The conventional comment on the antebellum armament trade is phrased in terms of abuse. Even before I9I4, pacifically inclined socialists learned to despise the 'war-mongering' armourers, doctrinaire free traders to distrust the great munitions combines, and poorly endowed social reformers to rail against expensive 'bloated armaments'. In the I920s and I930s the protests accumulated into a shrill campaign for nationalization. Added strength was given to the movement by the search for scapegoats after the Great War. The carnage of Flanders could not be blamed on the gallant and decimated soldiery, and, as yet, only an informed minority could turn against the commanders. Not many thought to blame a Government which, despite blunders, in the end secured total victory. But even at the time those who had made profits out of war provided universally recognizable and ideally culpable whipping-boys. The distaste for trade, rooted deep in British social values, no doubt helped in the selection of an industrial victim. In such a climate, objective assessment of the armament industry was impossible. Hostility to the armourers was firmly entrenched, yet facts about their dealings were scarce. The result was a literature of vilification. Lacking information, it found a basis in innuendo and gossip. Compensating for the absence of solid foundation, it offered hypotheses heavily flavoured with prejudice, alarmism and, occasionally, honest pacifism. Titles like The Merchants of Death, The Bloody Traffic, The Secret International, or This War Business, aptly summarized the bias of their authors. Criticism was not, however, confined to a series of journalistic explosions; more authoritative condemnation came from the
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