Mao's Policy Research Articles

Mao's Legacy Revisited: Its Lasting Impact on China and Post‐Mao Era Reform

Most observers hold a positive view of China's reform since 1978 but are critical of the policies of the era of Mao Zedong, ignoring the inseparable connections between the two. This article argues that the post‐Mao era reform represents both continuity and discontinuity with the immediate past, and a complex mingling of Mao's legacy with new initiatives. The origins of many reform policies, as well as their accomplishments, could be traced back to the Mao era. They were often conditioned by, benefited from, or were built upon the outcomes of Mao's policies. These included the decisions to normalize China's relations with the United States and develop friendship with Third World countries, efforts to decentralize economic power and industrialize China without urbanization, and the move to defeat “capitalist roaders” but call Deng Xiaoping back to office. Overall, the turn toward capitalism of China has proven Mao's foresight, validated his concerns, and may be evidence of the lasting utility of Maoism.

Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s

This article reexamines the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954—55 and 1958, and the initial Sino—Soviet conflict, with particular attention to Mao's dominant role in the events. In contrast to previous scholarship, based on newly available sources it finds Mao to have been an erratic dictator who micromanaged China's military and political operations in the Taiwan Strait against the U.S.—Taiwan alliance with neither a long-term strategy nor a short-term plan. Mao's grandiose ambition to be the leader of the communist world led him into a conflict with Moscow, and the Sino—Soviet alliance began to unravel when China most needed allies. In the end, Mao's policy behavior was counterproductive and self-defeating; China's national interest, which Mao thought he was protecting and enhancing, suffered a great deal of damage.

Yang Tian Chang Xiao: Yige Dan Jian Shiyi Nian De Hongweibing Yuzhong Yutianlu (Outcry from a Red Guard Imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution) (review)

Reviewed by: Yang Tian Chang Xiao: Yige Dan Jian Shiyi Nian De Hongweibing Yuzhong Yutianlu (Outcry from a Red Guard Imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution) Jing Li (bio) Lu Li'an . Yang Tian Chang Xiao: Yige Dan Jian Shiyi Nian De Hongweibing Yuzhong Yutianlu (Outcry from a Red Guard Imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution). Edited by Wang Shaoguang. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005. 630 pp. $23.00, ISBN 962–996–250–0. Hubei is a province with a strong rebellious spirit. The revolution of 1911 first broke out here, in the provincial capital Wuhan. From the late 1920s through the 1940s, as Chinese communists fought their way to power in China, a large number of Hubei natives joined the movement—of the 1,054 People's Liberation Army officers who in 1955 were conferred the rank of brigadier general and above, 234 came from Hubei Province. In the Cultural Revolution, Wuhan was the scene of the only large-scale open defiance of Chairman Mao. In the July Twentieth Incident of 1967, armed soldiers and workers unhappy with Mao's policies staged major demonstrations in the streets of Wuhan and stormed the guesthouse where Mao was staying, forcing the chairman into humiliating flight. For their complicity in what amounted to a mutiny, top brass in the Wuhan Regional Military Command, among them Commander Chen Zaidao, were discharged and disciplined. Lu Li'an, the author of the book under review, was also a rebel in Wuhan when the Cultural Revolution began, but a rebel of a very different kind. His rebellion targeted officials and generals such as Chen Zaidao. Lu, like Chen, was condemned and punished. In Lu's case, punishment came in the form of imprisonment from 1968 to 1979. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, officials such as Commander Chen Zaidao have been able to write about their woes in the "ten years of chaos" (Chen's memoir came out in 1988). Red Guards like Lu, however, have been denied the status of victims and have been forbidden by the Chinese government to relate publicly their experiences. (In the postscript to his memoir, Lu lamented that his book could not make its appearance in mainland China; it was published in Hong Kong, by the Chinese University Press.) Rebellions in the Cultural Revolution had very different meanings and very different consequences, which point to the complexity of the momentous historical event that has both inspired and aggrieved so many Chinese. To carry this reflection a little further: one of the two prefaces to Lu's book is authored by Jiang Hong, a retired professor who, for his criticism of the Chinese government in 1957, was denounced and labeled a Rightist. One generally expects Chinese like Jiang Hong, with liberal tendencies, to be hostile toward the Cultural Revolution. Yet, in Jiang we find someone who was excited about the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and who, even today, admires a Red Guard like Lu. As Jiang recalls it, back in 1966 and 1967, Lu's "idealism, his oratorical talent, and his courage appealed to many Rightists. My Rightist friends and I often talked about him in private, praising him, because in him we see ourselves in the old days" (p. xv). [End Page 510] Such experience spotlights something that China's official historiography on the Cultural Revolution has so far largely refused to acknowledge, that is, the Cultural Revolution was a phenomenon more complex than the official verdict "ten years of chaos" (shinian dongluan) can fully convey. At least in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, many "little people," among them Chinese who had undesirable class backgrounds and who had suffered persecution in the past, harbored hopes that the new movement would address their grievances. This has not been fully recognized in China because Chinese leaders and officials who suffered at the hands of Red Guards have dominated the shaping of the official perspective on the Cultural Revolution, and they have been unwilling to give former Red Guards opportunities, and the pleasure, to justify or explain away the atrocities committed in the Cultural Revolution. While the above-mentioned concern is certainly legitimate, one should remember that only through the...

The cultural revolution in the foreign ministry of China

The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, by Ma Jisen. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2004. xvi + 466 pp. US$39.00 (hardcover), US$25.00 (paperback). Ma Jisen's book deals with a subject broader than its title indicates. The Cultural Revolution in China's Foreign Ministry had an impact on the development of the Cultural Revolution throughout the country. The book shows, among other things, how the Party center severely curtailed its early spontaneity. The book provides a vivid picture of an ailing and paranoid Zedong who became totally unpredictable in his persecution of leaders and ordinary people alike, and the assessment of Zhou Enlai's role offers a new picture of the Premier. It has often been assumed that Zhou had a moderating influence on Mao's policies and acted as a cushion and savior of people threatened by Mao, the Gang of Four or fanatical Red Guards. But Ma's account shows Zhou as a faithful follower of Mao's murky instructions. It also becomes apparent that people with more courage than Zhou-Chen Yi, for example-tried to introduce some measure of rationality. However, he received Zhou's support only as long as this did not interfere with Zhou remaining part of Mao Zedong's proletarian headquarters. The book tells the story of how the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution spilled over into such an elite ministry and how, with the establishment of different factions vying with each other to seize power within the Ministry, relations among the staff were ruined for years to come. In addition, contradictory instructions by the leadership paralyzed the operational activities of foreign and diplomatic relations for several years. Ma's personal background as an insider at the Ministry during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, along with thorough research based on interviews and documents she has been able to unearth, allows her to write knowledgeably about the mass movement in the Ministry and to provide an interesting and original analysis of more than 200 pages on what occurred up to 1968. In the process she is able to clarify issues that Western scholars had earlier touched upon but, due to a paucity of information, had often misunderstood. Consider, for example, the role of Foreign Minister Chen Yi or of the red diplomat Yao Dengshan. The sections dealing with foreign policy reflect mainly the perceptions of Zedong and Zhou Enlai which dominated diplomatic policy. …

Comment: Mao, the Comintern and the Second United Front

Sheng and I are in essential agreement that between mid-1935 and late 1936 repeated interventions by the Comintern induced changes in CCP policy which brought it successively closer to a united front with Chiang Kai-shek. We disagree about whether there were significant discrepancies between CCP and Comintern line on this issue at specific points. I argue there were. Sheng argues there were not. The Comintern did not itself adopt a true policy of a united front with Chiang until late 1936, Sheng implies. The Comintern's policy of a united front with Chiang evolved slowly, and as it inched towards this goal it communicated the ideas to Mao who adopted them fully and promptly. “Mao was amenable to Stalin's advice,” Sheng says; he was “sensitive and responsive” to Comintern directives. Any discrepancies between Comintern and CCP lines were differences emphasis, not of substance, according to Sheng. I, on the other hand, argue that Mao's policy was consistently more anti-Chiang than the Comintern's.

De-Maoization

Three years after the death of Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev surprised the world with his dramatic de-Stalinization speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Unlike deStalinization, which began only after the death of the dictator, deMaoization got under way long before Mao Tse-tung died. It has been a protracted process involving several factions in the Chinese Communist Party; and it has usually been heavily veiled, and often interrupted. Mao was the CCP leader responsible for victory in the civil war, but he consolidated his power largely by utilizing the talents of others, such as Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai, and Lin Piao in military affairs, Chou En-lai in administration and diplomacy, Liu Shao-ch'i in the labor movement and internal security;and by playing one faction against the other, always liquidating the most powerful secondary leader. For example, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Kao Kang, Yao Shu-shih, P'eng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Lin Piao were all purged and disgraced while occupying a position in the CCP second only to Mao. Chou En-lai barely escaped because of his usefulness as an administrator and diplomat, his value as a counterweight to Liu and Lin, and his long illness. Teng Hsiaop'ing was pushed aside quickly when Chou died. In the Soviet Union, de-Stalinization was carried out by lesser dictators who feared Stalin but were not substantially opposed to his policies. In Communist China, most of the purged secondary leaders had rigorously opposed Mao's policies. If one can still argue that the purges of Chang Kuo-t'ao, Yao Shu-shih, and Kao Kang were the result primarily of a power struggle, one must recognize that P'eng, Liu, and Teng were against Mao's policy of the Three Red Flags (the Great Leap Forward, the communes, and the General Line of Socialist Construc-

Refutation Of The "Stinking Number Nine" Theory Of The "Gang Of Four"

The gang of four — Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan — have created great chaos by confusing the relations between ourselves and the enemy, obliterating the differences between the two kinds of contradiction, wrecking Chairman Mao's policy of uniting with, educating and reforming intellectuals, calling intellectuals the stinking number nine, smothering the revolutionary initiative of the broad masses of intellectuals, and destroying the ranks of revolutionary intellectuals.

Always Adhere to Chairman Mao's Policy for Education

Chairman Mao pointed out long ago that must serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labor and that education policy must enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually, and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture. Chairman Mao set forth this policy in accordance with the basic theory of the proletarian dictatorship, a policy which generalizes the experience and lessons of class struggle in the sphere of education both inside and outside our country. In order to use education as an instrument for restoring capitalism, Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, and their ilk have tried in every way to resist, undermine, and distort the policy. Though Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao were defeated in their scheme, class struggle and two-line struggle remain acute on the education front and will continue to be so for a long time to come. The revolution in education forms an important part of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revoluti...

The Farther One Goes on the Great Road of the "May 7 Directive," The Vaster it Becomes

Our great leader, Chairman Mao, has pointed out: "Education must serve proletarian politics and must be united with productive labor." The revolutionary committee of the First Middle School, with the assistance of a school-based workers' propaganda team, correctly and thoroughly carried out Chairman Mao's policy for proletarian educational revolution. By initiating revolutionary criticism in depth, by unswervingly taking the road of the "May 7 Directive," and by self-reliance and hard struggle, they have a base within the school for the study of industry and agriculture. At the same time, they have linked factory and school, and brigade and school, and have initiated organized, planned activities for studying industry and agriculture, thus achieving the three-in-one combination of teaching, productive labor, and scientific research, and completely changing the "three separations" situation of former schools. Having been reeducated by the workers and the poor and lower-middle peasants, and having been steeled to hardship in the Three Great Revolutionary Movements, the spiritual countenance of most of the teachers and students has profoundly changed, and their world view has been rapidly transformed. The whole school presents an appearance as lively and as fresh as early morning air.

Exposing the Towering Criminal Acts of the Old [Canton] Municipal Committee, The Public Safety [Organs], the Procuracy, the Courts, and the Small Group of Capitalist-Roaders Holding Power within the Party in Opposing Chairman Mao's Policies of the Downward Transfer of Cadres

The great leader Chairman Mao has taught us: "It is necessary to insist that the cadres participate in the system of collective production and labor. The cadres of our party and state are ordinary laborers and not the old masters riding on the heads of the people. Through participation in collective production and labor, the cadres will be able to maintain the most extensive, constant, and intimate connections with the laboring people. This is a great thing of fundamental importance in the system of socialism. It helps overcome bureaucratism and prevents revisionism and dogmatism."