Mandatory Retirement Rules Research Articles

Pathways to Retirement, Well-Being, and Mandatory Retirement Rules: Evidence from Canadian Reforms

Amid the aging workforce, a better understanding of the retirement transition patterns of older workers has implications for public policy. Such transitions are often characterized as complex trajectories involving multiple stages and alternative pathways which, in turn, depend on labor market regulations. This study investigates the factors affecting bridge employment and partial retirement and their subsequent effects on health, well-being and financial security, using micro-level data from a national healthy aging survey and augmented with personal income tax records. The analysis exploits policy-induced changes in retirement status arising from the elimination of mandatory retirement rules in Canada—which occurred at different times across provinces—in an instrumental variables design. The results indicate, first, that mandatory retirement is not used often by employers even when it is permissible: only approximately 7% of current retirees report that their first retirement occurred for this reason. This finding is consistent with limited international evidence on how employers use these rules. Second, we find supportive evidence that the elimination of mandatory retirement reduced the likelihood of individuals being retired by approximately 7–16% but raised the likelihood of subjective partial retirement by 5–6%. Most notably, the reforms reduced the incidence of work after retirement as workers become permitted to stay in their incumbent jobs longer, this finding being very robust across several statistical estimators commonly used in the related literature. No discernible effects are observed on individuals’ health, well-being or future financial security. These findings suggest that costs of mandatory retirement are limited to adjustment frictions among individuals searching for new work or entering retirement earlier than desired under the prevailing wage.

Mandatory Retirement and Age Discrimination under EU Law

In what direction has the prohibition of age discrimination been heading since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in Rosenbladt that there are almost no limits to the discretion of Member States in adopting mandatory retirement rules? This article argues that the general labour market policy of Member States will probably continue to be exempt from strict judicial scrutiny when long-standing features of employment law that are shared by many States are concerned. However, in the case of rules for specific occupations or specific age-related entitlements, the margin of discretion left to the Member States is narrowed down considerably. This article argues that there is a need to bridge the gap between the different control standards. Especially since the entry into force of the European Union (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights, the interest of some employees to continue in employment and to pursue their chosen occupation needs to be balanced more evenly against the labour market policy of Member States. A suggestion about how to reconcile these interests is put forward.

Institutional barriers to work beyond retirement in an aging Japan: Evidence from a recent employee survey

This paper focuses on institutional barriers to older workers' continued work beyond the conventional retirement age in contemporary Japan. Under the current institutional arrangements, most older workers in Japan, contending with mandatory retirement rules at the workplace, have the option of being re-employed after mandatory retirement, and experience large wage reductions if they choose this option. We examine how these institutional arrangements in Japan today affect older workers' views and decisions regarding their future labor market behaviors. Using a multi-nomial logit analysis, we analyze data drawn from a nationally representative sample of 1,400 male regular employees, aged 57 to 59, who participated in the 2007 “Survey on continued employment and occupational life after age 60 (Rokujūsai ikō no keizoku kōyō to shokugyō seikatsu ni kansuru chōsa)”, which was conducted by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT). Our analysis has found (i) that older workers do not want to be re-employed if their prospective wages are lower than their desired minimum level; (ii) that, if they choose not to be re-employed, they tend to seek alternative employment opportunities by themselves rather than retiring; and (iii) that, other than prospective wage level, the prospective total income (including “in-work” social security benefits) and the availability of flexible work arrangements are crucial factors affecting the future labor market behaviors of older workers.

Mandatory Retirement Rules and the Retirement Decisions of University Professors in Canada

We examine the impact of mandatory retirement on the retirement decisions of professors in Canada using administrative data. Estimation of a discrete time hazard model indicates that faculty members at universities with mandatory retirement at age 65 have exit rates at age 65 that are around 30 to 38 percentage points higher than those of their counterparts at universities without mandatory retirement. This overall difference in exit rates is found when the sample is restricted by discipline, professional rank and type of university. Similar results are found for both men and women; however, the magnitude of this effect is somewhat smaller for women. Restricting the analysis to include faculty members who received their highest degree at age 34 or older does not affect the magnitude of the difference in exit rates between faculty at universities without mandatory retirement and those at universities with mandatory retirement. The estimated survival probabilities indicate that only 22.7% of faculty members employed at age 64 at universities without mandatory retirement will continue to be employed at the same university at age 72.

Wages, productivity, and retirement

Pensions, both state provided and privately provided, affect incentives to retire. But private pensions are part of the long term compensation package, and altering pensions not only affects retirement incentives, but also wages. A key factor in determining whether retirement occurs at the appropriate age is the relation of productivity to alternatives. When wages, coupled with public and private pension accrual, deviate from worker productivity, private retirement incentives are distorted. Sometimes this results in too much early retirement, creating fiscal difficulties. Sometimes, it results in a desire for delayed retirement, which argues for mandatory retirement rules. Pay compression, where wages do not vary across individuals as much as productivity, exacerbate distortions. Defined benefit pension plans tend to create incentives to retire after a certain number of years of work. Defined contribution plans do not have this feature. Public plans should be designed noting their interaction with incentives that are already inherent in the private wage and pension schemes.

Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement

Some people have self-control problems regularly. This paper adds endogenous retirement to Laibson’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting savings model [Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997) 443–477]. Earlier selves think that the deciding self tends to retire too early and may save less to induce later retirement. Still earlier selves may think the pre-retirement self does this too much, saving more to induce early retirement. The consumption pattern may be different from that with exponential discounting. Other observational non-equivalence includes the impact of changing mandatory retirement rules or work incentives on savings and a possibly negative marginal propensity to consume out of increased future earnings. Naive agents are briefly considered.

Probation, layoffs, and wage-tenure profiles: A sorting explanation

In this paper, we demonstrate that sorting considerations alone generate steep wage-tenure profiles, high turnover rates of newly hired workers, an increase in the variance of wages with seniority, and mandatory retirement rules. We show that `excessive monitoring' is sometimes necessary to deter applications from low productivity workers. We derive conditions under which firms randomly test workers, as well as conditions under which firms retain some workers that fail its test. Finally, we show that competition for workers can lower total output.

An economywide view of changing mandatory retirement rules

AbstractBecause of the strong disincentives to work that are embedded in social security and many employee pensions, most workers will continue to retire in their early sixties despite the uncapping of the mandatory retirement age.

Predicting participation in retirement preparation programs.

Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men, the current study estimated the probability of participation in a retirement preparation program. Results are presented from a multivariate logit analysis. The study found (a) that occupational status, marital status, health status, preretirement income, and constraint by mandatory retirement rules are significant predictors of participation, and (b) that positive sample selectivity bias exists.

Why is There Mandatory Retirement? An Empirical Reexamination

A widely cited explanation of mandatory retirement age provisions is the incentives model developed and tested by Lazear. The research reported here builds upon Lazear's empirical framework by adding testable implications drawn from a specific human capital explanation of mandatory retirement. The role of monitoring costs in accounting for mandatory retirement rules is also discussed. The evidence presented, based on data from the NLS mature men sample, indicates that, in addition to the personal characteristics examined by Lazear, a comprehensive explanation of mandatory retirement requires the consideration of both specific human capital and monitoring costs.

Is Mandatory Retirement Overrated? Evidence from the 1970s

In this paper we argue that mandatory retirement is only one aspect of a much broader system that influences an individual's retirement decision. We look at responses over time to variations in mandatory retirement rules faced by a sample of private-sector workers aged 62-64 in 1973. This is done within a model that specifically includes the economic incentives present in Social Security and pension systems. We find that the impact of a mandatory retirement rule on work is considerably smaller than a simple comparison of those with and without mandatory retirement would imply.