Maximum-revenue Tariff Research Articles

Optimal privatisation, and optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

We examine the effect of privatisation on the priority of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff in an international mixed oligopoly with foreign competition and optimal privatisation. We demonstrate that when the marginal cost of the domestic privatised firm is high enough, the optimum-welfare tariff will exceed the maximum-revenue tariff. Moreover, due to the higher tariff rate that leads to the high degree of privatisation, the optimum-welfare tariff generates greater optimal privatisation than the maximum-revenue tariff does. Lastly, when the gap between the number of domestic private firms and that of their foreign counterparts becomes larger, the optimum-welfare tariff will exceed the maximum-revenue tariff.

Network externalities and tariff structure

In this paper, we show that with cost asymmetry, stronger network externalities and less differentiated goods, the uniform tariff rate set by the government of the importing country increases and the optimal discriminatory-tariff gap widens. In addition, under network externalities and good differentiation, we demonstrate that: (a) the optimal tariff policy is superior to free trade in maximizing the domestic social welfare; (b) the maximum-revenue tariff rate is always higher than the optimal tariff rate; (c) the consumer surplus and social welfare are always higher under the optimal tariff policy than under the maximum-revenue tariff policy.

Ranking the optimum tariff and the maximum revenue tariff in vertically related markets

This paper firstly shows that in a vertically related industry with either domestic upstream monopolist or foreign upstream monopolist, when the upstream firm adopts uniform input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff is higher than the maximum-revenue tariff, if the number of foreign competitors is sufficiently large. Secondly, when domestic upstream monopolist adopts discriminatory input pricing, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. Thirdly, when foreign upstream monopolist adopts discriminatory input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff will exceed the maximum-revenue tariff if the sizes of domestic and foreign firms become more unequally distributed.

Optimum-Welfare and Maximum-Revenue Tariffs in Vertically Related Markets

This paper compares the optimum-welfare tariffs with the maximum-revenue tariffs in a model of vertically related markets characterized by Cournot competition. It shows that the optimum-welfare tariff on the intermediate good exceeds the maximum-revenue tariff if the home intermediate-good firm is much more cost-competitive than the foreign intermediate-good firm. Further, the optimum-welfare tariff on the final good exceeds the maximum-revenue tariff if the home intermediate-good firm is significantly inefficient compared to the foreign intermediate-good firm. It is less likely that the optimum-welfare tariffs on the intermediate and the final good, respectively, exceed the maximum-revenue tariffs on the intermediate and the final good in the presence of vertical trade structures than in their absence.

The Evaluation of Maximum Tariffs in an Emerging Economy: The Nigerian Case

Using the Cournot and Stackelberg theories of oligopolistic competition, the paper re-evaluate the importance of tariff ranking issue under a mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrated that under Cournot theory, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms becomes more unequally distributed, maximum–welfare tariff will exceed maximum–revenue tariff. The study also revealed that under Stackelberg theory, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher maximum–welfare tariffs versus maximum–revenue tariffs. These two positions notwithstanding, when the Nigerian government decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus maximum–welfare tariffs. The findings of this paper remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower in the market.

Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger.

Maximum-Revenue and Optimum-Welfare Tariffs in International Mixed Duopoly: Does the Order of Firms’ Move Matter?

This paper examines the effect of privatization on the priority of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff in a mixed oligopoly with partial privatization and foreign competition. Major findings of this paper are that: firstly, in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization and asymmetric marginal costs, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm is higher than a critical value, the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff regardless of the order of firms’ move; secondly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and cost is symmetric, the optimum-welfare tariff will be higher than the maximum-revenue tariff; thirdly, if the degree of privatization is sufficiently high and the domestic firm is highly ineffective in production, under Stackelberg public leadership, the optimum-welfare tariff is low and then it is more possible that the optimum-welfare tariff is lower than the maximum-revenue one.

Tariffs Ranking in Mixed Oligopoly with Revenue Constraint

Utilizing linear mixed oligopoly model, this paper explores the magnitude of the maximum‐revenue tariff, optimum‐welfare tariff, and revenue‐constrained optimal tariff that is especially designed for the consideration of the bureaucratic inefficiency. In particular, the tariff ranking issue is examined under both cases of Cournot competition and domestic public leadership. We found that, under Cournot competition, the optimum‐welfare tariff is the highest and it is followed by the revenue‐constrained optimal tariff while the maximum‐revenue tariff is the lowest. But, under Stackelberg public leadership, if the domestic private firms are fewer than the foreign firms, the maximum‐revenue tariff becomes the highest and the optimum‐welfare exceeds the revenue‐constrained optimal tariff.

OPTIMUM‐WELFARE AND MAXIMUM‐REVENUE TARIFFS IN MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH FOREIGN COMPETITORS

This paper re‐examines the important tariff ranking issue under a linear mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrate that under Cournot competition, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms become more unequally distributed, optimum‐welfare tariff will exceed maximum‐revenue tariff. We also show that under Stackelberg competition, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher optimum‐welfare tariffs versus maximum‐revenue tariffs; however, when it decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum‐revenue tariffs versus optimum‐welfare tariffs. The above results remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower.

Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm.

Welfare–maximizing and revenue–maximizing tariffs with a few domestic firms

In this paper we compare the orthodox optimal tariff formula with the appropriate welfare–maximizing tariff when there are a few producing or importing firms. The welfare–maximizing tariff can be very low, voire negative in some cases, while in others it can even exceed the maximum–revenue tariff. The relationship between the welfare–maximizing tariff and the number of firms need not be monotonically increasing, because the tariff is not strictly used to internalize terms of trade externality. It is also used to manipulate cost asymmetries between producing and importing firms. Welfare–maximizing specific tariffs are never worse than their ad valorem counterparts. JEL Classification F13, L13 Tarif qui maximise le bien être et tarif qui maximise le revenu quand on est en présence de peu de firmes. Nous comparons le tarif optimal orthodoxe au tarif maximisant le bien être lorsqu’il y a peu de firmes productrices ou importatrices. Le tarif qui maximise le bien être est parfois très bas, même négatif, mais il peut excéder le tarif qui maximise le revenu dans d’autres cas. La relation entre le tarif et le nombre de firmes n’est pas nécessairement monotone parce que le tarif n’est pas strictement utilisé pour améliorer les termes d’échange. Il est aussi utilisé pour manipuler les asymétries dans les coûts des firmes productrices et importatrices. Le tarif spécifique n’est jamais dominé par le tarif ad valorem.

The Maximum Revenue Tarrif and Growth, a Note

This paper intends to show that growth will not necessarily increase the tariff revenue of a country, assuming that the country always imposes a maximum revenue tariff. If there is an increase in import demand after growth, the maximum tariff revenue will increase. However, if there is a decrease in import demand after growth, the maximum tariff revenue will decrease. The offer curve approach is used in this study.

OPTIMUM WELFARE AND MAXIMUM REVENUE TARIFFS UNDER OLIGOPOLY

Scottish Journal of Political EconomyVolume 38, Issue 4 p. 398-401 OPTIMUM WELFARE AND MAXIMUM REVENUE TARIFFS UNDER OLIGOPOLY David Collie, David Collie Department of Economics, University of Warwick, CoventrySearch for more papers by this author David Collie, David Collie Department of Economics, University of Warwick, CoventrySearch for more papers by this author First published: November 1991 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.1991.tb00327.xCitations: 24AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume38, Issue4November 1991Pages 398-401 RelatedInformation

A note on the maximum revenue tariff

This note attempts to prove that the maximum revenue tariff when the tariff revenue is measured in units of the exportable good will be higher than the maximum revenue tariff when the tariff revenue is measured in units of the importable good.

Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariffs

Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariffs