Mens Rea Requirement Research Articles

10.1023/A:1010661127873

This article takes issue with the claim that hate crime statutes are justified because hatred and bias constitute uniquely culpable mental states that merit increased punishment. It outlines three key differences between hatred and bias and the mens rea requirements with which the criminal law has traditionally measured the culpability of defendants. It then argues that because hatred and bias are uniquely dispositional, the enactment of hate crime statutes marks a shift from an act-centered theory of criminal punishment to a character-centered theory, and thereby, a move from a liberal theory of legislation to a perfectionist theory. It closes by critically examining the perfectionist’s claim that the criminal law should be in the business of punishing vice and cultivating virtue, arguing that we should be wary of using punishment to regulate not only what we do, but who we are.

The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance

Ignorantia legis non excusat—ignorance of the law does not excuse—is a centuries-old criminal law maxim familiar to lawyer and layperson alike. Under the doctrine, an accused finds little protection in the claim “But, I did not know the law,” for all are presumed either to be familiar with the law’s commands or to proceed in ignorance at their own peril. The ignorant must be punished along with the knowing, the maxim teaches, to achieve a better educated and more lawabiding populace and to avoid the easy-to-assert and difficult-todispute claim of ignorance that would otherwise flow from the lips of any person facing criminal punishment. Despite this country’s long-standing allegiance to the hoary maxim, over the last century, and in particular over the last decade, the courts have seriously eroded the ignorantia legis principle by frequently con† Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law; J.D., 1987, Columbia University School of Law; B.A., 1984, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The author wishes to thank Sara Sun Beale, Kathleen Brickey, James J. Brudney, Pamela Bucy, Ruth Colker, Dan M. Kahan, Debra Livingston, Gerard Lynch, Deborah Jones Merritt, Alan C. Michaels, Kathy S. Northern, Peter Swire and Sarah Welling for agreeing to read and providing helpful comments on earlier drafts, and the Ohio State University College of Law for its generous financial support of this project. Special thanks are also due to Bryan Faller and Stephanie Greene for their invaluable research assistance. Finally, the author is especially indebted to Michele Whetzel-Newton and Carol Peirano for their outstanding secretarial and administrative assistance. DAVIES TO PRINTER 03/22/99 12:51 PM 342 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:341 struing the mens rea term “willfully” to require proof of an accused’s knowledge of the law. The erosive effect that these constructions have had on the ignorantia legis maxim is referred to in this Article as the “jurisprudence of willfulness.” Professor Davies demonstrates that, contrary to the maxim, the number of federal criminal statutes that have been construed to impose such a heightened mens rea requirement is already quite large. The Article reveals that, if the courts continue to employ their current interpretive approach to the term “willfully,” at least 160 additional federal statutes containing the term are at risk of similar treatment. The author argues that contemporary constructions of the troublesome scienter term to impose a knowledge of the law element have been grounded on doubtful, unchallenged logic and have bequeathed a legacy of grave interpretive confusion. Professor Davies maintains that much of the “jurisprudence of willfulness” is inimical to congressional judgments and, therefore, violative of rule of law and separation of powers principles. The Article urges a return to the ignorantia legis principle in all cases in which a clear legislative intent to abandon the maxim when employing the term “willfully” is missing. Ignorance of the law excuses no man; not that all men know the law, but because ‘tis an excuse every man will plead, and no man can tell how to refute him.

A Little Knowledge Can Be a Dangerous Thing - State of New Jersey v. Robertson & Mens Rea in the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act of 1987

State of New Jersey v. Robertson was the first case to have interpreted the mens rea requirement in the criminal provisions of the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act of 1987. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, unlike a majority of the courts that have examined criminal provisions of environmental statutes, held that a defendant's knowledge of the illegality of his acts was a necessary element in a criminal prosecution under this Act. This Case Note asserts that the decision in Robertson was improper and inconsistent with the background principles of criminal law, and that the criminal provisions of the Act should have been analyzed in light of the public welfare doctrine.

Faultless mistake of fact: Justification or excuse?

I. Introduction According to Lafave and Scott, No area of the substantive criminal law has traditionally been surrounded by more confusion than that of ignorance or mistake of fact or law.[1] However, the authors go on to say that [i]n actuality, the basic rule is extremely simple: ignorance or mistake of fact or law is a defense when it negatives the existence of a mental state essential to the crime charged.[2] Typically then, a mistake of fact on the part of a defendant at the time of the offense serves to undergird a failure of proof defense. In a failure of proof defense, the defense attempts to show that an element essential to the definition of the crime is not present and, thus, that the prosecution has not proved its prima facie case. Regina v. Morgan provides an example of the utilization of a defense of this sort.[3] In Morgan, the Lords concluded that since Morgan's co-appellants sincerely believed that the alleged victim consented to intercourse (although in fact she had not), it cannot be said that they intended the act qua prohibited act, regardless of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of each of their beliefs regarding her consent. Thus, according to the Lords, controversial decision, the mens rea requirement is not met in circumstances in which a defendant charged with rape sincerely believed, at the time of the act, that the intercourse was consensual. In effect, the mistake of fact negatives defendant intent. An affirmative defense may also be founded upon a defendant's mistake of fact. defense of this sort may concede that the prosecution has made its prima facie case, that is, that the conduct and culpability requirements for the crime are met, but nevertheless contend that the defendant ought to be found not guilty for other reasons, for example, because the defendant's actions were justified or excused. People v. Young serves as an example of the application of such a defense.[4] In this case, Young went to the aid of an eighteen-year-old individual who was struggling against two assailants. According to Young, he intervened because the youth was crying and trying to escape the clutches of the two men who, in the struggle, had nearly removed the young man's pants. As a consequence of Young's intervention, one of the men believed by Young to be an unlawful assailant suffered a broken leg. Unbeknownst to Young, though, the two assailants were in fact plain clothes detectives. So, unfortunately for Young and the detectives, Young was mistaken about the facts of the situation. Specifically, he held the erroneous belief that the two assailants were ordinary civilians, not police officers carrying out their duties. However, although Young knowingly and purposely attacked the two men who turned out to be officers of the law (and, so, mens rea, in addition to the other material elements for assault, was clearly present),[5] Young had an affirmative defense for his conduct.[6] The New York State legislature provides those with reasonable but mistaken beliefs with the following defense: A person may...use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person.[7] In this paper, I shall focus upon the affirmative defense of actions similar to Young's, actions upon a faultless mistake of fact.[8] I shall advance the following thesis: action based upon a faultless mistake of fact are appropriately deemed excused, not justified, by morality and by the law.[9] In Section II, I explicate the basic distinction between the notions of justification and excuse as well as suggest why the distinction is important. In Section III, I provide an analysis of the notion faultless mistake of fact. Next, in Section IV, I criticize the competing analysis of Kent Greenawalt and provide arguments for the central thesis of my paper. …

Impaired Voluntariness and Criminal Responsibility: Reworking Hart's Theory of Excuses-the English Judicial Response

Impaired Voluntariness and Criminal Responsibility: Reworking Hart's Theory of Excuses-the English Judicial Response

The juvenile death penalty: A frustrated society's attempt for control

AbstractThe United States is alone among western industrialized nations in allowing a provision for the juvenile death penalty. Specifically, 92% of the juveniles presently sentenced to death were convicted under a felony‐murder doctrine which eliminates the state's burden of proving the mens rea requirement for murder. The high rate of felony‐murder convictions of juveniles on death row is highly inconsistent with theories of punishment which have traditionally been used to support the death penalty.