Meta-ethical Framework Research Articles

The Problem with Apu: Recognizing Moral Issues in Media Ethics

ABSTRACT The task of media ethicists is not only to shine a light on the dilemmas facing our field, but also to point out what the moral issues of the day are. Why is it that some cases and issues appear on our radar, in our textbooks, web sites and journals? Using the example of how the problematic nature of the Apu character in The Simpsons escaped the attention of this author and other media ethicists, this essay explores how media ethicists can be better aware of their own blind spots. Given our limited cognitive abilities and unconscious biases, I will argue that media ethicists could potentially benefit from the help of a theoretical media ethics moral machine (MeMorMach), especially in instances where they are unaware of the potential violation of an established norm. But when normative change occurs, such a device would be less useful in tracking this change and alerting them, especially to those adhering to a constructivist meta-ethical framework. The essay concludes with a call for media ethicists to pay attention to and assist so-called moral enquirers, advocates who, through personal engagement, enact normative change.

Kantian Constructivism as a Tool to Face Irrational Demand: In the Clinical Field

This article tries to put a metaethical framework, Kantian constructivism, to the applied test, specifically of the biomedical field. After briefly introducing and defining the branch of practical reasoning, I will show what Kantian constructivism is and what it can do in practice to face moral dilemmas. I will then argue that in the biomedical field it is possible to have behaviors, both on the part of patients and health practitioners, that can be addressed as practical irrationality, and that we can address moral dilemmas more effectively with the tools provided by Kantian constructivism. In arguing this I will focus on the analysis of a rare disease of a little girl and the demands of her parents

A Thomistic Solution to the Deep Problem for Perfectionism

AbstractPerfectionism is the view that what is intrinsically good is the fulfillment of human nature or the development and exercise of the characteristic human capacities. An important objection to the theory is what Gwen Bradford calls the “Deep Problem”: explaining why nature-fulfillment is good. We argue that situating perfectionism within a Thomistic metaethical framework and adopting Aquinas's account of the metaphysical “convertibility” of being and goodness gives us a solution to the Deep Problem. In short, the fulfillment of human nature consists in the actualization of human potentialities or fullness of human being, and because being is ultimately the same thing as goodness, the fulfillment of human nature is good. We show that Thomistic perfectionism meets the requirements for an answer to the Deep Problem, provides the best explanation possible for the goodness of nature fulfillment, and is a natural foundation for perfectionist theories of value.

Towards an Ethics of Hybrid Agency in Performance

In the late 1980s, Jean-Luc Nancy brought together nineteen leading thinkers to consider ‘Who comes after the subject?’, in the wake of major historical and philosophical developments that had radically destabilized modern understandings of selfhood and agency. Several of the respondents addressed ideas in their work that have contributed to fundamental reconfigurations of subjectivity in performance research, as well as to expansive, cross-disciplinary discourses that have since emerged on posthumanism and performativity. Some three decades after Nancy’s provocation, the shifting social, cultural, political, environmental, technological and research landscapes have prompted pervasive re-imaginings of agential relations and behaviour. Nevertheless, with human and other biological life now being tracked, evaluated, quantified, mediated, anticipated, exploited and placed in situations to perform in unprecedented ways, and according to often-opaque processes or criteria, the ethical imperative to return to the question of the (post)subject—and its increasingly hybridized manifestations—arguably resonates even more profoundly today. Offering its own response to Nancy, this article takes steps towards a metaethical framework for investigating the vastly expanded scope of hybrid agency in contemporary performance. Who comes after ‘the subject’ in performance research? How are diverse modes of human and nonhuman perception, representation, decision-making and engagement with the world bound up with performance, performativity and the ‘performatic’? To what extent does thinking about such questions coincide across communities and disciplinary boundaries? How do numerous individual choices and criteria about what is ‘good’ and how to act shape particular instances of practice, especially in everyday life? Who or what performs them, and to what ends? What harms might they cause? Building on philosopher Simon Critchley’s ‘fundamental question of ethics’, the article proposes we step back, to explore how—across different fields—various agential configurations materialize and seek to perform or bind themselves by means of performance to whatever they determine as ‘the good’.

Dworkin’s Unity of Value: An Interpretation and Defense

Ronald Dworkin’s unity of value thesis underlies his influential moral, political, and legal thought. This essay presents an interpretation of the unity thesis designed to isolate its distinctly ethical character, elaborate Dworkin’s fundamental ethical arguments for it, and to utilize this reconstruction to correct misinterpretations that, I argue, underlie recent criticism. This criticism largely depends on construing the unity thesis within a familiar dualistic meta-ethical framework according to which Dworkin’s theory of value is classified as either constructivist or realist in character. Both options, however, misapprehend the epistemological framework within which Dworkin defends value judgments in general, and therefore fail to challenge his use of that framework in defending the unity of value in particular. Correcting this oversight is essential to a proper understanding of Dworkin’s novel account of moral epistemology and of the moral and political program that his unity thesis sponsors. The paper concludes by suggesting how more profitable criticism of the unity of value might proceed.

The Functional Model of Analysis as Middle Ground Meta-Ethics

The main purpose of the paper is to present a new framework of meta-ethics which I call the Functional Model of Analysis. It presupposes that the most important meta-ethical question is not “What is the meaning of normative words, sentences and what is the ontological fabric of the moral world?” but “What should morality and ethics be for?”. It is a form of meta-ethics that focuses on finding theoretical resources that can be helpful in understanding ongoing ethical debates between disciples of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, utilitarians and Kant, and in building normative ethical theories that can help us to answer normative questions. As an example of such output I will present a formal sketch of Hybrid Function Consequentialism – a normative ethical theory based upon the meta-ethical framework proposed here.

The ethical demand in teaching and learning

This paper outlines the main tenets of the moral philosophy of Knud Ejler Løgstrup and its relevance for teaching and learning in the context of care ethics. It is the contention of this paper that Løgstrup’s moral phenomenology of the ethical demand and the spontaneous expressions of life provides a metaethical framework for a normativity of care in teaching and learning. Some implications are highlighted to demonstrate how this metaethical framework may work in practice.

Why Should We Become Posthuman? The Beneficence Argument Questioned.

Why should we become posthuman? There is only one morally compelling answer to this question: because posthumanity will be a more beneficial state, better than present humanity. This is the Posthuman Beneficence Argument (PBA), the centerpiece of the liberal transhumanist defense of "directed evolution." In this article, I examine PBA and find it deficient on a number of lethal counts. My argument focuses on the writings of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has developed the most articulate defense of PBA and disclosed its metaethical framework. I begin by locating PBA in the context of wider transhumanist claims for the desirability of posthumanity. I identify two crucial components: (1) a model of deliberative rationality, requiring reasons to endorse claims; and (2) the reasons themselves (i.e., the greater beneficence that posthumanity represents). I examine these two conditions, in turn, specifying the claims that they ask us to accept. Following Bostrom, I argue that there is a need for a foundationalist approach that assures us of some universality in the process of valuation. This is required to appropriately ground the moral continuity and appeal to universality that PBA demands. I examine the reasons why this approach ultimately fails, leaving posthumanity as an unintelligible concept with no moral force. I conclude by identifying (and endorsing) a more mature approach to the debate on human enhancement, one that forfeits the grandiose but baseless claims too often found in transhumanist defenses of directed evolution. In short, posthumanity may be a good science fiction trope, but it has no normative force in the moral philosophy of human enhancement.

C. S. Lewis and the Challenge of Ethics in Digital Society

This paper examines the idea that digital societies lack an ethical framework for understanding and mitigating the impact of digital technologies on human flourishing and the consequent diminishing of human agency. The authors examine how selected works of C.S. Lewis address man's moral responsibility while living in a developing society and call for a grounding in metaethical frameworks prior to any outcomes of applied ethics. Each of the authors contributes from his own field of expertise - Mahrik on nanoethics and Neal on digital media - while Lewis' writing corpus is the shared interest as well as the basis for their research. Writing and thinking from within a metaethical framework he terms the Tao, or natural law, Lewis offers an approach to the dehumanization of digital culture through his own approach to one of the oldest technologies: that of language. This offers the beginning of an infrastructure for thinking about and reacting to digital society in an ethical manner.

Just cyber war?: Casus belli, information ethics, and the human perspective

AbstractDoes the advent of cyber war require us to abandon the traditional ethical framework for thinking about the morality of warfare – just war theory – and develop principles specific to the unique nature of cyber attacks? Or can just war theory still provide an appropriate basis for thinking through the ethical issues raised by cyber weapons? This article explores these questions via the issue of whether a cyber attack can constitute a casus belli. The first half of the article critically engages with recent attempts to provide a new theory of just information warfare (JIW) that is supposedly better suited to the unique character of cyber war insofar as it is grounded the broader meta-ethical framework of information ethics (IE). Yet the article argues that not only is JIW fundamentally unsuitable as a way of thinking about cyber war, but (in the second half) that it is possible to develop a different account of how we can understand a cyber attack as constituting a casus belli in a way that is in keeping with traditional just war theory. In short, there is no need to reinvent just war theory for the digital age.

Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism

Metaethics is often dominated by both realist views according to which moral claims are made true by either non-natural or natural properties and by non-cognitivist views according to which these claims express desire-like attitudes. It is sometimes suggested that constructivism is a fourth alternative, but it has remained opaque just how it differs from the other views. To solve this problem, this article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on Crispin Wright’s anti-realism. It then outlines an argumentative strategy that can be used to argue against constructivist views about practical reasons. The rest of the article explains how the outlined constructivist metaethical framework, reasons, and contractualism in normative ethics can still be used to create a new viable metaethical constructivist position about right and wrong.

On the Theoretical Significance of G. A. Cohen’s Fact-Insensitivity Thesis

G. A. Cohen’s claim that fundamental principles are ‘fact-insensitive’ has not received an especially warm welcome from the philosophical community. While some philosophers have expressed doubts about the plausibility of his claim, others have complained that even if his thesis is true, it is also relatively insignificant. In my paper, I argue that the fact-insensitivity thesis, if true, provides considerable support for value pluralism, and is thus of interest for that reason. Though Cohen himself assumes a plurality of fundamental principles, he never argues that the fact-insensitivity thesis supports this assumption. One of my paper’s aims, then, is to fill an argumentative gap in Cohen’s meta-ethical framework.

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and the Normativity Challenge

Aristotelian virtue theorists are currently engaged in a discussion with philosophers who use psychological findings to question some of their main assumptions. In this article, I present and argue against one of these psychological challenges—Jesse Prinz’s Normativity Challenge—which rests on the claim that findings in cultural psychology contradict the Aristotelian thesis that the normativity of virtues derives from nature. First, I demonstrate that the Normativity Challenge is based on three problematic assumptions about contemporary Aristotelianism. Second, I argue that it presupposes the truth of a metaethical framework that Aristotelians reject: moral relativism.

Ethic and Value Considerations in the Design of Interactional Agency

This paper continues the exploration of network society ethics and value considerations that have moved more clearly toward interactional agency. Interactional agency produces relationships between agents and structure. Agents and structure each have their own powers and capabilities that social science has considered fundamental to sociality. In a network society the interaction of the two produces new relational patterns. At a sociological level, the Internet is an exemplar of the generation of new relational patterns and can be thought of as a social structure that facilitates the enactment of relations through the free use of agency. Within such a view, it is possible to posit an enactment approach that considers relations to be a phenomenon as important as structure and agency. As the network society continues to expand, relations will more clearly be seen as both fundamental indicators and generative mechanisms in their own right. When relations are considered to be generative mechanisms, the context in which relations differentiate new forms as well as the new social forms are critical to ethical analysis. This paper introduces a contextual approach that may be useful in any future contextual analysis of this type. An initial meta-ethical framework for extending the disclosive capability assessment format to incorporate relational considerations is proposed. A case is argued here that considerations of contextualized relationships between and among human and non-human actors will be a major concern in the network society for the foreseeable future.

Rights Enforcement, Trade-offs, and Pluralism

This paper asks whether (human) rights enforcement is permissible given that it may entail infringing on the rights of innocent bystanders. I consider two strategies that adopt a rights-sensitive consequentialist framework and offer a positive answer to this question, namely Amartya Sen’s and Hillel Steiner’s. Against Sen, I argue that trade-offs between rights are problematic since they contradict the purpose of rights, which is to provide a pluralist solution to disagreement about values, i.e. to allow agents to act in accordance with their values. I further argue that Steiner’s compensation strategy does not succeed in avoiding trade-offs so it falls prey to the same criticism. I propose a non-trade-off solution that is implicit in the accounts discussed and is more consistent with the meta-ethical framework advocated by Sen. This solution relies on an enforceable duty to share in the costs of rights enforcement hence it entails a degree of redistribution for enforcement purposes.

RESPONSIBILITIES IN ELDERLY CARE: MR POWELL'S NARRATIVE OF DUTY AND RELATIONS

In Western countries a considerable number of older people move to a residential home when their health declines. Institutionalization often results in increased dependence, inactivity and loss of identity or self-worth (dignity). This raises the moral question as to how older, institutionalized people can remain autonomous as far as continuing to live in line with their own values is concerned. Following Walker's meta-ethical framework on the assignment of responsibilities, we suggest that instead of directing all older people towards more autonomy in terms of independence, professional caregivers should listen to the life narrative of older people and attempt to find out how their personal identity, relations and values in life can be continued in the new setting. If mutual normative expectations between caregivers and older people are not carefully negotiated, it creates tension. This tension is illustrated by the narrative of Mr Powell, a retired successful public servant now living in a residential home. The narrative describes his current life, his need for help, his independent frame of mind, and his encounters with institutional and professional policies. Mr Powell sees himself as a man who has always cared for himself and others, and who still feels that he has to fulfil certain duties in life. Mr Powell's story shows that he is not always understood well by caregivers who respond from a one-sided view of autonomy as independence. This leads to misunderstanding and an underestimation of his need to be noticed and involved in the residential community.

A Meta-Ethical Framework of the Theory of Natural Goodness ― An Attempt to interpreting the Philosophy of Zhu Xi in terms of Moral Naturalism ―

A Meta-Ethical Framework of the Theory of Natural Goodness ― An Attempt to interpreting the Philosophy of Zhu Xi in terms of Moral Naturalism ―

Ethos, Ethics, and Endeavors: New Horizons in Family Nursing

This article is an invitation to contemplation and dialogue about the purpose of family nursing. The shared ethos of family nursing is explored as a common ground for endeavours in practice and research. A comparison of ethical principles relating to research, family nursing practice, and Foucault's meta-ethical framework is offered. Such examination would suggest a remarkable congruence between family nursing values and Foucault's meta-ethical framework. The implications of such theoretical deliberations are outlined within the context of contemporary issues at a global level. Further support for the relevance of the implications at national level is presented by drawing on examples of challenges for nursing work with families in primary care in the United Kingdom. This article also raises new questions based on a number of suppositions such as family nursing being conceptualized as relational practice with an integrated approach, unifying ethos, and potential of a new paradigm of care.

THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST COGNITIVISM

Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper, I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical framework Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them.

The metaethical framework of anti-abortion rhetoric.

Like the labors of Sisyphus, the abortion issue's persistence in American politics seems interminable. As the gender gap threatens to become a yawning chasm, the Republican party commits itself to a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion; the Reagan administration cuts off aid to world population control programs that maintain the abortion alternative; the film The Silent Scream plays at the White House; violent attacks on women's health clinics mount; shots are fired into the home of Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun; the Department of Justice asks the Supreme Court to reverse its ruling in Roe v. Wade; and the president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops denounces as logically untenable the notion that one can personally oppose abortion and at the same time support the availability of that option for others.' Feminist scholarship on reproductive freedom is vast, well established,