MBA Education Research Articles

BP: Beyond Petroleum

Suitable for MBA, EMBA, and executive education programs, this case uses the complexities of the oil industry to set the stage to unfold a stakeholder analysis on BP's growth and opportunity in the renewable energy sector. This public sourced case offers a discussion about the firm's overall strategy, post Gulf Oil spill, moving forward. The case describes how within a single decade, BP had emerged as one of the largest energy companies in the world. Within that scope, BP had an odd achievement: It had been building an alternative energy business and had gained a reputation as being an oil company with a regard for the environment. Then a series of preventable accidents, in the United States in particular, started to chip away at the firm's status. In a matter of five years, BP went from celebrating its most profitable period to finding itself selling assets while industry watchers wondered whether the company would survive after being responsible for the largest oil spill in the United States. Shortly following the Gulf oil spill, Robert Dudley, a legacy Amoco executive, was appointed to replace Tony Hayward, the beleaguered BP group chief executive and director. Besides the oil spill and ongoing cleanup, Dudley had slumping revenues (even before the Deepwater tragedy) and a huge rebuilding task ahead of him. Not only did he have a multinational energy company to run, but Robert Dudley had to rehabilitate the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem, compensate all who suffered loss as a result of the damage, and repair the firm's shabby reputation. Dudley needed to implement a sound long-term strategy. How would his former division—renewable energy and alternative activities—fit into his plans?

Taking a Mexican Company Global—The CEMEX Way

“Suitable for MBA, Executive MBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs, this case uses CEMEX, a global cement producer based in Mexico, to set the stage for unfolding an analysis of a growth through acquisition strategy. It offers a discussion about the firm's overall strategy to acquire on a global scale instead of growing organically and provides an opportunity to introduce basic financial, marketing, and operational terms that can be explored in subsequent classes. The material includes a PMI process that further allows discussion on that technique.The case opens with a conference call and another barrage of questions for CEO Lorenzo Zambrano about his bid to buy the Australia-based Rinker Group in October 2006. Until this point, CEMEX has had a long-standing habit of buying businesses in emerging markets; this acquisition would be a departure from that strategy. If the deal goes through, it would be the single largest acquisition in CEMEX's history, and it would be among its few forays into a developed market other than the neighboring United States. The company has grown exponentially and successfully. Why would this effort be any different? Was the acquisition a good idea or not? And if it was, how would Zambrano and his leadership team convince Wall Street and others of that?”

Tata Motors Limited: Ratan's Next Step

Suitable for MBA, EMBA, and executive education programs, this case uses Tata Motors' move to acquire Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) from Ford to analyze a growth-through-acquisition strategy. It offers a discussion about the firm's overall strategy to acquire instead of growing organically. The case begins when Ratan Tata, chairman of Tata Motors, unveils the world's cheapest car—the Nano. He had challenged the people around him to design and produce something that had previously been unthinkable. Their ability to deliver on such a bold aspiration provided the confidence Tata Motors needed to compete in the international automobile market. Ratan believed he would have to establish a firm foothold in the United States and the United Kingdom to be considered a global contender. His strategy was to become a runner in the bid to acquire JLR from Ford. Establishing a luxury brand would go a long way toward separating Tata Motors from regional automotive firms. Yet Ratan had to think about whether the firm was well positioned to execute the acquisition if it won the bid. Or was organic growth a safer route to the same end? Excerpt UVA-S-0184 Rev. May 9, 2013 TATA MOTORS LIMITED: RATAN'S NEXT STEP On January 10, 2008, Ratan Tata, chairman of Tata Motors Limited (Tata Motors), drove onto the stage at the New Delhi Auto Expo in the world's cheapest car. As he parked next to two other models of the Nano, he thought back on the day several years prior when he had promised the world an affordable car that could be bought for under $ 2,500. At the time, India was an emerging economy that had begun to invest millions of dollars in transportation infrastructure. Ratan saw the influx of roads and new prosperity for Indians as the perfect environment to debut a car that could be purchased by almost anyone. Like his personal hero, John F. Kennedy, Ratan challenged the people around him to design and produce something that had previously been unthinkable. Ratan's ability to deliver on such a bold aspiration instilled in his investors and him the confidence that Tata Motors was capable of competing in the international automobile market. The Nano's production was made possible by a wide range of capabilities within the Tata Group, which, along with Tata Motors, owned 98 other companies operating in 80 countries. Such a diverse and complete range of resources made Tata's future bright. And even as Ratan stood on the stage introducing his accomplishment, he wondered what the next step ought to be to move his company forward. A lifelong interest in automobiles and an appreciation of the Western car market led Ratan to believe that he would have to establish a firm foothold in the United States and the United Kingdom to be considered a contender in the global automotive industry. His mind turned to the ongoing bid and negotiations to acquire Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) from Ford Motor Company (Ford). Establishing a luxury brand would go a long way toward separating Tata Motors from regional automotive firms. Yet he had to think about whether the firm was well positioned to execute the acquisition if it won the bid. Or was organic growth a safer route to the same end? . . .

Tyson Toles on Leadership

Unless we learn to manage our own behavior more intentionally, how can we possibly lead others effectively? This is a descriptive case of one MBA student's views on core leadership principles, his personal charter, his personal mission statement, and his life's dream. The case therefore gives an opportunity to discuss how people need to develop the ability to lead their own lives in order to lead others. The material would work well with the technical note Personal Charters (UVA-OB-0801) and be suitable for any MBA or executive education classroom. Excerpt UVA-OB-0997 May 3, 2010 TYSON TOLES ON LEADERSHIP I have always considered myself a little bit different and have always tried to take a different path. Born to an African-American couple later in their lives, I stood apart from my siblings, who were substantially older. In the small rural town where I grew up, I stood apart from other children amid an eclectic mix of middle-class Anglos and Mexican migrants. I was often the “only one of my kind,” smart and friendly with classmates, but certainly distinct from them. Academics and school were fun, and the camaraderie was even more fun. It came as no surprise, then, that upon reaching high-school age, I asked my parents if I could attend Bellarmine College Preparatory, a Jesuit school considered to be the best school in our area across the board: academics, athletics, and community. Students from that school were always looked at a little differently. “He goes to Bellarmine,” one would hear whispered in hushed tones when a student walked by, as if the student were royalty. Ignorant of the fact that I would face five hours on a bus each day and (even worse) that it was an all-boys school, I had decided that I had to be there. My four years at Bellarmine were invaluable for my personal growth, enabling me to strive to be citius, altius, fortius—swifter, faster, stronger—toward college and beyond. From there, I was able to attend law school and spar intellectually with some of the world's brightest minds on issues that touch everyday life. Upon graduation, I practiced law as a civil litigator, but I made a discovery that would require a change in direction: I had not become a leader. . . .

Saks Fifth Avenue: Project Evolution

This case is used in Darden's first-year strategy course and is appropriate for MBA, Executive MBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs. The head of strategy for a well-known fashion retailer, Saks Fifth Avenue, and her general management colleagues face critical decisions required to address evolving buying patterns as online retailing becomes an important part of consumer behavior. How should a successful firm organize itself when market shifts require existing and emerging processes to coexist in one organizational structure? Excerpt UVA-S-0244 Rev. Jul. 14, 2020 Saks Fifth Avenue: Project Evolution The Project Evolution status meeting couldn't have been more troubling. As an experienced general merchandise manager (GMM) at Saks Fifth Avenue (Saks), Cody Kondo was used to dealing with conflicting market information and crafting a path forward that didn't require clear signals. It was March 2013, and the update meeting with the external consultants hired to review the firm's channel strategy had provided some promising results from the prior year's pilot in Women's Footwear. But the consultants' broader findings left Kondo concerned about how the pilot could be implemented and scaled for his whole division, let alone all of Saks. He wondered what his partner in shepherding the Project Evolution initiative, Michael Burgess, was thinking. Burgess was an experienced internet retailer who had only recently joined the company to head up Saks Direct (the company's online channel). How would Burgess and Kondo, together with the corporate strategy division, lead the omni-channel implementation—the merging of Saks Fifth Avenue stores and Saks Direct into one business? See Exhibit 1 for graphical representation of the internal vision and strategy. At least one of the challenges was clarity about the vision within the organization. Saks' CEO, Steve Sadove, believed in driving consensus. He was convinced that the right strategy, organization, and implementation speed for omni-channel (see Exhibit 1—“Saks 2015 Omni-Channel Vision”) would emerge at the completion of the footwear pilot. He believed that reasonable executives would agree that collaboration was needed across Saks' functions and disparate business units would then fall into line accordingly. That, Sadove felt, was the Saks way. Sadove placed Project Evolution stewardship in the hands of Shirley Romig—the VP of corporate strategy—and Ashley Wiland, director of corporate strategy. Overall sponsorship for Project Evolution was put under the care of two experienced general managers: Burgess and Kondo. Burgess joined Saks in 2012 from the consumer division of FTD Companies, Inc., where he led all North American merchandising and marketing and was responsible for the FTD.com profit and loss statement. Burgess's business unit at FTD was a highly profitable division boasting more than $ 300 million in annual revenues. Kondo, his unlikely partner, was a pedigreed retailer with past experience at Ralph Lauren, Nordstrom, and now the GMM for the accessories categories (including fashion and fine jewelry, watches, women's shoes, and handbags and soft accessories) for all Saks Fifth Avenue stores. He had also founded his own internet company. Kondo was well known to Saks rank and file, having been with the company since 2000 and having worked in the menswear division for several years. Kondo had the legitimacy of being a retailer with “fashion in the veins,” who had also d

Why Everything You Think You Know About Growth is Probably Wrong

Appropriate for courses in business strategy at the MBA and executive education levels. By searching the disciplines of biology, economics, strategy, finance, and organizational design and behavior, Professor Hess in this technical note decides that the U.S. Growth Model has no theoretical or empirical support. Six keys to organic growth are offered, and the characteristics of companies with above-average growth are examined. Excerpt UVA-S-0172 WHY EVERYTHING YOU THINK YOU KNOW ABOUT GROWTH IS PROBABLY WRONG Most U.S. business leaders believe that: (1) businesses either grow or die; (2) all growth is good; (3) growing bigger is always better; and (4) public companies should grow in a linear, continuous manner as evidenced by ever-increasing quarterly earnings. For our purposes, we will call these beliefs the U.S. Growth Model. Grow or Die has been a key business axiom for at least half a century, recognized as such by Time magazine in 1954 and repeatedly since. Goggling the phrase “businesses grow or die” produces more than four million hits. Countless books and articles have been written about the imperative to continuously grow. The U.S. Growth Model Surprisingly, the U.S. Growth Model has been embraced without rigorous analysis about how well it describes the growth of robust businesses or its benefits or risks to businesses as an objective. Nonetheless, it is the foundation of the short-term business mentality dominant in many C-suites, boardrooms, and Wall Street firms, which expect quarterly reporting of the ever increasing growth. . . .

Kulicke and Soffa Industries, Inc.: Designing a Supply Chain Network

Supply chain network design choices and the challenges in implementing and understanding how alternatives influence firm performance are key management skills that can be applied to the case of a global company, Kulicke and Soffa Industries, Inc. (K&S), and its expansion strategy. Suitable for the MBA, EMBA, GMBA, and executive education programs, the case explores the decision to expand the company’s tool bonding capacity in order to manage its growth. The question becomes whether to grow current operations in Yokneam Israel or seek alternative sites. And if it was decided to seek a location outside of Israel, where exactly should the company go?

Exercise: Creating a Model of Consumer Behavior

Converting myriad data into a simple, visual conceptual model is the basis for developing the ability to communicate consumer marketing insights up, down, and across the organization. This enables the marketer to persuade others of his or her analysis and helps with alignment of the broader organization. And while throughout the MBA program, students have been exposed to various models, once students graduate and enter the workforce, they will be expected to convert complex data into usable insight, typically through visual models of their own design. This exercise, then, is designed to help the students transition from users of conceptual models to creators or developers of models. The ability to create a conceptual model sharpens the abstract thinking required to convert insight about the market, consumers, competitors, or other entities into an understandable model. The detailed teaching note accompanying this exercise guides instructors through the process of eliciting and evaluating students' visual models, and then proposes a simple, complete model that frames many consumer categories surprisingly well. Additionally, there are videos that can be used to help explain the development of a new-to-the-world conceptual model.This exercise is intended for use in either an undergraduate capstone class or at any point during an MBA, executive MBA, global MBA, or executive education program. Excerpt UVA-M-0893 Dec. 19, 2016 Exercise: Creating a Model of Consumer Beliefs The problem of creating something which is new, but which is consistent with everything which has been seen before, is one of extreme difficulty. —Richard P. Feynman Whether you are a marketing strategist, an account planner at an ad agency, a marketing researcher, or a consultant, it is likely that in the near future, you will be asked to convert research and insight about the consumer (or customer) into a conceptual model or framework. Conceptual models, employed across industries and functional areas, are visual representations of constructs or concepts, used to help people simply and holistically understand a subject. Most top companies that recruit from college campuses require that student interviewees use models and frameworks to organize and explain their answers. Firms do this because the ability to communicate complex concepts through models and frameworks represents a type of intellectual competency that is valuable. The reason is twofold. First, models and frameworks are powerful tools that enable creators to convey complex information in an easy-to-understand format. Second, these tools enable a receiver to not only understand complex information easily, but to assess the creator's thinking. . . .

Kulicke and Soffa Industries, Inc., in China: Transferring Knowledge (a) and (B) (Abridged)

This version condenses the two parts of “K&S Industries Inc. in China: Transferring Knowledge (A) and (B)” into a single-use case. Suitable for the MBA, EMBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs, the case presents a manufacturer of semiconductor assembly equipment looking to achieve growth in its wire bonding tools segment—in particular, capillaries and dicing saw blades—through geographic expansion. At the time, it manufactured capillaries in Yokneam, Israel, and blades in Santa Clara, California. While much of the work on outsourcing to China focuses on the low cost and its tradeoffs, this case examines in depth the interaction between human capital and a firm's cost and capabilities.The expansion committee team is charged with designing and opening a new facility in Suzhou, China. Expanding operations to China meant cost savings, and it was where K&S's market had expanded. But it wasn't clear whether it made sense to move the capillary process, the dicing blade manufacturing, or both. And if K&S did move to China, it would keep the Israeli-based factory open but close the American-based. If both were moved, what order would make sense given that one existing factory would be closed down and the other kept open? And once those decisions were made, what exactly would the knowledge transfer look like? Excerpt UVA-OM-1500 Rev. Jul. 10, 2014 KULICKE AND SOFFA INDUSTRIES, INC., IN CHINA: TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE (A) AND (B) (ABRIDGED) Shay Torton, a general manager for Kulicke and Soffa Industries, Inc. (K&S), and Ilan Gilboa and Shlomit Drori, from K&S Israel, were members of a committee put together in early 2002 to manage the firm's expansion processes. K&S, a manufacturer of semiconductor assembly equipment, was looking to achieve growth in its wire bonding tools segment—in particular, capillaries and dicing saw blades—through geographic expansion and entry into new markets. At the time, it manufactured capillaries in Yokneam, Israel, and blades in Santa Clara, California. The team, mindful of the substantial expense involved, had been charged with designing and opening a new facility in Suzhou, China. The strategic shifting of manufacturing to more cost-effective areas had been well researched (see Exhibit 1 for an economic comparison of different regions). The city of Suzhou was chosen for several reasons: its proximity to several K&S customers and to Shanghai, relative low cost of living, ability to manufacture six days a week, abundant worker supply, and low labor costs. An 80 km2 industrial park offered a reliable infrastructure, plentiful public transportation, and an easy one-stop government approval service. Much conversation at the senior executive level was about the possibility of transferring both capillary and dicing blade production to Suzhou. . . .

So Long to Singlestop? (A)

This case pairing was designed for use in the Darden School's Global MBA for Executives program in the core Leadership and Organizations course and is also suitable for MBA, EMBA, and Executive Education courses in a module covering transformational leadership or human resources strategy. The field-based case uses the experiences of three managers at a big-box retail distribution center to set the stage for an analysis of transformational leadership in a large company. Kevin Henson has worked at big-box retailer SingleStop's distribution center for only four months when he was offered a job at another firm. He had joined the firm in the spring of 2012 while it was undergoing a difficult transformation. His disastrous hiring process and difficult first months are described from Henson's viewpoint and two other management members of the firm. Henson must decide whether to give SingleStop another chance. Excerpt UVA-OB-1049 Rev. Oct. 13, 2015 So Long to SingleStop? (A) Kevin Henson hung up the phone. For someone only four months into his current position with the big-box retailer SingleStop, the offer to move to another firm was unsettling. He had joined one of SingleStop's distribution centers in the spring of 2012 while it was undergoing a difficult transformation. Although it had been rough, his shift was now the number one in the entire company network. In addition, the prospect of changing jobs again was unappealing. The new job offered higher pay and more benefits. All he had to do was say “yes,” and it would be his. Henson needed advice. Had he really given SingleStop a chance or had he never overcome his disastrous hiring process? Should he take the new offer or continue at SingleStop? Kevin Henson Henson had spent several years serving in the U.S. Navy and then took a career “detour” in 2010 to help his family transform a newly purchased restaurant. The restaurant was struggling because the previous owner had taken the best employees with him, leaving Henson's parents with mediocre workers. Henson described his approach to managing those employees: . . .

Galaxy Television: Melding Worlds or Cultural Big Bang?

Suitable for MBA, EMBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs, this case explores the early days of a potential global leader's career. Emily Goh joined Galaxy Television, an Arab television start-up, as the head of corporate planning and worked in Rome for 10 months. She was heading back to Los Angeles to produce a television special on the Academy Awards. Her team included Arab on-air talent and producers, British production technicians, an Italian accountant, and American production support staff. Given the mix of cultures represented on her team, Goh wondered how she could generate the trust and cohesion the members would need for fruitful collaboration. Would there be a difference in the team dynamic now that they were in Los Angeles rather than in Rome? Would she herself behave differently? More broadly, Goh wondered whether she could continue to tackle the challenges inherent in living abroad and working for a multinational company. Was the melange of cultures in the pressure cooker of a multinational start-up company too much change? Was Galaxy's array of cultures too disparate to blend and lead? Could she find a way to meld her worlds and those at Galaxy? Or would Galaxy Television be her “big bang”? Excerpt UVA-OB-1022 Aug. 10, 2011 GALAXY TELEVISION: MELDING WORLDS OR CULTURAL BIG BANG? The Alitalia flight from Rome to Los Angeles had leveled off, and Emily Goh settled into her first-class seat, glass of wine in hand. She thought back 10 months to when she had been on the same flight in the opposite direction. Goh had moved to Rome to join an Arab television start-up as the head of corporate planning. Her excitement and anticipation of the impending adventure kept her up for that 14-hour flight. This time, however, she had the long flight home to decompress and reassume her American identity—to return to comfortable, more familiar surroundings than she had experienced in the cauldron that was Galaxy Television. Although the trip back home was for business, Goh was looking forward to spending time with her family and close friends in Los Angeles before producing a television special on the Academy Awards with the Galaxy team that would arrive in a week. Her team included Arab on-air talent and producers, British production technicians, an Italian accountant, and American production support staff. The Academy Awards' high visibility with customers, potential studio partners, and competitors meant the production was a priority for Galaxy. As such, her boss, the CEO, designated Goh as the project's team leader. A successful show would position the company as the leading Arab television network and a proven producer of quality, original entertainment programming. . . .

943-945 Warren Road

This case, intended for MBA and executive education audiences, investigates whether an LLC should invest in a real estate deal. The materials provide a straightforward opportunity for applying discounted-cash-flow methods from the perspective of equity investors in the LLC. The investors know the terms of interest and principal payments on planned debt financing and have made forecasts of rental rates, occupancy, depreciation, future sale price, various expenses, and other items related to the property. The case can be used as an introduction to estimation and analysis of cash flows to the suppliers of equity. The setting provides opportunities for discussion of tax issues and risks. Excerpt UVA-F-1638 May 11, 2011 943–945 Warren Road Mike Grant, Tom Hoffman, and Andy Krouse had created a limited liability company (LLC) for the purpose of owning real estate. They had considerable experience in real estate; their most recent deal involved purchasing a small apartment complex and converting it to condominiums. With that $ 5 million investment ($ 3 million to purchase the complex and$ 2 million for the conversion), they earned a 20% annual rate of return on their money over a three-year period. The LLC now owned 10 commercial properties throughout central Virginia. Grant, Hoffman, and Krouse were considering buying a small retail complex (approximately 14,000 square feet) located at 943–945 Warren Road in Charlottesville, Virginia. The estimated purchase price was $ 2.5 million, and they anticipated spending an additional $ 300,000 on renovations immediately after the purchase. The total investment would be approximately $ 2.8 million. They had a commitment from a local bank for a $ 2.175 million25-year mortgage at an interest rate of 7.25%, which they thought was attractive given current lending markets. Exhibit 1 shows the annual breakdown of mortgage payments by interest and principal over the life of the loan. They needed to decide quickly whether to pursue the deal. 943–945 Warren Road . . .

Emerson Process Management: Metran Acquisition

This case is used in Darden's first-year strategy course and is appropriate for MBA, Executive MBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs. The president of a key division of Emerson, a well-known diversified global manufacturing company, and his team address important questions about expanding into Russia through the acquisition of a relatively small company that has a strong local brand. How should a successful firm evaluate and enter new markets that are experiencing political and economic uncertainty? Excerpt UVA-S-0252 Rev. Jun. 8, 2016 Emerson Process Management: Metran Acquisition Steve Sonnenberg looked up from the Metran acquisition review report he was reading to gaze out at the Russian midwinter landscape just as the wheels on the Soviet-era Aeroflot Ilyushin II-62 on which he was a passenger touched down unsteadily on the Chelyabinsk airport runway. It was January 2004, and Sonnenberg and his team were in Chelyabinsk to assess the prospect of acquiring Metran Industrial Group for the Emerson Electric Co. (Emerson) Process Management (Emerson Process Management) business platform. As president of Rosemount Inc., Emerson Process Management's flagship company, Sonnenberg was leading Emerson's effort to expand into Russia. Sonnenberg recalled: Russia was an important emerging market. With one of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world, it represented a great opportunity to expand our process automation and control systems business. But in 2004, there were a lot of question marks around owning a company in Russia, as well as around Metran itself. Five years earlier, we had considered investing in Metran and decided against it. As we prepared for the Chelyabinsk visit that winter, we asked ourselves—had enough changed at Metran for us to jump in now? Sonnenberg was confident in his team's capabilities and encouraged by the warm reception the team had received during a recent visit to Metran. Nevertheless, many vexing questions remained: Was the time right for Emerson to expand its presence in Russia? If so, should the Metran acquisition drive that expansion? If the acquisition moved forward, what would be the best price and structure for the deal? Finally, how might Metran combine with the Emerson Process Management business in Russia so that the best qualities of both companies were retained? That is, how could Emerson maintain the quality and reliability of its Emerson Process Management brand while taking advantage of Metran's reputation for responsive, locally focused client relationships? Sonnenberg realized that these questions, and many others, would have to be answered by the next month, when David Farr, Emerson's corporate CEO, was coming to visit Chelyabinsk. . . .

Taking a Mexican Company Global—The Cemex Way

Suitable for MBA, Executive MBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs, this case uses CEMEX, a global cement producer based in Mexico, to set the stage for unfolding an analysis of a growth through acquisition strategy. It offers a discussion about the firm’s overall strategy to acquire on a global scale instead of growing organically and provides an opportunity to introduce basic financial, marketing, and operational terms that can be explored in subsequent classes. The material includes a PMI process that further allows discussion on that technique. The case opens with a conference call and another barrage of questions for CEO Lorenzo Zambrano about his bid to buy the Australia-based Rinker Group in October 2006. Until this point, CEMEX has had a long-standing habit of buying businesses in emerging markets; this acquisition would be a departure from that strategy. If the deal goes through, it would be the single largest acquisition in CEMEX’s history, and it would be among its few forays into a developed market other than the neighboring United States. The company has grown exponentially and successfully. Why would this effort be any different? Was the acquisition a good idea or not? And if it was, how would Zambrano and his leadership team convince Wall Street and others of that?

The World is Flat...The World is Lumpy?

Suitable for MBA, EMBA, GEMBA, and executive education programs, this note sets the stage to unfold an analysis of popular notions about how the world works. On one hand, some believe that global competition has created a flattened world and that globalization has leveled the playing field. Yet a zest to view the world as flat, others have said, results in an underestimation of the differences between countries—standardization, exact replication, and scale expansion on a global basis could be problematic. In this note, we acknowledge that the flat world has some lumps, but regardless of whether the world is considered to be flat or round, there are certain implications on both sides that business leaders need to be aware of in order to create global efficiency. The note offers three practical examples that students can work through and apply their learning. Excerpt UVA-S-0191 Aug. 12, 2011 THE WORLD IS FLAT…THE WORLD IS LUMPY? Despite the seemingly fresh arrival of the term “globalization,” it is really nothing new. The drive to explore the unknown can be traced back to ancient civilizations and those brave souls who set out to explore the earth—mostly by sea. Trade followed, as did tariff duties. What has changed over the centuries is the amount of contact and the form of engagement. Much of the movement toward a global economy occurred during three different periods. The latter part of the 1800s to the mid-1900s generally marks what historians consider the first wave of globalization when trading goods expanded to investing capital and labor in foreign countries. Immediately following World War II, declining trade barriers between countries set off a second wave. And since 1980, economic policy reform, particularly among developing countries, as well as declining transportation costs and technology advancements allowed more countries to enter global markets and resulted in the third wave of globalization. At first, reaching outside of one's borders was limited to a few industries—mostly consumer-product-driven firms. Incentives included lower production costs, access to resources (either natural or knowledge and skills of local populations), growth into new markets, financial value, and/or a desire to be viewed as a local company as opposed to a foreign-owned one. By the year 2000, service industries started to appreciate the gains from going global. Transportation efficiencies allowed us to produce and deliver resources, products, and services around the world. And the meaning of globalization transformed well beyond the concept of international trade to include increasing worldwide connectivity, integration, and interdependence of cultural, ecological, governmental, high-tech, and social spheres. . . .

Rejuvenating management education

Management education in India is facing a lot of problems of relevance in the current scenario. Thousands of MBA institutes have mushroomed in the last decade and many of MBA students and professionals are undergoing MBA education to be better equipped for the growing economy. All the sides of management education such as quality of curriculum, MBA aspirants, faculty in management education business research, quality of research, industry-institute interaction, MDP, faculty development programmes, placements, compensation packages of MBA, career development path of alumni, diversity among faculty as well as students, governance and accountability, etc. are under critical scanner. This paper is an effort to examine the current issues in management education system in India and to find out ways for quality improvements in the present management education system so that business schools respond to current situation. All the sides of management education such as quality of curriculum, MBA aspirants, faculty in management education business research, quality of research, industry-institute interaction, MDP, faculty development programmes, placements, compensation packages of MBA, career development path of alumni, diversity among faculty as well as students, governance and accountability, etc. are under critical scanner. However, a very important question arises i.e. what special or extra needs to be done in order to make the Management education more effective and Industry Oriented. One of the very crucial elements that need to be incorporated is the involvement of corporate sector in the management education, to make it effective and industry oriented, since only the corporate Sector is the direct beneficiary of the higher and management education. There are around 4000 management institutes in India.

An Approach to Management Communication Pedagogy in MBA Education

This note provides a pedagogical overview of Management Communication for MBA education. Excerpt An APPROACH to Management Communication PEDAGOGY in MBA Education Management communication and corporate communication have changed dramatically in the last ten years. Corporations and organizations have become more complex; yet, the single biggest factors influencing management communication have been, externally, the explosion of business news, and internally, the very different working conditions of a highly competitive marketplace. Externally, communication in business was traditionally associated with public relations. The rise of consulting quickly pushed the envelope of communication culture in business, setting new standards of presentation, and the development of logical arguments applied to business problems. Internally, communication in business can be seen as the ways the practices of human resources are implemented, and how strategy becomes manifest. New technologies, such as the transparency of the Web, have resulted in an increasing visibility of communication in business. Increasingly, vice presidents of corporate communication and chief communication officers play a role in developing corporate strategy. The divide between internal and external communication has been replaced in more and more companies by an integrated function that communicates the strategy, values, and identity of an organization to its multiple stakeholders. A working definition of management communication can be stated as both the many communication-related activities within companies and the specific function of corporate communication. As Rosabeth Moss Kanter noted some time ago, managers spend most of their time communicating, often under a fair amount of uncertainty. Management communication continues to be the area of communication in business that centers on the individual manager's ability to be an effective communicator. The exclusive focus on writing and speaking skills, however, has evolved into a strategic approach set in real-world organizational contexts that directly prepare students for the demands placed on today's manager. A dazzling and often confusing array of communication choices and channels, from e-mail to teleconferences, from instant messaging on palm pilots, to multi-media presentation technology, faces the men and women who work in companies, where, as the cliche goes, the only constant is change. Change, by definition, raises the need for the ability to communicate persuasively. It is no coincidence that the most celebrated CEOs are often great communicators, individuals who not only articulate the company's strategy with precision, but also become the corporation's “story-teller-in-chief.” . . .

Drivers420.com: Organising Transporters

This case describes a situation in which Malkit Singh Bal (Bal) partner of Bal Roadlines shares with Mr. Ghura, who was about to be hired as consultant for Bal Roadlines, about the rise in issue of fraud and crime done by the fleet drivers and asked him to help a way out to solve the problem. The purpose of this case is to provide an opportunity to the participants of an MBA or Management Executive Education Programme to step into the shoes of Ghura, a consultant and to explore the options and to select the best possible option to offer a solution to Bal. The context for this involvement is the rise in fraud and crime done by the fleet drivers.

Crisis management as a critical perspective

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to draw the authors experience of teaching a crisis management module within a range of MBA programmes in the UK, EU and USA. A key characteristic of the module was its development as a means of critiquing conventional approaches to management education. The paper details that experience. Design/methodology/approach – It reviews the literature on management education that has been critical of prescriptive and “toolkit-based” approaches to MBA education. Findings – An approach to a crisis management course is shown to provide a means of challenging dominant theoretical and practical approaches to management. Practical implications – The paper identifies challenges and personal and academic benefits for educators and students when engaging with critical perspectives and critical pedagogies. Originality/value – Through introducing the notion of crisis management, the paper discusses the importance of challenging theory and practice and creating within students, an appetite to challenge the dominant paradigms of conventional teaching and business practice.

Lessons Jesuit Business Programs Can Learn from Chinese MBA Programs

North American Schools of Business have been going by transplanting pedagogy and content to Asia and Africa for several centuries. From a teaching perspective, our western schools look to these regions as contexts to provide richness to our students' educational ex- perience, to prepare Americans for dealings in the global business marketplace, and often to increase our own enrollments and revenues. To date we have served as exporters of our own Western brand of MBA education. Using an ethnographic approach of participant observation gained through two years of teaching and living in China supplemented with inter- views with Chinese students studying in the U.S., this paper suggests an alternative view. China in particular and Asia in general present a different viewpoint of leadership, motivation, team-work and MBA education in general. The paper suggests an alternative viewpoint to higher education and a series of concepts and ideas that can be imported into western business education from the Middle Kingdom.