of a time period in which Heidegger tried to develop his own positive concept of metaphysics. The main texts which show this development are the lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic and the essay On the Essence of Ground. Based on Aristotle’s twofold metaphysics—consisting of ontology and philosophical theology—Heidegger sketches his own concept of metaphysics. The fundamental ontology which plays the role of ontology is complemented by his cosmological interpretation of theology: metontology. Together, they form Heidegger’s novel notion of metaphysics: the metaphysics of Dasein. Whereas fundamental ontology is concerned with the question of Being, the main subject of metontology is world as beings as a whole. Heidegger develops his concept of transcendence, i.e., metontological freedom, which describes the connection between freedom and world, on the basis of the terms world-projection (Weltentwurf), world-view (Weltanschauung), and world-formation (Weltbildung), each describing an aspect of transcendence.

Heidegger on the Being of Monads: Lessons in Leibniz and in the Practice of Reading the History of Philosophy

This paper is a discussion of the treatment of Leibniz's conception of substance in Heidegger's The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. I explain Heidegger's account, consider its relation to recent interpretations of Leibniz in the Anglophone secondary literature, and reflect on the ways in which Heidegger's methodology may illuminate what it is to read Leibniz and other figures in the history of philosophy.

Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Memory

My analysis in the following paper will focus on a subtle development in Heidegger's interpretation ofthe theme ofmemory, from the period of his early Freiburg lectures to Being and Time and then in the works of the late 1920s. There is in this period an apparent shift in Heidegger's understanding of this theme, which cornes to light above all in his way of examining memory in the 1921 Freiburg course lectures Augustine and Neo-Platonism, then in Being and Time (1927) and finally in the 1928 lectures on the metaphysical foundations of logic (Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz) and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). This shift is of interest, as I will argue, not only in indicating an internal development of Heidegger's thinking, but above all in regard to the problem of the finitude of memory which Heidegger brings into focus and which I will interpret in my concluding remarks.

Makeshift: Phenomenology of Original Temporality

When questions are raised about principles, the network of exchange that they have opened becomes confused, and the order that they have founded declines. A principle has its rise, its period of reign, and its ruin. Its death usually takes disproportionately more time than its reign.1 In many ways, these many names are place-names, [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota], for the investigation of the historicity of thought in its significant junctures, reversals, transitions, convergences, transgressions. And there is a marked similarity in the treatment of these many thinkers as each is appropriated in the context of makeshift. As mentioned, Heidegger does not seek to be a good scholar, but to investigate various [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota] of thought with respect to their disclosure of matters themselves, in their accentuation of the phenomenon of original temporality. In his activity of squatting these various [tau][omicron][pi][omicron][iota], Heidegger is in a destruktive, oppositional comportment with the history of ontology, but in such a way which seeks to learn from this trajectory of the thesis that truth resides in the proposition and that the measure of truth is ultimately logic. radical phenomenology came into its own between the years of 1924-1929. primary texts for the are his published works of the period, the unfinished and (1926) and and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), his 1924 lecture, The Concept of Time to the Marburg Theological Society, and his many lecture courses of the period, such as History of the Concept of (1925), Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1928), Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), and Phenomenological Interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason (1928). There are also indications of this in later texts which trace the continuity of concerns-for instance, to the Origin of the Work of Art (1936), The Anaximander Fragment (1946), Kant's Thesis About (1962), and still others. Often in the unpublished lectures, we find unexpected formulations and previously unknown, unchartered investigations, such as extended discussion of sexual difference in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. In the same lecture, Heidegger depicts his own and as an example of an extreme of a principial explication of Eigenlichkeit.3 These lectures are accentuated due to their rather neglected status in the current literature. While a few have focused on work in this period, it is safe to say that the majority neglects the 1927-1928 lecture courses in favor of and and often very minute sections of this, so-called magnum opus.4 Even Kiesiel in his admirable Genesis of and stops short in his journey-right when it is getting interesting, i.e., when it was on the verge of discussing Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Moreover, and the Problem of Metaphysics is rarely discussed in conjunction with and (in the sense of the Being and project projected in outline of the unpublished sections of and Time), but has been co-opted in order to evoke the sterile debate of whether Heidegger's Kant is the real Kant. In light of this reticence to go all the way to the end, work lies in ruins, despite inquirers such as Sallis, Taminiaux, Krell, Sherover, and Schalow, who have attempted to understand matters themselves. 1920's phenomenology begins with a specification of the phenomenon of original Temporality of the self, of existence (Dasein) in the lecture The Concept of Time. Heidegger seeks to displace the linear model of clock-time in order to excavate the singularity of authentic temporality. As he moves through the lecture, Heidegger calls on his audience to detach itself from the interpretation of time which sets an external standard, whether as the fluctuation of night and day, or as the sun dial, or finally, as the mechanical device on the wall which executes a repetition of the same. …

The Question of God

The period since Martin Heidegger's death has provided major additional materials for tracing the path of his thinking on the question of god. These include, among others, publication of the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic; the several lecture series on Holderlin; the Parmenides lectures; The Principle of Reasons; as well as major research on Heidegger's thinking prior to Being and Time, notably Theodore Kisiel's The Genesis of Being and Time and John Van Buren's The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King. Most central of all is the Beitrage zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), written in 193f38 and published in 1989. The Beitrage contains by far the most attention to the question of god of any of Heidegger's known works, and has been decisive for organization and interpretation in the present essay. This essay is in four parts: a delineation of the question of god; a survey of the question of god in Heidegger; an overview of the Beitrage; and a reading of the question of god in the Beitrage. Delineation of the Question of God The question of god is not an optional philosophical topic, which may or may not be taken up in metaphysics or philosophy of religion. The question of god is in our history a question put to human being by be-ing,2 the question anciently driven home with the name of god, put as it were by god to human being, or put by the absence of god, or by the failure of reliance on god or the vacating of the site where god used to be. As an integral component in the construction of the conceptual map of reality and experience constituted in the Western tradition, it is a question implicit in all our discourse, religious and secular. Both in ancient Israel and in early Greece, the question of god arose in dimensions of necessity and death, of responsibility and fault, of meaning and participation, of the context of suffering, of the displacement of desire. It is a temporal and historical question, naming a summons and a recall, invoking an overtopping standard and an abandonment to responsibility. It locates-if not invents-a subject as respondent, within a story, a community, a history, and directs that respondent, in a framework of warning and promise, toward the openness of possibility. The evasion of the question of god begins already at least in the ancient Greek origins of metaphysics. Indeed, it may be that the evasion of the question of god is the concealed essence of metaphysics. The later attempt to fuse Biblical tradition with classical philosophy-in Augustine, for example-effects a systemic ambiguity between god as the other of the radical question and god as the answer, as a guarantee that the domain of the radical question is brought to rest by the answer, by god as the ideally One and Best and Permanent. The same ambiguity persists in Anselm and Aquinas, though in at least the traditional reading they both escape from the radical question by demonstrating the logical necessity of the ideal answer. In the sixteenth century, the question again comes to the fore. At the same time the concern of the Reformation era about the certainty of salvation institutes a new countermove toward precluding the radicality of the question. As a result the religious crisis soon transforms itself into a contest of doctrines. The contestants claim that certainty of salvation is tied up with correctness of doctrine, and thus the risk inherent in the question of god is objectified and externalized as the risk of condemnation for those that do not have the right answer. Disclosive aletheia gives way to enforceable verum: the test of truth, understood as propositional correctness of doctrine, distinguishes those who have the right to kill (the guardians of truth) from those who may rightly be killed (the heretics). So the radical revival of the question of god is met by a radical counter movement, both Protestant and Catholic, intensifying and enforcing its denial and avoidance through dogma and inquisition. …

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. By Martin Heidegger

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. By Martin Heidegger

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic

The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic