In objecting to comparable worth, conservative critics have argued that it subverts basic principles of a free market economy, and radical critics have claimed that it is anti-working class. In a recent Harvard Law Review article, a new and politically intermediate criticism emerges from Paul Weiler, a professor Harvard Law School. 1 Differing with conservatives, Weiler acknowledges in Wages of Sex that some market regulation is compatible with free enterprise, and indeed is necessary to keep market competitive (1763). Because management of labor is not entirely constrained by forces of supply and demand, market can be inflected by gender and race discrimination (1762). Thus, comparable policy, which aims to counter irrational market forces, can actually serve to make market more competitive, and should therefore be acceptable to defenders of capitalism. Moreover, because there are policy-capturing approaches to job evaluation that allow for decentralized wage setting, comparable need not involve extensive government intrusion in market.2 Differing with radicals, Weiler holds that comparable offers working-class women some remedy for gender-based pay inequities. He advocates empowering women and implementing comparable through collective bargaining and by government incentives (1798, 1754). However, although Weiler grants that comparable does not contradict free market principles and that it offers a potential remedy for wage discrimination, he does not support establishing it in our legal system. Having argued that comparable is sound in principle, Weiler then aims to demonstrate that a comparable law would be ineffective and costly in practice. But these latter claims, I contend, are based on empirical error and logical confusion. A feminist response to Weiler is needed not only because his essay appeared in perhaps single most influential legal journal in country, but also because he represents a new line of attack from what might be called a progressive liberal perspective, one that feminists cannot afford to ignore. Though I agree with Weiler that comparable should be pursued both through positive incentives provided by executive order and through collective bargaining, I do not want to dismiss possibility of implementing comparable through our legal institutions. Here is a brief summary of Weiler's argument. He maintains that the difficulty with comparable consists not so much in its theory as in its implementation (1778). He identifies two major difficulties in implementing comparable through courts. The first is that at present ... American judges do not have a body of reliable experience to draw upon in scrutinizing claims made by parties and their hired experts in litigation undertaken to implement an enforceable legal right to comparable worth (1770). The second is that court that orders a single firm to increase sharply price that it pays for traditionally female jobs, without offering any relief in other prices that it pays or receives, could seriously damage firm's business, and hence its female employees, whose real wages are purportedly being improved (1779). Thus, Weiler sees legally mandated comparable as impractical, both because of its reliance upon sophisticated statistical analyses that would likely overtax institutional resources of court and because of decentralized nature