Mentalizing System Research Articles

Synergy of the mirror neuron system and the mentalizing system in a single brain and between brains during joint actions

Cooperative action involves the simulation of actions and their co-representation by two or more people. This requires the involvement of two complex brain systems: the mirror neuron system (MNS) and the mentalizing system (MENT), both of critical importance for successful social interaction. However, their internal organization and the potential synergy of both systems during joint actions (JA) are yet to be determined. The aim of this study was to examine the role and interaction of these two fundamental systems—MENT and MNS—during continuous interaction. To this hand, we conducted a multiple-brain connectivity analysis in the source domain during a motor cooperation task using high-density EEG dual-recordings providing relevant insights into the roles of MNS and MENT at the intra- and interbrain levels.In particular, the intra-brain analysis demonstrated the essential function of both systems during JA, as well as the crucial role played by single brain regions of both neural mechanisms during cooperative activities. Specifically, our intra-brain analysis revealed that both neural mechanisms are essential during Joint Action (JA), showing a solid connection between MNS and MENT and a central role of the single brain regions of both mechanisms during cooperative actions. Additionally, our inter-brain study revealed increased inter-subject connections involving the motor system, MENT and MNS. Thus, our findings show a mutual influence between two interacting agents, based on synchronization of MNS and MENT systems. Our results actually encourage more research into the still-largely unknown realm of inter-brain dynamics and contribute to expand the body of knowledge in social neuroscience.

Online chasing action recruits both mirror neuron and mentalizing systems: A pilot fNIRS study

Engaging in chasing, where an actor actively pursues a target, is considered a crucial activity for the development of social skills. Previous studies have focused predominantly on understanding the neural correlates of chasing from an observer's perspective, but the neural mechanisms underlying the real-time implementation of chasing action remain poorly understood. To gain deeper insights into this phenomenon, the current study employed functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) techniques and a novel interactive game. In this interactive game, participants (N = 29) were tasked to engage in chasing behavior by controlling an on-screen character using a gamepad, with the goal of catching a virtual partner. To specifically examine the brain activations associated with the interactive nature of chasing, we included two additional interactive actions: following action of following the path of a virtual partner and free action of moving without a specific pursuit goal. The results revealed that chasing and following actions elicited activation in a broad and overlapping network of brain regions, including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), premotor cortex (PMC), primary somatosensory cortex (SI), and primary motor cortex (M1). Crucially, these regions were found to be modulated by the type of interaction, with greater activation and functional connectivity during the chasing interaction than during the following and free interactions. These findings suggested that both the MNS, encompassing regions such as the PMC, M1 and SI, and the mentalizing system (MS), involving the TPJ and mPFC, contribute to the execution of online chasing actions. Thus, the present study represents an initial step toward future investigations into the roles of MNS and MS in real-time chasing interactions.

Seeing the Unexpected: How Brains Read Communicative Intent through Kinematics.

Social interaction requires us to recognize subtle cues in behavior, such as kinematic differences in actions and gestures produced with different social intentions. Neuroscientific studies indicate that the putative mirror neuron system (pMNS) in the premotor cortex and mentalizing system (MS) in the medial prefrontal cortex support inferences about contextually unusual actions. However, little is known regarding the brain dynamics of these systems when viewing communicatively exaggerated kinematics. In an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment, 28 participants viewed stick-light videos of pantomime gestures, recorded in a previous study, which contained varying degrees of communicative exaggeration. Participants made either social or nonsocial classifications of the videos. Using participant responses and pantomime kinematics, we modeled the probability of each video being classified as communicative. Interregion connectivity and activity were modulated by kinematic exaggeration, depending on the task. In the Social Task, communicativeness of the gesture increased activation of several pMNS and MS regions and modulated top-down coupling from the MS to the pMNS, but engagement of the pMNS and MS was not found in the nonsocial task. Our results suggest that expectation violations can be a key cue for inferring communicative intention, extending previous findings from wholly unexpected actions to more subtle social signaling.

Distinct functional roles of the mirror neuron system and the mentalizing system

Movements can inform us about what people are doing and also about how they feel. This phenomenologically evident distinction has been suggested to correspond functionally with differential neural correlates denoted as mirror neuron system (MNS) and mentalizing system (MENT). To separate out the roles of the underlying systems we presented identical stimuli under different task demands: character animations showing everyday activities (mopping, sweeping) performed in different moods (angry, happy). Thirty-two participants were undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while asked to identify either the performed movement or the displayed mood. Univariate GLM analysis revealed the expected activation of either in MNS or MENT depending on the task. A complementary multivariate pattern-learning analysis based on the “social brain atlas” confirmed the expected recruitment of both systems. In conclusion, both approaches converge onto clearly distinct functional roles of both social neural networks in a novel dynamic social perception paradigm.

Concurrent mapping of brain activation from multiple subjects during social interaction by hyperscanning: a mini-review.

Social interaction plays an essential role in acquiring knowledge and developing our own personalities in our daily life. Meanwhile, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)-, electroencephalograph (EEG)-, and functional near inferred spectroscopy (fNIRS)-hyperscanning, enables us to concurrently map brain activation from two or more participants who are engaged in social interaction simultaneously. In this review, we first highlight the recent technologies advances and the most significant findings towards social interaction by using the hyperscanning method. In addition, we also illustrate several well-designed hyperscanning tasks that have been extensively adopted for the study of social interaction. Basically, hyperscanning contains six categories of experimental paradigms that can track the interactive neural process of interest. Furthermore, it contains two main elucidated neural systems which are involved in social interaction, including the mirror neuron system (MNS) and mentalizing system (MS). Finally, future research directions and clinical implications that are associated with hyperscanning are also highlighted and discussed.

Potential for social involvement modulates activity within the mirror and the mentalizing systems

Processing biological motion is fundamental for everyday life activities, such as social interaction, motor learning and nonverbal communication. The ability to detect the nature of a motor pattern has been investigated by means of point-light displays (PLD), sets of moving light points reproducing human kinematics, easily recognizable as meaningful once in motion. Although PLD are rudimentary, the human brain can decipher their content including social intentions. Neuroimaging studies suggest that inferring the social meaning conveyed by PLD could rely on both the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) and the Mentalizing System (MS), but their specific role to this endeavor remains uncertain. We describe a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment in which participants had to judge whether visually presented PLD and videoclips of human-like walkers (HL) were facing towards or away from them. Results show that coding for stimulus direction specifically engages the MNS when considering PLD moving away from the observer, while the nature of the stimulus reveals a dissociation between MNS -mainly involved in coding for PLD- and MS, recruited by HL moving away. These results suggest that the contribution of the two systems can be modulated by the nature of the observed stimulus and its potential for social involvement.

Differential role of the Mentalizing and the Mirror Neuron system in the imitation of communicative gestures

Successful social interaction requires recognising the intention of another person's communicative gestures. At a neural level, this process may involve neural activity in different systems, such as the mentalizing system (MS) and the mirror neuron system (MNS). The aim of the present study was to explore the neural correlates of communicative gestures during observation and execution of these gestures. Twenty participants watched video clips of an actor executing social gestures (S), non-social gestures (NS) and meaningless gestures (ML). During fMRI data acquisition, participants were asked to observe (O) and subsequently to execute (E) one of two tasks: imitate the gesture presented (IMI) or perform a motor control task (CT). For the contrast IMI>CT we found activations in the core areas of the MNS [inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and inferior frontal cortex, the posterior part of pars opercularis], as well as in areas related to the MS [superior temporal sulcus (STS) and middle cingulate cortex]. For S>NS, we found activations in the left medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), right superior frontal cortex and middle cingulate cortex. The interaction of stimulus condition (S vs NS) and task (IMI vs CT) revealed activation in the right IPL. For the interaction between observation vs execution (O vs E), task (IMI vs CT) and stimulus condition (S vs NS) we found activation in the right mOFC. Our data suggest that imitation is differentially processed in the MNS as well as in the MS. The activation in IPL is enhanced during the processing of social gestures most likely due to their communicative intention. The activation of IPL together with medial frontal areas may contribute to mentalizing processes. The interaction in the mOFC suggests an involvement of self-referential processes in the processing of social gesture.

Dissociating Modality-Specific and Supramodal Neural Systems for Action Understanding

The neural basis of action understanding in humans remains disputed, with some research implicating the putative mirror neuron system (MNS) and some a mentalizing system (MZS) for inferring mental states. The basis for this dispute may be that action understanding is a heterogeneous construct: actions can be understood from sensory information about body movements or from language about action, and with the goal of understanding the implementation ("how") or motive ("why") of an action. Although extant research implicates the MNS in understanding implementation and the MZS in understanding motive, it remains unknown to what extent these systems subserve modality-specific or supramodal functions in action understanding. While undergoing fMRI, 21 volunteers considered the implementation ("How is she doing it?") and motive ("Why is she doing it?") for actions presented in video or text. Bilateral parietal and right frontal areas of the MNS showed a modality-specific association with perceiving actions in videos, while left-hemisphere MNS showed a supramodal association with understanding implementation. Largely left-hemisphere MZS showed a supramodal association with understanding motive; however, connectivity among the MZS and MNS during the inference of motive was modality specific, being significantly stronger when motive was understood from actions in videos compared to text. These results support a tripartite model of MNS and MZS contributions to action understanding, where distinct areas of the MNS contribute to action perception ("perceiving what") and the representation of action implementation ("knowing how"), while the MZS supports an abstract, modality-independent representation of the mental states that explain action performance ("knowing why").