In a recent paper in this journal, entitled 'Marx, Weber and the Development of Capitalism',1 Anthony Giddens considered the relationship between Marx and Weber's theoretical approaches, and stated that '. . . in order ... to assess the main points of similarity and divergence between Marx and Weber, it is necessary to reconsider the nature of historical materialism in general, and Marx's conception of the genesis, and trend of movement of capitalism in particular'.2 This reconsideration, Giddens argues, follows from the appearance of a number of previously unpublished works of Marx, which confound any view of Marx which would suggest either that his view of historical materialism was the same as that of Engels or, more importantly, that Marx himself had a rigid conception of the determinants of the historical process. In many respects, Giddens' article is not only excellent but is also a breath of reason for it is the case that much of the work of Marx and Weber can be seen as complementary rather than as antagonistic, and that, further, much of Weber's argument is directed against Marxism rather than Marx himself. Thus, Giddens is correct to give a short socio-political history of the period in which Weber wrote. Only in these terms can Weber's disagreements with Marx be fully understood. Giddens, however (as I shall have cause to note), does not similarly locate Marx's pronouncements in their historical ground. Moreover, Giddens goes on to note that the ultimate distinction between Marx and Weber is at an epistemological level rather than at the level of social theory.3 But, whilst in agreement with Giddens' concern to undermine the view of Marx and Weber as mutually exclusive theorists, one cannot help but feel that he achieves this at the expense of simplifying the positions held by both. More importantly, Giddens so frequently qualifies any comparism that, at the general level, we are rarely shown the possibility of a major disagreement between the two theorists. In short, Giddens does not do what he claims, namely to re-evaluate aspects of the theoretical conflict between Marx and Weber in the light of Marx's posthumously published writings'. All of this would be unimportant for sociologists were it not for the fact that three of these works, the 1844 Manuscripts , the Grundrisse and Theories of Surplus Value 4 have in the past been the basis for major re-evaluations of the work of Marx, and, that they are perhaps even more likely to be so in the future.5 There is, of course, no space here to engage in the thorough re-evaluation that these works deserve, so I shall limit my discussion of the weaknesses of Giddens' article to a few arguments, which concentrate on the importance of the meaning of Marx's Grundrisse , and his Theories of Surplus Value.