The three papers offer engaging discussions of oligopsony power at the first-handler level in agricultural markets. The papers fill an important gap in the literature and thus are important reading for those interested in market power issues in markets for raw agricultural commodities. In addition to making the case for increased attention to the potential for oligopsony power at the first-handler level, each of the papers makes important methodological contributions in offering analytical and empirical approaches for evaluating this oligopsony power. Although linked by a common theme, the three papers differ significantly in their approaches to the market power issue. As Rogers and Sexton note, statistics on concentration, at least on the sellers' side of the market, suggest that farm-related industries are highly concentrated and that this concentration has increased significantly in recent years. For example, the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) in the steer and heifer slaughter industry has gone from 30% in 1978 to 70% in 1988 (Purcell 1990a). Likewise, the CR4 for the flour-milling industry has gone from 37% in 1980 to over 65% in 1991 (Brester and Goodwin). The period 1977-87 was one of four great U.S. merger movements. Approximately $400 billion was spend on industrial mergers during this period, with food and tobacco firms being the major players (Connor and Geithman). These mergers were fueled, in part, by relaxed restrictions on mergers by federal antitrust agencies after 1980. These statistics lead one to suspect the existence of market power influences in farm-related industries. However, a high degree of concentration in an industry does not confirm the existence of discriminatory market power practices. After many years of debate among industrial organization economists, the relationship between industry concentration and the exercise of market power remains inconclusive.' The papers, at l ast implicitly, take as given the premise that industry concentration implies the existence of collusive market power practices. An alternative view, presented by Demsetz, holds that scale economies or other competitive advantages lead to increased concentration in many industries without implying the existence of welfare-diminishing market power pricing practices. In such cases, increased concentration may result in more efficient use of resources. Of course, this alternative view often assumes that entry and exit in an industry are relatively easy and thus that firms in highly concentrated industries are disciplined by the threat of competition. Evidence of scale economies in the food processing sector has been offered in recent research. For example, Ward found that significant economies of size existed in the