Managerial Risk-taking Research Articles

Options trading, managerial risk-taking, and brand development

This study examines how options trading influences brand development strategies by encouraging managerial risk-taking. We find that firms with higher levels of options trading tend to introduce more new trademarks, which exhibit lower citation rates from subsequent trademarks. These firms favor brand creation over extension, leading to increased brand riskiness, as evidenced by greater trademark diversity. Potential channels for these effects include increased institutional ownership by transient investors and enhanced managerial hedging opportunities. These effects are more pronounced in firms with weaker governance, managers with higher pay-risk sensitivity, younger managerial teams, and intense competition. Additionally, we observe a negative relation between unrelated brand diversification, driven by options trading, and firm value. Our findings support the notion that active options markets incentivize managers to pursue riskier brand strategies.

Does ESG contracting align or compete with stakeholder interests?

The paper investigates whether ESG-linked managerial incentives, also known as ESG contracting, align or compete with stakeholder interests in the banking sector. The few related literature, focussed on non-financial companies, shows arguments both pro and against pay for sustainability. Using a panel data set of 595 worldwide listed banks for the period 2010–2021, the paper studies the effectiveness of ESG incentives in improving ESG performance and limiting ESG controversies. ESG contracting is shown to improve both ESG performance and ESG disputes, thus suggesting that it is more symbolic than substantial in meeting stakeholder interests. ESG strategy, ESG committee and managerial risk-taking are significant channels through which ESG incentives affect ESG performance and ESG controversies in the banking sector.

CEO Power and ESG Performance: The Mediating Role of Managerial Risk-Taking

CEO Power and ESG Performance: The Mediating Role of Managerial Risk-Taking

Star CEOs: influence on competitor CEOs' risk-taking

PurposeResearch has focused primarily on the antecedents that influence the risk taking of CEOs themselves. This study examines how an important event experienced by a CEO at a direct rival firm influences a CEO's risk-taking. It also examines how prior firm performance relative to aspirations moderates the relationship.Design/methodology/approachIn order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an a difference-in-differences methodology.FindingsUsing a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that when a CEO wins a prestigious CEO award, competitor CEOs increase their firm risk-taking in the post-award period. The proclivity becomes stronger when their prior firm performance relative to aspirations is better. These findings suggest that a CEO winning a prominent CEO award influences competitor CEOs' risk-taking.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature on managerial risk-taking by highlighting that a star CEO winning a prominent award may serve as a striving aspiration and induce competitor CEOs to take risks, and that two different types of aspirations – striving and competitive aspirations – interact to influence the competitor CEOs' risk-taking.

Does CEO Power Affect the Relations between CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking?

Purpose - This study investigates the effect of incentive compensation and CEO power on a firm’s risk-taking behavior, leveraging stock return volatility and earnings volatility as the key indicators of risk-taking.
 Design/Methodology/Approach - A comprehensive analysis is conducted using data from 1,958 U.S. firms over a 28-year period (1992- 2019). The study employ both ordinary least square (OLS) regression and two-stage least square (2SLS) regression for analysis. Pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) and CEO-pay slice (CPS) are used as proxies for incentive compensation and CEO power, respectively.
 Findings - The findings offer solid empirical proof that PVS and CPS have a negative influence on both earnings volatility and stock return volatility. Furthermore, the detrimental effect of PVS on managerial risk-taking is significantly more pronounced for CEOs with lower CPS compared with those with higher CPS. While incentive compensation appears to deter CEOs from embracing higher risks, CEOs with more power are less risk-averse when offered incentive compensation compared to their less powerful counterparts.
 Research Implications - This study significantly contributes to existing literature by revealing the interactive effects between CEO power and incentive compensation on a firm’s risk-taking behavior. Understanding these dynamics is pivotal as it offers a nuanced view of how CEO compensation structures and power hierarchies within a firm influence its risk-taking propensity, which is critical for both firm performance and broader financial stability considerations. The insights derived from this analysis can inform more balanced executive compensation structures and governance models that ensure an optimal level of risk-taking.

Lead independent director, managerial risk-taking, and cost of debt: Evidence from UK

We extend the existing literature on how the adoption of a lead independent director is related to corporate outcomes by documenting that the presence of a lead independent director on the board is significantly and negatively related to managerial risk-taking. The result is more pronounced for firms with a non-independent board chair. In a further analysis, we document that decreased managerial risk-taking leads to a reduction in the cost of debt for firms with a lead independent director on the board. Overall, our results suggest that the adoption of a lead independent director is an effective governance mechanism when the board chair is not independent, which supports the motivation of the United Kingdom corporate governance code.

Managerial ability, managerial risk taking and innovation performance

This study examines the effects of managerial risk-taking on corporate innovation performance. Using the sample of China's A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020, we find strong evidence that managerial risk-taking has a positive effect on corporate innovation performance which relies on the managerial ability. Further, our results show that management personal risk-taking improves their ability and firm level risk-taking improves innovation performance only if it meets with high managerial ability. In this paper we provide new evidence that overly aggressive managerial personal risk tolerance may hinder managerial ability. In addition, we find that managerial ability and risk tolerance of enterprise may work together to promote corporate innovation performance.

Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking

This paper theoretically examines how relative wealth concerns affect equilibrium contracting and systemic risk-taking. We find that such externalities can generate pay for luck as an equilibrium strategy. In expectation of pay for luck in other firms, tying managerial pay to luck provides insurance to managers against a compensation shortfall relative to executive peers. We also show that an effort-inducing mechanism exists: managers have additional incentives to exert effort in utilizing investment opportunities, which helps them keep up with their peers during industry movements; however, pay for luck that is efficient within firms can nonetheless exacerbate aggregate fluctuations, especially during periods of heightened market risk. (JEL D81, D82, D86, G51, M12, M52)

CEO general work experience and FDI-based internationalization

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to study the impact of the chief executive officer (CEO) general work experience on the level of firm internationalization in the form of foreign direct investment.Design/methodology/approachThe author collects and analyzes data on publicly traded US firms in the manufacturing sector from 1993 to 2012.FindingsThe author finds that CEOs with more general work experience tend to engage in a higher degree of foreign direct investment (FDI)-based internationalization. This relationship will be weakened by CEO stock ownership and enhanced by CEO Ivy League education.Originality/valueThis study enriches the understanding of the important role top managers play in internationalization decisions. The study also contributes to the literature on managerial risk-taking by exploring the outcomes of managerial risk-taking, which have been less studied than the antecedents.

Regional social capital and stock price crash risk: Evidence from the US

Using data from the US, we present empirical evidence for the causal influence of regional social capital on firms’ risk of future stock price crash. Specifically, we show that regional social capital is negatively related to firms’ risk of a future stock price crash. We also identify three potential channels (mediating factors) through which regional social capital can decrease the risk of a future stock price crash—the degree of private corporate news hiding, accounting conservatism, and excessive managerial risk-taking. The findings of our analyses indicate that companies located in high social capital areas tend to have lower degrees of private corporate news hiding or excessive managerial risk-taking, and higher degrees of firm-level accounting conservatism that lead to a lower risk of future stock price crash.

Lead Independent Director, Managerial Risk-Taking and Cost of Debt: Evidence from UK

Lead Independent Director, Managerial Risk-Taking and Cost of Debt: Evidence from UK

Influence of socioemotional wealth on non-family managers’ risk taking and product innovation in family businesses

PurposeThere is a growing interest in understanding family firms’ strategic behavior using the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective. This study explores how family SEW dimensions influence non-family managers’ attitudes toward risk in the context of product innovation. This study also examines whether managerial risk-taking mediates the relationship between SEW and product innovation.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses a sample of 150 family firms in the United Arab Emirates and collects data from family owners and non-family managers via self-administered questionnaires. The study uses SmartPLS structural equation modeling to test the conceptual model and the proposed hypotheses.FindingsThe results indicate that multidimensional SEW influences non-family managers’ risk-taking behavior in different magnitudes and directions, thus impacting firms’ product innovation. Moreover, risk-taking partially mediates the relationship between SEW dimensions and product innovation.Originality/valueWhile product innovation could be seen as a loss scenario for family firms due to the potential loss of SEW, growth, continuity and reputation outweighed the desire to maintain control for the firms in this sample. Thus, these firms encourage non-family managers to take risks in product innovation.

Impact of Risk-Taking on Firm Value

This paper investigates the relationship between managerial risk-taking and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. We conduct OLS regressions to examine the relationship between firm value and managerial risk-taking. To consider differential behaviors by different levels of risk-taking, we conduct separate tests on different risk-taking levels and on a dummy variable for risk-taking. We also adjust for industry fixed effects and address potential endogeneity issues with a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach. We find that risk-taking is positively related to firm value, and that this relationship is driven mainly by firms with relatively higher levels of risk-taking. We confirm the findings with various sub-periods, with industry fixed effects, and with two-stage linear regressions. Finally, we show that excessive risk-taking is not value-destroying. Subsequent tests report that higher risk-taking manifests as positive but slightly reduced capital allocation efficiency. When managers engage in more risk-taking, they increase the efficiency of capital allocation, suggesting that both immediate payoffs as well as long-term gains contribute to the boost in firm value. While the prior studies examine managerial risk-taking, none of them explicitly investigate its relation to a variable of particular importance to shareholders: firm value measured as Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, prior studies do not examine whether high levels of risk-taking can lead to the acceptance of negative NPV investments and consequently destroy firm value.

Sentiments–Risk Relationship across the Corporate Life Cycle: Evidence from an Emerging Market

The influence of market sentiments on the bankruptcy risk propensity of firms has been extensively explored in the literature. However, less attention has been paid to whether the corporate life cycle plays any role in this nexus. The purpose of this research is to unveil how the corporate bankruptcy risk propensity responds to market sentiments, and whether this sentiments–risk relationship varies over different stages of the corporate life cycle. Using a sample of 301 Pakistani non-financial listed firms for 2005–2014, we employ two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) regression estimation to address the issue of endogeneity. Empirical evidence reveals that managers tend to escalate a firm’s bankruptcy risk during high market sentiments. Further analysis indicates that during the period of positive market sentiments, introduction stage firms prefer to assume the highest bankruptcy risk followed by decline and growth firms, while mature firms continue to be risk-averse. This research contributes to the corporate finance literature by suggesting that managerial risk-taking is influenced by market sentiments and corporate managers show a different attitude towards risk at different stages of the corporate life cycle. Therefore, to ensure enterprise sustainability, capital market regulators should have a robust risk management framework in place to discipline the excessive risk-taking by firm managers over different stages of the corporate life cycle. Moreover, investors and creditors shall take into consideration the respective life cycle stage of the firm to minimize the risk exposure of their investment portfolios. Our results are robust to alternate econometric specifications and alternate variable specifications.

CEOs’ Regulatory Focus and Risk-Taking When Firms Perform Below and Above the Bar

Both upper echelons theory and the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) have made important contributions to our understanding of the drivers of managerial risk-taking. Yet, how the individual- and organizational-level mechanisms espoused by these theories act in concert to determine risk-taking is not well understood. In this paper, we draw on regulatory focus theory as a fulcrum to bridge these two levels of analyses and integrate insights from both theoretical traditions. Consistent with the BTOF, we argue that promotion-focused CEOs engage in increased (decreased) risk-taking under conditions of performance below (above) aspirations. In contrast to the predictions of the BTOF, however, we predict that prevention-focused CEOs engage in increased (decreased) risk-taking under conditions of performance above (below) aspirations. We find support for these arguments in a large sample of CEOs from publicly listed U.S. firms and discuss the implications of our findings for both theory and practice.

Are bonds blind? Board-CEO social networks and firm risk

We examine the impact of social networks between independent directors and the CEO on firm risk. Employing the deaths and retirements of socially connected independent directors and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act for two identifications, we find that board-CEO social networks have a positive impact on firm risk. Specifically, CEOs who are socially connected to their independent directors are motivated to adopt riskier investment, operating and financing strategies. This positive influence is more pronounced for prior under-performing firms and for CEOs with low power or overconfidence, indicating that board-CEO social networks act as career insurance and a power-enhancing mechanism to encourage managerial risk-taking.

Antecedents of Firm’s Risk-play – A Structural Equation Modeling Approach in an Emerging Market Context

Firm-risk and managerial risk-taking though distinct are used interchangeably in empirical literature. Here, we identify these two distinctly by examining different proxies for them. We use income stream uncertainty and accounting beta to proxy firm-risk, and market risk and capital intensity ratio represent managerial risk-taking. Once defined, our objective is to find the antecedents of both these by using the most advanced structural equation modelling (SEM) approach from created constructs of performance, psychological, corporate governance, shareholding patterns, fundamental valuation and firm’s characteristics drivers. We formulate seven hypotheses based on empirical literature representing these constructs. We use data of 269 Indian firms for 18 (1999-2017) years to run SEM and then analyse our results individually and combinedly. SEM is used here to test the unidimensionality of the seven constructs (consisting of 19 drivers) and to analyze these drivers (i.e. antecedents) influence on firm-risk and managerial risk-taking i.e. firm’s risk-play. Results prove that present firm-performance, corporate governance drivers, promoters’ shareholding and firm’s characteristics are driving firm’s risk-play. However, fundamental valuation drivers have no role to play in influencing income stream uncertainty, systematic operating risks and managerial risk-attitudes. Psychological drivers and foreign shareholdings act only as a catalyst of firm-risk.

Antecedents of Firm’s Risk-play – A Structural Equation Modeling Approach in an Emerging Market Context

Firm-risk and managerial risk-taking though distinct are used interchangeably in empirical literature. Here, we identify these two distinctly by examining different proxies for them. We use income stream uncertainty and accounting beta to proxy firm-risk, and market risk and capital intensity ratio represent managerial risk-taking. Once defined, our objective is to find the antecedents of both these by using the most advanced structural equation modelling (SEM) approach from created constructs of performance, psychological, corporate governance, shareholding patterns, fundamental valuation and firm’s characteristics drivers. We formulate seven hypotheses based on empirical literature representing these constructs. We use data of 269 Indian firms for 18 (1999-2017) years to run SEM and then analyse our results individually and combinedly. SEM is used here to test the unidimensionality of the seven constructs (consisting of 19 drivers) and to analyze these drivers (i.e. antecedents) influence on firm-risk and managerial risk-taking i.e. firm’s risk-play. Results prove that present firm-performance, corporate governance drivers, promoters’ shareholding and firm’s characteristics are driving firm’s risk-play. However, fundamental valuation drivers have no role to play in influencing income stream uncertainty, systematic operating risks and managerial risk-attitudes. Psychological drivers and foreign shareholdings act only as a catalyst of firm-risk.

Mandated Performance Disclosure and Managerial Risk-Taking

I document that mandated performance disclosure increased managerial risk-taking, resulting in significant unintended consequences and agency conflicts. After the SEC required that all mutual funds disclose a self-selected primary benchmark, I find that most fund managers chose a benchmark that was not the best fit index. Furthermore, I provide evidence that actively managed funds increased risk-taking relative to their disclosed benchmarks in response to the disclosure change. I also find that the mandated disclosure requirement exacerbated the well-documented tendency of managers who underperform during the first half of the year to increase the risks they take in the second half of the year.

Imprinting Risky Behavior: The Institutional Origins of Bank CEO Risk-Taking

Commercial banks in the United States have taken on more risk since the 1980s, in line with a shift in the dominant business model in the field, from one emphasizing financial stability to one promoting greater risk-taking to maximize shareholder value. But why did certain banks embrace risky strategies more actively than others? Combining insights from the upper echelons perspective and imprinting theory, we argue that bank CEOs who absorbed the principles of shareholder value maximization through MBA education and started their banking career in the post-deregulation era pursued risk-taking more aggressively than other CEOs. We test this argument using data on 194 large commercial banks from 1993 to 2015. Our analysis shows that CEOs with an MBA who entered banking after the mid-1980s were heavier users of brokered deposits—a riskier funding source that contributed to bank instability during the 2007-2009 credit crisis. They also contributed to the use of brokered deposits indirectly by promoting shareholder-value prescriptions known to boost incentives for managerial risk-taking. By highlighting the role that organizational decision-makers—and their institutionally-embedded cognitive orientations—play in driving the uptake of risky strategies, our study contributes to the literatures on corporate risk-taking and institutional change.