Matching Market Research Articles

EMM: Extended matching market based scheduling for big data platform hadoop

EMM: Extended matching market based scheduling for big data platform hadoop

Recovery processes of sustainable energy using different biomass and wastes

The biomass ‘waste-to-energy theory transforms low-value biomass within value-added outputs which include high financial potential has drawn awareness from both academicians and enterprise professionals. The biomass waste administration method involves the production, chamber, acquisition, transferal, and conveyor, processing, and distribution of all classes of trash. However, most of these methods are yet under the growing state and attempting to acquire a business partly due to several hurdles, such as proper infrastructure, feedstock, technological conditions, administration management, and communal recognition. Recently, thermochemical methods towards agricultural biomass to power conversion appear encouraging and achievable. The comparative benefit of thermochemical transformation above others is higher potency and adaptability among subsisting infrastructure tools. These advantages differ by method and final product, presenting compliance in matching market necessities. Advantages include environmental change: upon a life-cycle base, high-level biofuels generated through thermochemical transformation could decrease greenhouse gases by around 50% or higher than traditional gasoline. In this article, a comprehensive report on the advancement of the five most encouraging ways of thermochemical transformation (i.e. incineration, pyrolysis, gasification, plasma, and torrefaction), three ways of biochemical renovation (i.e. composting, bioethanol fermentation and anaerobic digestion) and landfill methane capture have been discussed. The modern evolution of several conversion technologies for biomass regeneration has also been examined and benchmarked towards global development. Additionally, the core scientific hurdles in profiting these green pieces of machinery are emphasized.

Preference evolution in different matching markets

We examine preference evolution under different matching market arrangements when preferences are influenced by parental preferences and own choices. Multiple stable equilibria arise under sufficiently random matching, but a unique equilibrium exists under sufficiently assortative matching. Mathematically, the dynamical system exhibits pitchfork bifurcation as the degree of sorting varies. Economically, using market-differential evolutionary trajectories after transitory and permanent shocks, we discuss the model’s implications on (i) the effects of marriage-market structure on female labor force participation such as in the United States and Europe after World Wars, (ii) the persistence of gender norms in developing countries with prevalent arranged marriages such as India, and (iii) the long-run impact of a short-run biased sex ratio on gender norms such as in Australia.

Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching

We consider a multilateral matching market, where two or more agents can engage in a joint venture via multilateral contracts. Possible joint ventures are exogenously given. We study four stability concepts: stability, weak setwise stability, strong group stability, and setwise stability. We characterize the structure of possible joint ventures that guarantee the efficiency and existence of outcomes satisfying these stability concepts under general preference profiles. Specifically, we show that any stable outcome, weakly setwise stable outcome, and setwise stable outcome are efficient for any preference profile if and only if the structure of possible joint ventures satisfies a condition called the acyclicity. We also show that the acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable outcome and strongly group stable outcome for any preference profile. Moreover, we show that a weaker condition called the no-crossing property is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weakly setwise stable outcome and setwise stable outcome for any preference profile.

Matching markets and cultural selection

We study the implications of two different matching mechanisms: bargaining in match (BIM) and binding agreement in the matching market (BAMM) in the context of cultural selection. Under BIM, matching across cultures is not operated through a well-regulated market, where agents’ payoffs are not determined by the market but through negotiation with their matched partners. Under BAMM, matching across cultures is operated through a formal market in which agents make binding agreements. We show that BIM results in inefficiency through cultural selection and possibly leads to assimilation, while BAMM restores efficiency and ensures cultural heterogeneity. The findings highlight the importance of regulating the matching market for multi-cultural societies.

Management of competitiveness of the enterprise in the conditions of foreign economic activity

An urgent problem in the modern economy is the management of enterprise competitiveness. The solution to this problem is the main criterion for production efficiency, the effectiveness of the management system, as well as the need to maintain and improve the economic security of a business in conditions of financial and economic instability. Today, one of the most optimal and effective means of matching market conditions and internal opportunities for developing competitiveness is the formation and dissemination of innovations in the field of marketing. As practice shows, almost all business entities successfully developing on the market are obliged to the correct policy of market assessment (competitors, consumers, assortment and price) and marketing. Another important issue is the release of products or the provision of services that meet the modern requirements of scientific and technological progress. The development and analysis of a strategic concept should activate self-organization and business adaptation in an ever-changing market environment, provide new competitive advantages and increase the level of manageability and competitiveness of the enterprise. The importance of competitiveness for the development and even the existence of an enterprise determines the relevance of the topic of the paper. The purpose of the work is to study the essence of enterprise competitiveness and determine the ways of proper management for its further development. This paper discusses the concepts and essence of competitiveness and competitiveness management of an enterprise. Also, the levels of management and ways to increase the competitiveness of the enterprise in modern economic conditions are determined.

Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm

We analyze a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game with perfect information induced by the firm-oriented deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm in a one-to-one matching market between firms and workers. Our game repeats the following procedure until every firm in the market has a partner: (i) an unmatched firm strategically decides to which worker to make an offer or to exit the market, and (ii) the worker receiving the offer strategically decides whether to tentatively accept or reject it. When no agents are strategic, the resulting outcome is the firm-optimal stable matching. We show that the worker-optimal stable matching is the unique SPE outcome when only workers are strategic. By contrast, multiple SPE outcomes may exist, possibly including unstable matchings when only firms are strategic. We show that every firm weakly prefers any SPE outcome to the worker-optimal stable matching and that the matching induced by Kesten’s efficiency-adjusted DA algorithm can be achieved as an SPE. When both workers and firms are strategic, we also show that the worker-optimal stable matching is still the unique SPE outcome.

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

In a foundational paper, Gale and Shapley (1962) introduced the deferred acceptance algorithm that achieves a stable outcome in a two-sided matching market by letting one side of the market make proposals to the other side. What happens when both sides of the market can propose? In “Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains,” Dworczak answers this question by constructing an equitable version of the Gale–Shapley algorithm in which the sequence of proposers can be arbitrary. The main result of the paper shows that the extended algorithm, equipped with so-called compensation chains, is not only guaranteed to converge in polynomial time to a stable outcome, but—in contrast to the original Gale–Shapley algorithm—achieves all stable matchings (as the sequence of proposers vary). The proof of convergence uses a novel potential function. The algorithm may find applications in settings where both stability and fairness are desirable features of the matching process.

LATE Estimators under Costly Non-compliance in Student-College Matching Markets

A growing literature exploits a feature of centralized college admission systems where students with similar admission scores in a neighborhood of a school’s admission threshold are or are not offered admission based on small quasi-random differences in admission scores. Assuming that the students at the margin of admission differ only in the treatment assignment, this literature relies on admission scores to instrument for admission or graduation. We point out that non-compliance with the centralized matching assignment typically corresponds to enrolling in one’s preferred program a year after the initial assignment, introducing significant non-compliance costs. We show that with costly non-compliance, the exclusion restriction, the key assumption of the LATE theorem, is violated, leading to biased estimates when instrumenting for graduation, i.e., for a treatment taking place after non-compliance costs are incurred. We use data from a student-college matching market in Croatia to illustrate the empirical importance of this potential source of bias and propose a method inspired by Lee (2009), which recovers the treatment effect bounds under the assumption that the costs of non-compliance are not related to the treatment assignment.

Co-simulation of transactive energy markets: A framework for market testing and evaluation

The proliferation of distributed energy resources (DER)—and the ability to intelligently control these assets—is re-defining the electrical distribution system. As the number of controllable devices rapidly expands, grid operators must determine how to incorporate these assets while delivering reliable, equitable, and affordable electricity. One possible approach is to establish distribution-level electricity markets and allow devices/aggregations of devices to participate in price establishment. While this approach purports some of the same benefits as the highly successful wholesale electricity markets (i.e., open competition, efficient price discovery, reduced communication overhead), this needs to be researched and quantified via an analysis platform that models distribution-level markets at the appropriate fidelity. Specifically, the simultaneous evaluation of market performance, DER performance, DER bidding approaches, and distribution feeder power quality requires modeling that spans multiple technical areas. Co-simulation has emerged as a powerful tool in addressing this type of problem, where outputs depend on a range of underlying areas of expertise and associated models. In this paper we describe a solution, as implemented in the HELICS co-simulation platform, where we include (1) high fidelity house models, (2) intelligent bidding agents, (3) a modular market integration/design, and (4) a distribution feeder model. We then present a case study where we test two different market designs: (1) a pseudo-wholesale double-blind auction, and (2) an asynchronous matching market. The markets are run under two DER penetration levels and economic results are compared to full retail net energy metering and avoided cost net metering scenarios that bookend current approaches to remuneration of DER participation. We show the potential for transactive markets to provide increased value for most customers relative to net metering (and all customers relative to avoided cost scenarios) while decreasing costs for the utility.

On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings

For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and q-responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of the convex hull of all connected sets of stable matchings. We also prove that a strongly stable fractional matching is represented by a lottery of stable matchings that are ordered in the common preferences of all firms.

Incentives in Matching Markets: Counting and Comparing Manipulating Agents

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often inevitable and the mechanism designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms and pick the best. Real-life examples include reforms in the entry-level medical labor market in the US (1998), school admissions systems in New York (2004), Chicago (2009-2010), Denver (2012), some cities in Ghana (2007-2008), and England (2005-2010). We provide a useful criterion for these design decisions: we count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate each mechanism under consideration during these reforms, and show that this number decreased as a result of the reforms. Our conclusion is robust to further additional strategic assumptions.

Welfare and Strategic Externalities in Matching Markets with Interviews

Welfare and Strategic Externalities in Matching Markets with Interviews

Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement

Volunteer crowdsourcing platforms, such as food recovery organizations, match volunteers with tasks which are often recurring. To ensure completion of such tasks, platforms frequently use a commitment lever known as “adoption.” Despite being effective in reducing match uncertainty, high levels of adoption reduce match availability for volunteers which in turn can suppress future engagement. We study how platforms should balance these two opposing factors. Our research is motivated by a collaboration with Food Rescue U.S.(FRUS), a volunteer-based food recovery organization active in over 33 locations across the U.S. For platforms such as FRUS, success crucially depends on efficient volunteer utilization and engagement. Consequently, effectively utilizing non-monetary levers, such as adoption, is critical. Based on our analysis of fine-grained FRUS data, we develop a model for a repeated two-sided matching market consisting of tasks (prearranged donations) and volunteers. Our model incorporates the uncertainty in match compatibility as well as the negative impact of failing to match on future engagement. We study the platform’s optimal policy for setting the adoption level to maximize the total discounted number of matches. Our analysis reveals that the optimal myopic policy is either full or no adoption. For sufficiently thick markets, we show that such a myopic policy is also optimal in the long run. In thinner markets, even though a static policy of full or no adoption can be suboptimal, we show it achieves a constant-factor approximation where the factor improves with market thickness. Using our analytical and empirical results, we revisit the current design of the FRUS platform and make location-specific policy recommendations. More broadly, our work sheds light on how other two-sided platforms can control the double-edged impacts that commitment levers have on growth and engagement.

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms

We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents’ search is guided by the platform. There are finitely many agent types, each with (potentially random) preferences drawn from known type-specific distributions. Equipped with knowledge of these distributions, the platform guides the search process by determining the meeting rate between each pair of types from the two sides. Focusing on symmetric pairwise preferences in a continuum model, we first characterize the unique stationary equilibrium that arises given a feasible set of meeting rates. We then introduce the platform’s optimal directed search problem, which involves optimizing meeting rates to maximize equilibrium social welfare. We first show that incentive issues arising from congestion and cannibalization make the design problem fairly intricate. Nonetheless, we develop an efficiently computable search design whose corresponding equilibrium achieves at least 1/4 the social welfare of the optimal design. In fact, our construction always recovers at least 1/4 the first-best social welfare, where agents’ incentives are disregarded. Our directed search design is simple and easy-to-implement, as its corresponding bipartite graph consists of disjoint stars. Furthermore, our design implies the platform can substantially limit choice and yet induce an equilibrium with an approximately optimal welfare. Finally, we show that approximation is likely the best we can hope for by establishing that the problem of designing optimal directed search is NP-hard to even approximate beyond a certain constant factor.

Twists and Turns in Arbitrator Selection: The Labor‐Management Context

Part I of this series last month established that there is a market for arbitration that exhibits some special characteristics. Among other things, it is a “matching market” where the buyers come in adversarial pairs, and it tends to be a “superstar market” subject to a type of “Matthew Effect” where success breeds success for arbitrators, while many highly qualified ones can be left behind.

A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming

Given two stable matchings in a many-to-one matching market with $ q $-responsive preferences, by manipulating the objective function of the linear program that characterizes the stable matching set, we compute the least upper bound and greatest lower bound between them.

An empirical evaluation of Chinese college admissions reforms through a natural experiment

College admissions policies affect the educational experiences and labor market outcomes for millions of students each year. In China alone, 10 million high school seniors participate in the National College Entrance Examination to compete for 7 million seats at various universities each year, making this system the largest centralized matching market in the world. The last 20 y have witnessed radical reforms in the Chinese college admissions system, with many provinces moving from a sequential (immediate acceptance) mechanism to some version of the parallel college admissions mechanism, a hybrid between the immediate and deferred acceptance mechanisms. In this study, we use a natural experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of the sequential and parallel mechanisms in motivating student college ranking strategies and providing stable matching outcomes. Using a unique dataset from a province that implemented a partial reform between 2008 and 2009, we find that students list more colleges in their rank-ordered lists, and more prestigious colleges as their top choices, after the province adopts the parallel mechanism in its tier 1 college admissions process. These listing strategies in turn lead to greater stability in matching outcomes, consistent with our theoretical prediction that the parallel mechanism is less manipulable and more stable than the sequential mechanism.

A Unified Model of Firm Dynamics with Limited Commitment and Assortative Matching

ABSTRACTWe develop a unified theory of dynamic contracting and assortative matching to explain firm dynamics. In our model, neither firms nor managers can commit to arrangements that yield lower payoffs than their outside options, which are microfounded by the equilibrium conditions in a matching market. The model endogenously generates power laws in firm size and CEO compensation, and explains differences in their right tails. We also show that our model quantitatively accounts for many salient features of the time‐series dynamics and the cross‐sectional distribution of firm investment, dividend payout, and CEO compensation.

Fuzzy Reciprocity: Contracting Limitations in Bidirectional Matching Markets

We introduce a one-to-one matching market where workers and firms exert efforts to produce benefits for their partners. We characterize how contracting limitations (due, for instance, to social institutions or technological constraints) shape the relationship between benefit production and receipt in stable allocations. In the absence of limitations, the market exhibits a sharp “ordinal reciprocity,” wherein the k-th largest benefit producing worker pairs with the k-th largest benefit producing firm. In contrast, in the present of limitations, only a “fuzzy reciprocity” obtains, wherein a worker who produces a benefit in the k-th “largest” worker benefit set pairs with a firm who produces a benefit in the k-th “largest” firm benefit set. As limitations evaporate, these sets shrink to singletons and ordinal reciprocity obtains.