As the world is threatened by new and powerful climate-driven hazards, how are states and societies likely to react? In this paper, I explore the role of regime type in determining the likelihood of state survival under extreme environmental conditions. I begin with a theoretical and empirical analysis of public goods provision under different regime types, finding no evidence for the contention that any one particular regime is superior to others. Following from this, I argue that the survival of the state under increased hazard conditions will at least partly be a function of political flexibility, with more democratic regimes better able to weather crisis than non-democratic ones. I explore this argument by analysing two historical cases of climate change: the non-democratic Maya civilisation in the first millennium and the quasi-democratic Icelandic state at the start of the second millennium. These historical cases highlight potential advantages to the democratic system in allowing states to survive a world with increased hazards but also underscore how rising competition and political instability can negatively impact those same democratic institutions. This article was published open access under a CC BY licence: https://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0 .