Malayan Communist Party Research Articles

Mountbatten versus the Generals: British Military Rule of Singapore, 1945–46

This article focuses on the largely unacknowledged but nonetheless significant political contest, during the British Military Administration of Malaya and Singapore (1945–46), between Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia, and Major-General Herbert Ralph Hone, who held a post equivalent to Governor-General. Following the sudden Japanese surrender of Malaya and Singapore, the struggle for mastery of policy between Mountbatten and the generals under his command was to prove a significant episode in the revival of British power in South-East Asia. Both sides adopted contrasting strategies for managing the growing threat of the Malayan Communist Party to British colonial rule, particularly in relation to the political strikes of 29–30 January and 15 February 1946 in Singapore. Mountbatten was reluctant to use either preventative arrest or the power to expel against Chinese communists which, as British military rule drew to a close, led both parties to refer their disputes to the Colonial Office in Whitehall.

British intelligence and counter‐insurgency in the era of decolonisation: The example of Malaya

This article uses two approaches to show the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) and intelligence were reaching a turning point before the 1952 appointment of a single commander; and to show the reason for this success was a counter‐insurgency technique which placed population control at its core. First, the article outlines the development of intelligence, in order to identify when and why it became effective. Second, it re‐examines intelligence on the Malayan Communist Party's (MCP) so‐called ‘October’ 1951 Directives. It argues these confirm the MCP was virtually forced to change its tactics by late 1951. Together, these approaches challenge existing historiography, which makes Sir Gerald Templer's era of 1952–54, when he was both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, the turning point.

Capitalism and Counter-insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-57

Contemporary critics argued that counter-insurgency in Malaya represented more than the defeat of militant communism. Britain's campaign against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was seen as resulting from British government collaboration with British capitalists to maintain profits at the expense of the legitimate aspirations of Malayan workers. More recently, it has been argued that the declaration of the emergency in June 1948 was a pre-emptive strike intended to ‘resolve the problem of political control’ and prevent the ‘radical nationalist forces organized around the MCP’ from gaining a nation-wide following. According to this view, government strategy was to ‘manage nationalism’ and ‘control’ decolonization so as to preserve the position of British capital in Malaya. For marxists, the emergency is seen as part of the process of establishing ‘neo-colonialism’. Even for less determinist models, the general complicity between British government and British business in colonial counter-insurgency campaigns is apparently clear. In primary-producing territories like Malaya, the harmony of interests between ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ officials and unofficials (centred on the City of London) ensured that after 1945 ‘coercion tended to be the first resort of policy’. The majority of scholarly output on the emergency has focused on official and guerrilla strategies leaving aside the role of business interests. As a result, the relationship between British business and British government has not been explored in depth. The present article seeks to fill this historiographical gap by reassessing official and commercial interaction in politically disturbed Malaya.

Malaysia - From PKI to the Comintern, 1924–1941: The Apprenticeship of the Malayan Communist Party: Selected Documents and Discussion. Compiled and Edited with an Introduction by Cheah Boon Kheng. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992. Pp. 143. Notes, Bibliography.

Malaysia - From PKI to the Comintern, 1924–1941: The Apprenticeship of the Malayan Communist Party: Selected Documents and Discussion. Compiled and Edited with an Introduction by Cheah Boon Kheng. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992. Pp. 143. Notes, Bibliography.

From PKI to the Comintern, 1924-1941: The Apprenticeship of the Malayan Communist Party.

From PKI to the Comintern, 1924-1941: The Apprenticeship of the Malayan Communist Party.

The Impact of the Cold War on the Development of Trade Unionism in Malaya (1948–57)

In the aftermath of World War Two, Malaya saw the emergence of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its attempt to mobilize labour support against the returning British colonial government. The Pan Malayan General Labour Union (PMGLU), later renamed the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Union (PMFTU), was established as a front organization to harness multiracial labour support and to work in close liaison with other left-wing political groups. Trade unions that mushroomed after the War were invariably dominated by the PMGLU and used as tools for the realization of communist political objectives in Malaya.

The end of the Malayan Communist Party?

The end of the Malayan Communist Party?

The Rusa Merah : Reflections on a revolutionary

In June 1948, the Malayan Communist Party, under the direction of its General Secretary, Chin Peng, launched its armed challenge to British colonial authority in Malaya. The Communist bid for power was destined to be unsuccessful. As leader of the 'armed struggle ', much of the responsibility for the events surrounding the challenge must be attributed to Chin Peng. To mark the 40th Anniversary of the Communist challenge to power, this paper offers some observations on his revolutionary leadership. It draws upon a selection of secondary sources and personal interviews conducted by the author.

Red Star Over Malaya. Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941-1946.

Red Star Over Malaya is an account of the inter-racial conflicts between Malays and Chinese during the final stages and the aftermath of the Japanese occupation. As Japanese forces retreated into the big cities, the Chinese guerrillas of the communist-led resistance movement, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), emerged from the jungle and took control of some 70 per cent of the country's smaller towns and villages. The ensuing conflict involving the Malayan Communist Party, the Malay population and the British Military Administration marked a crucial stage in the history of Malaya. Based on extensive archival research in Malaysia, Great Britain, Japan and the United States, Red Star Over Malaya provides a riveting account of the way the Japanese occupation reshaped colonial Malaya, and of the tension-filled months that followed surrender. This book is fundamental to an understanding of social and political developments in Malaysia during the second half of the 20th century. First published in 1987, this book is a 'must' for any student of history in Southeast Asia. This edition contains a new foreword from the author.

Sino-Malay Conflicts in Malaya, 1945–1946: Communist Vendetta and Islamic Resistance

The Japanese occupation (1941–45) in Malaya enabled the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to increase its political influence during and after the war. As it was the only effective political organization actively engaged in anti-Japanese insurgency, it attracted widespread support among the Chinese who suffered greatly from the hostility of the Japanese. The MCP succeeded, therefore, in establishing a strong politico-military resistance movement led by the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MFAJA), in the midst of the Chinese community. There was, however, considerably less support for the MCP from the Malay and Indian communities because their cooperation with the Japanese was clearly better and greater than that of the Chinese. None the less, because of its sizeable guerrilla forces operating during the Japanese occupation, the MCP thus became a major political force in post-war Malaya.

The United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Early Years of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1955

In the decade following the Second World War, two aspects of Malaya's political life were predominant. First, there was an increased political awareness among Malayans which led to the formation of political organizations, the political mobilization of a significant proportion of the population, and eventually, in 1955, to the holding of Malaya's first federal elections. Second, there was the “Emergency”, the name commonly given to the guerrilla war waged by the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) and its supporters from June 1948 to August 1960. Both of these aspects have been chronicled and examined in some detail by students of Malayan history. And yet, interestingly enough, rarely have the effects of one upon the other been fully considered. Indeed, the usual pattern of analysis in the, often otherwise excellent, general studies that examine this period is for each aspect to be treated in a separate section or chapter. Moreover, accounts which focus solely on the Emergency are even less encouraging in this respect. Mr. Anthony Short's impressive history of the Colonial Government's activities in countering the Communist guerrillas is typical in the scant attention which is given to the political parties' role in undermining the Communists' cause. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to explore some of the links between the development of the political parties, especially the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.), prior to 1955, and the course of the Emergency.

Malaysia in 1977: A Prelude to Premature Parliamentary Elections

IT WAS A year of tranquility for Malaysia, with ostentatious progress and prosperity. The country had completed two decades of independence and played host to the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In four successful cooperative ventures with Thai security forces, the fractious Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was reported to have been seriously decimated. Export earnings had increased and unemployment dropped slightly; the Philippines renounced its claim to Sabah; and pride in political leadership prevailed. Yet there were decided undertones of tension; the experience of 1969 is reemerging from the subconscious.' Malaysia's political dilemma is that it was invested at the onset of nationhood with all the libertarian attributes of democracy. Institutional evolution had to be accelerated retroactively, thereby establishing governmental practices that lacked societal preparation. Retrogressive measures were needed to compensate for the absence of consensus, ethnic unity, industrialization, literacy, and other factors commonly associated with a stable democracy. Twenty years were only able to bring about an adaptation, not integration. Communalism, communism, traditionalism, and regionalism are still potentially system-changing forces in Malaysia today. Appearances have changed, however. To the Moslem/non-Moslem dichotomy has been added volatile intra-Malay conflict. The terrorist tactics of communism have changed to infiltration at the apex of influ-

Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963

This Thesis covers an urban and rural guerilla insurgency carried out simultaneously by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), and is focussed mainly on the point of contact between the revolutionaries and the people. In Singapore, the study concentrates on the revolutionary organisations amongst Chinese students and in the trade unions, and later on their attempt to gain control of the political party in power. On the government side particular attention has been paid to police intelligence and riot control. In the rural insurgency, the main fields of study have been the MCP's parallel of government which extended through the jungle to the underground organisation amongst the Chinese village population; and the evolution of the government's technique (and especially of its police intelligence system) for identifying and digging out the roots of this underground organisation, thereby finding and destroying a guerilla army and political hierarchy widely dispersed in dense jungle. The early years of the Emergency have been only briefly sketched. These have been well covered elsewhere, and it was in the later years (1953-58) that both the guerillas' organisation and the government's technique for uprooting it reached their peak of refinement. The two conflicts, urban and rural, have been analysed in relation to the current controversy amongst revolutionary thinkers between those who support the classical philosophy of Lenin and Mao Tse Tung, with their stress on developing a strong organisation amongst the people before launching a campaign of violence, and writers of the New Left such as Fanon and Debray, who reject such delay and commend immediate and continuing confrontation and violence as a better means of rallying popular support. The conclusion supports the classical school, and underlines the indispensability of a viable organisation if a revolutionary movement is to prevail against a determined government.

The Thai Muslims

C ONTROL OVER southern Thailand has been disputed many times in the past by the Thai state in the north and a variety of kingdoms lying to the south. Having changed hands repeatedly, this relatively remote frontier zone is now ethnically mixed. The presence there of a large Malay minority known as Thai Muslims or Thai Malays has special significance for contemporary Thai politics. This group is representative of a northward movement of Malays who were incorporated into the Thai nation as a result of Thailand's southern expansion toward Malaya in the early 19th century. The ethnic Malays who live in this area are the second largest indigenous minority in Thailand. As a homogeneous group, they have steadily resisted assimilation into the Thai national culture. The growing disaffection of a significant number of the socalled Thai Muslims, whose goal is to organize a separatist movement, together with the persistent efforts of Communist terrorist remnants from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), contribute to conditions of instability in the region. This situation is a test for the ingenuity and capability of Thailand's political apparatus. The Thai Muslims total approximately one million persons. They are concentrated in southern Thailand, especially in the provinces of Satun, Songkhla, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. The geographical accessibility of these provinces to Malaysia, and the racial, linguistic, and cultural affinities of the people on both sides of the Thai-Malaysian border make communications easier to maintain with Malaysia than with the other provinces of Thailand. Malays constitute the majority of Thailand's Muslim population, the remainder consisting of ethnic Thai and a small group of Pakistani immigrants. Their language is Malay (most cannot communicate in Thai), and their villages resemble Malay kampongs. The inability of the Malays to speak Thai is evidence of their opposition to Thai religious beliefs, since Malays equate the

Chinese Politics in Malaya

During the past 20 years, the politics of the Chinese in Malaya has been a subject of international interest.The Malayan Communist Party has been predominantly Chinese; it was Chinese politics in Singapore (briefly part of Malaysia) which produced the phenomenon of Lee Kuan Yew; and the Kuala Lumpur riots of May 1969 are widely thought to have been efforts to stem a Chinese challenge to Malay supremacy. The Chinese in West Malaysia, especially when taken together with those in Singapore, have earned the attention of governments, journalists and scholars alike. They form the largest concentration of Chinese outside of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong; their economic life is among the most sophisticated in Asia; their social and cultural life probably the most complex that Chinese anywhere have ever known; and, above all, their political life has been more open and exposed than that of any other kind of Chinese. This last, their political life, has been difficult to evaluate for a number of reasons. The main reason is that two contradictory views about them have long prevailed: that the Chinese are non-political and that the Chinese are political in a secretive and inscrutable way. These views are based on a concept of politics in the democratic tradition and are either anachronistic or misleading. Chinese, Malay and colonial political systems have been, in varying degrees, authoritarian, and Chinese political life must be seen in that context except in the period 1957–69.

Labour and Labour Parties in Malaya

S INCE IN THE NOT DISTANT FUTURE Singapore and the Federation of Malaya will have elected Legislatures,' it is only natural that there should now be a heightening of local political fervour along with the usual calls for support by political parties to the electorate. One of the more interesting aspects of post-war political development in Malaya and Singapore, has been the birth of several groups or parties professing labour or aims. The role of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) is only too well-known and need not be elaborated.2 The other left-wing groups sometimes expressed a genuine desire to implement socialist programmes, but otherwise were not representative of large sections of labour, nor did they in fact directly aim at supporting the demands of the workers. They came to life to give voice to the sectional, communal and personal interests of small groups and of the individuals who led them. With the quickening of the movement towards self-government, and the impact of the Emergency,3 views and groups became eventually more clarified, and out of the complex political scene in Malaya and Singapore, five groups have emerged which may be considered to have at least some of their aims similar to those of Labour parties or more or less left-of-centre groups in the West, and which draw quite clear and rationally given support from small and large sections of Malayan labour, whether or not unionised, and from individuals with left-wing views. These may extend from light pink to red-from so-called democratic socialists to Communist sympathisers. Of most of the latter it is often difficult to say whether they are more imbued