Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has a tree-like form and requires a coherent topdown reading. Every remark has to be placed at specific point assigned to it on tree of Tractatus, starting from very first page containing a significant chain of seven cardinal propositions. The theme of solipsism and self can be elucidated by means of a cognitive map, where each proposition becomes a node on a hierarchical graph. In fact, difficulty in understanding group 5.6 on the limits of my is due to a consecutive reading of propositions 5.5571 / 5.6, 5.634 / 5.64, etc. As confirmed by a close philological examination of his diaries and of manuscript MS104, these erroneous combinations of remarks hide real development of Wittgenstein’s thinking. In contrast, cognitive tree shows that problem of limits of language and springs from a rigorous analysis of way in which logic fills world (line 5.1, 5.5, 5.6); that relationship between ego and does explain why solipsism and realism coincide (5.63, 5.64); that Wittgenstein’s elimination of any extra-logic a priori includes Kantian forms of phenomena (5.633, 5.634); and so on. Proposition 5.6331, with its picture showing a deceptive representation of visual field, reveals real focus, that is actual shape of field of vision (metaphor of phenomenological world). This is a much more remarkable problem than a supposed question about position of eye. Scholars and editors generally presume that Wittgenstein has drawn a picture (to dispute it) of an eye inside its own visual field. But that cannot be his theme and he never in fact drew such an absurd depiction, as examination of his handwritten drafts clearly reveals.
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