Mechanism Design Theory Research Articles

不確かな情報環境における制約付きエネルギー需要ネットワークのAGVメカニズムによる統合

In the liberalized future power market, social welfare will be maximized by demand side management. Methods of demand side management usually require exchanges of information between consumers and a utility company, but there will be strategic false reports of information. In this research we consider an energy demand network that consists of one utility company and consumers. In this network a day-ahead market is formed and we optimize the schedule of consumption using demand response under equality and inequality constraints. In order to prevent strategic false reports we apply mechanism design theory, which is discussed in economics and game theory. Our proposed integration mechanism is based on AGV mechanism, which is Bayesian incentive compatible and budget balanced. Through a numerical experiment, the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism is demonstrated under equality and inequality constraints.

Application of Intelligent Optimization Algorithm in Mechanical Design

Mechanical optimization design is a new design method in the development foundation of the modern mechanical design theory, the application of optimization design in mechanical design can make the scheme achieve some optimization results in the design requirements specified, without consuming too much computational effort. The corresponding mathematical models of ant algorithm and Cellular ant algorithm are established, according to the actual mechanical design problems, and used to solve the established mathematical model by computer, so as to obtains the optimal design scheme.

Structure Design of Manipulator for Pot Seedling Transplanter and Simulation Analysis

In order to solve the problem of seedling damaged and inefficiency of pot seedling trasplanter, the manipulator for pot seedling transplanter came into being. The three thin finger structure was selected for the manipulator, which could weaken the resistance and leakage by employing pneumatic drive. SolidWorks software was used to establish the 3D model and virtual assembly, to analyze force on the finger on the basis of the mechanical design theory. The strength of the finger part was checked in the SolidWorks SimulationXpress module, the maximum pressure of the finger was 50040656 N/m2, which was far less than the yield strength of the alloy steel finger 620422016N/m2. The results showed that the manipulator was highly practical with reasonable structure and productivity-enhancing ability.

A dynamic probabilistic design method for blade-tip radial running clearance of aeroengine high-pressure turbine

Around the engineering background of the probabilistic design of high-pressure turbine (HPT) blade-tip radial running clearance (BTRRC) which conduces to the high-performance and high-reliability of aeroengine, a distributed collaborative extremum response surface method (DCERSM) was proposed for the dynamic probabilistic analysis of turbomachinery. On the basis of investigating extremum response surface method (ERSM), the mathematical model of DCERSM was established. The DCERSM was applied to the dynamic probabilistic analysis of BTRRC. The results show that the blade-tip radial static clearance δ = 1.82 mm is advisable synthetically considering the reliability and efficiency of gas turbine. As revealed by the comparison of three methods (DCERSM, ERSM, and Monte Carlo method), the DCERSM reshapes the possibility of the probabilistic analysis for turbomachinery and improves the computational efficiency while preserving computational accuracy. The DCERSM offers a useful insight for BTRRC dynamic probabilistic analysis and optimization. The present study enrichs mechanical reliability analysis and design theory.

Incentive compatible market design with applications

This paper studies markets for heterogeneous goods using mechanism-design theory. For each combination of desirable properties, we derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or we show that it does not exist. Each participant’s utility is quasi-linear in money, and depends upon the allocation that he gets and his privately known multidimensional ‘type.’ The key properties are incentive compatibility, individual rationality, efficiency, and budget balance. The main results characterize mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible in combination with other properties.

Novel method and model for dynamic reliability optimal design of turbine blade deformation

Turbine blade radial deformation seriously influences the Blade-Tip Radial Running Clearance (BTRRC) of the high pressure turbine and the performance and reliability of gas turbine engine. For blade radial deformation design under gas turbine operating conditions, Extremum Response Surface Method (ERSM)-based Support vector machine of Regression (SR) (SR-ERSM) and Importance Degree Model (IDM) were proposed for structural dynamic reliability optimal design. The mathematical model of SR-ERSM was established by taking SR model as an extremum response surface function. The IDM was developed by considering important random parameters obtained by probabilistic analysis. The proposed SR-ERSM and IDM were applied to the reliability optimal design of turbine blade radial deformation based on nonlinear material properties and time-varying loads. The optimization results show that SR-ERSM and IDM are promising to reduce additional design samples and calculated load as well as improve computational efficiency with acceptable precision for nonlinear dynamic structural optimized design. Moreover, a viable design value of blade radial deformation is gained for BTRRC control and high-performance high-reliability gas turbine design. The presented efforts provide a high-efficiency and high-accuracy method and a rapid model for dynamic optimization design of structures for further research as well as enriching mechanical reliability design theory.

Simulation of Environmental Pollution Improvement

In recent years, the researches on the theory and application of public articles and mechanism design at home and abroad has attracted more and more attentions. The paper uses the idea of mechanism design and simulation to analyze and solve environmental pollution improvement. By establishing a simple environmental pollution improvement model, the paper transforms pollution control into binary decision established by a sewage treatment plant and different decisions by the fisherman on the establishment of sewage treatment plants. The paper observes the results of applying different mechanisms and proposes the suggestions of implementing various pollution control methods.

The Energy-Saving Management System Design of Major Projects in Implementation

The energy-saving management system of major projects in implementation has always been in a state of imperfect. On the basis of combining energy-saving management status of major projects in implementation, referring to the research results of the management mechanism design theory at home and abroad, this paper aims at the primary interest-related subjects of the major projects energy-saving, uses economic mechanism designing theory and incentive theory, designs the energy-saving management mechanism; It does the theoretical analysis of the government and major projects owner with the complete information dynamic game model, then, provides decision evidence for the government to formulate the rational management intensity and maximize the interests of all parties. At last, the paper provides the suggestions to solve the existing problems of major projects energy-saving management.

Application of Modern Simulation Technology in Mechanical Outstanding Engineer Training

This text has described the relationship between outstanding engineer training and modern simulation technology, have recommended the characteristics of mechanical outstanding engineer in detail. Aiming at the importance of the teaching practice link to course of theory of mechanics, mechanical design and mechanical signal analysis, have expounded the function of modern simulation technology in the mechanical outstanding engineer training, especially on teaching practice in the theory of mechanics, mechanical design and mechanical signal analysis. It has the advantages of economizing the teaching cost, overcoming the hardware constrains, model prediction, promoting student's innovation and manipulative ability, so can popularize and develop in a more cost-effective manner in the university.

The Motion Planning Research of Bionic Worming Crawling

On the basis of the PYR type joint kinematics, redundant manipulator motion planning and bionic motion about surrounded grasping, creeping crawling, serpentine movement is researched. The motion planning of the mechanical arm by grab and surrounded was carried out based on geometric analysis. The grasping operation model meets the operation conditions. According to the creeping, serpentine movement of the bionic motion principle, the 5 section of 11 degree of freedom, the bionic worming crawling and the snake like motion planning about 8 joints and 17 degrees of freedom mechanical arm were given, combined with a full range of joint mechanism design and kinematics theory.

Study on the theory, method and model for mechanical dynamic assembly reliability optimization

To improve the performance and reliability of gas turbine like an aeroengine, the multi-object multi-discipline (MOMD) reliability optimization design of high press turbine (HPT) blade-tip radial running clearance (BTRRC) was first accomplished based on the mechanical dynamic assembly reliability (MDAR) theory and distributed collaborative response surface method (DCRSM). Four optimization models of MDAR were developed based on the features of assembly machinery and the thought of DCRSM, which are, respectively, called as the direct reliability optimization model (denoted by M1), the multilayer reliability optimization models (denoted by M2), the direct reliability optimization model-based probabilistic analysis (denoted by M3), and the multilayer reliability optimization model-based probabilistic analysis (denoted by M4). Through the MDAR optimization design of BTRRC by the four standard optimization models, some conclusions are drawn as follows: (1) the DCRSM is proved to be effective and feasible for MOMD MDAR optimization design with high computational efficiency and precision; (2) all the reliability optimization results of BTRRC and assembly objects satisfy the requirements of optimization design, and the optimized BTTRC variations are reduced by about 10% and obey the normal distribution, which are quite promising in improving the design and control of HPT BTRRC; (3) in computational efficiency, the computing time of M1 and M3 is far less than those of M2 and M4, meanwhile M3 and M4 are superior to M1 and M2; (4) in computational accuracy, M1 and M2 are better than M3 and M4, as well as M2 and M4 are higher than M1 and M3 theoretically. The presented study does not only fulfill the HPT BTRRC dynamic assembly design from a probabilistic optimization perspective and improve the performance and reliability of gas turbine engine, but also provides a promising approach and four valuable optimization models for MDAR optimization design. Besides, the present efforts are of great significance in enriching the theory and method of mechanical reliability design.

Research on the Force-Position Switching Control System of Wire Bonding Head on DSP

Presented the force-position switching control system of wire bonding head on DSP. Analysis of the bond head mechanism design theory,for wire bonding high precision motion control requires, design of the force-position switching control system hardware and software. .

What Mechanism Design Theorists Had to Say About Laboratory Experimentation in the Mid-1980s

Thanks to the recent studies of the history and philosophy of experimental economics, it is well known that around the early 1980s, experimental economists made a case for the legitimacy of their laboratory work by emphasizing that it was a nice and indispensable complement to mechanism design theorists’ mathematical study of institutions. The present paper examines what mechanism design theorists thought of laboratory experimentation, or whether they were willing to form a coalition with experimental economists circa the mid-1980s. By exploring several dimensions of the relationship between mechanism design theory and experimental economics, the present paper shows that a close rapport had been established by the early 1980s between the representative members of the two camps, and also that mechanism design theorists were among the strongest supporters of laboratory experimentation in the economics profession in the mid-1980s.

Analysis on the Core Theory of Mechanical Abstractive Design

ive Design Xia Yang Luzhou Vocational and Technical College, Luzhou, Sichuan, 646005, China zhuqinyang2011@126.com Keywords: Machinery; Abstraction; Design; Core Theory; Analysis. Abstract. The theory of mechanical abstractive design is the newest mechanical design concept at present. Lots of software achieve a certain degree of intelligence with the development of computer technology. And the processing efficiency is improved to a great deal through intelligent processing. Many suggestions for reference can be proposed during the processing. The study is based on the concept and characteristics of mechanical design. And the core theory of mechanical abstractive design, such as intelligence, automatic modeling and relative abstraction, was analyzed combined with the implication of abstractive design. Thus, a certain degree of reference is hopefully provided for the pragmatic design work.

Penalty mechanism design

Penalty is a crucial approach to maintain society in order in both the legal and the political philosophies. How to establish a rational and efficient penalty mechanism is exceedingly important in practice in economics and politics and this paper explores the optimal mechanism design of penalty. A penalty under monopoly mechanism design theory is established and developed in this piece of work. By establishing the penalty mechanism design model, this paper finds that stricter punishment can efficiently deter violation of the regulations but can decrease the profits of the monopoly firm at the same time. Furthermore, penalty increases the concavity of the monopoly firm's profit function, which makes it easier for the firm to make decisions and which means strict penalty results in optimal decisions. We also show that punishment is in general costly, which is highly consistent with the phenomena in practice.

Revenue Maximization Under Two-Dimensional Buyers with Type Uncertainty Using Dynamic Mechanism Design

I study a decision problem to maximize seller revenue under a two-dimensional buyer with multiple type space with private information. I consider the general case of a single seller with a single good to sell to buyers with private attribute values arriving over 2 time periods. The seller's problem is to determine the optimal time period of allocation. I use mechanism design theory to find an optimal policy for the seller and investigate structural conditions for the optimal seller policy. This paper aims to show that there are tractable and relatively simple ways to deal with multidimensional type space in Revenue Management problems through the application of mechanism design.

Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the higher the reservation price is, the higher is the sellerʼs revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidderʼs equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one.

Efficient network security as a strategic game

We implement game and mechanism design theories to develop a network-wide autonomous consumer-centric and delay-efficient security protocol, DSIC-S. It induces a dominant strategy incentive compatible equilibrium among all rational and selfish nodes. We show that our protocol is network-wide socially desirable and Pareto optimal. DSIC-S guarantees the delivery of consumer’s security services within desired levels, naturally and trustfully, reinforced by our nesting security model. We address resource management and delay-efficiency through synergy of several design aspects. We propose a scenario-based security model with different levels. We incorporate a valuation system to integrate the caused delay at each node in selection of security algorithms without consumer’s knowledge of the actual delays. We achieve this by incorporating our valuation system, in particular that of the consumer’s, in the calculation of the credit transfers with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments and Clarke’s pivotal rule. We prove that DSIC-S design solves the revelation theorem’s problem of misrepresentation of agents’ private information in mechanism design theory. We propose an incentive model and incorporate the valuations in these incentives. The simulations validate our theoretical results. They prove the significance of our model and show the correlation of the credit transfers to actual delays and security valuations.

Safety in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory

We introduce safety in implementation theory as robustness of players' welfare to unexpected deviations by others. Specifically, we define a (fi,!)-safe strategy profile to be one at which a deviation by any fi players can result in at most ! victims, and define a victim to be a player who attains an outcome within his least preferred K outcomes, where K is set by the designer. We discuss three notions of implementation: Nash implementation with all Nash equilibria being safe, implementation in safe equilibria, and double implementation in safe and Nash equilibria. Strong safe implementation is the most desirable notion; we show that it is restrictive when other assumptions are made, but that mild behavioral assumptions unrelated to safety can achieve strong safe implementation from double implementation. We give conditions that are necessary for implementation in safe equilibria and sufficient under mild preference restrictions. We then address double implementation and, allowing for simple transfers, we give conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for double implementation. We prove a no result showing that absolute safety (fi˘ ni1 and !˘ 0) can lead to non-existence of Nash equilibria in a wide range of environments making safe implementation with guarantees impossible. We show that, in general, safety leads to restrictions in every player's freedom and to a loss in efficiency. We illustrate the design of a safe mechanism in an example of hiring candidates with multidimensional quality.

Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems

This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents’ interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination problem. An equilibrium design procedure is proposed and applied as an analytic tool in a study of mechanism design games. In the setting considered the well-known fact is demonstrated that gains from reaching a desired solution to a coordination problem in a Nash equilibrium point need not balance the overall costs of its implementation. However, it is also demonstrated how these costs can be distributed among the agents and related to the particular organization of interactions in the system. Finally, application of the developed framework in the field of Internet traffic engineering is presented.