Market Access Issues Research Articles

It’s A Question of Market Access

In this paper, we argue that market access issues associated with the question of the optimal mandate of the World Trade Organization should be separated from nonmarket access issues. We identify race-to-the-bottom and regulatory-chill concerns as market access issues and suggest that the WTO should address these concerns. We then describe ways that WTO principles and procedures might be augmented to do so. As for nonmarket access issues, we argue that as a general matter these are best handled outside the WTO, and that, while implicit links might be encouraged, explicit links between the WTO and other labor and environmental organizations should not as a general matter be forged. We view this as a measured approach to labor and the environment within the WTO.

Antitrust issues arising our of actual or potential enforcement of trade laws

A WTO working group is now studying the trade law/competition law interface. The group has concentrated on market access issues and policy analysis, but has not yet focused specifically on actual cases involving both bodies of law. The United States experience is instructive in this regard. US cases in four areas illuminate the key issues at the interface, and point the way toward the development of international norms. (1) Firms may face antitrust liability for knowingly advancing false claims or evidence in trade cases, but are protected by a broad right of advocacy and strict rules of causation; (2) firms may settle trade cases on a price basis, usually subject to public review requirements; (3) price agreements among two or more trade case defendants or plaintiffs will usually not be antitrust exempt; (4) damage liability for price-fixing will normally not be eliminated merely because price increases were one way to react to a governmental dumping finding. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Globalization, International Corporate Alliances, and Political Conflict: The Experience of the US Airline and Telecommunication Industries

The globalization of production simultaneously opens up new opportunities for firms and threatens them with intensified foreign competition. Studies of the resulting producer demands for commercial policy have not yet incorporated two recent trends: the increasing significance of the trade in services and the proliferation of international corporate alliances. With two US industries (airlines and telecommunications) as illustrative case studies, it can be seen that, to a surprising extent, even competitive global industries will seek to block foreign competitors from entering local markets via alliances. The level of political conflict in response to these alliances is related to the issue of market access at home and abroad. Market barriers abroad provide global producers with the motive for seeking contingent restrictions. Restrictions at home give domestic firms the opportunity to oppose alliances without worrying that competitors could enter the market through foreign direct investment. The model suggests some important differences in the political reactions to globalization between service and manufacturing firms.

Competition policy for global markers

Proposals for international action on competition policy respond to four problems: increasing transnational anti-competitive activity outside control of any single nation, enforcement conflicts, market access problems, and unnecessary costs of compliance with multiple national regimes. All four are real, but limited, problems, though transnational anti-competitive activity could be very significant in the future. A competition code in the WTO would process competition problems principally as market access problems. The resulting arrangement would address market access issues imperfectly, and the other three problems not at all. International initiatives in this area must facilitate cooperation among competition authorities. The best approach is to pursue a mix of bilateral, OECD, and WTO initiatives which places protection of consumers from anti-competitive activities at the center of international efforts. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Transitional economies in free trade areas: Lao PDR in the ASEAN free trade area

Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) is a transitional economy, and one of the few least developed economies in the Southeast Asian region. Lao became a member of ASEAN in July 1997, and will participate in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) from 1 January 1998. In this paper, we examine the impact that membership of AFTA is likely to have on Lao's trade, government revenue and foreign investment flows. We find that: (i) trade diversion is likely to be low, and that AFTA will provide the vehicle to negotiate market access issues with Thailand; (ii) the reduction in government revenue from trade taxes is likely to be low, particularly in light of the high share of informal trade and only low levels of trade diversion; and (iii) foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are likely to grow sharply in the future, as the legal, administrative and institutional framework in Lao develops to meet the ASEAN standard.

Clinton, Europe and Economic Diplomacy: What Makes the EU Different?

The Clinton administration's economic diplomacy has been more aggressive, politicized and controversial than that of any recent US administration. We examine its application to the European Union (EU) and seek to answer the question: what makes Europe different? Put another way, why has the US pursued cooperation on “behind‐the‐border” issues such as competition policy, standards and investment rules, and eschewed export promotion?We offer three explanations. First, the EU's market is unique: it is a mature, but lucrative one for large US‐owned firms concerned more with behind‐the‐border issues than with market access issues. Second, American companies who have invested heavily in Europe have developed their own political links to the EU, particularly through the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce. Third, these same companies have a powerful influence over US policy towards Europe as well as EU policymaking. Our analysis develops these three hypotheses, and also offers an assessment of the progress and meaning of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue.

Vertical Restraints and Market Access

This paper analyzes vertical restraints in relation to market access issues. In Section II we briefly review the recent three major trade conflicts between Japan and the USA in light of vertical restraints. In Section III we review the major policy lessons of the economics literature of vertical restraints, and analyze whether we need a special treatment for vertical restraints abroad for a market access reason. In Section IV we evaluate the policy options towards foreign foreclosure and suggest that nondiscriminatory application of foreign or home competition policy should be the mechanism to address such concern instead of trade policy actions such as “voluntary” import expansions.

Policy Issues for an Industrializing Animal Agriculture Sector: Discussion

American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsVolume 77, Issue 5 p. 1250-1251 Principal Paper Session Policy Issues for an Industrializing Animal Agriculture Sector: Discussion Marvin L. Hayenga, Marvin L. Hayenga professor of economics Iowa State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Marvin L. Hayenga, Marvin L. Hayenga professor of economics Iowa State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 December 1995 https://doi.org/10.2307/1243356Citations: 1AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL No abstract is available for this article.Citing Literature Volume77, Issue5December 1995Pages 1250-1251 RelatedInformation

Trade and market access issues in US ‐ EC relations

Trade and market access issues in US ‐ EC relations

Market access issues in EC-US relations: trading partners or trading blows?

Journal Article Market access issues in EC-US relations: trading partners or trading blows? Get access Market access issues in EC-US relations: trading partners or trading blows?By Stephen Woolcock. London: Pinter for Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1991. 132pp. £22.50; ISBN 0 86187 081 6. Pb.: £8.95; ISBN 0 86187 082 4. Finn Laursen Finn Laursen 1European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 68, Issue 3, July 1992, Pages 534–535, https://doi.org/10.2307/2623010 Published: 01 July 1992

Straight talk on why Canada needs to reform its trade development system

Canada is a trading nation. Yet it is not a nation of traders. Seventy percent of Canadian companies do not export; fewer than 100 firms account for 70 percent of Canada's export trade. Nearly 100 years of government services and programs to encourage trade has not changed the paradox of a trading nation bereft of a trading culture. This paper argues that in light of the changing international business environment, trade development will need to become more sophisticated in developing linkages to domestic competitiveness and addressing market access issues. The Canadian government's fiscal. restraint should be viewed as an opportunity to re‐evaluate the services currently provided by the Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) and the nature of Canada's trade development programs, with a view to making both more effective and focused. The findings suggest that programs and services should be designed to reduce dependence on government support rather than entrench it; that access to programs and activities will need to become more selective and differentiated; and that current resources and activities are over concentrated in mature markets with diminishing marginal rates of return. Future programs will need to question universal access to government programs and services, enhanced linkages to the basic competitiveness of Canadian companies, and greater devolution of program delivery.