Mental State Attribution Research Articles

Mindreading in conversation

How is human social intelligence engaged in the course of ordinary conversation? Standard models of conversation hold that language production and comprehension are guided by constant, rapid inferences about what other agents have in mind. However, the idea that mindreading is a pervasive feature of conversation is challenged by a large body of evidence suggesting that mental state attribution is slow and taxing, at least when it deals with propositional attitudes such as beliefs. Belief attributions involve contents that are decoupled from our own primary representation of reality; handling these contents has come to be seen as the signature of full-blown human mindreading. However, mindreading in cooperative communication does not necessarily demand decoupling. We argue for a theoretical and empirical turn towards “factive” forms of mentalizing here. In factive mentalizing, we monitor what others do or do not know, without generating decoupled representations. We propose a model of the representational, cognitive, and interactive components of factive mentalizing, a model that aims to explain efficient real-time monitoring of epistemic states in conversation. After laying out this account, we articulate a more limited set of conversational functions for nonfactive forms of mentalizing, including contexts of meta-linguistic repair, deception, and argumentation. We conclude with suggestions for further research into the roles played by factive versus nonfactive forms of mentalizing in conversation.

Amygdala-prefrontal connectivity during emotion regulation: A meta-analysis of psychophysiological interactions

Given the importance of emotion regulation as a transdiagnostic factor in the development of psychopathology, a myriad of neuroimaging studies has investigated its neural underpinnings. However, single studies usually provide limited insight into the function of specific brain regions. Hence, to better understand the interaction between key regions involved in emotion generation and regulation, we performed a coordinate-based meta-analysis on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that examined emotion regulation-modulated connectivity of the amygdala using psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis. We analyzed fifteen PPI studies using the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) algorithm. Investigating emotion regulation-modulated connectivity independent of regulation strategy and goal revealed convergent connectivity between the amygdala and the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), which was primarily driven by PPI studies implementing reappraisal as a regulation strategy. A more focused analysis testing for effective coupling during the down-regulation of emotions by using reappraisal specifically revealed convergent connectivity between the amygdala and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). These prefrontal regions have been implicated in emotion regulatory processes such as working memory (dlPFC), language processes (vlPFC), and the attribution of mental states (dmPFC). Our findings suggest not only a dynamic modulation of connectivity between emotion generative and regulatory systems during the cognitive control of emotions, but also highlight the robustness of task-modulated prefrontal-amygdala coupling, thereby informing neurally-derived models of emotion regulation.

Neural correlates of recursive thinking during interpersonal strategic interactions.

To navigate the complex social world, individuals need to represent others' mental states to think strategically and predict their next move. Strategic mentalizing can be classified into different levels of theory of mind according to its order of mental state attribution of other people's beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth. For example, reasoning people's beliefs about simple world facts is the first‐order attribution while going further to reason people's beliefs about the minds of others is the second‐order attribution. The neural substrates that support such high‐order recursive reasoning in strategic interpersonal interactions are still unclear. Here, using a sequential‐move interactional game together with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we showed that recursive reasoning engaged the frontal‐subcortical regions. At the stimulus stage, the ventral striatum was more activated in high‐order reasoning as compared with low‐order reasoning. At the decision stage, high‐order reasoning activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and other mentalizing regions. Moreover, functional connectivity between the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the insula/hippocampus was positively correlated with individual differences in high‐order social reasoning. This work delineates the neural correlates of high‐order recursive thinking in strategic games and highlights the key role of the interplay between mPFC and subcortical regions in advanced social decision‐making.

Friends are not to be eaten: Children are reluctant to eat cookies that share physical and psychological human features due to their desire to relate to the food

Children's food marketers very often use anthropomorphism in advertising as if it is an effective technique aimed at increasing food consumption. However, the evidence supporting this effect is mixed. In this research, we propose that while a food product's humanlike appearance (physical anthropomorphism) may increase consumption, attribution of mental states and emotions (psychological anthropomorphism) to a physically anthropomorphized food product discourages consumption because it facilitates the formation of a social-like relationship with the food. In two studies, we tested this prediction on samples of children. Preschoolers (N = 91 and N = 97) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which they were presented with a cookie that was both physically and psychologically anthropomorphized, physically anthropomorphized only, or not anthropomorphized. In two studies, we observed whether children left alone with the cookie would consume it and how quickly it would happen. Additionally, in Study 2, we asked children about their desire to relate to the cookie. The results confirmed that physical anthropomorphism accompanied by psychological anthropomorphism considerably reduced consumption of the cookies compared to both mere physical anthropomorphism and non-anthropomorphism. Moreover, the reduced appetite for cookies that were physically and psychologically anthropomorphized was mediated by the desire to relate to them. We discuss the implications of these results.

Do "knowledge attributions" involve metarepresentation just like belief attributions do?

The authors distinguish knowledge and belief attributions, emphasizing the role of the former in mental-state attribution. This does not, however, warrant diminishing interest in the latter. Knowledge attributions may not entail mental-state attributions or metarepresentations. Even if they do, the proposed features are insufficient to distinguish them from belief attributions, demanding that we first understand each underlying representation.

Fiction effects on social cognition

Abstract Social cognition, the skillset involved in interpreting the cognitive and affective states of others, is essential for navigating the social world. Research has indicated that reading about fictional social content may support social cognitive abilities; however, the processes underpinning these effects remain unidentified. This study aimed to examine the effect of narrative engagement on social cognition. A text pretest (N = 11), a manipulation pilot (N = 29) and full experiment (N = 93) were conducted. In the full experiment, the manipulation failed to vary levels of narrative engagement (transportation, identification and affective empathy) with a passage from a popular fiction text. A correlation analysis revealed positive associations between narrative engagement dimensions and social cognition. An exploratory between-groups analysis comparing reading to no-reading found a significant gain in explicit mental state attribution in the reading group, when controlling for demographic and dispositional differences.

The Neurobehavioral Mechanisms Underlying Attitudes Toward People With Mental or Physical Illness.

Social factors play a significant role in the health outcomes of those struggling with mental or physical health issues. People with mental illness experience more social stigmatization and receive less concern for their welfare than do those with physical illness. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms by which such a bias in attitude arises remain unclear. This functional MRI study examined whether a lack of self-other similarity during mental state attribution affects perceivers’ theory of mind and, subsequently, how they value a patient’s welfare. During scanning, participants were asked to respond to an expression of caring and sympathetic concern from either their own perspective or while adopting the perspective of patients labeled physically ill or mentally ill. Participants reported that physically ill patients would share their affective responses to the situations, but mentally ill patients would not. Furthermore, mentalizing about physically ill patients was associated with increased activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a critical region for empathic concern and value-based decisions. In contrast, mentalizing about mentally ill patients preferentially engaged the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and anterior insula, regions previously implicated in empathic distress, in which activity correlated with individual differences in prejudice control. The findings indicate that a lack of perceived self-other similarity poses a challenge to the theory of mind and thus requires greater cognitive resources and neural computations. This might give rise to stereotyped beliefs about and prejudice against the mentally ill and failure to respond with appropriate empathy and care.

The neural basis for mental state attribution: A voxel-based lesion mapping study.

The ability to infer other persons' mental states, “Theory of Mind” (ToM), is a key function of social cognition and is needed when interpreting the intention of others. ToM is associated with a network of functionally related regions, with reportedly key prominent hubs located in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). The involvement of (mainly the right) TPJ in ToM is based primarily on functional imaging studies that provide correlational evidence for brain‐behavior associations. In this lesion study, we test whether certain brain areas are necessary for intact ToM performance. We investigated individuals with penetrating traumatic brain injury (n = 170) and healthy matched controls (n = 30) using voxel‐based lesion‐symptom mapping (VLSM) and by measuring the impact of a given lesion on white matter disconnections. ToM performance was compared between five patient groups based on lesion location: right TPJ, left TPJ, right dlPFC, left dlPFC, and other lesion, as well as healthy controls. The only group to present with lower ToM abilities was the one with lesions in the right dlPFC. Similarly, VLSM analysis revealed a main cluster in the right frontal middle gyrus and a secondary cluster in the left inferior parietal gyrus. Last, we found that disconnection of the left inferior longitudinal fasciculus and right superior longitudinal fasciculus were associated with poor ToM performance. This study highlights the importance of lesion studies in complementing functional neuroimaging findings and supports the assertion that the right dlPFC is a key region mediating mental state attribution.

A Robot Is Not Worth Another: Exploring Children's Mental State Attribution to Different Humanoid Robots.

Recent technological developments in robotics has driven the design and production of different humanoid robots. Several studies have highlighted that the presence of human-like physical features could lead both adults and children to anthropomorphize the robots. In the present study we aimed to compare the attribution of mental states to two humanoid robots, NAO and Robovie, which differed in the degree of anthropomorphism. Children aged 5, 7, and 9 years were required to attribute mental states to the NAO robot, which presents more human-like characteristics compared to the Robovie robot, whose physical features look more mechanical. The results on mental state attribution as a function of children’s age and robot type showed that 5-year-olds have a greater tendency to anthropomorphize robots than older children, regardless of the type of robot. Moreover, the findings revealed that, although children aged 7 and 9 years attributed a certain degree of human-like mental features to both robots, they attributed greater mental states to NAO than Robovie compared to younger children. These results generally show that children tend to anthropomorphize humanoid robots that also present some mechanical characteristics, such as Robovie. Nevertheless, age-related differences showed that they should be endowed with physical characteristics closely resembling human ones to increase older children’s perception of human likeness. These findings have important implications for the design of robots, which also needs to consider the user’s target age, as well as for the generalizability issue of research findings that are commonly associated with the use of specific types of robots.

Enhanced social learning of threat in adults with autism

BackgroundRecent theories have linked autism to challenges in prediction learning and social cognition. It is unknown, however, how autism affects learning about threats from others “demonstrators” through observation, which contains predictive learning based on social information. The aims of this study are therefore to investigate social fear learning in individual with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and to examine whether typically developing social cognition is necessary for successful observational learning.MethodsAdults with ASD (n = 23) and neurotypical controls (n = 25) completed a social fear learning (SFL) procedure in which participants watched a “demonstrator” receiving electrical shocks in conjunction with a previously neutral conditioned stimulus (CS+), but never with a safe control stimulus (CS−). Skin conductance was used to measure autonomic responses of learned threat responses to the CS+ versus CS−. Visual attention was measured during learning using eye tracking. To establish a non-social learning baseline, each participant also underwent a test of Pavlovian conditioning.ResultsDuring learning, individuals with ASD attended less to the demonstrator’s face, and when later tested, displayed stronger observational, but not Pavlovian, autonomic indices of learning (skin conductance) compared to controls. In controls, both higher levels of attention to the demonstrator’s face and trait empathy predicted diminished expressions of learning during test.LimitationsThe relatively small sample size of this study and the typical IQ range of the ASD group limit the generalizability of our findings to individuals with ASD in the average intellectual ability range.ConclusionsThe enhanced social threat learning in individuals with ASD may be linked to difficulties using visual attention and mental state attributions to downregulate their emotion.

Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition

Theory of mind, the attribution of mental states to others is one form of social cognition. The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of another, much simpler, form of social cognition, which I call vicarious representation. Vicarious representation is the attribution of other-centered properties to objects. This mental capacity is different from, and much simpler than, theory of mind as it does not imply the understanding (or representation) of the mental (or even perceptual) states of another agents. I argue that the most convincing experiments that are supposed to show that non-human primates have theory of mind in fact demonstrate that they are capable of vicarious representation. The same is true for the experiments about the theory of mind of infants under 12 months.

Other minds are neither seen nor inferred

How do we know about other minds on the basis of perception? The two most common answers to this question are that we literally perceive others’ mental states, or that we infer their mental states on the basis of perceiving something else. In this paper, I argue for a different answer. On my view, we don’t perceive mental states, and yet perceptual experiences often immediately justify mental state attributions. In a slogan: other minds are neither seen nor inferred. I argue that this view offers the best explanation of our deeply equivocal intuitions about perception-based mental state attributions, and also holds substantial interest for the epistemology of perception more generally.

Recognition of Social Rule Violation in "Deficit Syndrome" Schizophrenia: A Study Using Economic Games.

Aberrant social behavior is a frequent clinical feature of schizophrenia and seems related to the duration and chronicity of the disorder. However, there is a paucity of research into the relationship between social behavior and social cognition in patients with severe chronic courses of schizophrenia. Accordingly, the present study sought to examine the appreciation of social rules and norms such as fairness and cooperation in schizophrenia patients who fulfilled the criteria for “deficit syndrome”. To this end, we utilized a so-called Ultimatum Game, and a Dictator Game, in which participants had the option to punish others’ unfair behavior. In addition, “theory of mind”, the ability to appreciate others’ mental states, was also examined using the Mental State Attribution Task (MSAT). Symptom severity was determined using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. While patients with deficit schizophrenia responded to varying levels of fairness in similar ways to controls, the patients accepted fewer fair offers and engaged less in third-party punishment. Impaired theory of mind in patients reduced the latter, but not the former, group difference to non-significance. No significant correlations emerged between symptom severity and task performance. Together, these findings suggest that the understanding of others’ minds partly contributes to the appreciation of social rules and norms in patients with severe chronic courses of schizophrenia.

Shot scale matters: The effect of close-up frequency on mental state attribution in film viewers

Mental state attribution, an important aspect of social cognition, refers to the verbalization of mental state references observed in another person. Fictional film narratives can elicit social cognition and mental state attribution specifically, however, little is known about the cinematographic techniques underlying this effect and their link to mental state attribution. The present experiment focuses on the role of close-up shots of the character's face in viewers’ mental state attribution, as well as in their cognitive and affective processing more generally. The online experiment (N = 495) included thirteen versions of an animated film and employed a 6 (different number of close-up shots) × 2 (facial expressions) factorial between-subject design, with an additional zero close-up control condition. Participants were randomly assigned to one version of the film and subsequently asked to describe the story (with and without a prompt for mental state attribution). In these free responses, the study used a quantitative content analytic method (with independent blind-coders) to identify the proportion of spontaneous and prompted mental state attributions (i.e. explicit mental state references to the character), as well as cognitive and affective processing employed by viewers. Additionally, we tested the moderation effect of character facial expression (in the close-up) and participant gender. Confirming our main hypothesis, close-up frequency significantly influenced spontaneous, but not prompted mental state attribution. Results indicate that increasing the number of close-ups may elicit a higher proportion of spontaneous mental state attribution up to a certain point, beyond which it may decrease the proportion of spontaneous mental state attributions. Results suggest that the effect of close-up frequency is specific to mental state attribution rather than some general effect on cognitive and affective processing of narratives.

The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: An EEG study

Despite the ubiquity of knowledge attribution in human social cognition, its associated neural and cognitive mechanisms are poorly documented. A wealth of converging evidence in cognitive neuroscience has identified independent perspective-taking and inhibitory processes for belief attribution, but the extent to which these processes are shared by knowledge attribution isn't presently understood. Here, we present the findings of an EEG study designed to directly address this shortcoming. These findings suggest that belief attribution is not a component process in knowledge attribution, contra a standard attitude taken by philosophers. Instead, observed differences in P3b amplitude indicate that knowledge attribution doesn't recruit the strong self-perspective inhibition characteristic of belief attribution. However, both belief and knowledge attribution were observed to display a late slow wave widely associated with mental state attribution, indicating that knowledge attribution also shares in more general processing of others' mental states. These results provide a new perspective both on how we think about knowledge attribution, as well as Theory of Mind processes generally.

Neural mechanisms of deception in a social context: an fMRI replication study

Deception is a form of manipulation aimed at misleading another person by conveying false or truthful messages. Manipulative truthful statements could be considered as sophisticated deception and elicit an increased cognitive load. However, only one fMRI study reported its neural correlates. To provide independent evidence for sophisticated deception, we carried out an fMRI study replicating the experimental paradigm and Bayesian statistical approach utilized in that study. During the experiment, participants played a game against an opponent by sending deliberate deceptive or honest messages. Compared to truth-telling, deceptive intentions, regardless of how they were fulfilled, were associated with increased BOLD signals in the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), left precuneus, and right superior temporal sulcus (STS). The right TPJ participates in the attribution of mental states, acting in a social context, and moral behaviour. Moreover, the other revealed brain areas have been considered nodes in the theory of mind brain neural system. Therefore, the obtained results reflect an increased demand for socio‑cognitive processes associated with deceptive intentions. We replicated the original study showing the involvement of the right TPJ and expanded upon it by revealing the involvement of the left TPJ, left precuneus and right STS in actions with deceptive intentions.

When do mothers' executive functions contribute to their representations of their child's mind? A contextual view on parental reflective functioning and mind-mindedness.

Parental mentalization refers to parents' capacity to treat their children as having minds of their own and consider the mental states underlying their behaviors. This study examined the roles of mothers' executive functions (EFs), a group of processes supporting self-regulation, in 2 aspects of parental mentalization-spontaneity as measured by mind-mindedness (MM), and complexity as measured by parental reflective functioning (PRF)-while examining child- and family related contextual-moderators. Ninety-nine mothers of 66-month-old preschool children (40 full-term, 59 preterm) completed EFs tasks, were interviewed regarding their child and coparenting, and rated their perception of their child as being difficult (i.e., difficult behavior and negative emotionality). EFs were unrelated to MM. However, EFs were related to PRF when children were rated as more difficult, and when mothers reported high coparenting dissatisfaction; moreover, EFs and PRF were associated among mothers of full-term children, but not in the preterm group. Findings indicate that EFs contribute to the complexity and coherence of maternal mentalization, especially in contexts in which regulation is required for being able to consider the child's mind (difficult child, coparenting dissatisfaction), but not in stressful contexts that are likely to elicit automaticity (prematurity). EFs, however, do not seem to contribute to spontaneous attribution of mental states to the child, when complexity is not considered. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Representing the Mind as Such in Infancy

Tyler Burge claims in a recent high-profile publication that none of the existing evidence for mental-state attribution by children prior to the age of four or five really supports such a conclusion; and he makes this claim, not just for beliefs, but for mental states of all sorts. In its place, he offers an explanatory framework according to which infants and young children attribute mere information-registering states and teleologically-characterized motivational states, which are said to lack the defining properties of the mental. I argue that Burge’s claims are poorly motivated and irrelevant to the goals of developmental psychology.

Shall I Trust You? From Child-Robot Interaction to Trusting Relationships.

Studying trust in the context of human–robot interaction is of great importance given the increasing relevance and presence of robotic agents in the social sphere, including educational and clinical. We investigated the acquisition, loss, and restoration of trust when preschool and school-age children played with either a human or a humanoid robot in vivo. The relationship between trust and the representation of the quality of attachment relationships, Theory of Mind, and executive function skills was also investigated. Additionally, to outline children’s beliefs about the mental competencies of the robot, we further evaluated the attribution of mental states to the interactive agent. In general, no substantial differences were found in children’s trust in the play partner as a function of agency (human or robot). Nevertheless, 3-year-olds showed a trend toward trusting the human more than the robot, as opposed to 7-year-olds, who displayed the reverse pattern. These findings align with results showing that, for 3- and 7-year-olds, the cognitive ability to switch was significantly associated with trust restoration in the human and the robot, respectively. Additionally, supporting previous findings, we found a dichotomy between attributions of mental states to the human and robot and children’s behavior: while attributing to the robot significantly lower mental states than the human, in the Trusting Game, children behaved in a similar way when they related to the human and the robot. Altogether, the results of this study highlight that similar psychological mechanisms are at play when children are to establish a novel trustful relationship with a human and robot partner. Furthermore, the findings shed light on the interplay – during development – between children’s quality of attachment relationships and the development of a Theory of Mind, which act differently on trust dynamics as a function of the children’s age as well as the interactive partner’s nature (human vs. robot).

The origins of mindreading: how interpretive socio-cognitive practices get off the ground

Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through cultural rather than biological evolution. Although these accounts describe the role of culture in the ontogenetic development of mindreading, they neglect the question of the cultural origins of mindreading in human prehistory. We discuss four possible models of this, distinguished by the role they posit for culture: (1) the standard evolutionary psychology model (Carruthers), (2) the individualist empiricist model (Wellman, Gopnik), (3) the cultural empiricist model (Heyes), and (4) the radical socio-cultural constructivist model, which we favor. We motivate model (4) by arguing that many forms of mental state ascription do not serve the function of simply describing inner states causally responsible for the behavior of a cognitive agent; rather, they relate the agent to her environment by characterizing her practical commitments. Making these practical commitments explicit has an important regulatory function in that it supports action coordination and alignment on joint goals. We propose a model of how the ascription of mental states may have evolved as a linguistic device to perform exactly this function of making agents’ practical commitments explicit.