Membership Action Plan Research Articles

Implementation of NATO standards in the training system for the Security Service of Ukraine

Incorporation of North Atlantic Alliance standards into domestic legislation, that governs relations in the security and defense sector is one of the key requirements for Ukraine to obtain a NATO Membership Action Plan and further deepen Euro-Atlantic integration with a view to acquiring Alliance membership. An Important condition for these tasks is the implementation of NATO standards and procedures in the legislation governing military education. In the process of standardizing and achieving the state of compatibility of the security and defense sector of Ukraine with the relevant NATO forces, the specificity of the application of standards in improving the system of training specialists for the Security Service of Ukraine should be highlighted separately. According to this development course, military education today includes formal and informal (general training) components, and the improvement of professional competence (special training). Professional training of military specialist according to NATO standards is carried out at the appropriate levels of management: operational, tactical, strategic. It remains compulsory for officers to have received a higher education in the relevant educational programs. Taking into account the specific nature of the professional activities of the members of the special service, the tasks assigned to them and the functions performed for that purpose, namely, countering intelligence and subversive activities, combating terrorism, counter-intelligence and defending national statehood, Ensuring the security of the State in cyberspace, etc., the training system for the Security Service may be differentiated according to its functional direction and institutionalized in the military education system or outside it. At the same time, an important basis for the development of the educational component in the Security Service of Ukraine will remain the recruitment of teaching staff from among persons with practical experience. Despite the format of the model chosen, training for the security forces should be based on NATO standards, with a conceptually new piece of legislation.

SOME ISSUES ON PROTECTION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS CONCEMING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PROCESS OF EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

Some issues of protection of national interests concerning intellectual property in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration are considered, in particular features of protection of intellectual property in the implementation of international military-technical cooperationof Ukraine, depending on the specifics of this activity. The legislation of Ukraine regulating activities related to military-technical cooperation is analyzed. The importance of intellectual property protection at all stages of military-technical cooperation and the need to improve the legislation on the regulation of intellectual property protection in the defense sphere are outlined.The Constitution and major legislative acts of Ukraine in the field of national security and defense have clearly defined the strategic course for achieving NATO membership. However, to achieve this strategic goal requires persistence and political will, as well as an understanding of the various tactical issues that need to be resolved along the way.New members are being trained in the process of performing the NATO Membership Action Plan. On the long-term path of Euro-Atlantic integration, Ukraine has developed an annual NATO-Ukraine national program. Traditionally, the Annual National Program is structurally constructed by analogy with a typical Membership Action Plan andincludes almost all areas of reformation and modernization of Ukraine.In particular, great attention is paid to reforming and comprehensive support of Ukraine's security and defense sector. It includes a wide range of measures to maintain combat capabilities, modernize and upgrade weapons and military equipment, reform and develop the defense-industrial complex of Ukraine, implement the government qualityassurance system of defense products, revitalize the scientific and military-technical cooperation. Even measures to ensure gender equality in the security and defense sector of Ukraine are being envisaged.It is stated that defense and technical cooperation with NATO will be focused, in particular, on the use of the best modern world technologies. However, the issues of intellectual property protection of all entities and protection of national interests in this field are not considered at all, although almost all the envisaged measures cannot be implementedwithout the use of intellectual property rights.In our view, intellectual property issues should be decided in conjunction with other issues. However, in order to determine the position of the state and development of appropriate proposals and recommendations for securing national interests in intellectual property in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, it is appropriate to consider these issuesin the following areas: legal cooperation between Ukraine and NATO;scientific cooperation; military-technical cooperation.

From Challenged Statehood to Democratic Civil-Military Relations: Defence Reform in Montenegro

ABSTRACTAfter gaining independence in 2006, Montenegro succeeded in establishing democratic civilian control over its armed forces in a short period of time, earning membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program in 2006, Membership Action Plan in 2009, and NATO in 2017. This essay evaluates this swift process of defense reform in Montenegro and argues that such successful establishment of democratic civil-military relations was only possible because the 2006 referendum on independence settled the question of statehood and removed it from the political agenda. The same level of success was not possible in the prior union of Serbia and Montenegro, because Montenegro’s and Kosovo’s independence aspirations generated uncertainty regarding the country’s future and created incentives to maintain non-democratic civil-military relations, even as the country was undergoing democratic reforms in other areas. Once the question of statehood was settled, the new state was able to reform its defense sector and establish democratic control over its armed forces with unusual speed.

Bosnia and Herzegovina on the uncertain path towards the membership in NATO

The path of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards NATO membership began after its entry into the Partnership for Peace in November 2006. In just a few years, Bosnia and Herzegovina has achieved an intensive dialogue with NATO (2008) and the launch of negotiations on the Membership Action Plan (2010), which was however activated in December 2018. In the meantime, there have come to a discord between the key internal political factors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly clear distinction between the Bosniak and Croat elites that unequivocally support NATO membership, and representatives of Serbs at the state level and the Republic of Srpska who are currently against it. Moreover, in October 2017, the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska took a stand by which it proclaimed the military neutrality of this entity and in that regard insisted on consultations with the neighboring state - the Republic of Serbia. However, in March 2018, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a five-year strategic foreign policy document which stipulates that NATO membership is one of its foreign policy foundations. This document only added to the confusion regarding BiH?s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Following the general elections held in October 2018, this issue has now posed a specific problem over the formation of the Council of Ministers. Neighbors of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro have different opinions concerning the possibility of membership of this country in NATO. Accordingly, Croatia declaratively expresses support and emphasizes its interest in integrating BiH into NATO to prevent cross-border security challenges. Serbian officials are quite restrained about BiH?s entry into NATO, saying that this should be the result of the compromise of the elites of the three constituent nations. The global race between the United States and the Russian Federation represents a turning point in terms of BiH?s membership in NATO. The United States strongly supports this process, believing that it will secure the post-conflict Western Balkans project, while Russia retains the explicit position that any new enlargement poses a problem for its security.

The 2019 NATO Summit on NATO Leaders and Expectations for Ukraine

Ukraine's accession to NATO has been and remains one of the priorities of our country's foreign policy, its strategic goal. Since independence, Ukraine has been moving towards joining NATO, but this movement has been slow and sometimes declarative compared to other neighboring countries. At present, the transformation of NATO's views in Ukrainian society is rapidly turning into a positive side, and membership in this organization is regarded as a pledge to realize the national interests of the country. The great positive is that on February 7, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on the constitution of Ukraine's strategic course for membership in the European Union and NATO. The recent visit of the North Atlantic Council to Ukraine, as well as the 2019 London Summit, have been of particular interest, primarily because of the prospect of NATO enlargement in the coming years. There is every reason to believe that the transition to enhanced partnership programs will take place in the near future. And, of course, we should take the most serious steps to improve Ukraine's political system, de-oligarchization, fight against corruption and other urgent tasks of building a civil society and a full-fledged democratic order that will fulfill the political criteria of membership in the Alliance. And, ultimately, it will create the right conditions for security in the face of the challenges of the modern world. The next Alliance Summit will be held on December 3-4, 2019 in London to commemorate NATO's 70th anniversary. For Ukraine, an event such as the NATO Summit should theoretically be an opportunity to declare its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, with the likelihood of making any statements and making demarches in this regard. At the moment, it is important for Ukraine, prior to the start of the dialogue on the submission of the NATO Membership Action Plan, to demonstrate to NATO member countries progress in meeting the criteria for NATO membership and to understand the prospects of NATO enlargement in the coming years.

Річні національні програми як інструмент євроатлантичної інтеграції України

The purpose of the article is to demonstrate the institutional consolidation and implementation of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine by means of the National Annual Programs.Attention is drawn to the fact that the implementation of the Annual National Programs by Ukraine began in 2009 and it is a unique practice in NATO's bilateral relations. The President of Ukraine annually approves the National Annual Program (ANP) and measures to implement it. All Annual NATO-Ukraine National Programs have been in full compliance with standards of NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, there remains a fundamental difference, in particular with regard to the responsibility of an applicant and the Alliance for implementation.Special attention is paid to the current ANP-2018, which not only determines the priorities for 2018, but also the medium-term goals to be achieved by 2020. Traditionally, the ANP is structurally similar to a typical MAP. Five sections are analysed: political and economic, defence/military, resource, security and legal issues.It is proved that in order to switch to the MAP it is necessary not only to mention the corresponding points in the ANP, but also to implement them thoroughly. The Alliance should see and assess the real political aspiration of the Ukrainian authorities and society for complete Euro-Atlantic integration.It is emphasized that the priority task in carrying out the ANP will remain to carry out the activities aimed at preserving international consensus in supporting Ukraine, to prolong sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation to end the armed aggression against Ukraine. It is especially worth noting that the ANP-2018 does not contain direct references to the need for the so-called "Minsk agreements". Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO in the area of strategic communications has become especially important.Thus, there is an objective co-relation between the real content of Ukraine's independence and the realization of its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

UNsatisfied? The Rocky Path to NATO Membership – Bosnia and Herzegovina: A New Approach in Understanding the Challenges

Abstract NATO’s enlargement in the Western Balkans (WB) has been the focus of a number of debates for almost two decades. Opinions and positions regarding this question range from serious doubts, criticisms and opportunistic press releases to enthusiastic support for membership. This paper assesses Bosnian reforms and policy changes, as well as the country’s efforts to join NATO. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has made significant steps in moving towards NATO’s military and political standards, but not sufficiently. Although BiH is viewed by some observers as a country approaching the point of joining the Membership Action Plan (MAP), this prospect remains uncertain. The findings of this research suggest that BiH is different from other WB countries and that it is not suitable for understanding the NATO integration challenges in the WB. In order to understand Bosnian ‘specifics’, it is necessary not only to view the challenges through the prism of technical and other domestic issues in BiH. A wider approach must be adopted. Through understanding the Bosnian specifics, the dilemmas related to the NATO membership of BiH become more obvious and clear. Bosnian specifics illustrate why BiH is not able to take significant steps towards long-term stabilization and NATO membership.

TBILISI AGAIN FEELS THREATENED BY MOSCOW

(By Yury Roks. Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 1, 2016, p. 7. Complete text:) Russia’s permanent representative to NATO Aleksandr Grushko said that accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO would put Europe on brink of a large-scale crisis. Tbilisi regarded this remark, made on Rossia 24 TV channel, as yet another Russian challenge and threat to Georgian independence. ... Russia’s NATO representative called alliance’s actions and plans to accept Ukraine and Georgia into its ranks intolerable. I can’t imagine a situation where these countries would continue to harbor hopes of joining NATO***and that alliance would actually be preparing to accept them, because that would explode the situation and put Europe on brink of a crisis whose size and extent are impossible to imagine today, said Grushko. Earlier, he noted that will not stand idly by and watch as US increases its military presence in Europe. ... We are not passive observers; we are consistently taking all military actions we consider necessary to compensate for this increased presence, which, incidentally, is totally unjustified. Of course, response will be absolutely asymmetric. It will be fine-tuned to reflect our perception of extent of military threat, and to provide maximum efficiency without excessive cost, Aleksandr Grushko said in response to view expressed recently by NATO Commander in Europe Gen. Philip Breedlove that alliance should increase its contingent to protect Baltic states from Russia. ... It is not entirely clear why Aleksandr Grushko chose this particular time to declare unacceptability of admitting Georgia, in particular, to NATO. The only thing that comes to mind is that statement was preemptive. After all, Georgia is not about to be admitted into NATO any time soon. Moreover, at NATO summit in Warsaw this July, in spite of all requests and even demands, [Georgia] will not receive a NATO Membership Action Plan, which is final stage on way to a country’s admission into organization. It is impossible to join alliance without it. At least there has been no precedent. European leaders remain deaf to Georgian representatives’ reasons for accepting it or at least for [striving to achieve] maximum progress in integration process. ... According to knowledgeable sources, Germany and France categorically oppose Georgia’s admission to NATO, and rumor has it that other countries do, too. However, US and several countries of former socialist camp headed by Poland are lobbying for [Georgia’s] admission. At any rate, Tbilisi is in limbo on the issue of joining NATO. ... On one hand, Georgia has been complying with all of Brussels’s recommendations, receiving positive assessments from Brussels and actively participating in NATO activities, putting its citizens in harm’s way to perform military duty in special operations far beyond their homeland. But on other hand, Georgia seems no closer to joining NATO than it was a few years ago. The situation is so ambiguous that [Georgian] Defense Minister Tina Khidasheli and other high-ranking officials of country actually directly asked NATO leaders to make a final decision and, if they are not planning to accept Georgia, to stop playing games and allow [Georgia’s] government to draft state development plans that disregard possible membership in alliance. ... Aleksandr Grushko’s statement plays into hands of the political forces in Georgia that are planning to use Russian card in fall 2016 parliamentary election campaign. That is, almost all of them. And it is no wonder that reaction was instantaneous. There is hardly any point in quoting [specific] responses from Georgian politicians. The refrain of this large chorus is that Russia does not and will not consider Georgia an independent state; that statement from [Russia’s] permanent representative to NATO is a threat and blackmail; and that the balanced policy toward that current authorities are talking about is meaningless, because it has ultimately led to, among other things, aggressive statement by Russia’s permanent representative to NATO. And this is tantamount to interference in Georgia’s internal affairs. ... The [Georgian] authorities have so far been silent. President Georgy Margvelashvili merely recalled at a meeting with US administration officials in Washington that Georgia remains a reliable ally of West in fight against global threats, and is the only country in region whose stated purpose is to join NATO and European Union. ... However, Georgian president did not say this in response to Grushko’s statement. He was only once again indicating the direction of Tbilisi’s geopolitical vector, which Moscow finds so vexing.

Picking Winners? Evidence on NATO’s Enlargement Strategy

The effectiveness of NATO conditionality for institutional reforms is highly controversial. Some papers argue that any effect this conditionality might have had may be due to endogeneity effects, i.e. NATO may have picked the winners. We argue that this is not the case. First, NATO-Mazedonia relations provide a case in point. Macedonia was granted entry into the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999 due to country’s strategic importance. Only after the Ohrid agreement, effective conditionality set in and marked a switch in NATO strategy from security only towards institution building. Second, this is supported by econometric evidence based on panel data. An event study reveals that entry into NATO’s accession process was mainly driven by neighbourhood and good relations with the West. We conclude that empirical evidence clearly supports a stronger role of NATO’s political agenda, i.e., low entry barriers but strict accession conditionality.

The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

David and Goliath: Georgia and Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy

The military conflict between Georgia and Russia over the separatist region of South Ossetia in August 2008 surprised many within the international community and reinforced growing concerns about a...

GAO Report on NATO Enlargement: Albania and Croatia

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 by twelve European and North American countries to provide collective defense against the emerging threat that the Soviet Union posed to the democracies of Western Europe. Since its inception, the Alliance’s key objective has been to achieve a lasting peace in the North Atlantic area that is based on the common values of democracy, the rule of law, and individual liberty. Article 10 of the treaty permits the accession of additional European states if they are in a position to further the treaty’s principles and contribute to North Atlantic security. While members must unanimously agree to any new country’s accession, the treaty contains no explicit criteria that a country must meet to join the Alliance. NATO’s invitations to countries to join the Alliance are political decisions based on the unanimous agreement of members. At the 1999 summit meeting in Washington, D.C., NATO promulgated, among other things, the Membership Action Plan, to provide guidance and counseling to other NATO aspirants to facilitate their preparations for possible membership. The plan sets forth defense, budgetary, information security, legal, political, and economic goals for countries to work toward in order to enhance their readiness for membership. Essentially, NATO wants countries that are seeking to join the Alliance to:

Montenegro’s Strategic Priorities on the Path of Euro-Atlantic Integration

Euro-Atlantic integration is the best framework for ensuring the long-term stability and security of the countries in the Western Balkans, and is the precondition for their economic development. Euro-Atlantic frameworks provide mechanisms for establishing confidence between countries in the regions, as well as strengthening cooperation and understanding, in the area of security and in many other fields. This is the reason why Montenegro fully supports the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its neighbors, with a focus on regional cooperation and participation in all regional initiatives that are based on a good-neighbor policy. Montenegro’s strategic priorities on the international level are building positive relations with its neighbors, increasing the level of regional security, and contributing to peacekeeping and stability in the world through participation in international missions and operations led by the UN, the EU, and NATO. At the same time, practical and efficient realization and implementation of a range of Partnership for Peace mechanisms have enabled Montenegro to gain access in a very short period of time to the Intensified Dialogue with NATO, and to begin the initial stages of the Membership Action Plan. Montenegro is ready to respond as rapidly as possible to all challenges that might arise in its path toward NATO membership, and looks forward to working in consultation and assistance with NATO, its neighbors, and other member states of NATO and the PfP.

Leading a Successful Transition: The Case of Croatia

An example of Croatia's successful transition is the completion of our preparations for NATO membership. Joining the Partnership for Peace programme was an earlier expression of the idea that Croatia belongs to the Euro-Atlantic community. It also marked Croatia's first formal participation in Western security structures. In 2002, Croatia became an official aspirant for NATO membership in the framework of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). After six MAP cycles, Croatia received an invitation to join NATO at the summit held on 2-4 April 2008 in Bucharest.

Georgia and NATO

Georgia's progress towards membership of NATO hangs in the balance as the Alliance's April 2008 Bucharest summit approaches. Divisions between members on whether to grant a Membership Action Plan widened after the Georgian government violently dispersed a rally in November and temporarily imposed a state of emergency. Although President Mikhail Saakashvili then called and won early elections, Georgia's domestic instability and unresolved internal conflicts could mean that NATO will make it wait.

Measuring Defense Reform: A Proposed Methodology to Measure Efforts to Achieve the Objectives of PAP-DIB

The development and continuous utilization of objective metrics to demonstrate the effectiveness of reforms instituted by countries to achieve the objectives established through the Partnership for Peace–Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) process should be seen as both essential and obvious. However, to date there have been only modest efforts by defense experts, as well as nations, to develop systematic and disciplined methods that ministries of defense and national defense headquarters can employ to ascertain whether the PAP-DIB reforms they are instituting are meeting their intended objectives. To be sure, PfP nations participate in the Planning and Review Process on an agreed time-table with the NATO International Staff. However, notwithstanding the usefulness of these review processes (both formal reviews and the accompanying informal dialogue with NATO officials and nations), these are essentially reviews to determine the degree to which a Partner has met the Partnership Goals it has agreed to with NATO (via the Membership Action Plan, PARP, or individual Partnership Action Plan processes). As such, these useful reviews and analyses can be more accurately assessed as constituting an important element of what should be a more comprehensive and inclusive analytical methodology. Despite the seemingly problematic nature of any attempt to measure the reform of public institutions, given their numerous subjective characteristics, there are analytical techniques that can be employed that can provide objective results to senior civilian and military officials that would enable them to measure the effectiveness of defense reforms. Indeed, such analyses should be viewed as being critical to enabling senior leadership to exercise requisite oversight through conducting informed cost-benefit analyses, based upon objective data. When developing metrics to measure effectives in the delivery of national defense reform efforts, a hierarchy should be employed that gives greater weight to those factors that are clearly objective in character. Other factors (e.g., those that might be more subjective) also need review, but their usefulness in determining the merit of specific reform projects and/or their envisaged methodological approach needs to be assessed in the light of the results of the first level of hierarchical analysis. The proposed categories of analysis suggested in this essay are: increases in defense capability/defense efficiency; improvements in the means to support/facilitate defense efforts; a review of the methodological approach of defense reform (e.g., review of assumptions and techniques); and analyses of other technical assistance options that might be employed to effect reform.

Enlarging NATO’s MAP: An Expanded Membership Action Plan and the War on Terrorism

Since no current NATO aspirant can project significant military power, NATO should set new membership criteria based on fighting the war on terrorism.

NATO’s Membership Action Plan and Defense Planning: Credibility at Stake

Partnership programs make NATO membership contingent on political, economic, and defense reform. But NATO’s credibility will be undermined unless it extends invitations to at least some aspirant states.

Особливості правового регулювання членства в Організації Північноатлантичного договору

На основі аналізу положень Північноатлантичного договору 1949 р. та ряду інших нормативних актів НАТО у статті проаналізовано критерії та процес набуття членства в цій Організації. Окрема увага приділена процесу підготовки держави до членства в Альянсі, який умовно складається з двох етапів: етапу Інтенсифікованого діалогу з НАТО щодо питань членства та відповідних реформ і етапу Плану дій щодо членства в НАТО. У зв’язку з тим, що Україна перебуває на етапі Інтенсифікованого діалогу, в статті вивчено проблемні моменти, які можуть виникнути у разі проходження нею наступного етапу – Плану дій щодо членства в НАТО, а також при безпосередньому прийнятті рішення державами-членами НАТО про залучення до їх складу нового члена.