Industrial Pollution Management Research Articles

Exploring the emission reduction potential of industries: A source-processing-end coordinated model and its application

Many requirements have been proposed for pollution control in a legal, scientific and targeted way. At the critical stage of pollution prevention and control, refined management of industrial pollution is a way of achieving targeted pollution control. Focusing regional pollution reduction targets on industrial production processes with reduction emission potential is an effective way to achieve targeted control. We established a source-processing-end (S–P-E) coordinated model—SPECM—by collaboratively considering the whole-process of raw material-processing-end-of-pipe (EOP) chains and applied the model to the setting of medium- and long-term pollution control targets and selection of reduction options for various industries in Lanzhou, China. The results indicated that (1) chemical manufacturing-related industries are the key potential volatile organic compound (VOC) emission reduction industries in Lanzhou, accounting for approximately 89% of the total emission reduction potential; (2) metal furniture manufacturing and paper-making industries should strengthen processing optimization while also giving attention to material substitution; and (3) printing-related industries need collaborative control of their whole-process, especially material substitution enhancement. The SPECM method focuses on the reduction in industrial processes and proposes reduction options under different reduction targets. This new collaborative control method could facilitate the design of coordinated control schemes across industries under industrial emission reduction targets. Overall, our results could provide new ideas and guidance for the refined management of regional industrial pollution.

A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment

A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment

A data engineering framework for on-site end-of-life industrial operations

Sustainable initiatives for converting end-of-life (EoL) material flows into feedstocks would make a crucial contribution towards protecting our environment and mitigating the negative impacts of anthropogenic activities. Chemical flow analysis enables decision-makers to identify potential environmental releases and exposure pathways at the EoL stage and, therefore, improves the estimation of chemical exposure. Certain industrial facilities apply on-site pollution abatement operations, thereby constituting nodes of the chemical EoL management chain that can be evaluated and improved to enable greater circularity of materials. This work enhances and extends a recently published EoL data engineering framework by using publicly-available databases, data-driven models, and analytic hierarchy approaches to track chemicals, estimate releases, and potential exposure pathways at on-site industrial pollution management operations. The extended framework develops pollution abatement unit (PAU) technologies and estimates their efficiencies, chemical releases, exposure media, operating expenses, and capital expenditures. Relevant case studies based on the food and pharmaceutical industry sectors illustrate the application of the framework for chemical flow allocation and analysis of a chemical of concern and the benefits of integrating and extending the framework with data-driven and multi-criteria decision-making models. The results show how the enhanced framework designs and evaluates PAU technology systems for managing EoL chemical flows and provides release inventories and pathways for conducting chemical risk evaluation and exposure assessment of potential on-site EoL scenarios.

A Differential Game of Industrial Pollution Management considering Public Participation

In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase

An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms.

In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.

The government capacity on industrial pollution management in Shanxi province: A response impulse analysis

This study employs the Vector Auto-regression model with Generalized Response Impulse Function to analyse the dynamic nexus between economic growth and the industrial environmental pollution intensity for six specific pollutants in Shanxi province of China from 1995 to 2015. The result show there exists bi-directional effects, with stronger impact running from economic development to industrial pollution is stronger. We also find the Shanxi government shows significant capacity in the management of industrial solid waste and waste gas. The provincial government has higher capacity in controlling Sulfur Dioxide compared to soot/dust. Our results verify the existence of Environmental Kuznets Curve through dynamic interactions between industrial pollution intensity and economic growth impulse. Three out of the six environmental pollution intensity responses are in the shape of inverted U curve. There are exceptions for three pollutants: N curve for Chemical Oxygen Demand and U curve for solid waste and waste gas.

Implementing chemicals policy: leaders or laggards?

AbstractPrioritization of regulatory agency resources remains a key issue in the management of industrial pollution. This is likely to become increasingly important as a new EC chemicals policy is implemented and measures are introduced to achieve the OSPAR zero emissions target. The Environment Agency (England and Wales) has updated the Operator Pollution and Risk Assessment (OPRA) scheme, but it still includes no quantitative measurement of operator attitudes towards environmental regulation. This is important because regulated firms' attitudes are known to affect regulatory behaviour. This study explores the attitudes of environmental managers from 142 chemical sector companies regulated under Integrated Pollution Control. Analysis of responses from a questionnaire survey revealed a number of regulatory typologies. A ‘conservative’ cluster exhibited satisfaction with the current regulatory system and rejected change. ‘Progressive’ cluster members recognized shortcomings and welcomed change. This methodology could be used alongside OPRA to support decisions necessary to prioritize regulatory resources. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

A differential game of industrial pollution management

This paper explores a differential game between a policy maker and a profit maximizing entrepreneur in which production generates pollution. The government levies a pollution tax on output and uses the tax received for pollution abatement. The entrepreneur determines the level of output. A feedback Nash equilibrium is derived. Using more specific functional forms, the game is extended to cover the multiple firm case.