Martial Law Administration Research Articles

Evaluation of government performance from foreign currency exchange market : A comparison of martial law administrator and civilian government through factor copula statistical model

This paper evaluates government’s performance of foreign exchange market in the country. We have a way to deal with the issue in various manners. A reverse strategy for appraisal, with the usage of factor copula demonstrating method was utilized in this exploration to consider the confidence association of money exchange rates as subordinate features through which the display of civilian government and martial law administrator in the country was assessed. Through guideline, part investigation, basic elements for money trade rates were acquired. Results reveal that adapted on the normal factor, the relationship between the chose monetary forms is sensibly lopsided in both the tenures, and situation on essential issue Clayton copula displaying speculation is more fitting for martial law Administrator. Nonetheless, we notice high left end dependence between foreign cash returns through political government terms, and circumstance on essential aspect Gumbel copula representative supposition that is more material, which shows that martial law director performed outclass then civilian government in the country.

Final Phase of Mir Bezanjo’s political struggle (Federalism v/s Regionalism)

The replacement of Bhutto Government by Zia’s Martial law brought many changes in the administrative and political system of Pakistan. Mir Bezanjo was released on bail from Hyderabad Conspiracy case, he applied on 6th December 1977. There was another breakthrough in the Hyderabad conspiracy case when on 1st January 1978 General Zia-ul-Haq, the chief Martial Law Administrator dis abandoned the Hyderabad. Tribunal and ordered to release all the accused. He also declared an amnesty for those who had left their homes during the disturbances in Balochistan. These developments were warmly appreciated in Balochistan Bezanjo and his old colleagues Khair Bakhsh Marri was also released on 4th January, 1978 from Hyderabad Jail. He stayed for quit a sometime in Quetta Balochistan and then on 11th November 1978 left for England. Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal also flew to England in the middle of 1979. Thus the Political scene of Balochistan was a bit changed, at least Stagnation, if not peace, Could be seen in the politics of Balochistan.

Health implications of torture in Pakistan.

The demand for a separate country for the Indian muslims resulted in the creation of Pakistan in 1947 by dividing British India. The migration of millions of people across the newly created borders of India and Pakistan resulted in the uprooting of innumerable communities and massive intercommunal massacres. This newly created country with a highly traumatised population was easily taken over by a regime which had no sympathy with the people. The ruling junta governed the country through an amalgamation of religion and politics. The human rights situation in Pakistan has had a low profile ever since the foundation of the country. The police department established during the colonial period, on the basis of the Police Act 1861, continued in the same form and the legacy of torture inherited from the past became established in the new state of Pakistan as well. A number of further statutes were passed which justified torture and preventive detention. Torture remained a normal part of interrogation and punishment for any activity which was deemed undesirable by the ruling junta. The first constitution of Pakistan was framed in 1956. It did not improve the situation. The government continued to possess extensive arbitrary powers of arrest and detention without trial. In October 1958 the constitution was superseded by the imposition of martial law in the country. Martial law regulations and orders were issued to govern the country. Military courts and tribunals were established with unlimited powers to arrest and try political activists. In 1962 Ayub Khan, the Chief Martial Law Administrator enforced a new constitution, which helped him to become president of the country. This constitution also was repressive in character. Resentment against this constitution developed into political agitation in 1968. To control the situation, a second series of martial laws were imposed in March 1969. The commander-in-chief of the army, General Yahya Khan, assumed power both as Chief Martial Law Administrator and as President. The Martial Law Administration started a military action in the east wing of the country aimed at suppressing the right of self-determination of the people there. The result was separation of the east wing of the country to become Bangladesh. This situation also resulted in the replacement of General Yahya Khan by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was the majority party leader from West Pakistan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto acted as a Civilian Martial Law Administrator till the enforcement of a new constitution which also failed to improve the human rights situation in Pakistan. Police atrocities, torture and repression of political opponents continued. In July 1977 another series of martial laws were imposed on the country by the Army Chief, General Zia-ul-Haq. This was the longest-lasting and the most ruthless of the states of martial law in Pakistan. Thousands of people were tried and punished by the military courts. Punishments included the death sentence, imprisonment, life imprisonment, flogging, confiscation of property and unlimited fines. During this period rapid growth and further institutional isation of torture occurred in Pakistan. In the name of religion, the state tried to provide a moral basis for torture.

Pakistan in 1982: Holding On

Research Article| February 01 1983 Pakistan in 1982: Holding On Marvin G. Weinbaum, Marvin G. Weinbaum Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Stephen P. Cohen Stephen P. Cohen Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1954) 23 (2): 123–132. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644343 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Marvin G. Weinbaum, Stephen P. Cohen; Pakistan in 1982: Holding On. Far Eastern Survey 1 February 1954; 23 (2): 123–132. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2644343 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1983 Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Pakistan 1978: At the Brink Again?

EVENTS IN PAKISTAN in 1978 were marked by a sense of suspended animation. Everything seems to depend on what happens in trial of ex-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for conspiracy in murder of Mohammad Ahmed Khan in 1974. The case, brought by victim's son, Ahmed Raza Khan Kasuri, was in final stages of appeal before Supreme Court in December. Bhutto himself appeared before Court, to say that the future of depended on his acquittal. The trial formed a backdrop to events of entire year, and was not far from anyone's thoughts in political discussion. By end of year Court had not announced a time for its verdict, but observers in Pakistan contend that any verdict at all means trouble. If government decides to execute Bhutto, civil strife is sure; if it is decided not to kill him, strife seems less sure but still probable. In private discussion people say that military regime should simply have shot him at outset; then he would just be another rascal in history, as one friend put it. (Weighed against convenience would have been introduction of a new element in Pakistani politics, execution of one's opponents.) A major reason for military government's involvement of civilian elements seems to be a desire to have them share responsibility-or even shoulder it-for whatever is done, since it will be government's decision ultimately: even if courts decide on a death sentence, clemency is possible. Although Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Zia ul Haq is quoted as saying that if Court convicts him, I'll hang blighter, a common joke in Pakistan says that CMLA stands for Cancel My Last Announcement-and with reason. But if there is clemency, what to

Nationalizing Education in Pakistan: Teachers' Associations and the People's Party

JN THE WAKE of Pakistan's dismemberment in December I97I, ZulfiIqar Ali Bhutto, chairman of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was called to head the martial law administration, restore confidence, and lead the injured nation back to civilian and parliamentary rule. With a mandate for his party in the I970 election, Bhutto drove the Islamabad administration feverishly to prepare sweeping policy reforms designed to appeal to the lower and middle classes and to consolidate a popular base. Among the first such measures was the new Education Policy, announced by Bhutto (then President) on March I2, I972.' The education proposals were nationalist in content, developmental in design and radical in spirit. Infused with ambitious egalitarian rhetoric, they promised to bring about a wholesale restructuring of values, local participation in educational affairs, equal access to education, and eradication of illiteracy. However laudable, these objectives were more visionary than realistic under Pakistan's social and economic conditions. But there was one practical measure-that of nationalizing private educational institutions-that could be enacted promptly so as to convey the resolve of the new government to use

Regional Development under the New Society in the Philippines

The main issue of development facing large Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines is the uplifting of their hinterlands, where the majority of their populations live. Unfortunately, with the exception of Malaysia, where the issue is obviously a central political consideration, their respective governing ?lite seems to be only half-heartedly concerned with it, hoping that whatever development takes place in certain areas will spill over to the other regions. This easygoing attitude was certainly characteristic of Filipino leaders before the advent of the New Society in September 1972. The provinces far from Manila were regarded mainly as sources of export commodities such as sugar, pineapple, timber, copper, and gold. To help Manila high society enjoy the benefits derived from these resources, the provinces also provided cheap industrial, entertainment, and domestic labour. Of course, substantial sums of money were supposed to be redistributed each year to the provinces, but most of the funds inevitably went for the enrichment of congressmen and senators through whom they were channelled. The provinces, consequently, were reduced to being arenas for deadly squabbling among warlord families and, in some cases, nests of desperate insurgencies. Rural emigrants who managed to drift into Manila and one or two other large cities found themselves in slums oftentimes dramatically squeezed between, and overshadowed by, luxurious hotels and flashy night-clubs. The nub of the problem was that the main pillars of the Philippine economy had very little to do with the overwhelming majority of the Filipino people. Logging and mining only involved a negligible number of people, while the feudahstic paternalism of sugar and pineapple production only encour?ged the sharing of poverty among many. Even rice growing, which occupied so many, only benefited very few because of widespread tenancy. Consequently, it was not surprising that Manila, the political and social hub of the country, was also overwhelmingly domi nant economically. More than 70% of the capital and industrial capacity of the country was actually concentrated in the greater Manila area. The imposition of martial law was primarily justified as a necessary means of dealing with the aggravated symptoms of this basic Manila-hinterland cleavage. A rising tide of insurgency in Luzon in the north and Mindanao in the south began to seep into Manila itself, accompanying the mounting tempo of deadly infighting among the factions of the political ?lite in the capital and the provincial centres. With the suspension of Congress and the arrest and silencing of political opponents, the martial law administration was soon able to quench political squabbling. More vigorous military operations also quickly suppressed the rebellions in Luzon, although, perhaps, heightening and aggravating the insurrection in the south. te a bonus, the no-nonsense image of the government produced a mixture of genuine

Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration

Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration

Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration, The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings, 1963–65 and Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy

Journal Article Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration, The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings, 1963–65 and Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy Get access Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration. By Herbert Feldman. London, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca: Oxford University Press. 1967. 242 pp. Index. 35s.The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings, 1963–65. By Ali Zulfikar Bhutto. Preface by A. B. A. Haleem and K. Sarwar Hasan. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. 1966. 106 pp. Rs. 7.50.Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy. By Arif Hussain. Preface by Guy Wint. London: Cass. 1966. 188 pp. Bibliog. Index. 35s. Richard Symonds Richard Symonds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 43, Issue 4, October 1967, Pages 785–787, https://doi.org/10.2307/2612873 Published: 01 October 1967

Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration.

Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration.

The Pakistan Coup d'Etat of 1958

P ARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN was ended by a military coup d'etat on October 7, 1958. In its beginnings it appeared to be little more than a palace revolution. There were no spontaneous uprisings or conspiratorial groups dedicated to a new social order. The Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, said that object of military rule was to return country to sanity. One Western observer labeled regime a preventive autocracy.' The language was clearly that of Latin America, not of Bolshevik Russia or Revolutionary France. As in most palace revolutions, no blood was shed and within less than a month army was back in its barracks. Pakistan was following a course dramatized by General Charles De Gaulle in France, and pursued closer to home by generals in Thailand and Burma. The military establishment, in coalition with bureaucracy, organized a new government in support of modernization and against political confusion.2 Some observers3 accepted coup as inevitable, given Pakistan's weak political community and superior organization, training and leadership of military forces. The collective wisdom of published opinion seems to suggest that political system failed, and that representative government collapsed.4 The Economist noted sadly that Pakistan's politics, in months preceding martial law, had ranged between the grotesque and macabre.5 This argument is certainly a favorite theme of Cromwellians themselves. Major-General Iskander Mirza, in his presidential proclamation of martial law, pointed an outraged finger at the ruthless struggle for power, corruption, shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, lack of decorum and prostitution of Islam for political ends.6 He charged that ruthless adventurers and exploiters were

Martial Law Administration in Pakistan

Martial Law Administration in Pakistan

Martial Law Administration in Pakistan

Martial Law Administration in Pakistan

Factors in Bengali Regionalism in Pakistan

ON October 8, 1958, the Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan, then in office only one day, issued a series of 48 orders, the last of which read: No person in the Martial Law area shall publish, print, circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated or otherwise be in possession of any pamphlet, poster, publication or any type of literature calculated to promote or attempt to promote feeling of enmity or hatred between persons of different provinces and speaking different languages. For violation of this order, the maximum punishment was death. With this bold statement the new military regime declared its opposition to regionalism and its readiness to enforce its view. Its attitude