Mental Agencies Research Articles

Towards Collective Self-knowledge

We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? How do groups get to know their own mental states? This is the question of collective self-knowledge. I argue that collective self-knowledge is a distinct phenomenon that deserves our attention. In particular I suggest: (1) that we should be interested in collective self-knowledge, because our behaviour indicates that we already engage with collective self-knowledge in practice; (2) that groups can collectively avow, which indicates that they have privileged and peculiar access to their own intentional states; and (3) that collective self-knowledge is not reducible to intentional states of individuals and therefore is an independent explanandum.

Testing the Integrated Motivational-Volitional Model of Suicidal Behavior in Chinese Adolescents

The integrated motivational-volitional model of suicidal behavior (IMV; O’Connor & Kirtley, 2018) integrates some key factors of suicidal behavior (e.g., defeat and entrapment) to explain the development of suicidal ideation and suicidal attempts. This study aimed to empirically test this model in a sample of Chinese adolescents. A number of 1,239 Chinese adolescents (679 girls; M age = 14.07, SD = 1.54) completed self-report questionnaires. Results showed that defeat was associated with entrapment, which, in turn, was related to suicidal ideation and suicidal attempts. In addition, the relationship between entrapment and suicidal ideation was significant at high levels of thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness, and low levels of resilience. These findings support the application of the IMV model in Chinese adolescents, and might help mental health organizations and educational agencies formulate effective suicidal prevention programs geared toward Chinese adolescents.

Coercive Measures and Stigmatization in the Psychiatric Medical Care

The involuntary commitment of psychiatric patients has been done for almost a decade under the Law 487/2002, the law of mental health and protection for people with psychiatric disorders. Frequent involuntary psychiatric hospitalizations have led to stigma attitudes and discriminatory acts towards patients with mental disorders. The coercive medical measures are applied in the psychiatric institutions of the mental health protection agencies. Coercion gives rise to serious ethical debates in the psychiatric assistance. The individual who was hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital anticipates social rejection becoming defensive, withdraws socially, experiences a complex internal conflict. The goal for this study is to illustrate aspects linked to coercive measures, mechanical restraint at involuntary admission of patients with mental illnesses in the psychiatric medical assistance. Material and method: This study is a retrospective one, and the data was taken from the charts with involuntary admissions during the period of October 2002 to July 2012. The studied lot was comprised of 202 patients admitted involuntarily in a psychiatric hospital according to the Law 487/2002, the law of mental health and protection for people with psychiatric disorders. Results: Of the 25.7% patients admitted involuntarily, that required coercive measures during admission, 58% were contained for symptoms like self-harm. The mechanical contention measures were especially necessary in the acute cases with symptoms as self-harm and/or harm of others, but also in situations with hallucinatory-delirium symptoms. The ratio of male sex subjects was significantly higher in the subject lot that needed coercive measures during hospitalization, of those admitted involuntarily (86.5% vs. 72%) (p = 0.036). Conclusions: Involuntary admission and mandatory treatment remains in psychiatry a medical, legal and ethical problem. The required measures can lead mainly to clinical benefits, implying a paternal attitude from the psychiatry specialists by defying the patients’ autonomy. Treatment compliance is directly proportional to the overall level of functioning and inversely proportional to the level of self-stigmatization.

¿De quién son estos pensamientos? Examinando el modelo top-down de las atribuciones de agencia mental

Resumen: Las atribuciones de agencia mental se definen como el acto de asignar el inicio o autoría de un pensamiento fenoménico en 1era persona a un agente específico. Este tipo de atribución es fundamental para la producción de la creencia de que los seres humanos somos agentes racionales no solamente en términos conductuales, sino que también cognitivos. La teoría top-down - uno de los enfoques dominantes en la literatura actual - sugiere que las atribuciones de agencia mental emergen como explicaciones retrospectivas de carácter racional a la ocurrencia de pensamientos fenoménicos en primera persona. De esta forma, la agencia de un pensamiento no es parte de su contenido fenoménico inicial, sino que una categoría impuesta tras un análisis retrospectivo. Tras introducir algunos aspectos básicos sobre la discusión, el presente artículo ofrece una evaluación crítica del modelo top-down con el fin de identificar sus fortalezas y debilidades argumentativas. El artículo concluye que, si bien el modelo posee méritos importantes, éste no está en condiciones de responder a ciertos desafíos conceptuales fundamentales.

PREDICTORS OF MEDICAL, SOCIAL SERVICE, AND MENTAL HEALTH USE AMONG PEOPLE WITH DEMENTIA AND THEIR CAREGIVERS

People with Alzheimer’s disease use more medical services (Eaker et al., 2002) and are admitted to inpatient facilities at higher rates (Zhu et al., 2015) than normal controls. In addition, social services provide support for caregivers and are associated with positive outcomes for care-recipients and their caregivers (Neville, Beattle, Fielding, & MacAndrew, 2014). Despite high level of need, utilization of mental health services and social agencies for caregiver support remains low (Goodarzi, Mele, Roberts & Holroyd-Leduc, 2017; Weber, Pirraglia & Kunik, 2011). Following the Andersen and Newman model (1973), we examined whether predisposing factors (i.e., age of the caregiver and type of PWD-caregiver relationship), needs (i.e., memory impairment, disruptive behaviors, depression, anxiety, pain, functional impairment, caregiver burden, total number of prescribed medications), and enabling factors (i.e., PWD and caregiver income, quality of the PWD-caregiver relationship) differentially predicted the presence of medical, social, and mental health service use. A total of 228 dyads (PWD and the caregiver) were included. We examined each PWD and caregiver characteristic individually (univariate models) and then as a unique predictor of each of the three service use outcomes (multivariate models). A greater number of medications uniquely predicted higher medical service use, greater pain severity and PWD income were uniquely associated with higher social service use, and a greater number of medications and increased memory impairment predicted more mental health service use. These results show that distinct factors predict use of different types of service use among PWD and their caregivers.

What is ‘mental action’?

ABSTRACTThere has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.

Right Care, Right Place, Right Time: The Atlantic Canada Art Therapy Roadshow (Bon soin, bon endroit, bon moment : tournée d’art-thérapie au Canada atlantique)

Despite a growing number of art therapists in some areas of Atlantic Canada, a significant percentage of the general population is currently not aware of art therapy as a clinical mental health intervention. With the exception of a few larger hospitals, it is often not a practice incorporated into mental health organizations, educational institutions, or community agencies. Misinformation about the term art therapy has limited people in their understanding of its inherent benefits. Atlantic Canada’s geography, climate, and cultural and language differences have created additional barriers for residents in accessing these services. Inspired by the art hive movement, the history of the Grenfell traveling missions, and the present state of mental health reform in Newfoundland, three art therapists set out to connect with community professionals in an “on the road” approach to art therapy outreach in smaller towns, remote locations and with other marginalized groups. These collaborations resulted in open art studios for each visited community. These studios have the potential to become ongoing and permanent mental health resources for the region.

Convergent and Concurrent Validity of the Lithuanian Version of the Behavioral and Emotional Rating Scale-2 Teacher Rating Scale

Abstract Given the increasing international calls for more strength-based assessment, there is a need for European schools, mental health programs and family service agencies to identify psychometrically sound instruments in their native languages. The purpose of this study was to examine the convergent and concurrent validity for [?] the Behavioral and Emotional Rating Scale-2 Teacher Rating Scale (BERS-2; Epstein, 2004) as translated into Lithuanian by comparing it with the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997) and the Emotional and Behavioral Screener (EBS; Cullinan & Epstein, 2013). The results showed moderate to large correlations across all of the instruments, which would suggest that the Lithuanian version of the BERS-2 Teacher Rating Scale may be an appropriate strength-based assessment for use in Lithuania.

ESTUDIO DIALÓGICO SOBRE EL DESARROLLO DE LA ENSEÑANZA

Abstract.DIALOGICAL STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEACHING AND LEARNING IN UNIVERSITY TEACHER IDENTITYThe construction of the self implies a selection and internalization of convincing voices. Thus, investigating the development of teaching and learning from a dialogic perspective implies attending discursive polyphony inherent in teacher identity. We interviewed two professors from the same university career in order to explore what voices / positions and personal innovations unfold when they talk about teaching and learning at university. The results show that both teachers were associated with a different set of voices and innovations: movements from positions focused other-voices to positions with a greater degree of integration between other-voices and self-voices as well as movements from innovations observable actions-centered like protests and actions to innovations mental actions- centered such as reflections and reconceptualizations. Hence, we show two ways of internalizing the agency in teaching and learning: (a) from an external agency, observable to an internal, mental agency; (b) from an external management of learning, carried out by others, to an internal management, in which the learner himself must assume the management of his own learning processes. Educational implications are discussed.Keywords: dialogical approach, identity, university professors, learning, teaching, multivoicedness method.Resumen.La construcción del yo (self) implica una selección e internalización de voces internamente convincentes. Así, investigar el desarrollo de procesos de enseñanza y aprendizaje desde una perspectiva dialógica significa atender a la polifonía discursiva inherente a la identidad docente. Entrevistamos dos profesores de una misma carrera universitaria con el objetivo de explorar qué voces/posiciones e innovaciones personales despliegan cuando hablan de la enseñanza y el aprendizaje en la universidad. Los resultados muestran que ambos profesores se asociaron a un conjunto diferente de voces e innovaciones: movimientos desde posiciones con foco en voces de otros hacia posiciones con mayor grado de integración entre voces del yo y de otros así como movimientos desde innovaciones centradas acciones observables como protestas y acciones propiamente dichas hacia innovaciones centradas en acciones mentales como reflexiones y reconceptualización. Ello implicó poner en evidencia formas de interiorización de la agencia en la enseñanza y el aprendizaje: (a) de una agencia externa, observable a una agencia interna, mental; (b) de una gestión externa del aprendizaje, realizada por otros, a una gestión interna, en la que el propio aprendiz debe asumir la gestión de sus propios procesos de aprendizaje. Implicancias educativas son discutidas.Palabras clave: perspectiva dialógica, identidad, profesores universitarios, aprendizaje, enseñanza, método multivoicedness.

Moving Closer: Speakers with Mental Disabilities, Deep Disclosure, and Agency through Vulnerability

This essay examines the rhetoric of an organized group of mentally disabled speakers who share their stories with the public to fight the stigma that adheres to psychiatric diagnoses. Their “deep disclosure” of the sometimes disturbing details of their disability-related experiences can make the speakers and their audience members vulnerable in distinct ways. Vulnerability in these rhetorical situations need not only be viewed as threatening, however. Rather, the essay argues, it has the potential to be highly productive when it encourages the speaker and audience member’s openness to each other’s influence.

Mental Time Travel, Dynamic Evaluation, and Moral Agency

Mental Time Travel, Dynamic Evaluation, and Moral Agency

Recovery's edge: an ethnography of mental health care and moral agency

Recovery's edge: an ethnography of mental health care and moral agency

Mental Actions and Mental Agency

This special issue discusses various aspects of mental actions and mental agency. Mental actions and mental agency are specific subcategories of actions and agency, respectively. The challenges of elucidating what ‘actions’ are in contrast to other bodily movements, and what role ‘agency’ plays in performing such actions, have elicited intensive discussion within the framework of Action Theory. Thus, before discussing the peculiarities of mental actions and mental agency, and the specific contributions of our authors to these issues, we would like to give a brief introduction to some of the core insights from classic Action Theory. According to a prominent view in Action Theory, actions – in contrast to other bodily movements, like reflexes – are caused by some an agent’s beliefs, desires and/or other mental states. Donald Davidson ([1963] 2001), for example, argues that an individual’s reasons to act function as causes of his or her action. According to Davidson, an individual acts for what she calls a ‘primary reason’ when the individual Bcan be characterized as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards actions of a certain kind and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that this action is of that kind.^ (p. 3–4). For example, when an individual feels hungry (pro attitude) and believes there is something to eat in the fridge, this belief-desire pair causes the individual to walk to the fridge (and eat something). Proponents of a teleological approach to action, in contrast, argue that actions are not caused by mental events but need to be explained by the teleological dimension of the action in question, i.e. by the aims and goals that an agent pursues when executing an action. Alfred Mele (2000), for example, argues for a teleological account of action and against a causal account of action, illustrating by means of a series of examples that an agent’s bodily movements may be consistent with but are still not caused by the agent’s beliefs and desires. Others Rev.Phil.Psych. (2015) 6:683–693 DOI 10.1007/s13164-015-0289-5

Supervision and MFT burnout: overcoming the challenges therapists face in the workplace.

Supervision and MFT burnout: overcoming the challenges therapists face in the workplace.

Joëlle Proust: The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness

Joëlle Proust: The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness

The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness By JOELLE PROUST

The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness By JOELLE PROUST

Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees

I offer an argument for what mental action may be like in nonhuman animals. Action planning is a type of mental action that involves a type of intention. Some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of proximal mental actions, and some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of distal mental actions. The distinction between these two types of “plan-states” is often spelled out in terms of mental content. The prominent view is that while proximal mental actions are caused by mental states with nonconceptual content, distal mental actions are caused by mental states with conceptual content. I argue that, when we are investigating animal cognition, we need a nonconceptual account for the content of intentions involved in mental actions such as action planning: non-immediate intentions. This in order to defend the claim that creatures that lack conceptual capacities are capable of entertaining plan-states, and thus of exercising mental agency in the form of action planning.

Lessons Learn by Peace Officers Working In Mental Health Collaboratives

The purpose of this research project is the introduce readers to the experiences of peace officers assigned to field teams that investigate incidents involving mental illness and the lessons learned throughout the evaluation process. This paper also endeavors to expose readers to how law enforcement agencies across the United States are addressing mental illness and improving response to incidents involving subjects with mental illnesses. Also included are highlights focused on training and the collaborations taking place between mental health professionals and law enforcement agencies wanting to combine judicial supervision with community based mental health treatment.

Alice Munro’s “Runaway” in the Mirror of Sigmund Freud

Mirroring the complexities of the human psyche, literature has received new comprehension through a psychoanalytic lens. Alice Munro's Runaway (2003) is character-based and has the psychological analysis potential but it had never received such kind of study. The objective of the present paper is to read Munro's Runaway in the mirror of Sigmund Freud to detect the psychological aspects of its fictional characters. The characters are driven by the Freudian mental agencies and undergo phases of psychic disorder. In the present paper, Munro's short fiction has been discussed based on Sigmund Freud's theory of the Unconscious and its connection with the interpretation of dreams as well as the symbolization of three main characters based on tripartite agencies of the id, ego and superego. Clarifying the latent and manifest levels of characters and the world of dreams indicates the artistic creation of Alice Munro in handling complex characterization. The unconscious and its connection with the female character's dreams have been discussed. The unconscious of the female character is reflected in her dreams in result of repression and asocial drives and desires. Unconscious through dreams is the mirror of the repressed psyche of the female character. Scrutinizing the three main characters in terms of Freudian psychic trilogy, they prove to fit their psychological Freudian terms.

Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering

In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency (i.e. mental agency with the purpose to voluntarily produce certain mental representations), mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at all. This personal-level difference in agency and purposiveness has, furthermore, the consequence that instances of mind-wandering do not constitute unified and self-contained segments of the stream of consciousness—in stark contrast to focused daydreams. Besides, the two kinds of mental phenomena differ in whether they possess a narrative structure, and in how we may make sense of the succession of mental episodes involved.