Pakistan in 1988: From Command to Conciliation Politics

Abstract

The 1985 partyless elections and the civilianization of the martial law regime of the late President Zia ul-Haq gave rise to optimism that democracy would be restored in Pakistan in a gradual fashion. Many thought that Zia would allow the transitional arrangements to grow into fuller and wider democratic participation, which could have provided him an honorable way out of the political quagmire. With hindsight we might conclude that the political system that Zia preferred and the regime he cultivated under the prime ministership of Mohammad Khan Junejo were expected to function around the office and personality of Zia himself. Soon after consolidating their position in the National Assembly and Senate, Junejo and a majority of his colleagues in the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) began to act quite independently, contrary to Zia's expectations. In temperament and political style, Junejo and Zia were distinctly different; their personal ambitions and perceptions of their respective roles in the new political arrangements widely diverged. The fundamental problem they confronted was how to share power and how to mediate their conflicts of interest. Although the amended 1973 constitution provided a legal basis for the orderly working of the power-sharing arrangements, the anomaly of the president retaining the office of chief of the army staff (COAS) and his strong connections with powerful lobbies and political groups constrained free functioning of the democratic institutions and maintained a threat against deviation from his norms. On the other hand, as Junejo built his image as the one who was instrumental in lifting martial law, he began to assert his constitutional powers and prerogatives.