Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s

Abstract

This article reexamines the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954—55 and 1958, and the initial Sino—Soviet conflict, with particular attention to Mao's dominant role in the events. In contrast to previous scholarship, based on newly available sources it finds Mao to have been an erratic dictator who micromanaged China's military and political operations in the Taiwan Strait against the U.S.—Taiwan alliance with neither a long-term strategy nor a short-term plan. Mao's grandiose ambition to be the leader of the communist world led him into a conflict with Moscow, and the Sino—Soviet alliance began to unravel when China most needed allies. In the end, Mao's policy behavior was counterproductive and self-defeating; China's national interest, which Mao thought he was protecting and enhancing, suffered a great deal of damage.