Mental State Attribution Research Articles

Mental State Attribution Mediates Exogenous Orienting of Attention Triggered by Gaze Cues, but not Other Social Cues

AbstractWe examined the properties in orienting visual attention that are triggered by social cues (eye gaze or pointing finger) and nonsocial cues (an arrow). Particularly, we investigated whether the mental state of others would be modulated by any social cue. We presented an occluder between the cue and target to manipulate the mental state of an agent in cues (i.e., whether the agent is aware of the target). For Experiment 1, the reaction time (RT) to detect the target was prolonged when the target side was occluded only in the gaze‐cue condition, but not for the arrow or the pointing finger. For Experiment 2, the RT of a discrimination task, which demanded greater cognitive demand, was not prolonged for any cue type. These results suggest that the mental state attribution for the agency of the cue, which is affected by an occluder, is specific to the gaze cue, and suggest that it is under top‐down control that requires cognitive resources.

Mentalistic attention orienting triggered by android eyes

The eyes play a special role in human communications. Previous psychological studies have reported reflexive attention orienting in response to another individual’s eyes during live interactions. Although robots are expected to collaborate with humans in various social situations, it remains unclear whether robot eyes have the potential to trigger attention orienting similarly to human eyes, specifically based on mental attribution. We investigated this issue in a series of experiments using a live gaze-cueing paradigm with an android. In Experiment 1, the non-predictive cue was the eyes and head of an android placed in front of human participants. Light-emitting diodes in the periphery served as target signals. The reaction times (RTs) required to localize the valid cued targets were faster than those for invalid cued targets for both types of cues. In Experiment 2, the gaze direction of the android eyes changed before the peripheral target lights appeared with or without barriers that made the targets non-visible, such that the android did not attend to them. The RTs were faster for validly cued targets only when there were no barriers. In Experiment 3, the targets were changed from lights to sounds, which the android could attend to even in the presence of barriers. The RTs to the target sounds were faster with valid cues, irrespective of the presence of barriers. These results suggest that android eyes may automatically induce attention orienting in humans based on mental state attribution.

Training self-other distinction: Effects on emotion regulation, empathy, and theory of mind.

Navigating our social environment requires the ability to distinguish ourselves from others. Previous research suggests that training interventions have the potential to enhance the capacity for self-other distinction (SOD), which then may impact various sociocognitive domains, including imitation-inhibition, visual perspective taking, and empathy. Importantly, empirical research on the role of SOD in emotion regulation remains scarce. In this study, we aim to investigate the impact of training SOD on emotion regulation and also replicate findings on empathy and the attribution of mental states to others. Using a pre-post design, participants (N = 104) were assigned to either the imitation-inhibition or general inhibitory control training. Compared to general inhibitory control training, participants trained to inhibit imitation displayed a significant increase in posttest emotion regulation levels compared to pretest levels, indicating that imitation-inhibition training increased self-reported emotion regulation. Notably, emotional interference remained unaffected by either form of training. Both training interventions resulted in diminished self-reported empathic concern, while only general inhibitory control training led to a reduction in personal distress. Moreover, neither type of training had an impact on self-reported perspective taking or theory of mind performance. This study provides novel empirical evidence of the positive impact of imitation-inhibition training on emotion regulation. Furthermore, our findings make significant contributions to the advancement of research in this area and offer further support for the advantages of behavioral training as a methodological approach to studying sociocognitive abilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The neural structures of theory of mind are valence-sensitive: evidence from three tDCS studies.

Several cortical structures are involved in theory of mind (ToM), including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and the right temporo- parietal junction (rTPJ). We investigated the role of these regions in mind reading with respect to the valence of mental states. Sixty-five healthy adult participants were recruited and received transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (1.5mA, 20min) with one week interval in three separate studies. The stimulation conditions were anodal tDCS over the dlPFC coupled with cathodal tDCS over the vmPFC, reversed stimulation conditions, and sham in the first study, and anodal tDCS over the vmPFC, or dlPFC, and sham stimulation, with an extracranial return electrode in the second and third study. During stimulation, participants underwent the reading mind from eyes/voice tests (RMET or RMVT) in each stimulation condition. Anodal left dlPFC/cathodal right vmPFC stimulation increased the accuracy of negative mental state attributions, anodal rTPJ decreased the accuracy of negative and neutral mental state attributions, and decreased the reaction time of positive mental state attributions. Our results imply that the neural correlates of ToM are valence-sensitive.

Dissonant music engages early visual processing

The neuroscientific examination of music processing in audio-visual contexts offers a valuable framework to assess how auditory information influences the emotional encoding of visual information. Using fMRI during naturalistic film viewing, we investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the effect of music on valence inferences during mental state attribution. Thirty-eight participants watched the same short-film accompanied by systematically controlled consonant or dissonant music. Subjects were instructed to think about the main character's intentions. The results revealed that increasing levels of dissonance led to more negatively valenced inferences, displaying the profound emotional impact of musical dissonance. Crucially, at the neuroscientific level and despite music being the sole manipulation, dissonance evoked the response of the primary visual cortex (V1). Functional/effective connectivity analysis showed a stronger coupling between the auditory ventral stream (AVS) and V1 in response to tonal dissonance and demonstrated the modulation of early visual processing via top-down feedback inputs from the AVS to V1. These V1 signal changes indicate the influence of high-level contextual representations associated with tonal dissonance on early visual cortices, serving to facilitate the emotional interpretation of visual information. Our results highlight the significance of employing systematically controlled music, which can isolate emotional valence from the arousal dimension, to elucidate the brain's sound-to-meaning interface and its distributive crossmodal effects on early visual encoding during naturalistic film viewing.

STUDY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COGNITIVE ASPECT OF THEORY OF MIND AND UNDERSTANDING IN ORAL LANGUAGE IN ALZHEIMER'S PATIENTS DURING THE MIDDLE STAGE OF THE DISEASE

The ability to infer internal mental states through the behavior is related to the understanding of implicit language statements in interactive situations where the speaker’s intention is public.This study looked at that relationship by answering whether this association persists during aging and after Alzheimer’s. Apply some of the terms of the Theory of mind (Toma) battery and the Oral Language (OLTA) battery designed for the adult. A group of5 individuals with Alzheimer's disease during the middle stage. The results found that the impact relationship is not limited to the group of individuals below the age of maturity, but continues into old age. it would explain the nature of language and cognitive disorders in understanding metaphors such as folk proverbs and the attribution of mental states either through behavior or through language in intermediate Alzheimer’s patients. Keywords:Cognitive side, theory of mind, understanding, oral language, Alzheimer's.

The Importance of Being Consistent: Attribution of Mental States in Strategic Human-Robot Interactions.

This article investigates the attribution of mental state (AMS) to an anthropomorphic robot by humans in a strategic interaction. We conducted an experiment in which human subjects are paired with either a human or an anthropomorphic robot to play an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, and we tested whether AMS is dependent on the robot "consistency," that is, the correspondence between the robot's verbal reaction and its behavior after a nonoptimal social outcome of the game is obtained. We find that human partners are attributed a higher mental state level than robotic partners, regardless of the partner's consistency between words and actions. Conversely, the level of AMS assigned to the robot is significantly higher when the robot is consistent in its words and actions. This finding is robust to the inclusion of psychological factors such as risk attitude and trust, and it holds regardless of subjects' initial beliefs about the adaptability of the robot. Finally, we find that when the robot apologizes for its behavior and defects in the following stage, the epistemic component of the AMS significantly increases.

Two Sides of Theory of Mind: Mental State Attribution to Moving Shapes in Paranoid Schizophrenia Is Independent of the Severity of Positive Symptoms.

Theory of Mind (ToM) impairment has repeatedly been found in paranoid schizophrenia. The current study aims at investigating whether this is related to a deficit in ToM (undermentalizing) or an increased ToM ability to hyperattribute others' mental states (overmentalizing). Mental state attribution was examined in 24 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (12 acute paranoid (APS) and 12 post-acute paranoid (PPS)) with regard to positive symptoms as well as matched healthy persons using a moving shapes paradigm. We used 3-T-functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to provide insights into the neural underpinnings of ToM due to attributional processes in different states of paranoid schizophrenia. In the condition that makes demands on theory of mind skills (ToM condition), in patients with diagnosed schizophrenia less appropriate mental state descriptions have been used, and they attributed mental states less often to the moving shapes than healthy persons. On a neural level, patients suffering from schizophrenia exhibited within the ToM network hypoactivity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and hyperactivity in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) as compared to the healthy sample. Our results indicate both undermentalizing and hypoactivity in the MPFC and increased overattribution related to hyperactivity in the TPJ in paranoid schizophrenia, providing new implications for understanding ToM in paranoid schizophrenia.

It is not all about you: Communicative cooperation is determined by your partner's theory of mind abilities as well as your own.

We investigated the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and communicative cooperation. Specifically, we examined whether communicative cooperation is affected by the ToM ability of one's cooperative partner as well as their own. ToM is the attribution of mental states to oneself and others; cooperation is the joint action that leads to achieving a shared goal. We measured cooperation using a novel communicative cooperation game completed by participants in pairs. ToM was measured via the Movies for Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) task and fluid intelligence via the Raven task. Findings of 350 adults show that ToM scores of both players were predictors of cooperative failure, whereas Raven scores were not. Furthermore, participants were split into low- and high-ToM groups through a median split of the MASC scores: high-ToM individuals committed significantly fewer cooperative errors compared to their low-ToM counterparts. Therefore, we found a direct relationship between ToM and cooperation. Interestingly, we also examined how ToM scores of paired participants determine cooperation. We found that pairs with two high-ToM individuals committed significantly fewer errors compared to pairs with two low-ToM individuals. We speculate that reduced cooperation in low-low ToM pairs is a result of less efficient development of conceptual alignment and recovery from misalignment, compared to high-high ToM dyads. For the first time, we thus demonstrate that it is not all about you; both cooperative partners make key, independent, contributions to cooperative outcomes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models.

Technological advances raise new puzzles and challenges for cognitive science and the study of how humans think about and interact with artificial intelligence (AI). For example, the advent of large language models and their human-like linguistic abilities has raised substantial debate regarding whether or not AI could be conscious. Here, we consider the question of whether AI could have subjective experiences such as feelings and sensations ('phenomenal consciousness'). While experts from many fields have weighed in on this issue in academic and public discourse, it remains unknown whether and how the general population attributes phenomenal consciousness to AI. We surveyed a sample of US residents (n = 300) and found that a majority of participants were willing to attribute some possibility of phenomenal consciousness to large language models. These attributions were robust, as they predicted attributions of mental states typically associated with phenomenality-but also flexible, as they were sensitive to individual differences such as usage frequency. Overall, these results show how folk intuitions about AI consciousness can diverge from expert intuitions-with potential implications for the legal and ethical status of AI.

Spontaneous mentalizing in patients with schizophrenia – a meta-analysis

IntroductionMentalizing helps us to understand the behaviour of others in our everyday social interactions. Spontaneous mentalizing without explicit instructions refers to representing mental state attribution. Several studies have described social cognitive deficit in schizophrenia, which largely determines the functional outcome of the disease.ObjectivesTo better understand the involvement of spontaneous mentalizing in schizophrenia, we consider it important to summarize the results of studies that used indirect instruction to measure spontaneous mentalizing performance in schizophrenia.MethodsIn our meta-analysis, we conducted a systematic search of four large databases (MEDLINE, EMBASE, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials [CENTRAL], Web of Science). A total of 14 articles were involved.ResultsBased on our findings, the performance of patients with schizophrenia is significantly weaker than in the average population for both scripts with mentalizing interactions (MD: -0.63; 95%CI (-0.90, -0.35); p=0.0021), and with goal-directed movements (SMD: -0.55; 95%CI (-0.97, -0.13); p=0.02). The intentionality of expressions used by patients with schizophrenia is significantly lower compared to the average population (for both animations with complex social interactions: MD: -0.99; 95% CI (-1.39, -0.59); p=0.0003; and with goal-directed movements: MD: -0.31; 95% CI (-0.53, -0.08); p=0.0218). We have found no significant difference neither in appropriateness nor in intentionality of verbal terms between the two goups in the case of animations with random movements.ConclusionsBased on the meta-analysis, we found poorer performance in schizophrenia in spontaneous mentalizing. We also found poorer performance in tasks with goal-directed movements used as control tasks, suggesting a more pervasive impairment of mentalizing in schizophrenia. These deficits may affect the functional outcome of the disease and could potentially have therapeutic implications.Disclosure of InterestNone Declared

Theory of mind in chronic migraine with medication overuse assessed with the MASC

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to infer one's own and others' mental states. Growing research indicates that ToM is impaired in Chronic Migraine with Medication Overuse (CM + MO). However, the research in this field has been conducted using static scenario-based tasks, often failing to test mentalization in everyday situations and measuring only performance accuracy. We filled this gap by administering the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) to subjects with CM + MO compared to episodic migraine (EM). This test allows us to assess both affective and cognitive ToM and which, in addition to being accurate, also analyzes the type of error in attribution of mental states, distinguishing between hypo-mentalization and hyper-mentalization. Thirty patients suffering from CM + MO and 42 from EM were enrolled. Results showed that CM + MO patients were less accurate in mental state attribution than EM. In addition, compared to EM, CM + MO individuals were more impaired in the affective ToM dimensions and committed more errors of hypo-mentalization. In conclusion, the application of MASC in patients with CM + MO allowed for the detection of an alteration in their ability to correctly draw conclusions about other people's mental states. This latter contributes critically to appropriate social reactions and also, possibly, to satisfactory social interactions.

Don’t Be Too Good at Reading Other People's Minds

Attribution of mental states is fundamental to our engagement with fiction. Crucially, its social content depends on mental states recursively “embedded” within each other; for instance, when a person doesn’t want other people to know about her intentions. Given that some characters seem to be consistently capable of embedding mental states on a higher level than others, this essay reviews factors that may influence authors’ constructions of such mindreading hierarchies as well as their reversals. The argument focuses on the reversal scenes in films Goodbye Lenin, The Lives of Others, and Never Look Away, and on prosocial emotions evoked by their depiction of a more equitable distribution of a presumably valuable and scarce resource, that is, access to other people's minds.

Social cognition in women with borderline personality disorder based on an exhaustive analysis of the Movie for Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) categories.

A significant number of borderline personality disorder (BPD) symptoms are manifested in the interpersonal context. This can be explained by the difficulties in attributing the mental states of oneself and others, which constitutes social cognition. Errors in social cognition are interrelated with the affective, cognitive, impulsive, and interpersonal areas of the person with BPD. The aims of this study was to analyze social cognition in women with BPD compared with a control group and to analyze social cognition in BPD based on BPD symptoms and its severity. To assess social cognition, we used a full range of social cognition categories provided by the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC): correct theory of mind (ToM); attribution of mental states (thoughts, emotions, or intentions); errors of mentalization; types of ToM; and attribution of mental states through perceptive or cognitive cues and through hot or cold emotions. The MASC has high ecological validity and has been validated in Spanish. The sample comprised 79 women, including 47 women with BPD and 32 healthy women. Worse social cognition performance was observed in women with BPD. More severe borderline symptoms were related to worse functioning in the correct ToM and to errors of no mentalization. Involvement of the cognitive area in borderline symptoms was associated with worse functioning in correct ToMand worse social cognition in cognitive areas as well as with hypermentalization. This is the first study that uses all the MASC categories and considers BPD heterogeneity and its severity to study social cognition.

Configural face processing and its influence on the timeline of mentalization

When mentalization fails, dehumanization can occur. Perceiving others as lacking fundamental mental states is the basic principle of dehumanization. Past research has already demonstrated the influence of both perceptual and contextual information on mentalization, while a recent line of research has tried to distinguish mentalization in a two-stage process: a mind detection phase in which we first identify a mind in others thanks to primary visual cues and a mind attribution phase in which both perceptual and contextual information are integrated to finalize the attribution of mental states to others. The current research aimed at deepening our understanding of the timeline of the mentalization process by specifically manipulating a perceptual, visual cue that has been related to dehumanization: the configural face process. This process was tested adapting the inversion effect that allowed us to show for the first time how and when this effect impacts and modulates the timeline of mentalization. Results indicated that the inversion effect impacted the early mind detection phase and resulted later in time in the elaboration of inverted human stimuli as more object-like.

Metarepresenting in communication

The standard cognitive explanation for the emergence of human communication is that it rests largely on the expression and attribution of communicative intentions which are, in turn, enabled by complex metarepresentations of mental states. This complexity is at odds with the limited metapsychological abilities of infants. But mentalistic metarepresentations are neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining communication. Coded ostensive signals (e.g., eye contact) and established channels (e.g., speech) allow that communicative episodes be identified through decoding rather than metarepresentational inferences. Thus, some metarepresentations may be unnecessary. However, metapsychology is also insufficient for explaining communication: the logic of instrumental actions permits interpreting their effect as following from intentions, yet the effect of communicative actions is often unavailable for inferring meaning. Moreover, current evidence for the developmental trajectory of communication and mental state attribution does not support the emergence of the former from the latter. My proposal is that our primitive concept of communication targets, instead, representational action. When we communicate, we typically convey a propositional content that is detached from our acts—a property absent in ordinary goal-directed actions. This view additionally raises the possibility that metarepresentational capacities evolved for representing external, communicative representations and were only later exapted for other purposes.

Theory of collective mind.

Theory of mind research has traditionally focused on the ascription of mental states to a single individual. Here, we introduce a theory of collective mind: the ascription of a unified mental state to a group of agents with convergent experiences. Rather than differentiation between one's personal perspective and that of another agent, a theory of collective mind requires perspectival unification across agents. We review recent scholarship across the cognitive sciences concerning the conceptual foundations of collective mind representations and their empirical induction through the synchronous arrival of shared information. Research suggests that representations of a collective mind cause psychological amplification of co-attended stimuli, create relational bonds, and increase cooperation, among co-attendees.

Do you believe that aliens feel pain? An empirical investigation of mental state attributions

On what basis do we attribute phenomenal states to others? One answer, defended by John Stuart Mill, appeals to an analogy between ourselves and the similar bodies and actions of others (1865, p. 208). Despite its intuitive plausibility, this position is often rejected (Arico et al., 2011; Buckwalter & Phelan, 2014; Knobe & Prinz, 2008). In line with Mill’s account, we propose that the primary factors used when making phenomenal state ascriptions are the appropriate display of functional and behavioral cues and having bodies with the right kind of physical composition. To test this account, we gave five groups of participants a vignette followed by three to six questions. For four of the groups, the vignette described an alien-human encounter and the participants had to judge the likelihood (on a 7-point scale) that the alien had a non-phenomenal state (a belief) and the likelihood that it could have a phenomenal state (pain). The fifth group, as a control, read a vignette about a similar interaction between two humans. We found that, as appropriate functional and behavioral cues and then humanoid features are added to the alien, people are more willing to attribute a phenomenal state to it. Attributions of the non-phenomenal state are primarily dependent on the appropriate functional and behavioral cues, not on having humanoid features.

Exploring Cognitive-Pragmatic Heterogeneity Following Acquired Brain Injury: A Cluster Analysis of Hint Comprehension.

Difficulties understanding nonliteral language (especially hints) are frequently reported following acquired brain injury (ABI). Several cognitive mechanisms, such as context processing, executive functions, and theory of mind (ToM), may underlie these disorders. However, their role remains controversial, mainly because of the characteristic heterogeneity of this population. Therefore, our study aimed to identify cognitive-pragmatic profiles in individuals with ABI. A new task of hint comprehension, manipulating executive demand, markers of hints, and ToM and neuropsychological tests were administered to 33 participants with frontal ABI and 33 control participants. Cluster analysis, a method sensitive to profile heterogeneity, was applied and coupled with error analysis. We highlighted two cognitive-pragmatic profiles. One subgroup of participants with ABI exhibited contextual insensitivity, leading them to infer the utterance meaning based on linguistic decoding alone-literal meaning. This difficulty in understanding hints was associated with deficits in working memory, inhibition, and ToM. The second subgroup of participants with ABI showed difficulty with literal statements, associated with impaired inhibition and ToM. In addition, the two subgroups differed only on the ToM task. This result suggests that various types of ToM deficit (misunderstanding vs. incorrect attribution of mental states) could contribute to the variability of the pragmatic profiles observed (difficulties in interpreting hints vs. literal statements). The experimental design adopted in this study provides valuable insight into the explanatory hypotheses of nonliteral language comprehension disorders and has important clinical implications. https://doi.org/10.23641/asha.24069516.

An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions

ABSTRACT In recent years, some authors have shown a renewed interest in interpretivist theories of folk psychological ascription [Hutto 2013. “Fictionalism About Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96 (4): 582–604.; Mölder 2010. Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Sanchez-Curry 2020. “Interpretivism and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 905–930.; Mölder 2021. “Interpretivism Without Judgement-Dependence.” Philosophia 49 (2): 611–615.; Slors 2015. "Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions." Studia Philosophica Estonica, 10 (2): 18–27.]. Part of the virtue of interpretivism lies in its ability to provide an answer to elminativist arguments without falling into the assumptions and problems of intentional realism. However, some recent developments in semantic expressivism applied to normative expressions could help to build an alternative theory to interpretivism that would enjoy the same virtues. The aim of this paper is to present and defend an expressivist approach to the status of folk psychological ascriptions. According to this view, mental states ascriptions are evaluative and non-descriptive statement that express or reflect certain normative standards or values of the attributor. After presenting the view and contrasting it with interpretivist positions, with which expressivism shares important motivations and claims, I present two arguments to favor the expressivist analysis. In line with the first argument, expressivism can account for fundamental aspects of disagreements regarding mental attributions while the second highlights the capacity of the view to explain the widespread justificatory and exculpatory uses of mental states ascriptions.