Martial Law Regime Research Articles

Career bureaucracy and technocracy in the Philippines: from authoritarian construction to democratic deconstruction

Set in the wider historical context of a country in severe political crisis at the beginning of the 1970s, the Career Executive Service (CES)—the managerial class in the Philippine civil service—began as an authoritarian construction within the political and institutional structure of the martial law regime. Because Philippine post-war state-building was accompanied by a weak central civil service, the CES became indispensable in promoting an entrepreneurial administrative culture which emphasized quality of innovativeness or risk-taking and senior-level teamwork within a bureaucracy that was professionally subservient to a technocratic elite, apart from providing the regime with a progressive civilian image. Insulated from power politics, the CES nevertheless became a closed merit-based system co-existing with a clientelist structure inhabited by rent-seeking coalitions outside it. Under the restored nominal democratic system in 1986, the CES underwent deconstruction, but still preserved the boundary bet...

Women Representation in Pakistani Legislatures

Women representation in decision-making and law-making is considered as a vital step in women empowerment. The Martial Law regime of General Pervez Musharraf1 brought in a drastic change in the composition of Pakistani legislatures at both central and provincial levels and has increased 17 per cent of reserved seats for women in 2002. However, this was much less than the 33 per cent stated in Strategic Objective G-2 in the plan. This step was deemed as a landmark in materialising the long-cherished dream of empowering Pakistani women. The purpose of this study is to assess the discourse on women’s political empowerment and their level of participation in mainstream politics by analysing the gender gaps in the Election Laws—General Elections of 2002, 2008 and 2013. Women are now present in all the legislative assemblies of Pakistan from more than a decade. How far this change has remained useful in addressing and solving the problems faced by Pakistani women? Furthermore, how these women legislators have performed on specific women-related issues or is this step just an extension of strengthening the dominant families in Pakistani politics? The issue of quota discourses in the Parliament is also discussed.

Reforming Intelligence: Identity and Security in Taiwan

Abstract: The intelligence and security services of the Republic of China on Taiwan have been transformed by democratization and Taiwanization. After decades as “political police” answering to the Nationalist Party, in the 1980s they began to focus on threats to the state, ending the use of coercion, and accepting external supervision. Like all aspects of political change on Taiwan, however, institutional reform of these agencies, particularly the National Security Bureau, became caught up in the island’s unresolved dilemmas of national identity and its precarious relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Such conflicts threaten to undermine the effectiveness of these agencies.

Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire

Research Article| June 01 1997 Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire Donald M. Seekins Donald M. Seekins Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1997) 37 (6): 525–539. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645527 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Donald M. Seekins; Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire. Asian Survey 1 June 1997; 37 (6): 525–539. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2645527 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1997 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Street Theatre in Pakistani Punjab: The Case of Ajoka, Lok Rehas, and the Woman Question

The Parallel Movement, or Street Theatre as it is loosely called, in province of Punjab, Pakistan, emerged during repressive era of General Zia-ul-Haque's Martial Law regime (1979-1989).' This form of theatre raises several questions about nature of relationship between Pakistani Islamic state and society. The most pertinent of these for my project is question of state's coercive relationship with its female citizenry. Related to this is issue of male-female relationships in society and how these relationships are complicated by class stratifications that inevitably affect way gendered politics (and policies) actually get played out. There is also increasingly vexed issue of national versus ethnic identity-a conflict which is reflected through language politics of theatre groups; linguistic choices reveal groups' conflicting and often self-contradictory ideological stands on this question. In choosing to focus on such an area of inquiry for a (so-called) postcolonial project, I am seeking to re-site question Who decolonizes? that Gayatri Spivak insists we confront in her afterward to Imaginary Maps (1995). This question forces us to reevaluate the task of post-colonial, which, as Spivak sees it-and I agree-ought to involve a rigorous moving away from conflating Eurocentric migrancy with post-coloniality (Spivak 1995:203). In words, let us, as postcolonial critics and scholars, turn our attention to other sites of enunciation, as Walter Mignolo has urged (1993:120). This elsewhere is really a turning inward toward postcolonial nationstate in order to cast a critical gaze at a decolonizing process that has simultaneously constructed a normative constitutional subject of new nation (Spivak 1995:2o3): in Pakistan's case, middle class, urban and male, or upper class, feudal and male. Within last decade or so, Ajoka (the major Parallel group in Pakistan) as well as its regional spin-offs, notably

Spiritual Progress in Carolingian Saxony: A Case from Ninth-Century Corvey

In view of the centrality of the evangelical impulse in the New Testament, it is not surprising that the of the Church, and even the as mission should arise as a topic of discussion among Christians. (1) But during the twentieth century and especially since 1945, the history of the expansion of the Church has attracted the interest of academic historians both inside and outside the Church, and a substantial literature on the history of Christian missions has emerged. Whether the story is presented in optimistic tones as the growth of the Church from Antiquity to the present, or as a more complex process of expansion and resistance at various times in the past, history has become an exceptionally productive field of inquiry. (2) While much attention has been focused on Christianity in Asia, Asia, and the New World in the modern age, the period before 1500 has not been ignored. The early medieval West presents exceptional opportunities to examine some of the diverse forms that Christianization can take. (3) Between the fall of the western provinces of the Roman Empire in the fifth century and the emergence of Frankish hegemony under the Carolinians in the eighth, evangelical monks and priests could count on very little in the way of logistic or political support from a central authority. Missionaries were faced with the task of translating the concerns of a universal faith into the language and thought world of gentile cultures with no written tradition of their own, and in the midst of social conditions quite different from those of the late antique Mediterranean. The circumstances of each varied according to the historical and cultural background of the people being evangelized. As a result early medieval Christianization in western and northern Europe had an episodic character, and recent studies have highlighted the differences between St. Augustine's rudes and the rustici of Gregory of Tours, and between Martin of Braga's simple people and the Germanic pagans whom Boniface encountered. (4) Among these early medieval episodes, the subjugation and forced conversion of Saxony in the later eighth and early ninth century has been a subject of enduring interest, in part because the affair seems to epitomize the chief strengths and the weaknesses of the order forged by the Carolinians. Contemporaries we aware of the remarkable character of recent events in Saxony. Writing sometime between 817 and 825/826, Einhard described Charlemagne's wars as thirty-three years of sporadic fighting, broken agreements, and sharp reprisals. (5) His depiction of the Saxons is not flattering: naturally ferocious and given to demon worship, they violated divine and human law at will. Their treacherous instability contrasts with Charlemagne's magnanimity and constancy of purpose in the Face of changing fortune. (6) The Franks eventually succeeded on the battlefield and then subdued the Saxons through a regime of martial law and a policy of selective deportation and resettlement. (7) Lasting peace came only in 804 and on condition that the Saxons give up the worship of demons, relinquish their ancestral ceremonies, and accept the sacraments of the Christian faith. Only then, united with the Franks, we the Saxons to become one people with them. (8) The Vita Karoli was well known at Carolinian and Ottonian Corvey, the Benedictine house located near Hoxter northeast of Paderborn on the Weser and established during the reign of Louis the Pious. (9) Authors of the house often borrowed from the Vita Karoli, paying special attention to the passages concerning Charlemagne's actions in Saxony. (10) Einhard's remark about religion as a bond uniting the two peoples may have interested the monks of Corvey because the how and why of Frankish-Saxon unity were linked to their conception of themselves as members of the Church and as subjects of a Frankish and later Saxon political hegemony. They readily accepted the broad concept of a Christian populus as descriptive of the new unity of faith and common orientation of the two peoples. …

The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties.

If Abraham Lincoln was known as the Great Emancipator, he was also the only president to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, Lincoln's record on the Constitution and individual rights has fueled a century of debate, from charges that Democrats were singled out for harrassment to Gore Vidal's depiction of Lincoln as an absolute dictator. Now, in The Fate of Liberty, one of America's leading authorities on Lincoln wades straight into this controversy, showing just who was jailed and why, even as he explores the whole range of Lincoln's constitutional policies. Mark Neely depicts Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus as a well-intentioned attempt to deal with a floodtide of unforeseen events: the threat to Washington as Maryland flirted with secession, distintegrating public order in the border states, corruption among military contractors, the occupation of hostile Confederate territory, contraband trade with the South, and the outcry against the first draft in U.S. history. Drawing upon letters from prisoners, records of military courts and federal prisons, memoirs, and federal archives, he paints a vivid picture of how Lincoln responded to these problems, how his policies were actually executed, and the virulent political debates that followed. Lincoln emerges from this account with this legendary statesmanship intact--mindful of political realities and prone to temper the sentences of military courts, concerned not with persecuting his opponents but with prosecuting the war efficiently. In addition, Neely explores the abuses of power under the regime of martial law: the routine torture of suspected deserters, widespread antisemitism among Union generals and officials, the common practice of seizing civilian hostages. He finds that though the system of military justice was flawed, it suffered less from merciless zeal, or political partisanship, than from inefficiency and the friction and complexities of modern war. Drawing on a deep understanding of this unique period, Neely takes a comprehensive look at the issues of civil liberties during Lincoln's administration, placing them firmly in the political context of the time. Written with keen insight and an intimate grasp of the original sources, The Fate of Liberty offers a vivid picture of the crises and chaos of a nation at war with itself, changing our understanding of this president and his most controversial policies.

Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Civil-Military Relations and Decision-Making

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and its allies hope that the nuclear arms race, with its attendant risks of accident, terrorism, and environmental pollution, will be reversed and ultimately eliminated. However, the developed nations are seriously concerned about a different kind of proliferation in South Asia: the possibility of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. The U.S. and its allies argue that the deeply ingrained, traditional hostility between India and Pakistan accentuates the dangers inherent in a South Asian nuclear proliferation. In addition, they worry about the inadequacy of safeguards against accidents, the lack of circumspect behavior in decision-making, and whether command and control arrangements are sufficient to prevent a possible nuclear conflagration because of misperception, miscalculation, or both. In India, civilian control over the production and deployment of nuclear weapons appears absolute. Although it is inconceivable that the military will not have a role in integrating nuclear weapons into the overall war fighting strategy, the extent of its involvement in the design and deployment of nuclear weapons is not known. In Pakistan, however, the military has had a substantial role in politics. In 1958 the martial law regime under Ayub Khan sought and obtained the full cooperation of the bureaucracy, which benefited from the military rule. Again in 1970, Yahya Khan was chiefly guided by military advisers, although he had some civilian members in his cabinet. Although civilians were the initiators of the nuclear program, the Pakistan

Pakistan: Hope Amidst Turmoil

Pakistan:Hope Amidst Turmoil Rasul Bakhsh Rais (bio) After enduring a spell of military rule that lasted from 1977 to 1988 under the late General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan has in recent years been making substantial progress toward a reasonably representative form of democracy. Its march down this road, however, has often run into minefields that the military regime laid down in a series of amendments to the Constitution of 1973. Since the latter half of 1979, General Zia had been experimenting with a variety of quasi-democratic modifications of his basically authoritarian regime: staging "partyless" elections, reintroducing a controlled form of civilian government, holding a referendum on his "Islamization" program, and even declaring the official termination of martial law at the end of 1985. The general's death in a mysterious plane crash on 17 August 1988 came less than three months after he had used his power as president to dismiss his own handpicked civilian prime minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, and dissolve the 237-member National Assembly, the lower house of Pakistan's bicameral Federal Legislature, with a promise of "free, fair, and independent" elections in November. Twice since Zia's death—first in 1990 and then again in 1993—his successor as president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, has used the same authority to bring down a government that enjoyed the support of parliament and to force new legislative elections. In a departure from past practice, the army did not react to the ensuing uncertainty by stepping in to assume power. Instead, it remained content on both occasions to act as a major force behind the scenes, lending quiet support to presidential actions. To understand what is going on in Pakistan today, one must realize [End Page 132] that the problems of transition which the country has been experiencing since 1988 flow as much from the legacy of recent military rule as they do from feudal political traditions and the deficiencies of a civil society that remains seriously underdeveloped. As a rule, the growth of a democratic order depends on the presence of freely competing political parties, the recognized supremacy of representative institutions, the protection of basic civil rights and liberties, and the observance of constitutional norms. Clearly, none of these can flourish under a martial-law regime with little or no popular legitimacy. Indeed, such regimes usually find it necessary to undermine systematically the development of such practices and institutions, often by suspending, distorting, or abrogating constitutions and by suborning or oppressing democratic movements and leaders. The National Assembly dissolutions of recent years have greatly reinforced the sense that the democratic transition remains highly tenuous and sadly incomplete. The Pakistani president—who holds an office that is conceived of as largely honorary in most other parliamentary forms of government—enjoys the authority to dismiss premiers and send legislators back to the hustings as a result of constitutional amendments that General Zia pushed through in the autumn of 1985, just before the official end of martial law. To a large extent, it is the asymmetry of power between the president and the prime minister that makes the system dysfunctional; this asymmetry is the direct legacy of Zia's authoritarian rule. In 1947, when the British accepted the partitioning of the subcontinent prefatory to their own withdrawal, Pakistan boasted a level of institutional development similar to India's, and its founders were no less committed to secular democracy and the rule of law than their Indian counterparts. Nevertheless, the new state (carved out of the heavily Muslim but noncontiguous northwest and northeast corners of the old British Raj) suffered a precipitous slide into military-bureaucratic authoritarianism. The country's failure to consolidate a democratic political process was due more to domestic factors than to its precarious security situation. At a minimum, working parliamentary democracy needed disciplined parties, a federal constitution, and a measure of consensus on sensitive issues concerning representation and provincial autonomy. Unfortunately, the Muslim League—the party that led the struggle for the creation of Pakistan—disintegrated into rival factions. Disputes over how to divide power between the central government and the provinces delayed the drafting and adoption of a constitution for the new republic. These and...

Islamization of Economy in Pakistan (1977-88): An Essay on the Relationship between Religion and Economics

The Martial Law regime which came into power in Pakistan on July 5, 1977 after a political crisis undertook a comprehensive scheme of Islamizing the political, legal, economic and educational areas of the Pakistani society. Ordinances and Laws on Zakat (poor-due), 'Ushr (tithe), elimination of riba (interest/ usury), profit and loss scheme, mudaraba (profit-sharing), and twelve modes of Islamic finance, were promulgated with the avowed aim of transforming the Pakistani economy into an Islamic economic system. In this article we shall confine ourselves to an examination of the Islamization of the economy only; that is, the article shall focus on the relationship between religion and economics in general, and Islam and economics in particular. Since the times of Adam Smith (1720-1790), and especially after the works of Lionel Robbins (1898-1984) the modern economy is generally taken by the economists as an autonomous economic system and modern economics, an important branch of the social sciences, has gradually become independent from religion. In both capitalist and socialist versions, economics is generally defined as the "study of the social laws governing production and distribution of the material means of satisfying human needs" [Lange (1963)].

Rise and Fall of Provincial Elites in the Philippines: Nueva Ecija from the 1880s to the Present Day

The position of local and provincial elites in the Philippines has changed in character. At the beginning of the century the landed elite was relatively autonomous, keeping the state weak and using it to reinforce its position. Since the 1950s a new elite of mercantile entrepreneurs has emerged, dependent on state credit and political protection. Under the martial law regime in the 1970s the state ceased to be an extension of regional elites and acquired the features of a separate level of organization. The transition to the Aquino administration has led to some degree of decentralization. However, provincial politicians are more than ever interested in finding their slot in the central state apparatus.

Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics

The 1985 partyless elections and the civilianization of the martial law regime of the late President Zia ul-Haq gave rise to optimism that democracy would be restored in Pakistan in a gradual fashion. Many thought that Zia would allow the transitional arrangements to grow into fuller and wider democratic participation, which could have provided him an honorable way out of the political quagmire. With hindsight we might conclude that the political system that Zia preferred and the regime he cultivated under the prime ministership of Mohammad Khan Junejo were expected to function around the office and personality of Zia himself. Soon after consolidating their position in the National Assembly and Senate, Junejo and a majority of his colleagues in the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) began to act quite independently, contrary to Zia's expectations. In temperament and political style, Junejo and Zia were distinctly different; their personal ambitions and perceptions of their respective roles in the new political arrangements widely diverged. The fundamental problem they confronted was how to share power and how to mediate their conflicts of interest. Although the amended 1973 constitution provided a legal basis for the orderly working of the power-sharing arrangements, the anomaly of the president retaining the office of chief of the army staff (COAS) and his strong connections with powerful lobbies and political groups constrained free functioning of the democratic institutions and maintained a threat against deviation from his norms. On the other hand, as Junejo built his image as the one who was instrumental in lifting martial law, he began to assert his constitutional powers and prerogatives.

Parliament, Parties, Polls and Islam

The ideological and political history of Pakistan is marked by acontinuing debate on the nature of the Islamic political system and itsconcrete manifestation in the constitutional framework of the state.Even the Objectives Resolution which was adopted in 1949 and washailed by the religious political groups as a “landmark” in the history ofIslamic constitutional thought could not bring about a broad consensusamong the politically relevant sectors of society. The three subsequentconstitutions adopted in 1956,1962, and 1973 have also failed to resolvethe controversies over the nature, characteristics, functions, andstructure of an Islamic state.The problem assumed new significance after the present martial lawregime of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq initiated the process ofIslamization, postponed the scheduled general elections and extended itstenure for an indefinite period. These moves were preceded by PresidentZia-ul-Haq-s expressing his aversion for the Western democratic systemand its institutions (i.e., parliament, parties, elections, etc.). He felt thatthere was no scope for such divisive institutions in an Islamic polity andthat he would introduce an alternative political system based on trulyIslamic principles. He gave no details of what he actually meant by a“true Islamic polity”, but it was apparent from his statements andactions that this “true Islamic polity” was anything but what is generallyrecognized as democratic. This polity, moreover, was not necessarilyfounded on the principle of majority rule. It was quite possible-andindeed legitimabin this system for an individual or a group tocontinue ruling the country against the wishes of the majority of thepeople. President Zia asserted that according to Islam only “rightdecisions” were to be respected and, if the majority were“misguided”, itsverdict would have to be ignored. Addressing a public meeting inIslamabad in 1983, for example, President Zia said: ...

Deterring Dissent in Education

‘Real scholars have been silenced and pseudo-scholars and sycophants have been promoted. It seems that the forces of darkness and obscurantism have succeeded in arresting the processes of scientific research.’ Pakistan under General Zia-ul Haq has had a regime of Martial Law since July 1977. According to a 1984 report on a mission to Pakistan published by the Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights, a climate of insecurity and arbitrariness has existed in the country since that date. It is characterised by the facility with which the Martial Law authorities may arrest whomever they wish, whenever they wish, and hold them for indefinite periods, as often as they choose; the absence of any scope for appeal against such decisions; and the absence of judicial surveillance of any kind whatsoever. In the following three articles, Pakistani writers describe the effects which Martial Law and the Islamic Law (Sharia) have had on higher education, the press and cultural life. Maleeha Lodhi teaches Politics at the London School of Economics and also works as a journalist with South magazine. The writer on Pakistan's press is a senior journalist who wishes to remain anonymous. And Farhad is the pseudonym of a Pakistani writer and journalist. For other articles on Pakistan see John Melville Williams ‘The Press in Pakistan’ (Index 5/1978), Shahid Nadeem ‘Imprisoned In Pakistan’ (Index 5/1979), Feroz Ahmed ‘Pakistan Curbs the Press’ (Index 4/1980), and Behroze Gandhy ‘Jamil Dehlavi Interviewed (Index 4/1981); and, of course, the Index Index section generally.

Bangladesh in 1984: A Year of Protracted Turmoil

By the standards of trial and tribulation set elsewhere in South Asia and the world at large during 1984, events in Bangladesh could perhaps claim only passing attention. The seemingly endless minisaga of efforts to return the country to electoral rule, in many ways a replay of its history over the past decade, paled beside the drama of India's Punjab and the Gandhi assassination. And compared to the heartrending images of famine in Ethiopia flashed electronically around the globe, who knew or even cared that Bangladesh was experiencing its worst floods in ten years? In these respects it seemed to be much the same old story in Bangladesh, by now long bereft of its capacity to draw the eyes of the world. At the onset of 1984 the martial law regime of Lt. General Hussain Muhammed Ershad, who had proclaimed himself president of Bangladesh in December, was within three months of completing its year. His government could claim reasonable progress toward meeting many of the objectives it had set for itself soon after its inception. Not the least of these were concrete steps taken toward administrative and judicial decentralization, in which the time-honored second tier of local government, the thana, was upgraded to the status of upazilla, or subdistrict, endowed with enhanced administrative functions and becoming the primary locus of the civil and judicial court system. Between November 1983 and February 1984, 460 thanas were designated as upazillas and the court system at that level had begun to operate. Consistent with the projected reorganization plan, sixty-four new administrative districts had been created out of the old subdivisional unit of administration. A key goal of the Ershad regime had been the disinvestment of government-owned industries, and by March 1984 it was asserted that thirty-three jute mills, twenty-five textile mills, and

India and Pakistan: Differing Security Perceptions

The two fragments into which Britain, before its withdrawal from the subcontinent, had split the Indian Empire, carried with them a legacy of mutual distrust. This could not but influence the course of subsequent events in the sub-continent. So have the attitudes of the erstwhile colonial and other powers towards the new states in the light of their respective regional interests. In the comparatively short period of thirty-seven years, short in the life of nations, the two states have been involved in hostilities on three occasions, not counting Pakistan's attack on India in the Kutch sector in April 1965. Time no doubt is a great healer but it takes same time for deep wounds to heal. The healing process would be aided and succeed only if the governments of both countries are convinced that not mutual hostility but at least co-existence, if not mutual amity, is good for both countries and strive to create conditions for peaceful co-existence. If only one side is anxious to maintain peace and the other wishes to maintain tension, the latter will prevail. Public opinion in the two countries, if mobilised far promoting coexistence rather than confrontation, would help. In democratic countries, at least in theory, public opinion is a force to reckon with and no government can for long afford to disregard public opinion. The media, again in theory, reflects public opinion and serves to consolidate and strengthen it, in the process compelling the government of the day to consider carefully the issues raised. In practice, however, governments, even in “liberal” democracies can influence prominent segments of the media to project issues in the manner desired by the former, i.e., the media can and regrettably are being used to misinform the public at home and abroad- Even so, in democracies, ultimately, governmental efforts not withstanding, at least some sections of the media discover facts and fearlessly expose governments' earlier efforts to misinform the public. This is the inherent strength of democracies. In dictatorships this is diffcult. But there are dictatorships and dictatorships! In Pakistan, for example, by all accounts the government of General Zia ul Haq, in its own way, has managed to secure tolerance if not the enthusiastic support of a majority of urban middle and lower middle classes for the martial law regime. A. section—even a large section—of politically conscious urban and rural groups are totally unreconciled to rule by generals for a number of reasons. Another section of the same strata of Pakistani society again for its own reasons, supports the regime. Thus General Zia is secure, provided he continues, with the dexterity he has so amply demonstrated during eight eventful years, to steer his country on a “least risk” course, and there is a good chance of preserving peace, precarious though it may be, in the sub-continent.

Economic Crisis in the Philippines

The assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., on August 21, 1983, triggered the severest political and economic crisis in the history of the Philippine Republic. The immediate reaction was to demand the resignation of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Rallies were held, marches undertaken, and speeches made. The immense size of the protests, particularly in Metro Manila, gave witness to the widespread disenchantment with the regime. Perhaps most surprising was the participation by the business community in Makati, the financial and corporate center of the country. Although individual business people had begun to speak out, at times vociferously, against the economic policies of the regime, most of the economically powerful had gone along with Marcos. For the first few years of the martial law regime business had benefited and there was little reason to complain. Later when the economy turned down and the bailouts of Marcos' cronies became excessive, business people generally kept their complaints to themselves or expressed them in subdued terms. Beyond the obvious revulsion at what was almost universally believed to be a Marcos administration initiated assassination, there are at least two reasons why Makati capitalists and executives perceived the need to become actively involved in the anti-Marcos movement. First, it was important that they be able to dominate the above ground, political opposition to the regime. Their involvement in the recent parliamentary elections demonstrates this point. Second, it became increasingly obvi-

The Philippine Court of Agrarian Relations in the Context of Martial Law

Research Article| June 01 1980 The Philippine Court of Agrarian Relations in the Context of Martial Law G. Sidney Silliman G. Sidney Silliman Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1951) 20 (6): 634–647. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643677 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation G. Sidney Silliman; The Philippine Court of Agrarian Relations in the Context of Martial Law. Far Eastern Survey 21 March 1951; 20 (6): 634–647. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2643677 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1980 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the “Eradication of Feudalism” in Pakistan

Early in his tenure in office, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced that his agrarian reforms would affect the lives of the common people of Pakistan more than any other measure contemplated by his avowedly socialist and populist regime. Almost seven years later, the martial law regime of Zia-ul-Haq issued a White Paper on the performance of Bhutto's government (which Zia ended with a coup in July of 1977), charging that the land reforms were in practice yet another example of that Government's cynical posturing, sinister manipulation, favoritism and victimization, corruption and abuse of power. The irony is that a centerpiece of Bhutto's program for the “salvation” of Pakistan should appear in a White Paper which attempted to add legitimacy to the execution of the popular ex-Prime Minister. A further irony is that Bhutto himself came from a background which could only be called “feudal” in the terms of Pakistani political discourse, and surrounded himself politically with scions of similar families. What was meant by Bhutto's pledge to eradicate feudalism via land reform and what are we to make of it?

Emergency Politics in the Philippines

So MUCH HAS been written recently on various aspects of the martial law regime in the Philippines that it is tempting to respond to an assignment to assess the general features of the regime in relation to development by providing an annotated bibliography.' I want to try something slightly different: to summarize some of the information and insights we now have-five years after the proclamation of martial law-about the reasons martial law was declared, the goals and methods of the new regime, and the results of its efforts.