Metaphilosophical Views Research Articles

How to frame the free will problem

The exchange is almost complete. I have argued that if we wish to view the free will problem in a non-question-begging way, we should frame the problem in more radical terms than we usually do. If we frame the problem this way, then we discover a compelling reason for rejecting all of the familiar “isms” in favor of my non-realism thesis. This thesis holds that “free choice” has a coherent meaning just in case it is treated as a subjective term; thus, if we try to view “free choice” as denoting classes of entities that themselves possess the characteristic of freeness, it is logically inconsistent. My thesis is supported by a certain metaphilosophical view. I admit that this metaphilosophical view — which tries to ‘locate’ everything ‘where it belongs’ — is neither provable nor refutable. But if my argument in this paper is correct, when we assert any of the positions that presuppose the coherence of “free will” (Hard Determinism, Soft Determinism, Libertarianism, Incompatibilism, Compatibilism), we should add the fact that we have adopted a metaphilosophical view that supports these. Since these metaphilosophies are non-truth-tracking views, our joint declaration of our lower level free will theory and its supporting metaphilosophy will sound Pickwickian (e.g., “I believe that Libertarianism is true and I support that view with the metaphilosophical thesis that the most important role of philosophy is not to track truth, but to create an intellectual climate best for improving the human condition.”) If I have shown that my opponents are forced to such declarations, I will be satisfied.

Diskussion/Discussion. A Reply to Six Critics

Abstract Professors Maclntyre and Rosenberg are more inclined than I to believe that ‘philosophy’ names a natural kind -- a distinctive sort of inquiry with a continuous history since the Greeks. Their criticisms of my book reflect this disagreement. Mr. Montefiore brings to light various ambiguities in my use of such terms as “edifying philosophy” and “Continental philosophy”. His criticisms make good points against the concluding portions of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Professors Bennett and Turnbull rightly say that I have over-simplified the current situation in Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy, but I would hope that these; simplificatons do not affect the gist of my argument. Dr. Köhler very helpfully traces connections between my metaphilosophical views and my discussion of certain first-order issues.

Economics as a Philosophical Science

Previous articleNext article FreeEconomics as a Philosophical ScienceR. G. CollingwoodR. G. Collingwood Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 36, Number 2Jan., 1926 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.36.2.2377247 Views: 33Total views on this site Citations: 10Citations are reported from Crossref Journal History This article was published in The International Journal of Ethics (1890-1938), which is continued by Ethics (1938-present). PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Colin P. Elliott Economic Theory and the Roman Monetary Economy, 167 (Feb 2020).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108290531James Connelly The Development of Collingwood’s Metaphilosophical Views, (Jan 2019): 35–75.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02432-1_3Gene Callahan Peter Earl and Bruce Littleboy, G. L. S. Shackle (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. xiii + 246, $115 (hardcover). ISBN 978-1-349-44836-4., Journal of the History of Economic Thought 38, no.44 (Nov 2016): 532–534.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1053837216000754Michaela Haase, Michael Kleinaltenkamp Introduction on the commentaries on Roger A. Layton's “There could be more to marketing than you might have thought!” (Layton, 2016), Australasian Marketing Journal (AMJ) 24, no.33 (Aug 2016): 238–240.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ausmj.2016.08.002Steffen W. Groß The power of “mapping the territory”. Why economists should become more aware of the performativity of their models, Journal of Business Economics 84, no.99 (Sep 2014): 1237–1259.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-014-0746-0Mark Hannam The Morality of Money Lending, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2012).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2187804Philip Goodchild What is Wrong with the Global Financial System?, Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 24, no.11 (Jan 2012): 7–28.https://doi.org/10.1177/0260107912471457James Connelly, James Connelly T.M. Knox and the study of economic activity, International Journal of Social Economics 37, no.1111 (Sep 2010): 880–893.https://doi.org/10.1108/03068291011082847James Connelly, Peter Johnson R.G. Collingwood on civility and economic licentiousness, International Journal of Social Economics 37, no.1111 (Sep 2010): 839–851.https://doi.org/10.1108/03068291011082810William M. Johnston Benedetto Croce as a Foil to R. G. Collingwood, (Jan 1967): 66–80.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5394-4_7