Abstract
The main purpose of the paper is to present a new framework of meta-ethics which I call the Functional Model of Analysis. It presupposes that the most important meta-ethical question is not “What is the meaning of normative words, sentences and what is the ontological fabric of the moral world?” but “What should morality and ethics be for?”. It is a form of meta-ethics that focuses on finding theoretical resources that can be helpful in understanding ongoing ethical debates between disciples of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, utilitarians and Kant, and in building normative ethical theories that can help us to answer normative questions. As an example of such output I will present a formal sketch of Hybrid Function Consequentialism – a normative ethical theory based upon the meta-ethical framework proposed here.
Highlights
It presupposes that the most important meta-ethical question is not “What is the meaning of normative words, sentences and what is the ontological fabric of the moral world?” but “What should morality and ethics be for?”
It is a form of meta-ethics that focuses on finding theoretical resources that can be helpful in understanding ongoing ethical debates between disciples of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, utilitarians and Kant, and in building normative ethical theories that can help us to answer normative questions
As an example of such output I will present a formal sketch of Hybrid Function Consequentialism – a normative ethical theory based upon the meta-ethical framework proposed here
Summary
Before I begin to fulfil this promise directly, we need to have a look into the condition of modern meta-ethics in analytic philosophy. As can be seen in many handbooks of the discipline, meta-ethics is mostly about defining or describing the meaning of moral terms or judgments, analysing the status of corresponding moral properties and facts, analysing important notions like moral knowledge, motivation, reason to act, etc. A typical pattern of progress in high ground meta-ethics can be described as importing some new philosophical ideas from other fields of philosophy and creatively connecting them with recent meta-ethical debates. The Moorean meta-ethics did not set firm foundations for normative ethics, but inflated philosophical theories that are still debated and defended Such inquiry is as valuable as metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language or mind; it cannot be seen as an aid to doing normative ethics.
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