Metaphysical Anthropology Research Articles

An Introduction to Acting “Together with Others” and Participation as the Basis for Community in the Thought of Karol Wojtyla

Karol Wojtyła’s conception of community is an often overlooked part of his vast body of writing. While much energy is dedicated to his ethics and theology, little attention is given to how he defined the way in which human persons interact with one another and build the communities and societies wherein they find themselves. Central to this definition of community are the concepts of “acting ‘together with others’” and “participation.” For Wojtyła, these two intimately personal and subjective aspects of the human person serve as both the basis and mode from which authentic human communities emerge. This work presents an introduction to Wojtyła’s basis for community through analyzing “acting ‘together with others’” and “participation,” thus placing the primary impetus for inter-personal action strictly within the tradition of metaphysical anthropology and personalism which Wojtyła himself embraced. In doing so, an overview of Wojtyła’s thought is presented that is based on his most influential philosophical works concerning community, particularly Person and Act and The Person: Subject and Community, with this serving as a realistic philosophical background for subsequent analysis of both the human person and communities generally.

Diagnosing Dignity’s De-Realization: Lessons From The ‘Laws Of Captivity’ Thesis

What does it mean to speak of dignity’s de-realization much less to diagnose the experience of it? This article draws inspiration from law, culture and the humanities to address these underexamined questions. I outline the relational problem of dignity’s de-realization and rely on a clinical case to illuminate the problem’s interpersonal dynamics. I describe the theoretical assumptions that inform my assessment of dignity’s co-constitutive de-realization. These assumptions form a metaphysical anthropology sufficient to make socio-cultural diagnosis possible. I revisit the society-of-captives thesis to explain how the interpersonal dynamics of dignity’s de-realization in the clinical case are more disturbingly constitutive of society’s own calcifying captivity. Given these de-stabilizing conditions of collective and interdependent captivity, I conclude by suggesting how to confront dignity’s de-realization. These transgressive speculations emphasize the cultivation of a trans-desistance philosophy. I initiate the article’s diagnostic intention with an introduction to the general thesis on the laws of captivity.

The Challenge of Muhammad Iqbal’s Philosophy of Khudi to Ibn ‘Arabi’s Metaphysical Anthropology

The period between the publication of Asrār-i Khūdī (Secrets of the Self) in 1915 and The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam in 1930 marked the consolidation of the philosophy of khūdī (self) from the perspective of the Indian philosopher Muhammad Iqbal. A philosophical project for the contemporary Islamic world that sought to overcome, from the acceptance of science and few elements of Western philosophy, the limitations of the Islamic tradition and, above all, of Sufism, which the author labels as pantheism. Among the deep dialogues he maintains with Islamic tradition, Iqbal carried out a very special one with Muḥyī l-Dīn Ibn ʻArabī (1165–1240), who was one of the most notorious mystics and philosophers of Islam. A metahistorical dialogue, in the form of a critique, that invites us to see the convergences and divergences in metaphysical and anthropological aspects of both authors.

The sleeping soul doctrine of metaphysical anthropology in the Javanese death tradition

The doctrine of the sleeping soul is a doctrine developed to accommodate local wisdom in Indonesia. This doctrine describes the metaphysical part of man after death. A local pearl of wisdom discussed is the Javanese death slametan tradition. The purpose of this article is to develop the doctrine of the sleeping soul according to the narrative of Jesus’ words in Mark 5:35–42 and the Prophet Daniel in Daniel 12:1–3 in representing the metaphysical anthropological view of the Javanese death slametan tradition in terms of the theory of collective memory. The descriptions of the sleeping soul doctrine in the Javanese death slametan tradition are as follows: Firstly, there is a collective memory in giving appreciation to the metaphysical side of humans after death. Secondly, the sleeping soul doctrine is developed from the collective memory of the Javanese death slametan tradition and the Hebrew view. Thirdly, the sleeping soul doctrine is a contextualisation doctrine of the Javanese death slametan tradition.Contribution: The implications of this research give birth to the doctrine of the sleeping soul in the framework of the preservation of Javanese culture, especially in the Javanese culture of death [slametan]. This study proves that Christianity has contributed to caring for culture rather than alienating it.

Sleeping soul: A concept representation of metaphysical anthropology of the funeral traditions of Torajan people

The funeral tradition of the Torajan people is one of the most recognised funeral traditions in the world, a part of Indonesia’s rich indigenous knowledge. However, this particular tradition has been in decline over time because of the alienation caused by the spreading of Christianity. This research aimed to reinterpret metaphysical anthropology of the funeral tradition of the Torajan people using the concept of the sleeping soul from the narration of Jesus in Mark 5:35–42 and Daniel 12:1–3. The research used a qualitative approach with theological and ethnographic research types. The results of this study reveal that the concept of the sleeping soul in the biblical view can reinterpret metaphysical anthropology in the funeral tradition of the Torajan people as follows: (1) souls are eternal in the process of death, (2) souls of the deceased are helpless and (3) the sleeping soul is an eschatological hope for Christianity and Torajan people.Contribution: The aim of this research is to find a Christian metaphysical anthropology doctrine that is cordial to the funeral tradition of the Torajan people. The relationship between the two is that they have the same way of appreciating human existence metaphysically. This finding contributes to Christianity in the preservation of Torajan culture.

Ritual and Thought: Spirituality and Method in Philosophy of Religion

This paper outlines a strain of French Spiritualism, a philosophical tradition extending from Maine de Biran, Félix Ravaisson, and Jules Lachelier to their reception in the work of Maurice Blondel and his protégé Henry Duméry. In receiving and transforming this tradition, Blondel and Duméry have helped to provide a distinct philosophical paradigm in philosophy of religion, capable of providing insight into the spiritual nature of the human being, both in how spirituality relates to the advanced stages of religious culture in addition to its primitive presence in spontaneous action. As a tradition consecrated to the study of human consciousness, and the operations of the mind [l’esprit], the French spiritualist tradition provides a rich conceptual matrix for analyzing the nature of human thinking and its relationship to action. In such an analysis of human thought, Maurice Blondel set up a moral psychology and metaphysical anthropology, highlighting how the consciousness of the human being is linked to the objective order of existence, both in its material form and in the intelligible realities behind the nature of existence. This philosophical matrix helps to show how religious practices, through embodied engagement with the material world, are effective at generating a consciousness of metaphysical or transcendent realities. As such, this philosophical paradigm provides the means for constructing a theory of ritual, where ritual acts with symbols and signs may be rendered intelligible as the sensible means for the cognitive expression of spiritual activity.

Интеллектуальная ответственность и эпистемологический теизм

One of the most interesting and widely discussed trends in modern epistemology is the so-called intellectual ethics, normative in its essence, centered around the concept of epistemic virtue, based on the idea of metaphysical anthropology, supplemented by elements of theology. The last consists in the idea of a certain “gift” to a person from the side of the Supreme Being, which is God – and this gift lies in the epistemic virtues inherent in the individual. This subject-centered concept emphasizes the intellectual and epistemic qualities of the cognizing subject that guarantee the truth of their beliefs. However, if is God the true guarantor of their “epistemic reliability” and the possibility of thus identifying justified belief with knowledge? The reliability of the cognitive human ability is seen in the realization of virtus as “perfection in being for the good”, in this case epistemic, the only guarantee of which can only be divine will. Is it so? This article attempts to answer this question in the course of reconstruction and analysis of the epistemological-theistic approach to defining one of the key epistemic virtues of the cognizing subject – intellectual responsibility.

Kematian Seutuhnya Dalam Pengakuan Gereja Toraja Menurut Pandangan Antropologi Metafisik

Death is a reality that every human being must experience. In death all human power and effort during his life becomes terminated, meaningless and death stops everything. Even so, humans believe in themselves there is something that is not affected by death, namely the soul, so that only the body experiences death. Whether influenced by philosophical thinking or traditional views. The dead body and the immortal soul contain the notion of a soul containing divine elements. The description in this paper focus on understanding death as a whole using a metaphysical anthropology approach. With the research method of literature study and cursory observations, the result show that humans die completely and live completely. Humans experience death in both body and soul. However, on the other hand, in personal relationships with others, it is found that the body and soul remain intact in the memories of others, even though someone’s person has died. The concept og human death as a whole, in the view of metaphysical anthropology, has similarities with complete death, is the recognition of the Toraja church. Keywords: Death, Body, Spirit, Metaphysical Anthropology, Wholeness and Unity.

Todd, Richard: The Sufi Doctrine of Man. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī's Metaphysical Anthropology. 2014.

<b>Todd, Richard: </b> <i>The Sufi Doctrine of Man. </i>Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī's Metaphysical Anthropology. 2014.

The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical Anthropology, by Richard Todd

The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical Anthropology, by Richard Todd

The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical Anthropology by Richard Todd (review)

The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical Anthropology by Richard Todd (review)

The Sufi Doctrine of Man: The Metaphysical Anthropology of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī. By Richard Todd

<b>The Sufi Doctrine of Man: The Metaphysical Anthropology of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī.</b> By Richard Todd

The Sufi Doctrine of Man. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical Anthropology , written by Richard Todd

The Sufi Doctrine of Man. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical Anthropology , written by Richard Todd

The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical AnthropologyBy Richard Todd

Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274) has long been recognized as the ‘foremost disciple’ (p. 1, partially citing the title of an article by William Chittick) of the ‘Great Shaykh’ ( al-shaykh al-akbar ) Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240), whom some sources actually report to have been al-Qūnawī’s stepfather. Despite al-Qūnawī’s formative role in the emergence of the so-called ‘Akbarian’ tradition of speculative Sufism, his works and thought have received relatively scant attention to date. Richard Todd’s monograph, partly based on unpublished manuscript sources, makes a highly welcome contribution towards filling this gap and considerably enriches our understanding of Islamic intellectual history during the Middle Period. Todd’s monograph is divided into two parts. Part One, titled ‘Qūnawī’s Life and Work’, opens with a chapter on al-Qūnawī’s biography and a helpful description of his main works. Todd then attempts a summary delineation of his author’s relationship to earlier thinkers and schools of thought. With regard to Ibn ʿArabī, he observes that al-Qūnawī does not merely style himself as elucidating the writings and teachings of his master but stakes out an independent claim to mystical inspirations (p. 45, cf. pp. 29f. and p. 42). While al-Qūnawī shares Ibn ʿArabī’s view of ‘existence envisaged as continual theophany’ and employs other signature Akbarian concepts and ideas, Todd emphasizes that his works also contain ideas which are novel or only marginally present in the writings of Ibn ʿArabī (p. 46), such as the theory that ‘determination’ ( taʿayyun ) must be ontologically preceded by ‘non-determination’ (cf. pp. 83–6). Todd accepts that al-Qūnawī’s writings display a more systematic quality than those of Ibn ʿArabī and that he is familiar with Peripatetic concepts and ideas (pp. 49f.), the use of which is duly noted at several junctures throughout the monograph (e.g., p. 55 or pp. 77f.). Nevertheless, Todd is sceptical about the characterization of al-Qūnawī as more ‘rationalistic’ than his teacher and underscores that, like Ibn ʿArabī, al-Qūnawī is ‘at pains to point out the limitations of syllogistic reasoning’ (p. 50; cf. also p. 73 and p. 177). In passing, it may be remarked that Todd’s discussion of al-Qūnawī’s ‘critique of rational inquiry’ (pp. 51–5) might usefully have explored the extent to which the latter’s stance is not only indebted to his teacher Ibn ʿArabī but also continues an attitude to Peripatetic philosophy previously articulated by al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) and Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191). Particularly reminiscent of the latter is al-Qūnawī’s appeal to the ‘ancient sages’ ( al-ḥukamāʾ al-awāʾil ) and to the ‘divine Plato’ (p. 54 and pp. 61f.) as embodying a venerable philosophical alternative to the Peripatetic tradition. 1

METAPHYSICAL REVOLUTION OF DESCARTES AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECT

The purpose is to reveal and comprehend forms of influence metaphysical' revolution for a way of interpretation of the anthropological project by Descartes on the basis of investigations of modern dekartes's researchers, that is the recognition of a fundamental role of metaphysics. Methodology. As methodological base modern investigations of dekartes's researchers accenting a fundamental role of metaphysics and expediency of unbiassed judgment of heritage of the great thinker are used. The scientific novelty. The transformation of the anthropological project is outlined as manifestation of metaphysical revolution. It is about a transcendencecy of naive anthropology (as an embodiment of reductive mindset), that is interpretations of human nature as its corporality and transition to metaphysical anthropology which consists in upholding of unconditional priority of human thinking as associated with God. As result of transition concentration of attention on intense human nature, that is at tension between sensuality and intelligence, aspiration to truth and tendency to delusion, between Life and Nothing, etc. Conclusions. The appeal to the incomplete anthropological project of Descartes on the basis of innovative researches allows proving the thesis about influence of metaphysical revolution on a way of its interpretation. The main forms of oriented to science ideals of naive anthropology, trust in evidence of the senses, atheism, interpretation of science as the main form of detection rationality of human nature, which Descartes tends constructively to overcome in the text of "meditation", are highlighted. During creation of metaphysical anthropology the attention of the thinker is drawn by the fact of impossibility of comprehension of human nature by means of natural-science rationality and expediency of the appeal to metaphysics. The subject of attention of the thinker is the tension between sensuality and intelligence, need for truth and tendency to delusion, ontologic tension between Life and Nothing etc.

The Nature of Woman in Relation to Man: Genesis 1 and 2 through the Lens of the Metaphysical Anthropology of Aquinas

I. Introduction Since its initial publication as The Original Unity of Man and Woman in 1981, Pope Saint John Paul II's widely studied work, A Theology of the Body, has generated interest, debate, and scholarship. (1) Much has been written already on this investigation into the sacramental meaning of the human body and its implications for our understanding of human personhood and the ontological and physical complementarity that characterizes men and women; his starting place in Genesis and his interpretation of these passages well documented. What has gone mostly unnoticed by scholars of his thought in this area the significance of John Paul's claim that the two creation accounts each reveal a different aspect of the nature of man, known and knowable in both its objective and subjective aspects. In the opening pages of the text, the Holy Father points to the two distinct creation accounts found in Genesis i and 2 as the place in scripture where we can derive the meaning of man, first as objective reality created in the image of God and, secondly, as a concretely existing subject. It this claim that the focus of this investigation. In the second general audience, the late Holy Father states that the powerful content hidden in Genesis i has provided an incontrovertible point of reference and a solid basis for metaphysics, anthropology, and ethics and has been a source of reflection throughout the ages for those who have sought to understand 'being' and 'existing.' (2) But in Genesis 2, he goes on to say, the depth to be uncovered in this second (though historically earlier) creation account has a different character; it is above all subjective in nature and thus in some way psychological. Here we find man in the concrete, as a subject of self-understanding and consciousness; here the account of the creation of man refers to him especially in the aspect of his (3) As well known to those familiar with his body of work, these two categories are foundational to his thought: being and existence; and personal subjectivity. Throughout his writings, he frequently contrasts the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness and attempts to reconcile and synthesize their claims. His own anthropology attempt at a creative completion of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of man, which, he argues, although it provides the necessary metaphysical terrain in the dimension of being and paves the way for the realization of personal human subjectivity, leaves out adequate investigation of lived human experience and thus lacks essential component of what it means to be actual living person. (4) The thrust of his effort to capture the meaning of human personhood in light of both the objective nature of the person and his lived experience as the subject of his own acts. (5) Setting aside for the moment the question of whether or not this accurate criticism of Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology, my argument in this article that, although the beginnings of a comprehensive theory regarding the nature and complementarity of man and woman can be found in his treatise, John Paul himself does not fully or adequately exploit his own claim regarding the meaning to be found in the creation accounts in Genesis on the nature of man. (6) I will show that only in looking at these texts through the lens provided by a fuller exposition of the anthropology of Aquinas do we uncover their profound, hidden meaning. Thus, my thesis not precisely a departure from that of the Holy Father, but meant to represent a legitimate development of his project. I intend to show that, when considered through the anthropology of Aquinas, the two creation accounts illuminate the full truth about man, not only in the sense of man qua man, but also in terms of his personal subjectivity and the differentiation and complementarity of the sexes. …

Hayden White’s Philosophical History

Hayden White’s philosophical history is usually approached as a theory and history of historical consciousness capable of being true or false. In this paper I argue that it is better described as the instrument and effect of a cultural politics aimed at the subordination of empirical historiography to a rival intellectual subculture. This subculture first emerged in 1780s Protestant Germany in the form of Kant’s metaphysical anthropology. But it was the reception of Kantianism in the Protestant colleges of the Northeastern United States, and thence in American pragmatism, that formed the version of this subculture that would shape White’s metahistory. White’s pursuit of the transcendental structures of historical consciousness should itself be understood historically, as an activity internal to the forms of moral and intellectual grooming maintained within a particular academic subculture.

PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE OF KANT AS FINDING AUTHENTICAL FORMS OF ANTROPOLOGICAL METAPHYSICAL

Contemporary culture needs metaphysical understanding of human nature based on the philosophical heritage of Kant. According to this assertion the author gives heed to explication of Kant's famous anthropological intention of his critiques. The author focuses attention on the ambivalent attitude of the philosopher on the issue of authenticity of metaphysical anthropology.

Problematology, Language, Rhetoric

Michel Meyer does not attempt to situate his work with regard to his contem poraries. We can see this well in his theory of language. In this aspect of his thought, as well others, the author of Problemcitology has established several encompassing principles which aim to construct a system of strong hypotheses capable of providing explanations for a vast realm of phenomena, including how language functions. The angle of Meyer's thinking since then is original for this very reason. The strength of his hypothesis does not arise from discussion with his peers but, on the contrary, from its theoretical rupture. This is also why Meyer's thought is a philosophy, in the traditional sense of the term. As a metaphysics of questioning, it tackles a large number of philo sophical questions from the perspective of what constitutes our very humanity: the capacity to question. This is also how one should understand his theory of argumentation, essentially founded on the idea that philosophy is first with respect to rhetoric: philosophy is the discipline of radical questioning. And questioning is first for us: it is the anthropological criterion of humanity. There fore, Meyer's philosophy offers itself as a metaphysical anthropology in which rhetoric should be understood as the universal manifestation of that which constitutes humanity, questioning. A student of Chaim Perelman, for whom he always maintained esteem and friendship, Meyer nonetheless asserted his autonomy with regard to his mentor from the very start. Problematology thus arose neither for nor against the New Rhetoric, but simply elsewhere. The very concept of questioning, the keystone of problematology, is essentially non-Perelmanian. We shall see why it is by under standing this concept that one may enter into problematological thought.

Trabajo negro: ensayo sobre responsabilidad y alteridad

This essay has two parts. The first reviews two settings of responsibility in this time: the one of the responsibility for nature and the one of responsibility for the other; the other past and death, the other present and suffering, and the other future: the future generations. The second sets the responsibility on the ethical theory and puts forward a change in the point of view: from the metaphysical anthropology and its inner space of the consciousness, to the semiotic anthropology and its external space of communication. This space, finally, is viewed through the «pragmatic turn» of the contemporary ethical theory, where the responsibility becomes «for the other»: the other caught in the darkness of illegal work.