Meaning Of Natural Kind Terms Research Articles

Reflection on natural kinds. Introduction to the special issue on natural kinds: language, science, and metaphysics

This article is an introduction to the Synthese Special Issue, Natural Kinds: Language, Science, and Metaphysics. The issue includes new contributions to some of the main questions involved in the present philosophical debates on natural kinds and on natural kind terms. Those debates are relevant to philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and metaphysics. In philosophy of language it is highly debated what the meaning of natural kind terms is, how their reference is determined, as well as whether there are differences and similarities between the semantics of natural kind terms and that of other sorts of kind terms. In philosophy of science, natural kinds are relevant because they are the basis for scientific classifications and play an explanatory role in scientific theories; thus one aim of science is to discover natural kinds and theorize about them. Natural kinds are also relevant in metaphysics, where many questions involving natural kinds are debated and especially those concerning the sort of entities we refer to when using natural kind terms, i.e., the ontological status of natural kinds; in this regard there are different views, such as conventionalism, realism and essentialism. Another metaphysical question is what it is that characterizes the naturalness of kind divisions. The introduction sketches the antecedents of some of the present views on natural kinds and natural kind terms, and indicates some of the topics dealt with in the articles that make up the issue, which can be classified in the following groups: (1) the metaphysics and epistemology of natural kinds (2) the semantics of natural kind terms and other kind terms (3) questions on species and (4) other related issues on natural kinds. However, many of the articles cover more than just one of these topics.

Empty Natural Kind Terms and Dry-Earth

This paper considers the problem of assigning meanings to empty natural kind terms. It does so in the context of the Twin-Earth externalist-internalist debate about whether the meanings of natural kind terms are individuated by the external physical environment of the speakers using these terms. The paper clarifies and outlines the different ways in which meanings could be assigned to empty natural kind terms. And it argues that externalists do not have the semantic resources to assign them meanings. The paper ends on a sceptical note concerning the fruitfulness of using the Twin-Earth setting in debates about the semantics of empty natural kind terms.

Conceptual stability and the meaning of natural kind terms

Conceptual stability and the meaning of natural kind terms

Naming Natural Kinds

This paper discusses whether it can be known a priori that a particular term, such as ‘water’, is a natural kind term, and how this problem relates to Putnam’s claim that natural kind terms require an externalist semantics. Two conceptions of natural kind terms are contrasted: The first holds that whether ‘water’ is a natural kind term depends on its a priori knowable semantic features. The second – currently gaining in popularity among externalists – holds that ‘water’ is a natural kind term only if water in fact turns out to be a natural kind. In the paper I argue that the first conception of natural kind terms should be rejected, since it does not adequately account for instances in which a purported natural kind term fails to name a natural kind (familiar examples are ‘air’, ‘sand’ and ‘jade’). However, I argue further Putnam’s externalism depends on this first, traditional conception of natural kind terms. The externalist is left with a Hobson’s choice: Either hold on to the traditional conception of natural kind terms, with its inherent problems, or reject extemalism. I argue that we should in fact reject externalism and reconsider the possibility of giving a descriptivist account of the meaning of natural kind terms.

Kripke, Putnam and the introduction of natural kind terms

In this paper, I will outline some of the important points made by Kripke and Putnam on the meaning of natural kind terms. Their notion of the baptism of natural kinds- the process by which kind terms are initially introduced into the language — is of special concern here. I argue that their accounts leave some ambiguities that suggest a baptism of objects and kinds that is free of additional theoretical commitments. Both authors suggest that we name the stuff and then let the scientists tell us what properties it really has, and hence what the real meaning is. I contend that such a barren baptism, taken at face value, cannot succeed in the semantic roles it has been assigned and that softening the stance on baptism suggests a more subtle and complex relation between reference and theoretical commitment than has emerged thus far.

Physical Externalism and Social Externalism

In this paper I examine the foundations of physical externalism and social externalism and argue that these foundations are incompatible. Physical externalism is based on a direct reference theory of natural-kind terms, while social externalism is based on a description theory of natural-kind terms. Thus, physical externalism and social externalism are incompatible just in the same way that the direct reference theory of proper names is incompatible with the description theory of proper names. My argument will proceed as follows. In Section One, I shall explain what the two theses say and spell out my suspicion. In Section Two, I shall take a look at the initial setups for physical externalism and social externalism by examining Putnam’s and Burge’s original arguments. Finally in Section Three, I shall explain that the real incompatibility comes to lie in the different assumptions on which the two theories are based. I will present some thought experiments to highlight this incompatibility. utnam and Burge have been viewed as launching a joint attack on individualism, the view that the content of one’s psychological state is determined by what is in the head. Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head, while Burge argues that beliefs are not in the head either, and both have come up with convincing arguments against individualism. It is generally conceived that Putnam’s view is a version of physical externalism, which argues that factors in the physical environment play a role in determining the meanings of natural-kind terms. Burge, on the other hand, is regarded as following up Putnam’s argument to bring in factors in the social environment P

The meanings of natural kind terms

Soulevant le probleme du traitement des singuliers abstraits que rencontrent Kripke et Putnam dans le cadre de leur position sur la necessite empirique des attributions d'identite, l'A. defend la these de Putnam selon laquelle les especes naturelles sont des universaux, contre la these radicalisee de Kripke selon laquelle les especes biologiques sont individuelles. Examinant la distinction entre les notions de signification et reference, l'A. montre que les termes naturels se differencient des singuliers abstraits en ce sens qu'ils se definissent comme des designateurs revelateurs. Dans le respect de la nature des noms propres dans le discours, l'A. repond aux objections fondees sur la generalisation des universaux vague qui s'opposent a sa conception des necessites empiriques

Why is colour naming difficult?

A suggestion exists in the child language literature that the meanings of natural kind terms are acquired before the meanings of colour terms. Explanations have typically claimed that object terms are more salient than property terms. Such explanations, however, tend to ignore the fact that natural kind terms refer to categories with sharp, clear boundaries while colour terms refer to categories with unclear or variable boundaries. Nonetheless, there has been little evidence to show that the delay in the acquisition of colour terms arises from these semantic properties. This study compares natural kind and colour naming (and corresponding comprehension) by 48 children, ranging in age from 3;0 to 5;5. The results suggest that, contra the salience view, the apparent delay in colour naming may be explained on solely semantic grounds.

II–Jane Heal

Tye claims that an externalist should say that memory content invoking natural kind concepts floats free of the setting where the memory is laid down and is at later times determined by the context in which the memory is revived. His argument assumes the existence of ‘slow switching’ of the meaning of natural kind terms when a person is transported from Earth to Twin Earth. But proper understanding of natural kind terms suggests that slow switching (contrary to what is often presupposed) is likely never to be completed. Hence the situation of a person unknowingly transported to Twin Earth is not that his memories switch content but rather than he gets two natural kinds confused.

Meaning Change for Natural Kind Terms

Diachronic linguistics studies and explains the ways in which langRages change over time. It studies changes in phonetic, grammatical, and semantic items, and in whatever theoretical entities linguists postulate to do ordinary synchronic linguistics. In this paper I want to consider the effects of scientific investigation on the meanings of natural kind terms. I will present a diachronic model of the way such terms undergo meaning changes. Consider some of the ways in which science has an effect on language. Scientists may discover important distinctions that are not captured by current natural language or by the technical vocabulary the scientists inherit. They may suggest new words or a new usage of old words to reflect such distinctions. On the other hand the scientists may discover that natural language has terms for classifying things that do not exist or for making distinctions that are no longer thought to be worth making. Then they may suggest dropping some words or usages. They might suggest a substitution, dropping an old usage and starting a new one at the same time. Historical accident enters into how all this happens. The scientist (or someone else) may explicitly suggest a change in the language or he may simply start using words in a new way, expecting that the change will catch on. In either case his attempt might fail; he may have an effect on nothing beyond his own ideolect. When a scientist does change the language, he may add clarity or confusion. The diachronic model I suggest for natural kind terms should be helpful for finding and systematizing whatever regularities are available among these changes. The model I pro-

Are the Things That We Call ‘Wrong’ Contrary to the Commands of a Loving God?

Divine command theories of morality have not been particularly popular among philosophers for some time. Consequently, such theories have received very little serious attention in recent years. One notable exception to this rule has been Robert M. Adams, who on several occasions has defended what he calls a modified divine command theory of ethical wrongness (1973, 1979a, 1979b). Most recently he has formulated this theory in terms drawn from current work on the theory of meaning. Specifically, he has proposed an account of the meaning of the term similar to Hilary Putnam's account of the meaning of natural kind terms such as water and gold. In this paper I will (1) describe the major features of Putnam's account of the meaning of natural kind terms, (2) describe Adams's analogous account of the meaning of the term wrong, (3) discuss what I take to be some advantages of Adams's theory, (4) discuss two problems with it, and (5) propose an alternative which retains the advantages and avoids the problems discussed here. According to Adams it is a necessary truth (if it is true at all) that any action is ethically wrong if and only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God. But, and this is where the new theory of meaning comes into play, this is not an analytic proposition. It is not the result of an analysis of a concept or of moral language. Nor is it a proposition that is known a priori. It does not represent what everyone thinks that wrong actions are. Nor does it represent how everyone recognizes wrong actions for what they are. Nor does it represent just the meaning of the concepts, or language, of Judaeo-Christian believers. Rather, it represents the actual nature of wrong actions. As such, the proposition is necessarily true (if it is true at all), although it is a synthetic one and epistemically a posteriori.

Putnam on the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms

In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Hilary Putnam presents several arguments to show that natural kind terms do not have a meaning or “sense” of a Fregean sort. Instead, he says, they function much like indexicals such as “this” or “I”, whose reference is determined by the circumstances of their use, not by unique properties of the referent that might be “expressed” in a sense. Putnam further argues that this account covers most general terms in our language, not just kind terms like “water” and “tiger”. He thus presents a serious challenge for the traditional notion of meaning, for if he is right only a few score words would be left with a meaning.In this paper I wish to distinguish three arguments which appear intermingled in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. Two of the arguments make explicit use of the same science-fiction example of a “Twin Earth” while the third uses a related example, and all three might be seen as showing that kind terms are like “rigid designators”. My purpose is to sort out these three arguments and show their importance for the theory of meaning.