This article suggests that since the end of the Cold War, Malaysia’s foreign policy towards a rising India has significantly intertwined with its overarching hedging calculations vis-à-vis the burgeoning power competition between the United States and China. Hedging, based on the conceptualization of Dr Cheng-Chwee Kuik, incorporates a largely structure-induced logic that encompasses a survival-driven, risk-averse and insurance-seeking behaviour to ensure the survival of less powerful states without putting all eggs in one great power’s basket due to concerns over future uncertainty. While the US and China are the most immediate and consequential structural factors impacting Malaysian foreign policy, Kuik presents the concept of dominance-denial as a sub-element of hedging, where a less powerful state aims to forge positive and functional ties with all major powers in the system based on its economic and security interests. Strengthening ties with India has been crucial in Putrajaya’s dominance-denial strategy. However, while Malaysia–India economic and defence ties continued to grow since the 1990s, bilateral relations backslid in 2019 due to former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed’s provocative stance towards New Delhi, leading to a considerable decline in economic relations. Therefore, this article seeks to theoretically explain these constraints in the relations between Putrajaya and New Delhi through a neoclassical realist lens in order to supplement Kuik’s hedging framework.