NATO Membership Research Articles

Courtship, Honeymoon, and Stabilisation? Military Expenditures of New NATO Member Countries Before and After the 1999–2020 Enlargements

ABSTRACT As a result of the 1999, 2004, 2009, 2017 and 2020 enlargements, the number of NATO members increased from 16 to 30, with the alliance including 14 new countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Southern and Eastern Europe. The different times at which individual countries joined the alliance allow assessing the effect of the accession process and the accession itself on the long- and short-run level of military expenditures of the countries involved. By using the difference in differences method in this article, it has been demonstrated that in a period of 1-3 years prior to the accession the military expenditures of countries applying for the alliance membership are significantly higher by approx. 0.1-0.2 percentage points of the GDP. In the years following the accession to the alliance, military expenditures level out as the increases of military expenditures are statistically insignificant. An increase in military expenditures prior to the accession is more pronounced in the Balkan states than in the countries of NATO’s Eastern Flank. Estimation results suggest that being a member of the alliance has a positive effect on the level of military expenditures, which constitutes an argument in favour of a lack of the free-riding among new NATO countries.

Bottom‐up foreign policy? Finland, NATO and public opinion

AbstractFinland's decision to apply for membership in NATO is a case of bottom‐up driven foreign policy. Public opinion had been rather stable for more than 25 years in the NATO issue with less than 30 per cent of the people supporting Finland's membership in NATO but almost overnight during the week when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, a majority of Finns were in favour of it. Only after that shift in public opinion did the decision‐makers support the idea of joining NATO. How was the bottom‐up driven change possible? First, the resistance to NATO membership in Finland was common but not deep. Second, in the run‐up to the war, Russia had demanded that NATO put a stop to its open door policy not only with regard to Ukraine but also for Finland. Third, Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine constituted a particular frame in Finland, because the 1939 Winter War analogy was a key part of the collective memory. Finally, due to a strong tradition of national consensus in foreign and security policy, the shift in the public opinion became overwhelming: when the tide had turned, only very few resisted. In sum, four factors enabled the public opinion change: a rational basis for opinion change, a sense of urgency, an emotional push and the consensus effect. Although public opinion is often seen as stabilising and retardant force particularly in foreign and security policy, it can also be a driver for change when suitable conditions such as those in Finland exist.

CORRUPTION AS AN IMPORTANT SOCIAL PROBLEM: STRATEGIC MEASURES TO FIGHT CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE

It is determined that during the full-scale war, the corruption system that has existed in Ukraine for decades was able to adapt and quickly develop new niches, including those related to the war. The Great War did not become an impetus for a real fight against or minimization of corruption schemes. Under these conditions, corruption remains a serious factor that negatively affects most processes in the country (economic, social, political, legal, and other), and is an obstacle to NATO membership and state development. It is noted that over the past ten years, a number of anti-corruption laws have been adopted in Ukraine, which demonstrates the confident direction of the state to address this problem. However, their implementation is not sufficient to reduce the level of corruption in the country. To improve the state of anti-corruption measures, it is necessary to ensure the legitimacy of all branches of government, and comprehensive work in this area is important. It is proved that the fight against corruption is a long-term process that requires constant efforts and cooperation from all segments of society, but it is necessary to ensure a comprehensive approach to overcoming corruption. The author identifies the key elements, the introduction and implementation of which, in combination, will reduce corruption to a level that will not pose a serious threat to the State and society, in particular, have the potential to overcome this global phenomenon. In addition, the author outlines strategic measures to minimize corruption in Ukraine.

NATO and Ukraine: The Peril of Indecision

Despite the unprecedented level of cooperation and support behind defending Ukraine, no criteria or timeline for Ukraine’s accession to NATO were established at the July 2024 NATO summit in Washington. Meanwhile, the window for Ukraine’s accession may be closing as NATO member states become more risk averse and transatlantic support for Ukraine more brittle. Establishing the sequence of developments that would make membership ripe would at least restore NATO’s control over the process. NATO could explicitly frame the membership option as integral to ending the war and bringing security and stability to the region. Senior officials would need to present a clear account of how and under what assumptions Ukraine’s membership in NATO could come about. The West Germany model, though it would not be easy to digest or implement, remains the most plausible one.

DYNAMICS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINEAN WAR. AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT ON FUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

In the context of geopolitical developments and international tensions, the war in Ukraine is a crucial contemporary reference point, capturing the attention of the international community by its complexity and scale. This conflict, which began in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and intensified in the eastern regions of Ukraine, has generated a series of profound transformations in the landscape of security and international relations. Detailed analysis of the dynamics of the Russian-Ukrainian war becomes essential for understanding its long-term implications for security and defence policies. This analytical process is not limited to investigating the conflict itself, but extends to assessing how events in Ukraine have shaped and will continue to shape national and international security strategies. Shaping future security and defence policy in Europe, with direct implications for Romania, given its position on the border with Ukraine and its membership of NATO, should be based on a comprehensive and coordinated approach.

Towards NATO Membership: Looking into the End of Sweden's Neutrality Amidst Strategic Shift in Europe

The year 2022 marked the re-outbreak of a chaotic war, between Russia and Ukraine, in Eastern Europe. While military attacks between the two warring countries were not directed to countries around the region, and Sweden does not have a shared border with both countries, Sweden decided to apply for NATO membership a few months after the war began. This decision contradicted with Sweden’s long-standing tradition of neutrality in foreign affairs for almost two centuries. Using the framework of neoclassical realism along with the concept of alliance, the shifting stance is explained through systemic incentives and intervening variables, which comprised of (1) the inconsistency in the utilization of Russian military capabilities and (2) the European Union's defense challenges; (3) the Swedish military posture, (4) the Swedish Prime Minister's perception, and (5) the majority support within the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament). This research also indicates that Sweden’s neutrality would be maintained during international competition or the growth of alliances with significant power capabilities in the region. However, the neutrality did not extend to non-military aspects such as trade and transportation access.

The role of science in resilience planning for military-civilian domains in the U.S. and NATO

ABSTRACT In recent years, the NATO member nations have committed to a coordinated approach to strengthening resilience among the Allies, including the development of National Resilience Plans (NRPs). The Allies outlined the extent to which the robustness of their respective military capacities requires the designed resilience of systems that bridge civilian and military domains. This article outlines the role that resilience plays in supporting tactical and strategic measures of national security and defense within military and civilian domains. This exploration provides an outline of how resilience is currently applied in practice by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and NATO. Building on this diversity of applications, various categorical forms of resilience drawn from the empirical science of resilience are positioned within NATO’s emerging frame for ‘layered’ resilience. This article reinforces the scientific debate that an optimal orientation to resilience leaves open the door for the transformative adaptation of function and identity when the single-equilibrium processes of resilience reach their limits. This article concludes with a normative perspective on how military and civilian resilience planning could support the development of NRPs that would amplify the Allies’ collective capacity to face shared security threats.

Cognitive Security in a Changing World: Citizen Perceptions During Finland's NATO Joining Process

Contemporary conflicts are multifaceted and no longer fit the traditional war-and-peace dichotomy due to digital dimensions and the role of the human mind. The concept of warfare has transformed significantly: it's no longer solely reliant on physical capabilities but increasingly fought within digital environments and individuals' minds. These persistent, intertwined crises and psychological information influence present challenges to cognitive security. Psychological influence shapes opinions, attitudes, emotions, behaviors, and decision-making in individuals, groups, and societies using various methods, often involving digital tools to manipulate cognitive processes. It aims to shape the human mind, going beyond altering information to influence how the human brain processes received information. To safeguard human cognition, cognitive security is crucial. It involves the capability to detect, recognize, control, and counter negative psychological information influence aimed at an individual. Cognitive security plays a critical role in enabling individuals and society to recognize, understand, and manage a wide range of threats and risks. The rapidly changing world, driven by technology, politics, and the environment, poses new challenges for citizens' cognitive security. As warfare evolves, individuals struggle to understand the complex threats, including cyber and information influence. Hence, this study aims to ascertain whether individuals' feeling of security has changed and if they are perceiving psychological information influence. The study investigates the sense of security among Finnish people using survey data collected during two significant time periods: after Finland announced its intention to join NATO (N = 1080) and after it officially became a NATO member (N = 1047). Additionally, whether an increase in hostile online influence and disruptions in the cyber environment was noticed by Finnish people during these same time frames is being investigated. The results indicate a statistically significant decrease in the feeling of security and a significant increase in the awareness of hostile influences. This implies that these phenomena warrant further investigation to gain a better understanding of citizens' cognitive security status and to explore ways to improve it.

The Importance of Cybersecurity Governance Model in Operational Technology Environments

There is a common will to unify regulation in the Western world regarding overall security, including cybersecurity. European cyber security regulations aim to create a foundation and guidelines for international standards in various industries and the operation of critical infrastructure. Protected critical infrastructure is a common goal for Western allies. Allies of NATO and EU member states mainly support the anti-aggression policy in Europe. The unstable situation in the world forces states to find solutions that represent the thoughts of the allies. Defending common values is crucial when the purpose is to protect critical infrastructure and vital functions in societies. The research will demonstrate the industrial needs of IT/OT-related cybersecurity governance. The study analyzes EU-level cybersecurity requirements and how those requirements affect standardization regarding cybersecurity governance in the operational technology environment. There will be four primary governance levels: Political, Strategical, Operational and Tactical. Many criminal state-linked operators do not care about international agreements or contracts. Some rogue states have even taken to inciting violations of international agreements. We cannot trust the loose contracts between states anymore. The research will find the main challenges concerning the cybersecurity governance of the industrial organizations that use operational technology-related technology in their daily businesses. We have seen that Information and Operational Technology are based on something other than similar threats and risk basements. Operational Technology-related threats threaten the cyber-physical ecosystem where anomalies affect the physical world, so operational functions of equipment, devices, sensors, components, and production lines are interrupted. As a result, continuity management and supply chain management are compromised. The study's primary purpose is to describe the cybersecurity governance elements of the OT environment for enhancing situational awareness. Standardizing the cybersecurity level among industrial stakeholders requires EU member states to have a national cybersecurity strategy that follows main EU-level guidelines. Despite the EU member states' implementation level of the regulation, the EU-level cybersecurity requirements obligate companies to take steps to solve future cybersecurity challenges.

ПІДГОТОВКА МАЙБУТНІХ ОФІЦЕРІВ РОЗВІДНИКІВ ДО ПРОФЕСІЙНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ В УМОВАХ ЗМІШАНОГО НАВЧАННЯ ЗАСОБАМИ ІНФОРМАЦІЙНО-ОСВІТНЬОГО СЕРЕДОВИЩА

The article analyzes scientific works, the regulatory and legal framework and the content of educational and methodological documentation regarding the organization of professional training of future intelligence officers. Modern approaches related to distance learning and digitalization of professional training of future specialists of the national security and defense sector of Ukraine, as well as the European Union, have been identified. The results of previous studies have been summarized. It has been established that the professional training of future intelligence officers in the conditions of pandemics and full-scale war can be carried out in the format of blended learning using the means of a specially created informational and educational environment. It is substantiated that blended learning of future military intelligence officers consists of the educational activity in two forms: in form of training sessions in specialized classrooms under the direct supervision of the scientific and pedagogical workers and in form of independent work with electronic resources of a specially created information and educational environment. Varieties of blended learning models in the conditions of pandemic and full-scale war are distinguished, namely "rotational model", "flexible model", "person-oriented model" and "enriched virtual environment model". Pedagogical components of information and educational environment tools for blended learning of future intelligence officers have been developed, which include: independent study of new educational material, independent study of material using elements of creativity, independent improvement of theoretical knowledge and practical skills in conditions of quasi-professional activity, and independent in-depth study of material. The introduction of innovative forms, methods and means of obtaining intelligence information into the professional training of future intelligence officers in the format of blended learning by means of the information and educational environment is proposed. The experience of conducting military intelligence acquired by the intelligence units of the armies of NATO member countries and the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the de-occupation of the territories of sovereign Ukraine captured by Russian-terrorist forces is considered as part of the blended learning. Standards of individual and collective training of future intelligence officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and NATO are applied. Key words: future intelligence officers, blended learning, blended learning models, information and educational environment tools, pedagogical components of information and educational environment tools.

European security and Finland’s policy during the Russian aggression against Ukraine

The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of Finland on regional policy of NATO and the Russo-Ukrainian war. The article explores political, economic and military aspects of Finland and Ukraine in the light of the Russian aggression while considering their relationships and foreign policy goals on a regional level. The author draws attention to various aspects of Helsinki domestic and foreign policy that is directed to set a balance in the region and, at the same time, to support Kyiv militarily and economically in confrontation with Moscow. Finland’s active policy of promoting stability can be described as a two-track policy, whereby EU membership and intensified military cooperation with Western partners provide a basis for the maintenance and development of relations with Russia. The author focused on energy resources and its importance for Finland that has a long history of energy trade with Russia. The trade is practically one-directional, as Finland lacks domestic fossil fuel reserves in comparison with its substantial demand for energy, whereas Russia has significant export volumes. Along with the above-mentioned issues, the author is observing aggressive Russian military activities in the Baltic Sea region. Despite peaceful relationships with Finland, Moscow does not mind to remind neighboring countries who calls the tune in the region. Pursuing this purpose, Russia increases military activity in the Baltic Sea region with relatively frequent airspace and territorial water violations. As a result, there is a risk that collisions or provocations might lead to a rapid and uncontrolled escalation. So, Finland finds its important to keep open channels for political dialogue and to seek ways to re-activate existing confidence-building measures. Finland-NATO relationships are taken into consideration as well. The author described the process of Finland’s accession to the alliance. After almost 30 years of close partnership with NATO, Finland joined the Alliance on April 4, 2023. Its partnership with NATO was historically based on its policy of military non-alignment, which changed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Following Russia’s aggression, Ukraine has requested materiel assistance from the EU and NATO member countries. To date, Finland has donated 23 defence materiel packages to Ukraine. The combined value of all defence materiel packages submitted so far is now over EUR 2 billion.

The Alliance in the Storm: Geopolitical Representation of the United States in the Turkish Parliament during Détente

This article analyzes how the geopolitical representation of the United States in Turkish political discourse changed during the 1960s and 1970s in the context of deep crises between the two countries, such as the Cyprus question, the opium issue, and the US arms embargo on Türkiye. Within the framework of critical geopolitical theory, it uses the concept of “geopolitical representation.” It examines the changes in the geopolitical representation of the United States in Turkish political life through practical geopolitics. To this end, it evaluates the debates, speeches, and correspondence made by the representatives of the ruling and opposition parties and members of the government in the Turkish Grand National Assembly between 1964 and 1979, within the context of the crises in Turkish-American relations, particularly within the foreign policy framework. It is argued that while the alliance between Türkiye and the United States and Türkiye’s membership in NATO were seen as important symbols of Türkiye’s sovereignty and enjoyed unwavering support in the 1950s, tensions with the US, Türkiye’s “strategic partner,” in the 1960s and 1970s led to notable shifts in the Turkish parliament’s narrative. As a pioneer of anti-NATO and anti-US rhetoric, the Workers’ Party of Türkiye (TİP) played a prominent role in shaping parliamentary discussions.

The Instrument of Government and NATO membership

The Instrument of Government and NATO membership

The market reaction of energy companies to the announcement of the Russian–Ukrainian invasion

PurposeThis study aims to empirically analyze the market response of energy companies to the Russian-Ukrainian invasion. Additionally, it examines the comparison of market reactions between companies in NATO member countries and non-member countries.Design/methodology/approachThis study utilizes a sample of 1,511 energy sector companies. To achieve the research objectives, two methods are employed. First, an event study is used to analyze the market reaction using Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) to the announcement of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 (event day) within an event window of (−30, +30). Second, a cross-sectional analysis is conducted to compare the responses of companies in NATO member countries with those in non-member countries.FindingsThe findings of this study reveal that energy companies worldwide reacted positively both before and after the announcement of the invasion, with significant reactions observed in companies from the Americas, Europe, and Asia & Pacific regions. However, the Middle East and Africa markets did not show significant reactions. Furthermore, the study indicates that most developed and emerging markets responded positively, likely due to the increase in energy commodity prices during the war. Moreover, the market reaction of companies in NATO member countries was stronger compared to other markets.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the existing literature by being the first to examine the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the energy sector, while categorizing markets as developed, emerging, and frontier. It also specifically explores the market reaction of energy companies in NATO member countries, providing unique insights into the differential responses within the energy sector.

Don’t say peace: militarisation and the shrinking space for critical voices in the Swedish NATO debate

ABSTRACT Sweden, long known as a voice for peace on the international arena, has undergone a rapid and far-reaching domestic (re-)militarisation the last decade. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this process intensified with a surge in military spending and a radical shift from a longstanding position of non-alignment towards NATO membership. As ‘war’ moves to the center of Swedish public debate, military and security experts occupy most of the space, leaving little room for alternative and critical perspectives. Drawing from feminist scholars, we offer some reflections on Sweden’s (re-)militarisation and ask who gets to speak, who is silenced, and why? Focusing on the domestic public debate post February 2022, we argue that when war moves to the center of the debate, peace is considered an ‘issue for later’. As war is understood in narrow military terms, war expertise is limited to matters of warfare instead of being seen as a broader societal issue. Critical voices and peace advocates are considered naive, unrealistic, and even dangerous. Our reflections invite a discussion on how militarisation and the politics of war expertise affect democratic debate with potentially far-reaching consequences for domestic and international politics.

IMPLEMENTATION OF INTEGRATED CYBER EDUCATION IN EUROPE

The development of partnerships between European countries in the field of cyber education is currently playing a significant role in enhancing countries’ cyber potential and comprehensive and systemic counteraction to cyber threats. The research aims to outline the main principles of implementing an integrated cyber education system in European countries. To solve the tasks set, the research uses the following methods: cognition methods to study theoretical foundations of digital education development; comparative and analytical methods to analyze National Cybersecurity Indices and Digital Development Level Indices of the EU and Ukraine; heuristic (expert) methods to formulate the goal, objectives, conclusions and recommendations to form a multilevel generalized model of cyber education; and logical and formalized methods to outline the relevance of cyber education to counter cyber threats. The research discusses the issue of digital education, presents National Cybersecurity Indices and Digital Development Level Indices of countries, explores the gaps between National Cybersecurity Indices and Digital Development Level Indices of the EU and Ukraine, and outlines the basic principles of the European Cybersecurity Taxonomy. The main research results are the proposed categorical apparatus of integrated cyber education in European countries and the multi-level generalized model of cyber education to gradually acquire skills and abilities to combat cyber threats introduced from primary school to adult education. Thus, a comprehensive acquisition of skills to combat cyber threats will help to develop knowledge, skills and abilities of European citizens in the field of cybersecurity and improve the cyber potential of European countries. The introduction of unified regulatory courses and methodological support developed in accordance with the best international practices and harmonized with the terminology of EU and NATO member states will enable effective cooperation in a single information and cyber space.

Stanowisko Polski wobec agresji Rosji na Ukrainę. Perspektywy akcesji Ukrainy do Unii Europejskiej i NATO

The article aims to analyze Poland’s position on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 and tries to show the prospects of its membership in the European Union and NATO. The undeclared war between Russia and Ukraine has been going on de facto since 2014, since the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation. Since then and Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008, the West, led by the US, has been promising Ukraine membership in NATO and the European Union but for now, formal negotiations have not even begun. In this article, the author tries to answer why this is happening and, at the same time analyzes Poland’s position on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022 and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The main thesis is the statement that Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the European Union is in the Polish national interest and will not be without significance for Poland’s security.

Legal basis of defense standardization of the European Union

Legal basis of defense standardization of the European Union

Military Expenditures and Economic Growth: Evidence from NATO and Non-NATO Alliances

ABSTRACT Given its significant socioeconomic implications, the nexus between military expenditures and economic growth has been the subject of an extensive theoretical and empirical debate. The present study focuses on NATO vs. non-NATO member countries (i.e. 141 countries) as a case study to empirically examine the aforementioned complex relationship during the period 1992–2020. Using annual data, we employ a panel model, as well as spectral preliminary analysis that takes into account the nonlinear behaviour of our series, positive or negative causal relationships and their coherence characteristics across both time and frequency domains. Findings reported herein from an extended panel of several states suggest that military expenditure enhances economic growth under the NATO alliance case, whereas it becomes harmful for growth in the case of non-NATO alliances such as the SCO & CSTO. Our study contributes to the understanding on the crucial role of a military alliance membership in the formation of the economic growth and military spending relationship. Hence, our findings can be beneficial for policymakers to account for the existence of possible spillovers that may arise from country participation in a military alliance.

Engaging women, peace, and security in defence: the role of the NATO committee on gender perspectives

ABSTRACT As NATO marks its 75th anniversary it is facing a future more uncertain than at any point since the end of the Cold War. The European security environment is changed and challenged by the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, while the Israel-Gaza war poses further challenges. Given this critical moment, this article offers a strategic intervention to highlight and reinforce the essential role of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in defence and deterrence, including through the integration of a gender perspective, for NATO members and partners. It does so by bringing together former Chairs of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) into conversation about the continued importance of NATO’s oldest committee in ensuring NATO’s future approach to WPS is fit for purpose. Drawing upon their reflections and insights, we recommend policy points to embed and advance WPS and the gender perspective in NATO’s response to this new security environment.