Meaning Of Shame Research Articles

URGENSI PENDIDIKAN SIFAT MALU DALAM HADITS (Telaah Hadits Imran Ibn Husain tentang Sifat Malu dalam Kitab Musnad Ahmad Ibn Hanbal)

In the hadith of the Prophet explained one of the attributes called the term al-haya '. The nature of al-haya �is translated in Indonesian with the meaning of shame. Most people assume the nature of shame is a bad trait that should be kept away from someone's personal. But the shame is actually recommended by the Prophet because it is a good quality as stipulated in the hadith of Imran Ibn Husain, narrated by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. This study aims to provide an explanation of the nature of shame mentioned by the Prophet as one of the good qualities. The conclusion of this study is the answer for people who still have the notion that shame is a bad trait that must be abandoned. The nature of shame is very urgent in Islamic education that should be fostered by all Muslims. That is due to the nature of shame can contribute to education, among others: 1) Education in shame can foster human ability to maintain the mind; 2) Keeping away actions that consume things that are prohibited; 3) Always remember death; 4) Become a person who is zuhud; 5) Contribute to the education of faith; 6) Education to decorate and beautify yourself with commendable qualities namely shame; 7) Human education to achieve the love of Allah.�Keywords: Hadith, Prophet, Imran, Embarrassed, Education

The Aspects and Meanings of Shame in Myeonjubowolbing

The Aspects and Meanings of Shame in Myeonjubowolbing

Understanding the emotion of shame in transgender individuals \u2013 some insight from Kafka

Both clinical literature and biographical accounts suggest that many transgender individuals experience shame or have experienced shame at some point in their life for reasons related to their gender identity. In clinical psychology, at least until the 1960s, shame has not received much attention; focus was on guilt and shame was regarded mainly as a ‘by-product’ of guilt. From the 1960s shame has been identified as an emotion not necessarily related to guilt and with unique features, and has been studied in connection with a number of situations, such as domestic abuse, trauma, illness, and sexual orientation. However shame has been studied less in connection with gender variance. Shame has however intrigued philosophers, writers and artists for a very long time. Yet, the importance of the contribution of various disciplines to the understanding of the experience of shame in vulnerable individuals has been overlooked. This paper attempts to explore the meaning of shame for transgender individuals, by making reference not only to clinical studies, but also to artworks and literary novels. Franz Kafka, named “the poet of shame” is particularly salient to the analysis of shame, and some of his works will enable us to shed light on the complexities of the experience of shame in transgender individuals which may defy clinical observation.

REPRESENTASI SOSIAL TENTANG MAKNA MALU PADA GENERASI MUDA DI JAKARTA

This study aims to find out the meaning of shame in the young generation of Jakarta. Shame as one of the basic emotions, continues to evolve according to the age level and social changes that occur. The theory used is social representation theory with approach of social representation structure that will find central core and peripheral element of shame. This study used mixed method design: quantitative method with hierarchized evocation technique and qualitative method by conducting interview. The hierarchized evocation technique was performed on 252 participants using a questionnaire. While interviews were conducted on 13 participants which explore further about the shame. Participants were obtained by using snowball and accidental sampling technique, with the criteria as followed: students, at least fifth semester and maximum age is 25. The results show that the meaning of shame in Jakarta young generation is related to self-doubt, events that lead to negative judgment, unideal physical appearance, violation of moral principles and mismatch on etiquette. These five attributes are very strongly attached to the collective memory of the younger generation.

'Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame': Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation

This paper considers the intersection between law, humiliation and shame, and how the law has the capacity to allow for, to encourage, or (in some cases) to remediate humiliation, or humiliating or shaming behavior. The need for new attention to be paid to this question has increased exponentially as we begin to also take more seriously international human rights mandates, especially – although certainly not exclusively – in the context of the recently-ratified United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a Convention that calls for “respect for inherent dignity,” and characterizes discrimination against any person on the basis of disability [as] a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person... Humiliation and shaming, we believe, contravene basic fundamental human rights and raise important constitutional questions implicating the due process and equal protection clauses. Humiliation and shaming practices include “scarlet letter”-like criminal sanctions, police stop-and-frisk practices, the treatment of persons with mental disabilities in the justice system, and the use of sex offender registries. Humiliation and shame are detrimental in the ways that lead to recidivism, inhibit rehabilitation, discourage treatment, and injure victims. They also directly contravene the guiding principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, especially in the context of its relationship to the importance of dignity in the law, and potentially violate international human rights law principles as well.In this paper, we will explore how humiliation and shaming are bad for all participants in the legal system, and bad for the law itself. We will urge that humiliating and shaming techniques be banned, and that, this ban will enhance dignity for the entire legal system and society as a whole. First, we consider the meaning of shame and humiliation. Then, we briefly discuss principles of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) and its relationship to the significance of dignity, and then consider recent developments in international human rights law, both of which are valuable interpretive tools in this conversation. Next, we consider how the United States Supreme Court has considered these concepts in recent cases. Following this, we consider several relevant areas of law and policy from the perspective of how overt shaming is employed: scarlet letter punishments, use of the police power, treatment of institutionalized persons with mental disabilities and elders, and sex offender registry law. We then, using a TJ filter and drawing on international human rights law principles, examine why these shaming tactics are contrary to bedrock principles of the legal system: the mandates to honor dignity, to minimize recidivism, and to enhance rehabilitation.

Feminine Shame/Masculine Disgrace: A Literary Excursion through Gender and Embodied Emotion

This paper seeks a disarticulation of shame and disgrace, and hypothesises that there is a gendered cultural articulation of the two terms at work that runs counter to the normative understanding of their symbiotic unity. Specifically, I argue that the primary difference is that where shame is embodied, or an emotion fundamentally of the body, disgrace is facialised and thus able to rid itself of the body in its capacity as the privileged representative of the face. I turn to literature—using JM Coetzee’s novel Disgrace (1999) as my example—both to elucidate this distinction and to argue that the meanings of shame and disgrace diverge noticeably when the two terms come into contact with gender. As a consequence, the paper will contend that the book’s dominant narrative of racial reconciliation is in fact articulated through sexually distinct shamed positionalities.

Dalla colpa alla vergogna: Considerazioni teoriche e cliniche. II parte

- C.G. Jung didn't face the problem of shame directly as he did with guilt, but nevertheless in Memories, dreams and reflections (1961) he refers an episode of his life in which it is possible to trace a phenomenology of this feeling and its evolution towards the discovery of personal dignity and responsibility. Some clinical references confirm this possible transformation. Shame seems to be an experience with an ethic potential (which can be used in a constructive or destructive way) which generates awareness. Shame is the feeling that accompanies the confrontation with the Shadow, since its more precocious manifestations, and therefore seems to be concomitant with the birth of conscience. Analysing the figure of the Trickster, it is possible to understand the meaning of shame. The archaic angst of shame, due to the lack of emphatic relationship between the mother and her child, asks for an analytical experience of emphatic understanding, capable to hold and to keep in contact with the patient's feeling of fragmentation. It means to listen and to reconstruct more than to interpret. Shame is a kind of "hologramemotion" where the part reflects the wholeness. The Author offers some clinical examples to face and to value shame as a transforming resource in the path towards individuation.Parole chiave: inadeguatezza, inferioritŕ, evitamento, vergogna dell'essere, emendabilitŕ, empatiaKey words: inadequacy, inferiority, avoidance, shame of being, emendability, empathy

Honor Dishonorable: Shameful Shame

MUCH modern sensibility feels that it is a shame that shame exists. This paradox is seemingly dissolved because the first use of shame, in an easy, common, colloquial phrase, engages a different sense of the word from the second one. In “it’s a shame that” = “it’s too bad—or to be regretted—that,” we seem to be using the word as if all the issues it raises for the papers in the current issue of this journal arose from some archaic and obsolete meaning of the word (consider also, for example, how we say “a heavenly day” to designate one delightfully of this world, and “it was literally hell” for a condition that was acutely figuratively so). It is of course the meanings of shame as the subject of the second clause that concern our speculation. But the notion that it is indeed somehow deeply shameful that shame seems to be part of the human condition is not a trivial one. Cicero declares at one point that he feels ashamed even to mention shame (pudet etiam loqui de pudicitia [De legibus I.19.50—cited by Barton, 2001: 203]). And yet this is distinct from a more personal sense of being ashamed that one may feel—despite all one believes to be the case about self and society, and so forth—that one is nonetheless feeling shame in a particular situation. The general case—of the shamefulness of shame—involves a sense of what we might call moral shamefulness . I shall return to this question later. To begin, I must observe that in these brief remarks on some aspects of the language with which we designate and invoke shame, I shall be primarily concerned with a modest agenda: to explore the possible interactions between two different concepts of shame that are both deployed in our common English word of Germanic origin, but which are often distinguished in other lanSOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Winter 2003) Honor Dishonorable: Shameful Shame JOHN HOLLANDER guages. In addition, a few important literary fictions pertaining to the origins of shame will be considered. But while depending upon some of the fascinatingly detailed work by anthropologists and sociologists (and particularly a thinker like Erving Goffman, in his concern for language as well as for institutional taxonomies ), I shall invoke patterns, rather than detailed instances, of linguistic usage. And along the way, I shall glance at some analogous complexities in our use of a major candidate for shame’s somewhat oblique antithesis, honor. The first entry for “shame” in the current Oxford English Dictionary (OED) [1a] covers the two roughly distinguished branches of signification of the word defining it as The painful emotion arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring, ridiculous , or indecorous in one’s own conduct or circumstances (or in those of others whose honour or disgrace one regards as one’s own), or of being in a situation which offends one’s sense of modesty or decency. The distinction covered by the “or”—highlighted in OED [3]: a disgrace, loss of esteem or reputation—is reflected in several familiar languages. French, for example, distinguishes between pudeur and honte, roughly paralleling the Latin pudor and infamia previously noted: one can speak of rougir de pudeur, blushing with shame, but not— except with deliberately heightened rhetorical force based on a patent extension of meaning—of blushing with dishonor.1 (Consider an instance of this last usage occurs, Edmund Burke’s “As one of the people, I blush for what has followed” [Burke, 1844: III.332]. This is a figurative blush of moral shame; here, it does not mean [a] “I’m ashamed to be one of the people” but more [b] “I’m ashamed for ‘the people’ by what some of them have done, which tempts some of the people even to contemplate saying [a], which could be thought of as a shameful thing to say.)2 Here, one meaning of “shame” (pudeur) is metaphoric for another (honte). Honte can in addition designate both a sense of shame and a cause of shame, in much the same way that English shame seems so full of grammatical as well as semantic possibilities. The Indo1062...

Reintegrative shaming and the 'frozen antithesis': Braithwaite and Elias

This paper compares the use of the notion of 'shame' in the criminological theory of John Braithwaite and the theory of civilising processes elaborated by Norbert Elias. It examines Braithwaite's suggestion that there are some deep 'resonances' between Elias's work and his own and concludes that their work diverges considerably, not only in terms of their fundamental understanding of the meaning of shame itself, but also in terms of their broader theoretical assumptions and perspectives, their inten tions and the uses to which their work might be put.

The meanings of shame: Implications for legal reform.

This article describes and critiques the recent revival of interest in shame and shaming in various contexts, including criminal punishment. In particular, it addresses criminal sanctions that require defendants to wear signs in public, or to otherwise advertise their convictions.The article begins with the work of culture critics who claim that Americans have become shameless in ways that undermine important social and legal goals. The author takes issue with these critics and warns against legal reforms based on their provocative but potentially destructive call to shame. The author argues that the culture critics tend to conflate three terms: shame, shaming, and shameful and explains why separation of these terms is crucial to meaningful discussions about whether Americans have lost their sense of shame or should be shamed for violating social or legal norms. The author then develops the psychological and the anthropological meanins of shame, uses this backdrop to evaluate all three terms, and speculates about the likely individual and social consequences of official shaming techniques. The insight of these materials is that shame is a sophisticated, context-sensitive, and potentially highly destructive emotion. Only in certain cultural settings is official shaming likely to prove an effective or humane method of enforcing norm observation. Finally, the author applies these insights to the use of shaming penalties by courts in criminal cases and concludes that American criminal courts may be ill-equipped to exploit offender or audience shame vulnerabilities in a way that makes practical or moral sense.

The meanings of shame: Implications for legal reform.

This article describes and critiques the recent revival of interest in shame and shaming in various contexts, including criminal punishment. In particular, it addresses criminal sanctions that require defendants to wear signs in public, or to otherwise advertise their convictions.The article begins with the work of culture critics who claim that Americans have become shameless in ways that undermine important social and legal goals. The author takes issue with these critics and warns against legal reforms based on their provocative but potentially destructive call to shame. The author argues that the culture critics tend to conflate three terms: shame, shaming, and shameful and explains why separation of these terms is crucial to meaningful discussions about whether Americans have lost their sense of shame or should be shamed for violating social or legal norms. The author then develops the psychological and the anthropological meanins of shame, uses this backdrop to evaluate all three terms, and speculates about the likely individual and social consequences of official shaming techniques. The insight of these materials is that shame is a sophisticated, context-sensitive, and potentially highly destructive emotion. Only in certain cultural settings is official shaming likely to prove an effective or humane method of enforcing norm observation. Finally, the author applies these insights to the use of shaming penalties by courts in criminal cases and concludes that American criminal courts may be ill-equipped to exploit offender or audience shame vulnerabilities in a way that makes practical or moral sense.

The meaning of shame: Toward a self-affirming identity.

The meaning of shame: Toward a self-affirming identity.