Abstract
In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase
Highlights
Owing to the rapid development of economy, environmental pollution has become more and more serious
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: (1) we propose a differential game model for industrial pollution, in which public participation is taken into account
We present a differential game among the government, enterprises, and the public in the process of industrial pollution management. e public participation is considered in this model
Summary
Owing to the rapid development of economy, environmental pollution has become more and more serious. How to effectively control industrial pollution has become an urgent problem to be solved. Lusky [3] developed a recycling model which both included the effect of the recycled good and the allocation of resources. In another branch, game theory is applied [6,7,8]. Misiolek [6] provided a model considered the effect of rent seeking costs on the design of an efficient pollution tax. As Plourde and Yeung [4] illustrated, there were some properties of industrial pollution which made the analysis complicated and difficult. The above researches are mainly in a (static) principalagent framework; obviously, they ignore the fact that the analysis of industrial pollution management is complicated and difficult
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