Material Weaknesses In Internal Control Research Articles

Mandatory management disclosure and mandatory independent audit of internal controls: Evidence of configural information processing by investors

We conduct an experiment where alumni participants from a Canadian accounting and finance undergraduate program assume they are in one of four regulatory regimes (manipulated between-subjects) and make investment potential evaluations for two firms (manipulated within-subjects): a firm disclosing no material weaknesses (No-MW disclosure firm) and a firm disclosing material weaknesses (MW disclosure firm) in internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). We find evidence of configural information processing. For the No-MW disclosure firm, mandatory (versus voluntary) disclosure of ICFR material weaknesses and mandatory (versus voluntary) independent ICFR audit are substitutes in enhancing investment potential evaluations. However, for the MW disclosure firm, neither mandatory disclosure nor mandatory audit has any effect on investment potential evaluations. Supplementary experiments with undergraduate participants suggest that the pattern of configural information processing is a function of participants' knowledge of company disclosure incentives and the assurance value of an audit, wherein undergraduates with lower levels of knowledge are less able to perceive the effects of mandatory disclosure and mandatory audit on investment potential evaluations. Our findings have implications for regulators who are concerned about balancing the costs and benefits of different regulatory mechanisms.

Do Managers Make Voluntary Accounting Changes in Response to a Material Weakness in Internal Control?

This study examines whether managers make voluntary changes in accounting principle in response to a material weakness (MW). We find that managers are more likely to report voluntary changes in the same year as and year following a MW disclosure, a result largely driven by companies with a greater number of MWs. Auditor, CFO, CEO, and director turnover and restatements are not the primary driver of these results, although MW companies with new CFOs are more likely to make voluntary changes in the same year. Managers of MW companies justify voluntary changes as improving accounting information, conforming internal policies, and providing administrative benefits. MW companies that report voluntary changes in the same year and justify the changes as improving accounting are more likely to remediate at least one MW in the following year. Further, entity level MW companies with voluntary changes in the same year are associated with higher accruals quality than other entity level MW companies, and a similar result holds for companies with more MWs. These results suggest that MW companies likely report voluntary changes as part of a strategy to improve financial reporting processes and policies. Our study informs both internal control policymakers and accounting standards setters.

Institutional Ownership, Audit Choices and Quality: Evidence from Russell Index Reconstitutions

This paper investigates the monitoring effect of institutional investors on portfolio firms’ audit policy. We identify an exogenous discontinuity in institutional ownership around the Russell index threshold, and test the effect of instrumented ownership on firms’ audit choices and quality. We find that an exogenous increase in a firm’s institutional ownership significantly enhances its auditor committee effectiveness and increases the likelihood to appoint auditors with industry expertise. Meanwhile, the firm is less likely to have accounting restatements and to receive material internal control weakness opinions from external auditors. Auditors perceive firms with such improvements to have lower audit risk hence charge lower fees. Overall, the results suggest that institutional ownership increases firms’ demand for high audit quality.

Unexpected Fees and the Prediction of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control Over Financial Reporting

We investigate whether prior year unexpected audit fees help predict new material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Predicting material weaknesses may be useful to investors and other financial statement users because these disclosures have adverse economic impacts on disclosing firms. Unexpected fees are significantly associated with material weaknesses reported under Section 404, even after controlling for Section 302 disclosures and other factors associated with internal control weaknesses. Unexpected fees are associated with company-level weaknesses but are not significantly associated with account-specific weaknesses, consistent with differences in the nature and severity of the two types of material weaknesses. Our results are consistent with unexpected audit fees containing information on unobserved audit costs and client control risks, which help predict future internal control weaknesses.

Industry contagion effects of internal control material weakness disclosures

This study examines whether there is an industry contagion effect for negative market reactions to internal control material weakness (ICMW) disclosures. From a sample of companies experiencing market share price declines to disclosures of ICMW over the years 2005–2014, results indicate that peer industry companies also experience market share price declines. We also find that the decline in share prices is related to accounting quality in that peer industry companies with higher accrual, relative to cash flow, components of earnings have larger negative market reaction compared to companies with lower accrual components of earnings. Our study contributes to the literature streams examining accounting information transfer and internal control quality.Data availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the paper.

Do material weaknesses in information technology-related internal controls affect firms' 8-K filing timeliness and compliance?

Form 8-K reporting represents a different (and relatively unknown) information environment than annual 10-K filings. The current study takes advantage of a unique, comprehensive sample of 118,863 8-K filing event observations to investigate the association between firms' Form 8-K reporting timeliness/compliance with required reporting deadlines and their internal control weaknesses. In addition, the study investigates the association between firms' 8-K reporting and their information technology (IT) related internal control weaknesses. Overall, we find strong and robust evidence of a negative relation between the likelihood of the firm reporting a material internal control weakness and the timeliness and compliance of the firms' 8-K filings. We also find distinguishing effects of weaknesses involving IT-related controls. Given recent interest in IT-related controls and far-reaching reforms with stated objectives of improving disclosure timeliness, increasing the quality of internal controls and improving the quality of accounting information, we believe our results provide insights to accounting information systems academics, regulators, accounting standard setters and other interested observers.

Internal Control Deficiencies and Municipal Borrowing Costs

“Internal controls” refer to organizational rules and procedures used to safeguard assets and to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This study examines the relationship between internal control deficiencies and municipal bond borrowing costs. The most severe form of internal control deficiencies (i.e., material weaknesses) is associated with higher borrowing costs for municipal bonds, between 10 and 18 basis points. Credit ratings mediate some of the effect of material weaknesses in internal controls but the indirect effect is relatively small. The effect of internal control deficiencies on borrowing costs was consistent in the time period before and after the financial crisis.

The Effect Of Internal Control Weakness On Investment Efficiency

This paper examines whether material weakness in internal accounting control is negatively associated with investment efficiency in Korea. Since internal accounting control weakness drives poor accounting quality and poor accounting quality exacerbates information asymmetry between firms and outside capital suppliers, managerial investment cannot be monitored effectively which result in over- and/or under- investment. Since internal accounting system is closely related to corporate governance, weak internal accounting control is often associated with poor corporate governance, and this control environment makes it hard to monitor managerial opportunistic behavior, causing abnormal investment such as over- and/or under- investment. We find that firms with internal accounting control weakness tend to make over- and under- investment. We also find the number of weakness in internal accounting control is negatively related to investment efficiency. In addition, three types of qualified review opinion - overall company level weakness, account-specific weakness and disclaimer review opinion due to scope limitation - are differentially affected to investment efficiency; disclaimer review opinion is present the most severe problem in internal accounting control that drives over- and under- investment. Our findings suggest weak internal accounting control provides poor monitoring to manager and cannot restrain managerial inefficient investment decision.

Do Municipal Bond Markups Reflect Accounting Quality?

We examine whether accounting measures of information uncertainty – specifically, the presence of internal control problems – impact municipal bond markups. Markups are the differences between the prices paid by investors and those stipulated in the underwriting agreement, and are a source of compensation to bond dealers. Markups are controversial in part because they are not transparent and individual investors comprise a large portion of the investor base. Primary findings suggest that municipal bonds issued by entities with a material weakness in internal controls exhibit larger markups. Findings are magnified under circumstances of greater information asymmetry between issuers and investors, such as for revenue bond issuances, delayed release of financial information, and retail investor trades. Moreover, bonds issued by entities with material weaknesses remain in dealer inventory significantly longer before eventual sale to investors. Our evidence is consistent with markups reflecting compensation to underwriters for the additional risk and effort involved in placing bonds issued by entities with serious accounting problems.

The effect of commercial banks' internal control weaknesses on loan loss reserves and provisions

This study examines whether the material internal control weaknesses (ICW) of commercial banks affect loan loss reserves and provisions. Bank regulators have been keen to improve the internal control procedures of banks in order to obtain accurate estimates of loan loss exposures. GAO (1991, 1994) reports that loan-loss reserves are often determined based on historical loss rates even for large loans, rather than individual loan impairment assessments, and the reported loan loss reserves include substantial amounts of supplemental reserves that are not linked to the loan loss exposure. We expect and find that banks with material ICW have, on average, higher loan loss reserves and provisions in years of ICW than those without ICW. We also find that ICW banks with successful remedial actions no longer have higher levels of loan loss reserves or provisions in the next year, while banks that report material ICW in both the current and following year continue to have significantly higher amounts of loan loss reserves and provisions in the next year.

Effect of internal controls on credit risk among listed Spanish banks

Purpose: The paper examines the effectiveness of internal control systems, explores the exposure of Spanish banks to the dangers of default as a result of internal control systems and establishes a relationship between internal controls and credit risk. Design/Methodology/Approach: Quantitative research approach is used to test hypotheses on the relationship between internal controls and credit risk among listed banks in Spain. Data from Bankscope and company websites from 2004-2013 were used. Generalized Least Squares (random effect) econometric estimation technique was used for the model. Findings: We find that internal control systems are in place but their effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. This exposes Spanish listed banks to serious default situations. There is significant effect of internal controls on credit risk especially the control environment, risk management, control activities and monitoring. The non-disclosure of material internal control weakness is a contributory factor to the ineffective internal control systems. There is however a perceived board ineffectiveness which does not augur well for effective internal control systems. Board characteristics for Spanish banks confirm the agency theory. Research Limitations and Implications: Data unavailability for certain years, variables and many inactive banks did not permit a larger sample size than expected. The use of quantitative variables lacks flexibility. Practical Implications: Bank management will find the work useful to ensure strict enforcement of internal control mechanisms and see it as both credit risk and operational risk issues. Central bank should hurry to compel banks to disclose material internal control weakness as provided in the reviewed COSO framework. Social Implications: Ineffective internal controls lead to credit risks, bank closure and loss of investments. Society suffers a lot from such losses and contagion. Disclosure of material internal control weakness is a social responsibility of banks. Originality/Value: The authors are yet to come across the use of purely quantitative variables to model the effect of elements of internal controls on credit risk. This study opens and adds a new dimension of internal controls not only to be seen as operational risk issue but also credit risk.

Does internal control over financial reporting really alleviate agency conflicts?

AbstractThis study investigates whether internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) alleviates the managerial expropriation of corporate resources. We do this by examining the potential effects of material weaknesses in internal control on the values of corporate cash holdings and capital expenditures. Our findings suggest that ICFR facilitates the scrutiny and discipline of capital markets and thus alleviates the agency problems. Our results support the premise that high financial reporting quality impairs managers’ abilities to use corporate resources in a self‐serving manner.

The effect of internal control weakness on firm valuation: Evidence from SOX Section 404 disclosures

We find that firms reporting internal control material weakness (ICW) under Section 404 of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) have 13% lower valuation than non-ICW firms based on Tobin's q. This valuation difference is mainly driven by stock underperformance of more than 13% during the year before ICW disclosure. The ICW firms that remedy the internal control weakness in the subsequent year have much better stock performance compared to those firms that fail to remedy existing ICW problems. We further show a better stock performance in the year before disclosure if a SOX 404 ICW firm has prior SOX 302 ICW disclosure more than one year earlier. All these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the equity market has incorporated the negative information associated with SOX 404 ICW reports before the actual disclosures are made.

Impact of internal control material weaknesses on executive compensation: evidence from Iran

After several financial scandals of large companies and the approval of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, management performance and responsibilities were formalised by launching and maintaining an effective internal control system. Different criteria and financial tools were applied for management performance measurements. These criteria are often used for rewarding and compensating managers. This study investigates non-financial criteria as a rewarding measure for Iranian executive compensation. Managers know that a lack of an effective internal control system can increase the difficulty of accomplishing the company mission, maintaining profitability, and minimising unexpected events. Therefore, the present paper aims at explaining the relationship between internal control material weaknesses and managers' compensation in the years 2004-2010 in an Iranian context. We examined a sample of 97 firms (679 firm-year observations) with combined regression and a pooled model. Results revealed an inverse relationship between the executive compensation and internal control material weaknesses. It can be concluded that the executive compensation is decreased by increasing the company's internal control weakness.

Mandatory Management Disclosure and Mandatory Independent Audit of Internal Controls: Evidence of Configural Information Processing by Investors

We conduct an experiment where alumni participants from a Canadian accounting and finance undergraduate program assume they are in one of four regulatory regimes (manipulated between-subjects) and make investment potential evaluations for two firms (manipulated within-subjects): a firm disclosing no material weaknesses (No-MW disclosure firm) and a firm disclosing material weaknesses (MW disclosure firm) in internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). We find evidence of configural information processing. For the No-MW disclosure firm, mandatory (versus voluntary) disclosure of ICFR material weaknesses and mandatory (versus voluntary) independent ICFR audit are substitutes in enhancing investment potential evaluations. However, for the MW disclosure firm, neither mandatory disclosure nor mandatory audit has any effect on investment potential evaluations. Supplementary experiments with undergraduate participants suggest that the pattern of configural information processing is a function of participants’ knowledge of company disclosure incentives and the assurance value of an audit, wherein undergraduates with lower levels of knowledge are less able to perceive the effects of mandatory disclosure and mandatory audit on investment potential evaluations. Our findings have implications for regulators who are concerned about balancing the costs and benefits of different regulatory mechanisms.

The Effect of Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Disclosure of Internal Control Material Weaknesses With a Field Study

the effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the disclosure of internal control material weakness with afield study

Restatement of 404 Internal Control Opinions

This paper investigates internal control restatements, i.e., companies and their auditors restating Section 404 internal control (IC) opinions from clean to adverse, after announcing financial statement restatements. We compare IC restatement companies with both companies that issue adverse IC opinions originally (initial ICMW companies) and companies that do not restate their prior period clean IC opinions after a financial statement restatement (no-IC restatement companies). We find that IC restatement companies are associated with lower likelihood of CFO and auditor turnover than the initial ICMW and no-IC restatement companies. Our cross-sectional analyses show that the low CFO and auditor turnover is mainly driven by IC restatement companies remediating ICMWs promptly, having transparent reporting practices and low earnings management incentives. Our results indicate that it is important for studies examining IC issues to distinguish between IC material weaknesses disclosed through IC restatements from those disclosed through original IC opinions.

Real Earnings Management before and after Reporting SOX 404 Material Weaknesses

SYNOPSIS The purpose of this study is to investigate whether SOX Section 404 material weaknesses manifest in real earnings management behavior. The empirical findings indicate that, compared to companies with effective internal controls, companies with existing material weaknesses in their internal controls engage in more manipulation of real activities (particularly inventory overproduction). This implies that the weak commitment by management to provide effective internal control system and high-quality financial information relates to a tendency to use real earnings management methods. Moreover, we find evidence suggesting that companies employ real earnings management (overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenses) after disclosing previous year's material weaknesses. We conjecture that the public disclosure of material weaknesses induces management to strive to mitigate the expected negative reactions of stakeholders to the disclosure by engaging in real earnings management, which is not easily detected or constrained by outsiders. Overall, this study suggests that material weaknesses in internal controls signal an environment where management is more inclined to employ real earnings management.

Measuring income tax accrual quality

We develop and validate a measure of tax accrual quality. Tax accrual quality captures variation in the extent to which the income tax accrual maps into income tax-related cash flows, with lower variation indicating a higher quality tax accrual. Low tax accrual quality arises from (1) management estimation error and (2) financial reporting standards that lead to differences between income tax expense and income tax cash flows not captured by deferred tax assets and liabilities. We validate our tax accrual quality measure by showing it is associated with firm characteristics that capture both constructs and by demonstrating it predicts future tax-related restatements and internal control material weaknesses. We illustrate the importance of our measure by showing that investors view tax expense as more informative in firms with better tax accrual quality. Future researchers can use tax accrual quality to address questions related to estimation error in the income tax account.

Managerial Ability And The Effectiveness Of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting

<p>Able managers are considered more likely to produce high quality earnings, as suggested by earlier studies in related fields. Considering a positive association between earnings quality and effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, I investigate the association between the latter, and managerial ability. As a result, I find that managerial ability is negatively associated with the existence of material weakness(es) in internal control over financial reporting. This result suggests that able managers are more likely to establish and maintain effective internal control over financial reporting, which helps them better monitor their firms' financial reporting.</p>